m- 


V 


? 


l£C 


DISSERT  A  TION 


CONCKRNING 


LIBERTY  AND  NECESSITY; 


CONTAINING 


REMARKS 


ESSAYS   OF    Dr.   SAMUEL   WEST, 


AND     ON      X  K  B 

WRITINGS    OF    SEVERAL    OTHER    AUTHORS, 
ON  THOSE  SUBJECTS. 

By  JONATHAN  EDWARDS,  D.  D. 


PRINTED    AT    WORCESTER, 

Bt  l  e  o  n  a  r  d  w  o  r  c  e  s  t  e  r. 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


I  BEGAN  this  Dijfertation  he/ore  I  faw  Br, 
Wejl'sfecond  edition  of^Jiis  Firft  P^tri  pub lif/ied  with  his 
Second  Part  :  But  on  hearing,  that  he  was  about 
to  publijii  his  fentiments  on  Liberty  and  Necejfuy  more 
largely^  I fufpended  the  profecution  of  my  defign,  that  I 
might  Jee  what  he  Jliould  further  publifh.  Since  the  pub- 
lication of  the  fecond  part^  I  have  been  neceffarily  though 
reluBantly  kept  back  till  this  time,  from  finifJiing  what 
I  had  begun.  At  length  I  fend  it  forth,  requc/ling  the 
candour  of  all  whojliall  read  it.  If  ever  candour  to  a 
writer  be  reafonably  requejled,  it  is  fo,  on  the  deep  ami 
dificult  fubjecls  brought  under  confideration  in  this  Dif 
fertation. 

The  quotations  from  the  DoBors  firfl:  part,  are  made 
according  to  the  pages  of  the  frf  edition,  with  ivhich  T 
began.  Yet  wherever  any  variation  in  words,  between 
the  firf  and  fecond  editions,  has  been  noticed  ;  the  fec- 
ond edition  has  been  followed  in  that  refpecl.  When  I 
quote  the  firfl  part  the  page  or  pages  only  are  referred 
to.  When  I  quote  the  fecond  part^  ^  fp^^fy  ^^^^  P^^^  ^^ 
well  as  the  pages. 


A  2  A 


ilia 


DISSERTATION,    &c. 


CHAPTER      I. 


« 


w   0 


OJ  Natural  and  Moral  Necejfity  and  Inability. 


0,     ^       RESIDENT   Edwards,  in  his  book 

r  1^"*-%^  on  the  Freedom  of  Will,  diftinguiflies 
i^iiv^f^^^  between  natural  and  moral  ncceflity 
p    j  1^  and  inability.     By  moral  neceffity  he 


us,  he  means,  "  That  neceffity 
{      •  c|v' "  of    connexion    and   confequence, 

vr  .4.-  '  'r^4^'  '  "  which  aiifes  from  fuch  moral  cauf- 
"  e.<,  as  the  ftrength  of  inch  nation  or  motives,  and  the 
'« connexion  which  there  is  in  many  cafes  between 
"  thefe  and  certain  vohtions  and  aBions."  P.  21.  "^y 
natural  neceffity  he  explains  himfelf  to  mean,  "  Such 
"  neceffity  as  men  are  under,  through  the  force  of 
"  natural  caufcs,  as  diflinguiflied  from  what  are  call- 
"  ed  moral  caufes ;  fuch  as  habits  and  difpofitions  of 
*'  heart,  and  moral  motives  and  inducements."  Ibid, 
ile  further  holds,  that  "  the  difference  between  thefe 
^'  two  kinds  of  neceffity,  does  not  lie  fo  much  in  the 
^'  nature  of  the  connexion,  as  in  the   two  terms  con- 

iietled  ;"  that  in  moral  neceffity,''  the  caufe .  is 

"  of  a  moral  nature,  either  fome  previous  habitual  dif- 
A  3  ^f  poJiiioTtj 


.^^ 


«'  pojition^  or  fome  motive  exhibited  to  the  underiland- 

"  ing  :  And  the  effe61:  is  alfo of  a  moral  nature 

<« fome  inclination  or  volition  of  the  foul  oicvol- 

^'•^tntary  aHion."  F.  22.  Alfo  he  held,  that  natural 
neceffity  always  "  has  reference  to  fome  fuppofable 
*«  voluntary  oppofition  or  endeavour,  which  is  infuffi- 
«  cient.  But  no  fuch  oppofition  or  contrary  will  and 
«  endeavour  is  fuppofable  in  the  cafe  of  moral  necefli- 
«« ty,  which  is  a  certainty  of  the  inclination  and  will  it- 
«/<?//,  which  does  not  admit  of  the  fuppofition  of  a 
''  will  to  oppofe  and  refift  it.  For  it  is  abfurd  to  fup- 
«  pofe  the  fame  individual  will  to  oppofe  itfelf  in  its 
(■'  prefent  atl"  P.  23,24.  And  p.  16.  "  Philofophical 
««  neceffily  is  realiy  nothing  elfe  than  the  full  and  fixed 
«  connection  between  the  things  fignified  by  the  fub- 
'« jeQ  and  predicate  of  a  propofuion.  When  there  is 
«'  fuch  a  connexion,  then  the  thing  af&rmed  in  the 

«•  propofuion  is  necefli\ry In  this   fenfe   I  ufe 

"  the  word  neccjfity when  1  endeavor  to  prove, 

"  that  nccejfity  is  not  inconfiftent  with  liberty"  Ibid. 
«'  Philofophical  neceffity  is  nothing  different  from  the 
«  certainty  that  is  in  things  themfelves,  which'  is  the 
«  foundation  of  the  certainty  of  the  knowledge  of 
«  them." 

This  is  the  account  given  by  Prefident  Edwards, 
of  the  diftinftion,  which  he  niade  between  natural 
and  moral  neceffity.  Moral  neceffity  is  the  certain  or 
neceffary  connexion  between  moral  caufes  and  moral 
efPeQs  /  natural  neceffity  is  the  conne6:ion  between 
caufes  and  effe61s,  which  are  not  of  a  moral  nature. 
The  difference  between  thefe  two  kinds  of  neceffity 
lies  chiefly  in  the  nature  of  the  tzuo  terms  conne£led 
by  it.  Natural  neceffity  admits  of  voluntary,  but  in- 
effeQual  oppofition  from  him  who  is  fubjeft  to  the  ne- 
ceffity ;  the  immediate  effis£t,  produced  by  that  ne- 
ceffity, may  be  oppofed  by  the  will  of'  the  fubjeft. 
But  with  refpecl  to  moral  neceffity,  which  is  a  pre- 
vious certainty  of  the  exiftence  of  a  volition  or  volun- 
tary aftion,  it  is  abfurd  to  fuppofe,  that  in  that  aB  the 

will 


tvill  fhould  either  oppofe  itfelF,  or  the  neceffity  from 
which  theaftarifes. The  dilHn6lion  between  natu- 
ral and  moral  inability  is  analogous  to  this.  Inability 
is  the  reverfe  of  neceffity. 

Now  Dr.  Well  teJls  us,  that  this  «  is  a  dillin6lion 
"  without  a  difference,"  p.  8.  But  if  the  terms  con- 
nedled  in  thefe  cafes  be  different,  as  Prefident  Ed- 
v/ards  fuppofes ;  if  in  one  cafe  "  the  caufe,  with  which 
"  the  effeB  is  connefted,  be  fome  previous  habitual  dif- 
"  pofition,  or  fome  motive  exhibited  to  the  under- 
"  (landing  ;  and  the  efieQ  be  a  volition  or  voluntary 
"  aftion  ;"  in  the  other,  the  caufe  be  neither  an  habit- 
ual difpofition  nor  a  motive  exhibited  to  the  under- 
ftanding,  and  the  effe6l  be  neither  a  volition  nor  a 
voluntary  adlion  ;  it  is  manifeft,  that  there  is  that  ve- 
ry difference  in  the  two  cafes,  which  Prefident  Ed-» 
wards's  diftintlion  fuppofes.  To  fay,  that  this  is  a  dif- 
tinclion  without  a  difference,  is  to  fay,  that  an  habitu- 
al difpofuion*  or  a  motive,  is  the  fame  with  fometbing, 
which  is  not  an  habitual  difpofition  or  motive  ;  and 
that  a  volition  or  voluntary  a8ion,  is  the  fame  with 
what  is  not  a  volition  or  voluntary  action. 

But  Dr.  Well  endeavours  to  fupport  his  charge  of  a 
diftinQion  without  a  difference.  Let  us  attend  to  what 
he  offers  with  this  view :  It  is  this,  "  That,"  according 
to  Prefident  Edwards,  "  the  principal,  if  not  the  only 

"difference  between  natural and  moral  neceffity 

"  and  inability,  is,  that  in  the  former  cafe,  the  oppofi- 
*"'  tion  and  endeavour  againft  what  does  take  place,  is 
"  overcome  and  borne  down  by  a  fuperiour  force;  but 
"  in  the  latter  kind  of  neceffity  and  inability  there  is  no 
'•  oppolition  and  endeavour,  that  is  overcome  by  any 
"  fuperiour  force.  But  that  Mr.  Edwards's  moral  ne- 
"  ceffity  and  inability  are  attended  with  as  much  infuf- 
"  ficient  oppofition  and  endeavour,  as  his  natural  necef- 
A  4  "  fity 

*  Gentlemen  may  differ  in  their  explanations  of  that  habitual  difpofition  or 
bias,  which  is  the  caufe  or  antecedent  of  volition  or  voluntary  aftion  ;  lome  fup- 
poling  it  to  We  a  certain  call  or  mould  of  the  fubflance  of  the  foul  ;  others  ftip- 
pofing  it  to  conlill  in  a  divine  coniUtution,  that  volitions  of  a  certain  kind,  fhall, 
in«  regular  manner  and  on  certain  conditions,  fucceed  each  other  in  the  mind, 
^uf  it  does  not  appnr,  that  Picfidcir.  Edwaids  meant  to  decide  this  <iue(lion. 


8 

"  {ny  and  inabiiity  ;"  p.  8.  Whether  this,  which  is  here 
faid  to  be,  be  indeed  according  to  Prefident  Edwardsthe 
only  or  the  principal  difference  between  natural  and 
moral  neceffity  and  inability,  I  fliall  not  at  prefent 
Itand  to  difpute.  It  is.  fufficient  for  my  prefent  piir- 
pofe  to  fhow,  that  Prefident  Edwards's  moral  neceffity 
and  inability  are  not,  and  cannot  be  attended  with  as 
iijuch  infufficientoppohtion  and  endeavour, as  his  nat- 
ural necciTuy  and  inability. 

Natural  necelfity  may  compel  a  man  to  that,  to 
^vhich  his  whole  will  is  entirely  oppofed,  and  againlt 
^vhich  he  puts  forth  aU  the  oppolition,  of  which  his 
flrength  of  body  and  mind  admits  :  As  when  he  is 
thrown  from  a  precipice  or  is  dragged  to  prifon.  But 
a  man's  whole  will  is  never  oppoied  to  the  influence 
of  that  bias,  difpofilion  or  motive,  or  of  any  moral  ne- 
ceffity, with  which  he  complies.  Whenever  any  of 
ihefe  influences  a  man  to  put  forth  a  volition  or  a  vol- 
untary external  aBion,  it  prevails  on  his  will  ;  his  will 
therefore  confents,  though  it  may  be  with  fome  degree 
of  relu£lance  occafloned  by  the  other  bias  or  motive. 
Nothing  is  more  common  than  fach  oppofition  between 
reafon  or  confcience,  and  depraved  appetite  ;  between 
covetoufnefs  and  ambition  ;  indolence  and  a  wifli  for 
gain,  &c.  But  whenever  any  of  thefe  principles  be- 
comes ftronger  than  its  oppofite,  the  will  confents,  and 
the  man  a8s  voluntarily  under  the  influence  of  moral 
neceffity  ;  and  though  he  may  a6l  with  fome  degree 
of  relu6lance  from  the  oppofite  principle,  yet  no  man 
will  fay,  that  he  is  compelled  to  a61  againfl:  his  zvhole 
will,  or  even  againd  his  flrongeft  inclination  ;  for  by 
the  very  cafe  fuppofed,  he  aBs  agreeably  to  his  flrong- 
eft inclination.*  But  by  natural  neceffity  he  is  or  may 
be  compelled  to  that,  to  which  every  inclination  and 
afcl  of  his  will,  the  flrongeft  as  well  as  the  molt  feeble, 
is  moft  direftly  oppofed.  A  man  dragged  to  prifon 
Hiay  be  compelled  to  enter  it,  in  dire6l  oppofition  to 

every 

•  Bv  ivclinaiion,  difftcjiticn  or  bia\  I  mean  fomelbing  diiliiift  horn  volitloo, 
'r'-;s  ciift:u£i:oii  is  /sade  by  Br.  V/eftjp.  13. 


fvcry  a6l  of  his  will.  This  is  natural  neceffiiy.  But 
an  indolent  man,  who  is  influenced  to  labour  by  the 
profpcft  of  gain,  is  not  compelled  to  labour  in  oppo- 
iition  to  every  inclination  or  act  of  his  w  ill,  but  complies 
with  the  flronger  inclination  and  afct,  in  oppofuion  to 
the  weaker,  which  would  lead  him  to  indulge  hnnreirin 

eale.     This  is  an  indanceof  moral  nece(ruy. -One 

difference  between  natural  neccfTny  and  moral,  is,  that 
eveiry  inclination  and  a6l  of  the  will  does  or  may  di- 
reftly  oppofe  natural  neccility  ;  but  every  a6t  of  will 
always  coincides  with  that  moral  neccflity,  from  which 
it  arifcs,  and  when  there  is  a  ftruggie  between  differ- 
ent inclinations  or  propenfities  and  their  a6ls,  the  a6U 
of  that  which  prevails,  never  oppofe  the  moral  necefli- 
ty  by  which  they  take  place. 

When  Prefident  Edwards  fays,  that  no  voluntary  in- 
fufficient  oppofition  or  endeavour  is  fuppofable  in  the 
cafe  of  moral  neceffity  ;  his  evident  meaning  is,  that 
it  is  not  fuppofable,  that  an  a.Q:  of  the  will  fliould  beop- 
pofed  to  that  moral  neceffity,  by  which  it  lakes  place. 
For  inllance,  if  a  man  be  under  a  monl  neceffity  of 
choofing  a  virtuous  courfe  of  life,  this  choice  is  not  op- 
pofe d  to  the  neceffitv,  which  is  the  fource  of  it,  nor  is 
It  fuppofjble,  that  it  fhould  be  oppofed  to  it  or  at  all  re- 
fill it.  The  cafe  is  very  different  with  regard  to  natu- 
ral neceffity.  A  man  dragged  to  execution  may  in 
every  refpetl  oppofe  with  his  will,  that  neceffity,  by 
which  he  is  carried  on. 

But  though  a  man,  who  is  determined  by  moral  ne- 
ceffity to  choofe  a  virtuous  courfe,  cannot  in  thai  aB 
oppofe  that  choice  or  the  caufe  of  it  ;  yet  he  may  in 
other  aHs  of  his  will  oppofe  both  this  choice  and  the 
caufe,  and  thus  in  different  a£ls  choofe  and  aft  incon- 
iiftently.  He  may  from  prevailing  motives  and  from 
moral  neceffity,  choofe  virtue.  He  may  at  the  fame 
time  from  weaker  motives  and  ineffeQuai  temptations, 
choofe  vice,  and  fo  far  feel  reluctant  or  indifpoled  to 
virtue.  And  this  weaker  choice  is  no  more  oppofed 
to  the  moral  neceffity,  which  caufes  it,  than  the  ftronger 

choice 


iO 

'  choice  of  virtue  is  to  tlie  moral  neceffity  whicli  caufes 
that.  In  both  there  is  no  fuppofable  oppofition  to 
their  refpedive  neceffities,  which  are  their  caul'es. 
This  is  true  with  refpeS;  to  every  choice  whether 
Wronger  or  weaker,  whether  prevailing  to  govern  the 
heart  and  conduB,  or  not.  Yet  there  is  a  mutual  op- 
pofition between  the  forementioned  different  aQ;s  of 
choice,  the  choice  of  virtue  and  choice  of  vice.  In- 
deed thefe  two  oppofite  choices  cannot  both  prevail, 
fo  as  to  govern  the  heart  and  life  at  the  fame  time. 
They  may  in  particular  cafes  be  equal,  or  fo  nearly 
equal,  that  neither  of  them  at  that  inftant  appears  to  pre- 
vail, and  the  man  '•  is  in  a  ftrait  betwixt  two."  In  oth- 
er inltances  they  may  for  a  time  at  leaft  alternately  pre- 
vail, and  exhibit  a  man  of  very  inconfiftent  condu6l. 
In  other  inftances  one  may  generally  prevail,  and  de- 
r.ominate  the  fubje£l  a  virtuous  or  vicious  man,  accord- 
ingly as  the  choice  and  love  of  virtue,  or  of  vice,  pre- 
vails and  governs  him.  Thus  we  Ihall  have  all  thofe 
four  modes  of  infufficient  oppofition  to  moral  neceffi- 
ty, which  Dr.  Well  fays,  p.  lO,  Prefident  Edwards  al- 
lows may  take  place,  and  from  which  he  argues  that 
Prefident  Edwards's  moral  necefTuy  may  be  attended 
with  as  much  infufficient  oppofition,  as  his  natural  ne- 
ceffity; and  (that  therefore  Prefident  Edwards's  diftinc- 
uon  between  natural  and  moral  neceffity  is  without  a 
difference,  i .  The  weaker  motives  to  vice  may  oppofe 
the  flronger  motives  to  virtue.  2.  The  man  may  now 
have  ffrong  and  prevailing  a6ls,  defires  and  refolutions 
againft  thofe  afts  of  vice,  to  which  he  forefees  he  fhall 
in  certain  circumftances  be  expofed,  and  which  he  ac- 
tually indulges,  when  the  foreieen  circumftances  take 
place.  3.  The  will  may  remotely  and  indirectly  refift 
itfelf,  not  in  the  fame  a6ls,  but  in  different  a6fs  ;  the 
depraved  appetites  may  flruggle  againft  the  principles 
ofvirtue.  4.  Reafon  pleading  in  favour  of  virtue,  may 
refift  the  prefent  ac'ts,  which  incline,  and  perhaps  pre- 
vailingly, to  vice.  Nor  is  there  any- thing  in  all  this, 
but  what  was  long  fince  obferved  by  the  poet,  and  has 

always 


li 

always  been  noticed  by  all  attentive  obfervers  of  hu- 
man nature  : 

"  Video  mcUora^prohoque;  deteriorafequor." 

Now,  it  will  not  be  pretended,  that  this  oppofition 
of  one  a£t  of  the  will,  to  another,  is  parallel  to  the  en- 
tire oppofition  of  the  will  which  there  is  or  may  be,  to 
natural  neceflity  ;  e.  g.  to  falling  when  a  man  is  thrown 
down  a  precipice,  or  to  going  to  the  gallows,  when 
a  man  is  forced  thither.  In  ihe  latter  cafe,  there  is 
or  may  be  an  entire  and  perfeQ  oppofition  of  the  whole 
will,  to  the  neceflity.  In  the  former,  there  is  a  con- 
fent  of  the  will  to  the  neceflity,  though  there  may  be 
a  degree  of  oppofue  choice  arifing  from  fome  otlier 
motive,  bias,  caufe  or  neceflity. 

Dr.  Wefl:  infers  from  this  actual  or  pofi^ble  oppofi- 
tion of  the  a6tsof  one  propenfity  in  human  nature,  to  thofe 
of  another,  acknowledged  by  Prefident  Edwards,  that 
all  thofe  afts  which  admit  of  this  oppofition  are  neccfl'ary 
with  natural  neceflity.  If  this  inference  bejuft,  doubt- 
lefs  every  att  of  the  human  will  is  neceflary  with  na- 
tiiral  necefl[ity.  If  a  man  choofe  virtue,  he  doubtlefs 
does  or  may  from  temptation  feel  fome  inclination  to 
vice.  In  this  cafe  then  his  choice  of  virtue  is,  accord- 
ing to  the  reafoning  of  Dr.  Weft,  the  eflett  of  natural 
neceflity  ;  for  natural  neceflity  is,  according  to  that  rea- 
foning, that  which  admits  of  any  voluntary  oppofition. 
And  as  there  is  no  propenfity  in  human  nature,  which 
may  notbeoppofed  by  fome  other  propenfity  ;  and  as  the 
human  mind  is  not  capable  of  any  a<St,  which  may  not  be 
attended  with  fome  degree  of  relu8ance  at  leaft ;  there- 
fore human  nature  is  not  capable  of  any  aB,  which  is  not 
neceflitated  with  a  natural  neceflTity,  a  neceflity,  which 
is  equally  inconfiftent  with  praife  and  blame,  as  that  by 
which  a  man  falls,  when  he  is  thrown  from  an  eminence. 

This  oppofition  of  one  propenfity  in  human  nature 
to  another,  and  of  one  a6;  of  the  will  to  another,  is  a- 
bundantly  granted  by  Dr.  Weft:  :  So  that  if  this  prove 
or  imply  a  natural  neceflity,  he  holds  that  the  afts  of 
the  will  are  fubje^l  to  natural  neceflity.     P,  14.  "A 

"  roan 


«'  man  may  love  a  perfon,  whom  he  knows  to  be  lUtertjr 
"  unworthy  of  his  affeClions,  and  may  really  chooje  to 
'^  eradicate  this  propenfion  from  his  mind  ;  and  yet  he 
*'  may  find  this  palhon  rifing  in  his  brcaft,  in  direft  op- 
'*  pofition  to  his  -will  ox  choice.  And  the  fame  obferva- 
«  lions  may  be  made  with  refpe61  to  every  other  pro- 
'vpenfion  in  the  human  mind.  They  may  all  be  in  di- 
"  re.H  oppofition  to  prefeiit  acis  of  the  will  and  choice. 
*<  Were  not  this  the  cafe,  there  could  be  no  ftruggle  in 
<•  the  mind,  to  overcome  wrong  propenfions  and  vicious 
"  habits.  But  common  experience  will  teach  us,  that 
«•  there  is  frequently  a  very  great  ftruggle  in  the  mind, 
*'•  to  gain  the  vitlory  over  vile  affections."  Whatever 
diftintiion  Dr.  Weft  makes  between  propenfion  and 
volition,  he  will  doubtlefs  grant,  that  there  may  be  a6ts 
of  the  will  agreeable  to  a  propenfion,  as  well  as  in  op- 
pofition to  it  ;  that  there  may  be  volitions  and  actions 
agreeable  to  a  vicious  propenfion,  and  yet  there  maybe 
a  ftruggle  of  virtuous  propenfion  and  volition  in  op- 
pofition to  the  vicious.  On  the  other  hand,  there  may 
be  a  ftruggle  of  vicious  propenfion  and  volition  in  op- 
pofition to  the  virtuous.  Dr.  Weft  will  not  deny  that 
love  to  God,  to  his  law  and  to  virtue,  is  a  voluntary 
exercife.  Now  he  who  has  a  degree  of  voluntary 
love  to  God  and  true  virtue,  and  a  degree  of  volun- 
tary love  to  vice,  has  an  oppofition  not  only  of  pro- 
penfions, but  of  voluntary  acts  and  exercifes,  i.  e.  of 
volitions.  Yet  would  l^v.  Weft  allow,  that  this  love 
of  virtue,  which  is  oppofed  by  a  degree  of  love  to  vice, 
is  neceffitated  by  a  natural  neccftlty  ?  Tins  will  follow 
from  the  principle  of  his  argument  to  prove,  that  Preli- 
dent  Edwards's  moral  neceftityisreally  a  natural  neceftity. 
Dr.  Weft,  p.  14,  afferts,  '•  thiit  it  is  abfurd,  that  the 
«  will  ftiould  dircBly  oppofe  its  own  prefent  a6ls  ;" 
and  yet  in  p.  9,  he  fays,  "  theffe  may  be  will  and  en- 
<«  deavouf  againft,  or  diverfe  from  prefent  acis  of  the 
**  will.'*  Thefe  propofitiohs  fecm  incapable  of  recon- 
ciliation, urtlefs  on'  the  ground  of  the  diftinclion, 
which  I  have  made  between  the  will  oppofing  itfelf 


m  the  fame  aBs,  and  in  different  aQs  arifing  from  dif- 
ferent motives  or  propenfitics. 

Prefidcnt  Edwards  conftantly  holds,  that  natural 
neceffity  and  inability  arc  inconfiftent  uiih  blame  in 
any  inftancc.  The  reafon  of  this  is,  that  all  our  fin- 
cere  and  mofl  ardent  defires  and  afts  of  will,  as  well 
as  external  endeavours,  may  be  refifted,  cppofed  and 
overcome  as  to  their  effc8s.  But  this  is  not  the  cafe 
in  moral  necclLty  and  inability  ;  therefore  they  do 
not  excufe  from  blame.  \\^hen  under  a  moral  nc- 
ceffity  we  will  to  do  an  aOion,  our  ftronged  defires 
and  a£ls  of  will  coincide  with  the  moral  ncccffiry, 
and  we  voluntarily  aft  agreeably  to  it.  And  if  we 
have  weaker  wifhes  and  defires  oppofing  the  nccefii* 
ly  and  the  fironger  defires  and  acts  of  our  will,  whicbi 
follow  from  that  iieceflTuy,  we  are  not  to  be  excufed" 
from  blame  on  that  account,  becaufe  on  the  whole 
we  confent  to  do  the  aftion.  No  man  will  pretend, 
that  he  who  is  influenced  by  the  malice  of  his  own 
heart,  to  murder  his  neighbour,  is  excufable  in  that 
aftion,  becaufe  he  has  fome  weak  and  incffeBual  re- 
luBance  arifing  from  a  knowledge  of  the  divine  law 
and  from  the  dictates  of  his  own  co-nfcience. 

It  has  been  faid  by  fome  of  our  opponents  in  this- 
difquifition,.  that  they  cannot  find  out  what  we  mean 
by  moral  neccffity,.  as  diQinguifhed  from  natural  or 
phyfical.  If  it  be  not  fufficiently  plain  from  his  owra 
writings,  \\hat  Prefident  Edwards  meant  by  it,  I  can 
only  give  my  opinion  concerning  his  meaning.  ButJ 
concerning  my  own  meaning  I  have  a  right  to  fpeak 
more  peremptorily,  that  1  inean  all  ncceffity  or  pre- 
vious certainty  of  the  volition  or  voluntary  adion  or 
a  rational  being,  whatever  be  the  caufe  or  influence^ 
by  which  that  nccefiity  is  edabliflied,  or  the  volition 
brought  into  ex i Hence,  and  however  great  and  effica- 
cious thst  influence  be.  When  '*  God's  people  are 
made  willing  in  the  day  of  his  power,"  there  is  doubt- 
]d's  a  neccffity  of  their  being  willinpj.  This  necefliiy 
I. call  a  mora!  ncceffity.     Againll  tliis  willingnefs,  or 

the 


14 

the  necefTity,  or  the  neceflitating  caufe,  from  which  it 
arifes,  the  will  of  him  who  is  made  willing,  does  not 
and  cannot  poffibly  make  entire  and  dire6l  oppofi- 
tion.  By  the  very  fuppofition  he  is  made  willing,  his 
will  therefore  coincides  with  the  neceflity  and  con- 
fents  to  it  ;  gnd  fo  far  as  i-t  confents,  it  cannot  diffent 
or  make  oppofition. 

Some  fcem  to  imagine,  that  the  difference  between 
.natural  and  moral  ncceffity,  is,  that  the  former  is  the 
effeO:  of  a  ftrong  and  irrefiftible  caufe  ;  but  the  lat- 
ter of  a  weak  one,  which  may  be  refifted  and  over- 
come ;  and  that  entire  oppofition  of  will  is  fuppofable 
in  both  cafes ;  though  with  this  difference,  that  in  nat- 
ural neceffity  it  isineffeQual,  but  in  moral  it  may  be  ef- 
fe8ual.  Whereas  the  truth  is,  that  let  the  caufe  of 
a  moral  a6l  be  what  it  will,  it  involves  a  moral  necef- 
fity only,  becaufe  it  is  not  fuppofable,  that  the  will 
Ihould  be  entirely  oppofed  to  it. 

The  perfons  abovementioned  objeft  to  the  appli- 
cation of  fuch  ftrong  epithets  as  infallible,  unavoidable, 
imalterable,  unfrujlrable,  Sec.  to  moral  neceffity  and 
inability,  fuppofing  that  they  imply  a  natural  neceffi- 
ty inconfiftent  with  praife  and  blame.  But  when  our 
Lord  had  given  the  prediftion,  was  there  not  an  in- 
fallible, unavoidable,  unalterable  and  unfruftrable  cer- 
tainty, that  Judas  would  betray  his  Lord  ?  And  will 
it  be  pretended,  that  on  that  account  he  was  not  to 
be  blamed  for  fo  doing  ?  Yet  this  adion  of  Judas 
%vas  rendered  no  more  unfruftrably  neceffary  by  the 
prediction,  than  it  was  before,  as  it  was  before  cer- 
tainly foreknown.  Nor  was  it  more  certainly  fore- 
known, than  every  event  and  every  moral  aftion, 
which  ever  has  or  will  come  to  pafs.  Therefore  all 
moral  a6lions  are  unfruftrably  certain  previoufly  to 
their  exiftence  ;  and  all  thofe  epithets  are  as  prop- 
erly applicable  to  them,  as  to  the  treachery  of  Judas, 
after  it  was  divinely  predifted. 

It  has  been  faid,  that  till  the  meafure  of  influence 
implied  in  moral  neceffity,  is  diftindly  known,  it  is 

impoffible 


fmponible  to  tell,  when  or  how  far  a  perfon  is  re- 
uardable  or  punifhable.  But  this  is  faid,  under  a 
miftaken  idea  of  moral  neceflity,  viz.  that  moral  ne- 
ceflity  implies  a  low  degree  of  influence  only.  Mor- 
al neceffity  is  the  real  and  certain  conneftion  be- 
tween fome  moral  aftion  and  its  caufe  ;  and  there  is 
no  moral  7ieceJ/i/y  in  the  cafe,  unlefs  the  connexion 
be  real  and  abfolutely  certain,  fo  as  to  enfiire  the  ex- 
iftencd  of  the  a6lion.  And  will  it  be  pretended,  that 
if  the  meafure  of  influence  be  increafed  beyond  this, 
the  neceflity  ceafes  to  be  moral  and  becomes  natural  ? 
That  if  a  motive  or  a  malicious  temper  be  barely  fuf- 
ficient  certainly  and  infallibly  to  influence  a  man  tO' 
murder  his  neighbour,  the  neceflity  is  moral  and  the 
man  is  blamable  ;  but  if  it  become  more  than  barely 
fufficient  for  this,  fo  as  to  excite  him  to  perpetrate 
the  aftion  with  great  eagernefs  and  with  the  overflow- 
ing of  malice,  that  in  this  cafe  the  neceflity  is  natur- 
al and  the  man  entirely  unblamable  ? The  truth, 

is,  that  there  is  no  ineonfiftence  between  the  moft  ef- 
ficacious influence  in  moral  neceflTity  and  accounta- 
blenefs.  Let  the  influence  be  ever  fo  great,  ftill  the 
man  afts  voluntarily,  and  there  is  no  fuppofable  en- 
tire oppofition  of  will  ;  and  as  he  is  a  rational  crea- 
ture, he  is  accountable  for  his  voluntary  aftions.  The 
contrary  fuppofition  implies,  that  in  order  to  account- 
ablcnefs  a  man  muft;  have  a  liberty  of  confingence,  and 
it  mult  be,  previoufly  to  his  ading,  uncertain  how  he 
win  aft.  A  bare  previous  certainty  of  the  voluntary 
aBion  of  an  intelligent  being  is  as  inconfifl:ent  with 
liberty  and  accountablenefs,  as  any  poflible  degree 
of  influence  producing  fuch  an  aBion.  In  either  cafe 
there  is  an  equal  confent  of  the  will,  and  an  entire 
oppofition  of  the  will  is  no  more  fuppofable  in  the 
one  cafe,  than  in  the  other. 

Some  infift,  that  moral  neceflity  and  inability  are 
always  of  our  own  procuring  ;  and  whatever  necefli- 
ty is  not  caufed  by  ourfelves  is  not  moral  neceflTity. 
But  moral  neceflity  is  the  previous  certainty  of  a 

moral 


t6 

moral  ft6ian.  Now  as  it  was  divinely  foretold,  agea 
before  it  came  to  pafs,  that  the  |ews  would  crucify^ 
our  Lord,  and  that  the  man  of  fin  would  petfecute 
the  faints,  Sec.  &c.  there  was  a  moral  neceiruy,  that 
thofe  fafts  fhould  come  to  pafs  :  And  as  this  neceffi^ 
ly  exiited  long  before  the  perpetrators  of  thofe  fatts 
exifted,  they  did  not  caufe  the  neceflity.  Therefore 
according  to  this  account  of  moral  and  natural  neceffi- 
ty,  it  was  a  natural  neceffity,  and  the  Jews  and  the  marv 
of  fin  were  in  thofe  aftions,  as  innocent  as  they  were  i« 

breathing  or  in  any  involuntary  motion. Further,  as 

all  the  acTtions  of  rational  creatures  are  foreknown  by- 
God,  before  the  authors  of  them  come  into  exiftence, 
they  are  equally  certain  and  neccffary,  a^  thofe  whicb 
are  predicled.  But  this  neceffity,  for  the  reafon  already- 
given,  cannot  be  the  effeft  of  thofe,  wbofe  anions 
they  are.  Therefore  either  this  is  not  a  natural  ne- 
ceffity, or  there  never  was,  is  now  nor  can  be  any 
crime  or  fin  in  the  univerfe. 

Dr.  Clarke  in  his  Remarks  on  Collins  gives  a  true 
account  of  moral  neceffity;  p.  16.  "  By  moral  necejfi- 
"  ty  confident  writers  never  mean  any  more  than  to- 
"  cxprefs  in  a  figurative  manner,  the  certainty  of  fuch 
"  an  event."  And  he  illuflrates  it  by  the  impoffibili- 
ty,  that  the  world  fhould  come  to  an  end  this  year, 
if  God  have  promifed  that  it  fhail  continue  anoth- 
er year.  Yet  in  his  difpute  with  Leibnitz  he  gives 
a  very  different  account  of  it;  p.  289.  "  That  a  good 
"  being,  continuing  to  be  good,  cannot  do  evil  ;  or  a 
"  wife  being,  continuing  to  be  wife,  cannot  do  iin- 
"  wifely  ;  or  a  veracious  perfon,  continuing  to  be  ve- 
"  racious,  cannot  tell  a  lie ;  is  moral  necejfity."  This' 
laft  account  implies  no  other  neceffity,  than  that  a 
thing  muit  be  when  it  is  fuppofcd  to  be  ;  which  is  \\o 
more  than  the  trifling  propofition.  that  what  is,  is, 
but  the  certainty  implied  in  the  divine  predi6lion,  that 
the  world  will  continue  to  a  particular  period,  is  a  very 

different  matter. Dr.  Wefi,  if  I  underftand  him,  has 

adopted  the  la-fl  account  given  by  Dr.  Clarke  of  nror- 

al 


al  ^ecelTuy.  No  doubt  lie  and  Dr.  CHirkeh^d  a  iii2,ht 
to  give  their  own  dcHnitions  oF  moral  necedity  ;  bvit 
Dr.  Wed  bad  no  right  to  impute  bis  idea  to  Preiident 
Edwards,  and  then  difpute  a^ainft  it  as  belonging  to  . 
him.  Dr.  Clarke's  lad  del'cribed  moral  necc(Ety 
would  exid,  if  human  volitions  came  into  exidence  by 
a  felf-determining  power  or  by  mere  chance.  On  ei- 
ther of  thofe  fuppofiiions,  what  is,  is,  and  mud  be,  lb 
lonff  as  it  is.  But  Preddent  Edwards's  idea  of  moral 
neceflity  is  utterly  inconfident  with  volitions'  coming 
into  exidence  by  chance,  or  by  felf  determination, 
unlefs  felf-determination  be  previoufly  edablifhed. 

In  all  matters  of  difpute,  it  ought  to  be  confidered 
how  far  the  parties  are  agreed,  and  wherein  they  dif- 
fer. As  to  natural  and  moral  necedtty,  I  believe  both 
parties  are  agreed,  in  this,  that  all  necedity  incondd- 
ent  with  moral  agency,  or  praife  and  blame,  is  natur- 
al neceflity  ;  and  that  all  neceflity  confident  with  praife 
and  blame,  is  moral  neceflity.  Therefore  if  all  ne- 
ceflity of  the  volitions  of  rational  beings,  be  confident 
with  praife  and  blame  ;  all  fuch  neceflity  is  mora!  ne- 
ceflity. But  if  any  neceflity  of  the  volitions  of  a  ra^ 
tional  being,  be  inconfident  with  praife  and  blame  ; 
then  1  have  given  an  erroneous  account  of  moral  ne- 
ceflity. Therefore  on  this  let  us  join  iffue.  If  an  in- 
fl:ance  can  be  produced  of  the  volition  of  a  rational 
being  in  fuch  a  fenfe  ncceflary,  as  to  be  on  that  ac- 
count the  proper  object  of  neither  praife  nor  blame  ; 
I  will  confefs,  that  1  am  miiiaken  in  my  idea  of  moral 
neceflity.     But  until  fuch  an  indance  can  be  produced, 

may  I  not  fairly  prefume,  that  rav  idea  is  right  ? 

If  it  diould  be  faid,  that  no  volitions  of  rational  crea- 
tures are  in  any  fenfe  necefliiry,  or  that  they  are  not 
previoufly  certain  ;  1  recur  to  the  indanccs  of  Judas's 
treachery,  Peter's  falfehood,  Pharaoh's  refufal  to  let  If- 
rael  go,  and  to  every  other  voluntary  action  of  a  ra- 
tional being  divinely  prcdifted  or  foreknown. 

If  any   fiiould  difpute,  whether  this   previous  cer- 
tainty of  voluntary  aUions,  be  properly  called  neccffi- 
B  ty  ; 


ty  ;  this  would  be  a  merely  verbal  difpiite,  which  they 
who  choofe,  may  agitate  to  their  full  fatisfa6tion.  It 
is  fufficient  to  inform  them,  that  it  is  what  we  mean 
by  moral  neceffiiy. 

I  have  already  ihown  that  Dr.  Weft  grants  the  mutual 
oppofition  of  different  propenfions  and  volitions ;  it  may 
be  further  obferved  that,  though  he  fo  (irenuoufly  dif- 
piTtes  againft  the  diftm6lion  between  natural  and  moral 
rieceffity,  and  fays  it  is  made  without  a  diderence  ;  yet 
the  fame  Oidinciion  is  abundantly  implied  in  his  book, 
particularly  in  his  diird  elfay.  He  there  holds  forth,  that 
a  man  may  have  a  pLyJical  pozvcr  to  do  an  action,  and  yet 
not  exert  \\\ai  power  ;  that  it  may  be  certain.,  there  may 
he.  a  certainty.,  2<nd  it  maybe  certainly  fore  known,  thdit  a 
man  will  do  fomething,  which  he  has  a  ph\jical  power 
not  to  do  ;  p.  46.  That  a  bare  certainty,  that  an  agent 
will  do  fuch  a  thing,  does  not  imply,  that  he  had  not 
a  power  to  refrain  from  doing  it  ;  p.  45.  Now  by 
moral  neceffity  we  mean  the  previous  certainty  of  any 
moral  atlion.  ,  Therefore  when  Dr.  Weft,  p.  46,  holds, 
that  there  may  be  a  cektaiuty,  that  a  man  will  do  fuck 
a  thing,  though  he  may  have  at  the  fame  time  a  phyfical 
power  of  not  doing  it  :  he  holds,  that  there  may  be  the 
very  thing  which  Prefident  Edwards  calls  a  moral  ne- 
ceffity, that  the  man  will  do  the  thing,  though  he  may 
have  at  the  fame  time  a  phyfical  or  natural  power  not 

to  do  it. Thus  Dr.  Welt   makes  and  abundantly 

infifts  on  that  very  diftinftion,  which  he  reprobates  in 
Prefident  Edwards,  and  which  he  declares  to  be  made 
without  any  difference.  Indeed  it  is  impoffible  for 
any  man  to  write  fenfibly  or  plauhbly  on  this  fubjecl, 
without  going  on  the  ground  of  this  diftinftion. 

It  has  been  inquired  concerning  Prcfrlent  Edwards's 
moral  inability,  whether  the  roan,  who  is  the  fubjefl; 
of  it,  can  remove  it  ?  I  anfwer,  yes,,  he  has  the  fame 
phyfical  power  to  remove  it  and  to  do  the  aftion,  which 
be  is  morally  unable  to  do,  which  the  man,  concern- 
ing whom  Dr.  Weft  fuppofes  there  is  a  certainty, 
that  he  will  not  do  an  attion,  has  to  do  the  allien 

and. 


^9 

and  fo  to  defeat  or  remove  the  faid  certainty.  I 
agree  with  Dr.  Welt,  that  he  has  a  phyfical  power  fo 
to  do. 

Perhaps  after  all  feme  will  infift,  that  natural  and 
moral  ncceflity  are  the  fame.  It  h  ardently  to  be  wifh- 
ed,  that  fuch  perfons  would  tell  us,  in  what  refpetis 
they  are  the  fame.  We  have  informed  them,  in  what 
refpefts  we  hold  them  to  be  different.  We  wifli  them 
to  be  equally  explicit  and  candid.  If  they  mean,  that 
natural  and  moral  neceffity  are  the  fame  in  this  refpet^, 
that  they  are  or  may  be  equally  certain  and  fixed,  and 
may  equally  enfure  their  refpective  confequenccs  or 
effects  ;  I  grant  it.  Still  they  may  be  different  in  oth- 
er refpe6ls,  particularly  this,  that  natural  neceffity  re- 
fpefts  thofe  events  or  things  only,  which  are  not  of  a 
moral  nature,  while  moral  neceffity  refpefts  thofe  only, 
which  are  of  a  moral  nature  ;  and  there  may  be  an 
entire  oppofition  of  will  to  the  former,  but  not  to  the 
latter.  If  they  mean,  that  they  are  the  fame  as  to  vir- 
tue and  vice,  praife  and  blame,  Sec.  this  is  not  grant- 
ed, and  to  aflert  it,  is  a  mere  begging  of  the  queftion. 
If  they  mean,  that  both  thofe  kinds  of  neceflity  may 
arife  from  nature  ;  meaning  by  this  the  fixed  proper- 
ties of  beings  and  the  eftabliffied  courfe  of  things  and 
events  ;  this  is  granted.  Still  there  may  be  the 
grounds  of  diftinfilion  before  mentioned.  If  they  fay, 
that  moral  neceffity  is  natural  neceffity,  becaufe  it  is 
or  may  be  born  xvilJi  us  ;  I  grant  it.  But  this  is  mere 
quibbling  on  the  word  natural.  Though  volitions  may 
be  the  effefts  of  a  bias  of  mind  born  v»'ith  us,  yet  thofe 
volitions  are  moral  atls,  and  therefore  the  neceffity 
from  which  they  proceed,  is  a  moral  neceffity.  A  man 
born  with  a  contrafted,  felfifh  difpofition,  (till  has  a 
phyfical  power  to  be  benevolent,  and  it  is  not  fuppof- 
able,  that  his  will  or  difpofition  fliould  be  entirely  op- 
pofed  to  felfifhnefsj  whenever  he  is  the  fubjeft  of  it. 


B  2  CHAPTER 


so: 


CHAPTER      11. 

OJ  Liberty, 

DR.  Weft  fays,  p.  16,  "  By  liberty  we  mean  £ 
"  potoer  of  a^l;irig,  willing  or  choofing  ;  and  by  a 
^"^  poivcr  of  afting,  we  meat),  that  when  ail  circumltan- 
"  ces  necefTary  for  aftion  have  taken  place,  the  mind 
*^  can  Si€t  or  not.  dW  This  is  not  explicit  :  There  is  an 
ambiguity  in  the  words pjzver,  can.  not  aH.  11' by  pow- 
er and  can,  he  mean  natural  power^  as  it  has  been  ex- 
plained in  the  preceding  chapter  ;  I  agree  tliat  in  any 
given  cafe  we  have  a  power  to  a£l  or  decline  the  pro- 
pofed  action.  A  man  pofleffes  liberty  when  he  poflelTes 
a  natural  or  phyfical  power  to  do  an  aftion,  and  is  un- 
der no  natural  inability  with  refpedl  to  that  a6lion. 
The  word  liberty  fuggefts  a  negative  idea,  and  means 
the  abfence  of  certain  obflacles,  confinement  or  re- 
itridion.  A  bird  not  confined  in  a  cage,  but  let  loofe 
in  the  open  air,  is  free;  a  man  not  fhut  up  in  prifon,  is 
in  that  refped,  free  ;  a  fervant  delivered  from  the  control 
of  his  mailer,  is  free  ;  a  man,  who  has  difcngaged  him- 
felf  from  the  tie  of  a  civil  bond,  is  in  that  refpeft  free. 
In  all  thefe  cafes  liberty  implies  fome  exemption,  or 
fome  negation.  In  a  moral  fcnfe  and  with  rcfpeft  to 
moral  condud,  a  man  is  free  or  poCTeffes  liberty,  when 
he  is  under  no  involuntary  redraint  or  compnlfion  y 
i.  e,  when  he  is  under  no  reftraint  or  compulfion,  to 
■which  his  will  docs  not  confent,  or  to  which  it  is  or  may 
be  entirely  oppofed.  An  exemption  from  this  reftraint 
or  compulfion,  is  liberty,  moral  liberty,  the  liberty  of  a 
moral  agent  ;  and  this  is  an  exemption  from  natural 
neceflity  and  inability  as  before  explained.  He  who 
is  thus  exempted,  has  a  natural  power  of  a6ling,jiilt  fo 
far  as  this  exemption  extends.  Even  though  *■'  all  cir- 
cumftances  necelTary  for  a£lion,  have  taken  place," 
yet ''  then  the  mind  can,"  in  this  fenfcj  "  a£i;"  in  any 

particular 


«( 


21 

■particular  manner,  or  decline  tliat  aflion.  For  in- 
flance,  when  all  circumflances  neceirary  for  judas's 
betraying  Iiis  Lord,  had  taken  place,  Hill  he  had  a  nat- 
ural power  either  to  betray  him  or  not  betray  him. 
He  was  under  no  compullion  to  betray  him,  to  which 
his  will  did  not  confent.  He  was  not,  nor  could 
he  poffibly  be,  under  any  fach  compulfion  to  chooje  to 
betray  him.  It  is  a  contradidion,  that  the  mind  fhould 
chooje  to  do  a  thing  involuntarily  and  with  an  entire 
oppofition  of  will. 

If  this  be  the  liberty,  for  which  Dr.  Weft  pleads, 
he  has  no  ground  of  controverfy  on  this  head,  with 
Prefident  Edwards,  or  with  any  who  embrace  his  fyf- 
tem.  There  is  nothing  in  tl^is  inconfiftent  with  the 
influence  of  motives  on  the  will,  to  produce  volition; 
or  with  the  dependence  of  volition  on  fome  caufe  ex- 
trinfic  to  itfelf,  cxtrinfic  to  the  power  of  will,  or  to 
the  mind  in  which  it  exids.  What  if  motives  do  ex- 
cite to  volition  ?  What  if  the  ccnneQion  between 
motive  and  volition  be  fuch,  that  volition  never  takes 
place  without  motive,  and  always  takes  place,  when 
a  proper  motive  appears?  What  if  volition  be  the 
effed  of  a  caufe  extrinfic  to  the  will  ?  Siill  it  is  true, 
that  volition  never  takes  place  without  the  content  or 
with  the  entire  oppofition  of  the  will.  The  will  or 
mind  then  is  ilill  free,  as  it  is  exempted  from  natural 
nccc-lTiiy  and  has  a  natural  or  phyfical  power  to  aft 
otherwife. 

If  it  be  faid,  that  it  is  not  fulficient  to  liberty,  that 
the  mind  aft  with  its  own  confent,  in  the  aH  itfelf ; 
but  it  mull  in  every  free  aft,  act  from  its  own  con- 
fent prtvioui  to  the  free  aft  ;  I  obferve,  that  this  im- 
plies, that  in  order  to  any  free  aft,  there  muft  be  an 
infinite  feries  of  free  a£ls  following  one  another.  For 
indance,  the  objeftion  fuppofes,  that  if  I  now  freely 
choofe  to  write  remarks  on  Dr.  Weft,  this  free  choice 
muft  arije  from  a  prtvioui  confent  of  my  will,  or  from 
a  previous  choice,  to  write  fuch  remarks.  Again, 
this  previous  choice,  in  order  to  be  free,  muft  for 
B  3  the 


22 

the  lame  reafon  arife  from  another  previous  free 
choice  ;  and  fo  on  infinitely,  which  is  abfurd. 

Or  if  it  fiiould  be  faid,  ihat  liberty  implies  nor  on- 
ly an  exemption  from  all  natural  or  phvjical  neceffity, 
but  alfo  an  exemption  from  all  moral  neceffity  ;  then, 
as  moral  neceflity  is  nothing  but  a  previous  certainty 
of  the  exiftence  of  any  moral  aft,  it  will  follow  that 
any  aft,  in  order  to  be  free,  muft  come  into  exift- 
ence without  any  previous  certainty  in  the  nature  of 
things  or  in  the  divine  mind,  that  it  would  exilt  ;  i.  e, 
no  a6t  can  be  free,  unlefs  it  come  into  exiftence  by 
pure  contingence  and  mere  chance. 

But  let  us  proceed  to  confider  what  Dr.  Weft  fays 
in  further  explanation  of  his  idea  of  liberty. 

"  To  a£t,"  fays  he,  "  to  will  or  to  choofe,  is  to  be 
«free."  P.  16.  If  this  be  liberty,  furely  Dr.  Weft  could 
not  imagine,  that  Prefident  Edwards,  or  any  man  in 
his  fenfes,  ever  denied  that  we  are  free.  It  is  to  be 
preiun^ed,  that  no  man  ever  denied,  that  we  deter- 
mine, that  we  will,  or  that  we  choofe.  However, 
though  I  allow  all  thefe  things,  yet  I  cannot  allow, 
that  this  is  a  true  account  of  liberty.  Will  Dr.  Weft 
pretend,  that  we  are  never  free,  but  when  we  are  in 
a6lion  ?  That  we  have  no  liberty  to  determine,  be- 
fjde  when  we  do  aftually  determine  ?  That  we  have 
no  liberty  to  will  or  choofe,  but  when  we  are  in  the 
exercife  of  volition  or  choice  ?  Will  he  fay,  that  he 
himfelf  had  no  liberty  to  determine  to  write  effays 
on  liberty  and  neceffity,  before  he  aftually  determin- 
ed to  write  them  ?  Dr.  Weft,  in  p.  46,  holds  that 
there  may  be  a  certainty,  that  a  man  will  do  an  ac- 
tion ;  yet  that  he  may  have  a  phyfical  power  of  doing 
the  contrary.  He  would  therefore  doubtlefs  grant, 
that  he  js  at  liberty  to  do  the  contrary,  though  he  ac- 
tually does  it  not ;  and  this  whether  the  a£lion  be 
external  or  mental.  Befides  ;  this  definition  of  lib- 
erty is  wholly  inconfiftent  with  the  other  favorite  one 
of  Dr.  Weft,  vi^.  a  pozoer  to  ad  or  not.  If  liberty  be 
a  power;  furely   it  is  not  an  aHion  ;  bu^  "  to  aft,  to 

•will 


■^3  _ 

''willorto  choofe,"  is  an  aBion.  Efpecially  if  liberty 
be  a  power  to  not  aB,  it  cannot  be  an  adion.  And 
if  a  power  of  acting,  be  a6\ion  ;  a  power  of  willing  be 
volition  ;  and  a  power  of  choofing  be  choice  ;  then 
a  power  of  walking  or  writing,  and  aftnal  walking  and 
vvrking  is  the  fame  thing  ;  and  whoever  is  able  to 
write,  and  lb  long  as  he  is  able,  is  aBually  employed 
in  writing.  Does  Dr.  Welt  hnd  by  experience,  that 
this  is  true  ? 

1  know  there  is  a  clafs  of  divines,  who  have  holden, 
that  God  is  free  to  good  only,  becaufe  he  does  good 
only  ;  that  the  faints  and  angels  in  heaven  are  for  the 
famereafon  free  to  good  only  ;  that  Adam  in  paradife 
was  free  to  both  good  and  evil  ;  that  unregenerate 
Imners  and  devils  are  free  to  evil  only  ;  and  that  the 
regenerate  in  the  prefcnt  life  are  free  to  both  good 
and  evil.  But  I  prefume  Dr.  Weft  would  not  choofe 
to  rank  himfeif  in  this  clafs. 

Dr.  S.  Clarke  is  equally  inconfiftent  in  his  defini- 
tion of  liberty,  as  Dr.  Weft.  "  The  whole  eflence  of 
"  liberty,"  lays  he,  "  confifts  in  iho.  poxuer  of  aBing. 
"  AHion  and  liber'y  are  identical  ideas  :  And  the  true 
«  dejinition  of  a  free  being,  is  one  that  is  endued  with 
"  a  power  of  ading,"  Remarks  on  Collins,  p.  15. 
How  true  it  is,  that  great  men  are  not  always  wife  ! 
And  how  furprifmg,  that  Dr.  Clarke,  whom  the  advo- 
cates for  felf-determmation,  fet  up  as  unequalled  in 
nietaphyfical  acutenei's,  fliould  contradi6l  himfeif  twice 
in  four  lines,  in  what  required  fo  much  accuracy,  as 
the  definition  of  liberty  !  1.  The  whole  eflence  of  lib- 
erty is  here  faid  to  coniift  in  a  poiver  of  afting.  2.  Ac- 
tion and  liberty  are  (aid  to  be  identical  ideas  ;  and 
therefore  the  power  of  a61ion  and  liberty  are  not  iden- 
tical ideas,  unlefs  the  power  of  atlion  and  aBion  are 
identical  ideas.  3.  The  true  definition  of  a  free  be- 
i-ng  is  faid  to  be  one  that  is  endued  with  the  power  of 
atling.  Thus  the  DoBor  ends  where  he  began,  for- 
getful of  the  middle. 

B  4  But 


24 

Bat  that  part  of  Dr.  Weft's  account  of  liberty,  with 
which  he  feems  to  be  moft  plcafccl,  and  on  which  he 
feems  Tnofl  to  depend,  remains  yet  to  be  confidered. 
It  is  this,  a  pozoer  to  aH  or  not  atl^  in  all  cafes  whatev- 
er. On  this  1  obferye,  that  if  by  atling  or  ?ioi  aBmg, 
the  Doctor  mean  choofing  or  refuting,  1  grant,  that 
we  have  a  natural  power  to  do  either  of  thefe  in  any 
cafe.  But  refufing  is  as  real  an  aft  of  the  mind,  as 
choofing,  and  therefore  is  very  improperly  called  noi 
aBing.  I  grant,  that  we  have  a  natural  power  to 
choofe  of  refufe  in  any  cafe  ;  but  we  have  no  moral 
power,,  or  power  oppofed  to  moral  nccejfuy  :  For  mor- 
al neceffiiy  is  previous  certainty  of  a  moral  a6tion  ; 
and  a  power  oppofed  to  this  mult  imply  a  previous 
uncertainty.     But  no  event  moral  or  natural  is  or  can 

be  uncertain  previoufly  to  its  csiH:!  nee. But  if  by 

a  power  to  a^  or  not  aft,  the  Dotlor  mean  a  power 
either  to  choofe  an  objeft  propofed,  or  to  refufe  it,  or 
to  do  neither;  this  is  an  impoffibiliiy.  Whenever  an 
objeft  is  propofed  for  our  choice,  if  there  be  any  me- 
dium between  choofing  and  refufing,  it  is  a  Itate  of 
perfeft  blockifli  inaftion  and  infenfibility  or  torpor  ; 
and  this  inaftion  mull  be  involuntary  ;  as  a  voluntary 
inaftion  implies  an  aft  or  volition,  which  is  inconfift- 
ent  with  perfeft  inaftion.  A  voluntary  Itate  of  inac- 
tion and  torpor  is  a  contradiftion  in  terms:  It  implies, 
that  the  mind  is  the  fubjeft  of  no  aft  at  all,  and  yet 
at  the  fame  time  is  the  fubjeft  of  a  volition,  by  which 
it  confents  to  inaftion.  Or  if  it  fhould  be  faid,  that 
a  voluntary  ftate  of  inaftion  means  a  ftate,  to  which 
the  mind  is  indeed  reduced  liy  an  aft  of  volition,  and 
that  the  volition  having  accomplifhed  a  ftate  of  inac- 
tion, ecafes  itfelf  to  exift,  and  thus  perfeft  and  uni- 
verfal  inaftion  follows;  1  obferve,  (i)  That  ftill  this 
plea  does  not  jid  the  matter  of  the  contradiftion. 
The  caufc  of  the  perfeft  inaftion  is  a  volition.  This 
caufe  muft  continue  in  exiftence  and  in  operation,  till 
the  efFeft  is  accomplifiied  ;  i.  e.  till  entire  and  perfe6l 
inaftion  has  aftually  taken  placfc.     And  yet  fo  long  as 

thjs 


a5 

this  caufe  continues  to  exill,  it  is  a  contradiflion, 
that  perfeft  and  entire  inadion  fhouM  take  place. 
(2)  Befides  this  contradi8ion,  if  the  mind  could  by  an 
aft  of  volition  or  by  other  means  be  reduced  to  a 
ftate  of  entire  inaftion  and  torpilude,  this  Ibte  would 
be  utterly  incondllent  with  the  exercife  of  any  liber- 
ty. The  man  in  this  Itate  can  no  more  exercife  lib- 
erty, than  if  he  were  under  ever  fo  great  natural  ne- 
ceffity,  or  than  if  he  were  turned  into  a  ftock  or  Itonc, 
During  this  ftate  he  cannot  poffibly  put  forth  any  aft,  to 
aroufe  himfelf  from  this  torpor.  It  is  in  the  power  of 
no  man,  to  reduce  himlelf  to  this  ftate,  with  rcfpect  to 
any  object  propofed  to  his  choice  ;  or  when  he  is  re- 
duced to  it,  to  recover  himfelf  from  it. 

If  to  this  it  fhould  be  objetted,  that  we  are  entire- 
ly indifferent  with  regard  to  many  objefts  ;  we  nei- 
ther choofe  nor  refule  them  :  1  anfwer,  be  this  as  it 
may  with  refpetl  to  objeGts  not  propofed  for  our 
choice  ;  it  is  not  true  with  refpeft  to  ihofe,  which  are 
propofed  for  our  choice  ;  and  this  is  all  that  I  have 
aflerted,  and  all  that  the  fubjed  requires  me  to  aflert; 
for  Dr.  Weft's  account  of  liberty  is  "  a  po\ver  of  aci- 
"  ing ;  and  by  a  power  of  afting,  we  mean,  that  when 
"  all  circumliances  necefl'ary  for  action  have  taken 
"  place,  the  mind  can  a6t  or  not  a£l  ;"  i.  e.  when  an 
occafion  for  volition,  choice  or  determination,  is  prc- 
fented  ;  or  when  an  objeft  of  choice,  or  an  objec!;, 
with  refpeft  to  which  we  are  to  will  or  determine,  is 
exhibited. 

Mr.  Locke's  obfervations  on  this  point  are  very 
pertinent  and  convincing  :  They  are  as  follows  ;  "  A 
".  man  in  refped  of  willing,  or  the  a6l  of  volition,  when 
"  an  aftion  in  his  power  is  once  propofed  to  his 
"  thoughts  as  prefcntiy  to  be  done,  cannot  be  free. 

"  The   reafon   whereof  is   manifeft  he    cannot 

"  avoid  willing  the  exiftence  or  not  exiftence  of  that 
'•  action  ;  it  is  alafolutely  neceffary,  that  he  will  the 
"  one  or  the  other,  i.  e.  prefer  the  one  to  the  other, 
[^  fince  one  of  them  niuft  neceffarily  follow  ;  and  that 

"  which 


25 

«  which  does  follow,  follows  by  the  choice  and  deter- 
«'  mination  of  his  mind,  that  is,  by  his  willing  it.  For 
"  if  he  did  not  will  it,  it  would  not  be.  So  ihat  in  re- 
"  fpetl  of  the  atl  of  willing,  a  man  in  fuch  a  cafe  is 
«'  not  free  :  Liberty  confining  in  a  power  to  aft  or  not 
«  a8:,  which  in  regard  of  volition,  a  man  upon  fuch  a 
««  propofal  has  not.  For  it  is  unavoidably  neceffary 
-«'  lo  prefer  the  doing  or  forbearance  of  an  aflion  in 
«  a  man's  power,  which  is  once  propofed  to  a  man's 
«'-  thoughts.  A  man  muft  neceffarily  will  the  one  or 
"  the  other  of  them,  upon  which  preference  or  voli- 
&»  tion  the  a6tion  or  its  forbearance  certainly  follows 
«  and  is  truly  voluntary.  But  the  a£l  of  volition  or 
<«  preferring  one  of  the  two,  being  that,  which  he  can- 
s' not  avoid,  a  man  in  refped  of  that  act  of  willing  is 

«  under  a  necefiity. This  then  is  evident,  that  in 

«  all  propoials  of  prcfent  action,  a  man  is  not  at  liber- 
€'  ty  to  will  or  not  to  will  ;  becaufe  he  cannot  forbear 

«•  willing." "  A  man  that  is  walking,  to  whom  it  is 

«  propofed  to  give  off  walking,  is  not  at  liberty, 
«'  whether  he  ivill  determine  himfelf  to  walk  or  give 
«  off  walking,  or  no.     He  miijl  ntajfanly  prefer  one  or 

«'  fother  of  them,  walking  or   not  walking." "  The 

<i'  mind  in  that  cafe  has  not  a  power  to  forbear  willing  : 

«'  It  cannot  avoid  fome  determination. It  is  man- 

"  ifeft,  that  it  orders  and  direfts  one  in  preference  to, 
«'  or  in  the  negleB  of  the  other."  Dr.  Weft  himfelf 
gives  up  his  favourite  power  o(  7iot  oBmg^  in  the  fol- 
lowing paiTage  :  "  As  foon  as  ideas  are  prefentcd  to 
"  the  mind  its  aftive  faculty  is  exerted,  and  the  mind 
««  continues  conftantly  acting,  as  long  as  it  has  ideas, 
"  jult  as  the  a61  of  feeing  takes  place  the  very  inftant 
«  the  eye  is  turned  to  the  light,  and  continues  as  long 
"  as  the  light  ftrikes  the  eye."  Part  II.  p.  9.  "  The 
"  mind  is  always  atting."  P.  lO.  If  it  continue  to 
aft  as  long  as  it  has  ideas,  as  the  eye  coniinues  to  fee 
as  long  as  the  light  ftrikes  it  ;  then  the  mind  has  no 
power  of  not  afting,  while  it  has  ideas.  And  I  think 
it  will  not  be  pret-ended  that  the  mind  has  a  power  to 

banifb 


banifli  from  itfelf,  all  ideas  at  pleafure.  This  would 
be  a  torpor  indeed  !  a  torpor  of  the  underftanding  as 
well  as  of  the  wi^l  !  And  if  the  mind  be  always  ading, 
it  never  exercifes  the  power  of  not  a6ting. 

Doctor  Welt  thinks  it  Itrange,  that  his  priA'ate  cor- 
refpondcnt  does  not  know  what  the  Doftor  means  hf 
a  power  to  ad  or  not  aH  ;  and  the  Doclor  proceeds  to 
give  feveral  inRances  of  it,  as  of  a  man,  who  had  been 
confined  in  prifon,  fet  at  liberty  to  go  out  or  ftill  to 
tarry  in  prifon  ;  and  of  an  hufbandman,  who  has  the 
offer  of  a  farm,  on  certain  conditions,  and  he  is  at  lib- 
erty to  take  the  farm  or  not.  But  neither  of  thcfe  is 
an  inftance  of  a  power  to  ad  or  not  ad  ;  they  are  mere 
inftances  of  a  natural  power  to  a6t  differently,  to  a6t 
one  way  or  another.  If  the  man  who  has  the  offer  to 
go  out  of  the  prifon,  choofe  to  tarry  in  it ;  he  as  re- 
ally atis  as  if  he  had  chofen  to  go  out.  If  the  huf- 
bandman choofe  to  decline  the  farm  offered  him, 
this  is  as  real  and  pofitive  an  a6t,  as  if  he  had  chofen 
to  take  it.  And  the  Dodor,  though  he  has  attempt- 
ed to  give  an  inftance  of  a  power  to  aft  or  not  aft,  has 
not  given  one.  For  this  reafon,  as  well  as  from  the 
nature  of  the  cafe,  I  helieve  it  is  not  in  his  power  to 
give  an  inftance  of  it.  If  it  be  in  his  power,  I  wiih 
him  to  do  it.  He  acknowledges  this  to  be  "  the 
"  m.in  point,  on  which  the  hinge  of  the  whole  contro- 
"  verfy  turns."  A  power  to  aft  or  not  aft,  is  his  def- 
inition of  that  liberty,  for  which  he  contends,  and  in 
fupport  of  which  he  has  written  his  two  books.  And 
if  he  be  not  able  to  give  a  fingle  inftance  of  fuch  a 
power,  it  is  high  time  for  him  to  give  it  up,  and  the 
whole  controverfy,  of  which  this  is  the  hinge.  No 
wonder  Dr.  Weft's  correfpondent  did  not  underftand 
what  the  Doftor  meant  by  this  power,  if  the  Doftor 
himfelf  did  not  underftand  it  fo  far  as  to   be  able  to 

give  an  inftance  of  it. A  porver  to  ad  or  not  ad 

muft  either  mean  a  power  to  choofe  or  refufe  ;  or  a 
power  to  aft,  or  to  ceafe  from  all  a6lion  in  either 
choofing  or  refufing.     If  the  former  be  the  meaning. 


at  is  no  more  than  we  all  grant,  provided  by  power  be 
fneant  natural  power.  But  if  in  this  cafe  moral  pow- 
€r  be  intended,  a  power  oppofed  to  moral  neceffity, 
vhicli  is  the  previous  certainty  of  a  moral  aftion  ;  this 
\v'e  utterly  deny,  becaufe  it  implies,  that  there  is  a  pre- 
vious perfeft  uncertainty  in  the  nature  of  things  and 
in  the  divine  mind,  whether  we  fliall  choofe  or  refufe 

the  propofed  objeft. If  the  laft  be  the  meaning  of 

€L  power  to  act  or  not  aB^  as  this  is  a  power  to  link  our- 
fel  ves  into  a  (tate  of  unfeeling  and  blockifii  torpor,  I  ap- 
peal to  the  reader,  whether  Dr.  Weft,  or  Limborch,  or 
any  other  man,  has  ever  had  or  can  have  any  idea  of 
fuch  a  power  ;  or  if  they  have,  whether  it  would  be 
any  deiirable  liberty,  or  would  imply  any  qualification 
for  moral  agency. 

I  am  fenfible,  that  Dr.  Weft  tells  us,  that  he  has 
given  a  definition  of"  a  power  to  a6l  or  not  a6t,"and 
that  this  definition  is,  "  that  there  is  no  infallible  con- 
"  neciion  between  motive  and  volition."  But  this, 
■which  he  calls  a  definition,  does  not  at  all  relieve  the 
difficulty,  if  it  mean,  that  when  motives  are  prefent- 
cd,  the  perfon  can  comply  with  them,  or  can  refufe  to 
comply,  or  can  neither  comply  nor  refufe;  I  deny  it, 
declare  it  to  be  an  impoffibility,  and  call  on  Dr.  Weft 
to  Ibew  the  poffibility  of  it.  If  when  he  fays,  there  is 
no  infallible  connedtion  between  motive  and  volition, 
he  mean,  that  the  mind  may  a£t,  whether  in  choofing 
or  refufing,  without  motive  ;  this  is  contrary  to  Dr. 
Weft  himfelf. 

The  Doftor,  in  p.  86  and  87,  Part  II,  refumes 
the  queftion  of  afcting  or  not  a6lmg,  and  mentions 
feveral  cafes,  which  he  confiders  as  inftances  of  not 
aftinc;  ;  e.  g.  when  of  two  objeds  one  is  chofen  and 
the  other  not  ;  when  of  the  Ipots  on  a  chefs-board, 
A  is  touched  and  B  not,  &c.  But  not  one  of  thefe 
is  a  better  inftance  of  not  afting,  than  there  always 
IS,  when  any  one  thing  is  chofen  and  not  another,  or 
in  preference  to  another.  Suppofe  a  man  to  offer  a 
beggar  a  fhilling  and  a  guinea,  of  which  he  may  have 

his 


fis  choice,  and  he  take  the  goinea  ;  will  it  be  faid, 
ihat  his  leaving  the  fliilling  is  an  iiiflance  of  not  afcl- 
ino  ?  Then  wc  never  do  any  thing,  without  at  the 
lame  lime  not  acting  }  i.  e.  while  we  do  one  thing, 
we  omit  many  other  things,  which  we  might  do.  iF 
this  be  what  Dr.  Weft  means  by  not  ading,  it  is  read- 
ily granted  ;  but  it  comes  to  little  or  nothing  ;  it  is  a 
mere  power  to  do  fome  things  and  to  refufe  or  omit 
fome  other  things.  This  power  is  confirtent  with  the 
iTioft  infallible  connexion  between  motives  and  voli- 
tions. Whenever  under  tiie  influence  of  motives, 
we  do  fome  things,  we  certainly  have  a  power  to  do 
thofe  things,  and  to  omit  other  things,  which  in  faOr 
we  do  not. 

Dr.  Clarke  in  his  Remarks  on  Collins,  p.  6,  fays, 
^  All  power  of  afting  effentially  implies,  at  the  fame 
"  time,  a  poner  of  not  acting  :  Otherwife  it  is  not  ad- 
'•  n?^5  but  barely  a  being  aBed  upon  by  that  power,  which 
"  caufes  the  atlion."  If  he  mean  hy  power ^  nakiral  or 
phyfical  power,  as  before  explained  ;  and  if  by  not  aEling 
he  mean,  refujing  or  voluntary  forbearing  to  a6l  in  a^ 
certain  propofed  manner  ;  I  agree  with  Dr.  Clarke. 
But  if  by  power  to  aft,  he  mean  foniething  oppof- 
cd  to  moral  neceffity  or  inability,  which  is  a  previ* 
ous  certai!)ty,  that  theaciion  will  or  will  not  take  place, 
in  tl.is  cafe  power  to  acl  will  be  a  previous  uncer- 
tainty concerning  the  exiftence  of  the  a6lion  :  And 
in  this  fenfe  of  the  words,  the  Doftor's  propofiticn, 
that  a  "  power  of  atling  elfentially  implies  a  power  o£ 
"  not  a8i!ig,"  will  amount  to  this  merely,  that  a  previ- 
ous uncertainty  concerning  the  exiftence  of  anaBion, 
eftcntialiy  implies  a  previous  uncertainty  concerning 
the  non-exillcnce  of  the  fame  action  :  Which  is  mere 

trifling. If  the  Doctor  mean  by  not  ading,  entire 

inaction,  1  deny  that  a  natural  power  to  a6t  implies  a 
power  to  fall  into  entire  inadion  and  toipitude.  Nor 
docs  an  uncert;iinly  whether  we  fliall  a£t  in  any  par- 
ticular maimer,  imply  an  uncertainty  whether  we 
Ihall  be  pcrfe6tiv  inactive  and  torpid, 

Dr. 


Dr.  Wefi,  [uppoks  felf-dderminaiicn  is  effential  ta 
liberty  ;  but  his  account  of  fe!f-detcrmination  is 
equally  inexplicit,  as  his  account  of  liberty.  "  We 
"  ufe  ielf-determination,"  fays  he,  "  not  to  fignify,  that 
"  felf  afts  on  felf  and  produces  volition  ;  or  that  the 
"mind  fome  how  determines  to  will  ;  i.  e.  wills  to 
"will,  or  choofes  to  choofe.  But  the  fenfe  in  which 
"  we  ufe  felf-determination  is  fimply  this,  that  we  our- 
"  felves  determine  ;  i.  e.  that  we  ourfelves  will  or 
"  choofe  ;  that  we  ourfelves  aO;  ;  i.  e.  that  we  are 
"  agents  and  not  mere  pafTive  beings  ;  or  in  other 
"words,  that  we  are  the  determiners  in  the  a8ive 
"  voice,  and  not  the  determined  in  the  paflive  voice." 

P.   17. Now  one   would  expeft,  that  in  all  this 

profufion  of  words,  in  this  variety  of  expreflion,  with 
the  help  of  three  i.  es.  we  fliould  have  a  moft  clear 
and  explicit  account  of  felf-determination.  But  the 
account  is  entirely  inexplicit,  and  equally  confident 
with  Prefident  Edwards's  fcheme  of  necelTity,  as  with 
the  oppofite  fcheme.  He  holds,  that  we  ourfelves 
determine  ;  but  he  does  not  hold,  that  we  are  the  ef- 
ficient caufes  of  our  own  determinations.  Nor  can 
Dr.  Weft  confidently  hold  this  ;  as  this  would  imply, 
that  our  determinations  or  volitions  are  effefts,  which 
Dr.  Weft  denies.  Prefident  Edwards  holds,  that  we 
ourfelves  will  or  choofe  ;  that  we  ourfelves  aft  and 
are  agents  :  But  he  does  not  hold,  that  we  efficiently 
caufe  our  own  mental  a6ls  :  Nor  for  the  reafon  already 
-given,  can  Dr.  Weft  confidently  hold  this.  Befides, 
this  would  imply,  that  "  felf  afts  on  fclf  and  produces 
"  volition,"  or  that  "  the  mind  fome  how  determines 
to  will  ;"  i.  e.  "  wills  to  will,  or  choofes  to  choofe," 
which  the  Do6lor  renounces.  Prefident  Edwards 
does  not  hold,  that  we  are  mere  paflive  beings,  unlefs 
this  expreffion  mean,  that  our  volitions  are  the  effe6ts 
of  fome  caufe  extrinfic  to  our  wills.*  If  this  be  the 
irjeaning  of  it,  he  does  hold  it,  and  the   believers  in 

his 

*  In  caufes  extrinfic  to  the  will  I  include  both  original   and  acquired  tafle, 
bias,  propcnfion,  or  whatever  it  be  called. 


his  fyftem  are  ready  to  join  ifTue  with  Dr.  Weft.,  on 
this  point.  Tliough  we  hold  that  our  volitions  arc 
the  efFecls  of  fome  extrinfic  caufe,  and  that  we  are 
paflive,  as  we  are  the  fubjeCts  of  the  influence  of 
that  caufe  ;  yet  we  hold,  that  we  are  not  merely  paf- 
five  ;  but  that  volition  is  in  its  own  nature  an  a£l  or 
adion,  and  in  the  exercife  of  it  we  are  aftive,  though 
in  the  eaufiition  of  it  we  are  pallive  fo  far  as  to  be  the 
fubjetls  of  the  influence  of  the  efficient  caufe.  This 
we  concede  ;  and  let  our  opponents  make  the  moft 
of  it  :  We  fear  not  the  conlequcnce.  In  this  fenfe 
we  hold,  "  that  we  are  determiners  in  the  aftive  voice, 
"  and  not  merely  determined  in  the  paflive  voice."  We 
hold,  that  we  are  determiners  in  the  aftive  voice,  in 
every  fenfe  which  does  not  imply,  that  "  felf  a6ls  on 
"felf  and  produces  volition  ;  or  diat  the  mind  fome 
"how  wills  to  will,  and  choofes  to  choofe,"  which- 
Dr.  Wefl;  utterly  denies  ;  and  "  he  entirely  joins 
*'  with  Mr.  Edwards  in  exploding  the  idea,  that  the 
«  will  determines  all  the  prcfent  ads  of  the  will." 

Though  we  are  determiners  in  the  adive  voice, 
and  not  merely  determined  in  the  paflive  voice  ;  yes 
our  determination  may  be  the  confequence  of  fufii- 
cient  motive  or  the  efl^ed  of  fome  other  extrinfic 
caufe.  We  fee,  hear,  feel,  love  and  bate,  in  the  ac- 
tive voice  ;  yet  we  are  or  may  be  caufed  to  fee,  hear, 
&:c.  And  when  we  are  caufed  to  love  or  hate,  we 
are  indeed  tlie  fubjeds  of  the  agency  or  influence 
of  fome  caufe  extrinfic  to  our  own  will,  and  fo 
far  are  paflive  :  Still  the  immediate  effed  of  this 
agency  is  our  ad,  and  in  this  ad  we  arc  certainly  ac- 
tive. So  that  we  are  not  merely  in  the  palfive  voice 
cauled  to  love,  but  we  alfo  in  the  adive  voice  love. 
Dr.  Weft  will  not  fay,  that  bccaufe  a  man  is  influ- 
enced or  perfuaded  by  proper  motives  to  the  love 
of  virtue,  he  does  not  love  it  at  all  in  the  adive 
voice.  Yet  it  is  often  faid  by  men  of  his  clafs,  thaZ 
if  we  be  influenced  to  will  or  choofe  an  objed,  it  i-i 
no  adion  at^all.     It  is  indeed  no  adion  in  their  fenfa 

O.C 


3^ 

of  the  word,  as  they  mean  by  a6lion,  felf-detcrmind' 
tion  :  But  inftead  of  taking  it  for  granted,  that  this  is 
the  true  fcnfe  of  the  word  aclion,  they  ought  to  fhow 
the  reahty  and  poffibihty  of  fuch  an  adion,  and  re- 
move the  abfurdities,  which  are  faid  to   be  inlepara- 

ble  from  it. To  fay,  that  we  are   felf-dctermined 

or  felf-moved,  becaufe  we  ourfelves  determine  and 
move,  is  as  improper  and  groundlefs,  as  to  fa\,  that  a 
body  is  felf-moved  and  felf-determined  in  its  motion, 
becaufe  the  body  itfelf  moves.  Extrinfic  caufaiity  is 
no  more  excluded  in  the  one  cafe,  than  in  the  other. 

The  Do6lor  puts  the  cafe  of  his  choofing  coffee, 
when  that,  tea  and  chocolate  were  offered  him,  and  all 
appeared  equally  eligible  ;  and  fays,  "  I  believe,  that 
"it  will  be  impoffible  in  this  and  a  multitude  of  fimi- 
"  lar  inftances,  to  affign  any  accident  or  circumftance, 
"  which  determines  the  mind  to  its  choice  among  things^ 
"  which  appear  equally  lit  and  eligible.  Confequenily 
"  here  is  an  undeniable  proof  of  the  liberty  for  which 
"  we  contend."  The  liberty  for  which  he  here  con- 
tends, is  a  power  to  choofe  one  of  feveral  equally  eli- 
gible things.  If  by  power  he  mean  nalural  or  phyfical 
power,  1  grant,  that  we  have  fuch  a  power  to  choofe 
not  only  one  of  feveral  things  equally  eligible,  if  any 
fuch  there  be,  but  one  of  things  ever  fo  unequally  el- 
igible, and  to  take  the  leaft  eligible.  A  man  may  be 
under  no  involuntary  reftraint  from  taking  an  objeft 
ever  fo  ineligible.  But  if  by  power  to  choofe  one  of 
feveral  equally  eligible  things,  he  mean  a  power  oppof- 
ed  to  moral  neceflity,  it  is  a  previous  uncertainty  which 
he  will  choofe.  But  there  is  in  this  cafe  no  more  pre- 
vious uncertainty  in  the  nature  of  things  and  in  the 
divine  mind,  than  in  any  cafe  whatever. 

The  Doftor  denies,  that  "  any  accident  or  circum- 
"  fiance,"  or  any  extrinfic  caufe,  "  determines  the  mind 
"  to  itft  choice  among  things  which  appear  equally  eli- 
*•  gible."  If  this  were  granted,  though  it  is  not,  what 
would  follow  ?  DoubtlelJs  either  that  the  choice  is  de- 
termined and  caufed  by  the  mind  irfflf,  or  that  it 

comes 


83 

comes  into  exillence  without  caufc.  But  Dr.  Weft 
cannot  with  confillcncy  hold  either  oFihcie.  To  hold 
that  choice  or  voUtion  is  caufed  by  the  mind,  is  ut 
hold,  that  it  is  an  effc6l  and  has  a  caufe,  which  Dr. 
Weft  denies,  and  has  written  an  elfay  to  prove  ii.  It 
is  alfo  to  l)oId,  that  "  felt'  ads  on  felf  and  produces 
"  volition  ;  or  that  the  mind  fbme  how  determines  to 
"  will,  i.  e.  wills  to  will  or  choofes  to  choofe,"  and  that 
"  the  will  determines  the  prefent  afts  of  the  will  ;"  all 
which  are  denied  by  Dr.  Weft.  On  the  other  hand, 
that  volition  comes  into  exiflence  without  caufe,  though 
this  is  maintained  by  the  Dottor,  in  that  h^  maintains, 
that  "  volition  is  no  elFeft  and  has  no  caufe  ;"  yet  it 
is  alfo  denied  and  renounced  by  him,  in  that  he  lays, 
p.  27,  "  We  cannot  be  charged  with  holding,  that  e- 
"  vents  take  p'ace  without  caufc." 

In  p.  19,  he  fays,  "  All  who  believe  there  is  a  De- 
•'  ity,  muft  grant,  that  he  has  a  fclf-determining  power  : 
"  For  he  being  the  firll  caufe,  his  volitions  cannot  be 
"  determined  by  any  caufe  antecedent  or  extiinfic  to 
"  himfelf."  If  by  felf-determining  power  here  be 
meant,  what  Dr.  Weft  fays  he  mQansfi7n/7l]\  That  the 
Deity  himfelf  has  a  power  to  determine  ;  that  he  him- 
felf has  a  power  to  will  or  choofe  ;  we  grant,  that  not 
only  the  Deity,  but  all  intelligent  beings  have  a  lelf- 
determining  power.  A  feli-dctermining  power  accord- 
ing to  this  definition,  is  nothing  but  a  power  of  will, 
which  we  all  grant  belongs  to  every  intelligent  and 
moral  agent.  Nor  does  this  imply  any  thing  inconfift- 
ent  with  the  idea,  that  the  Deity  and  all  other  intelli- 
gent beings  are  {governed  by  motives,  in  the  only  icnfc 
in  which  we  hold  government  by  motives  ;  which  is, 
that  the  Deity  does  every  thing  which  he  does,  be- 
caufe  there  is  a  motive  to  <lo  it,  arifintr  from  his  own 
infinite  wifdom  and  goodnefs. But  if  by  fed'-dctcr- 


ro- 


mining  power,  be  meant  a  power  by  which  God  p 
duces  volition  in  himfelf,  by  which  "  felf  ads  on  felt 
'•and  produces  volition,"  we  join  with  Dr.  Weft  m 
reprobating  fuch  a  power.  He  exprcfsly  fays,  "  The 
C  '•  divine 


m 

"divine  volitions  are  no  effe£ls  produced  by  the  Deii 
"  ty."  P.  28. If  any  thing  elfe  be  meant,  when- 
ever Dr.  Weft  will  inform  us  what  it  is,  (as  we  cannor 
imagine  any  befide  one  or  other  of  the  forementioned 
fenfes)  we  wiil  inform  him,  whether  we  allow  or  deny 
it,  and  will  give  our  reafons. 

As  to  the  argument,  that  "  The  Deity  being  the  firftr 
"  caufe,  his  volitions  cannot  be  determined  by  any 
"  caufe  antecedent  or  extrinfic  to  himfelf ;"  it  may  be 
anfwered,  Still  he  may  will  as  he  does,  becaufe  of  mo- 
tives and  reafons  arifing  from  his  own  infinite  wifdom 
and  goodnefs.  It  may  be  further  faid,  that  the  lame 
argument,  v;hich  Dr.  Weft  here  ufes  to  prove,  that 
God  determines  himfelf,  will  prove,  that  God  created 
bimfelf :  Thus,  All  who  believe  that  there  is  a  Deity, 
niuft  jrrant,  that  he  has  a  fclf-creating  power  and  did' 
create  himfelf.  For  he  being  the  firft  caufe,  his  cxift- 
ence  cannot  be  caufed  by  any  thing  antecedent  or  ex- 
trinfic to  himfelf.  But  it  no  more  follows  from  the 
eonfideration,  that  God's  volitions  were  not  caufed  by 
any  thing  antecedent  or  extrinfic  to  God,  that  they 
ivere  caufed  by  God,  than  from  the  eonfideration,  that 
his  exijlenge  was  not  caufed  by  any  thing  antecedent 
or  extrinfic  to  himfelf,  it  follows,  that  it  was  caufed  by 
himfelf.  The  truth  is  the  divine  volitions  were  no 
more  caufed,  whether  by  God  himfelf  or  by  any  other 
caufe,  than  the  divine  exiftence  was.  The  divine  vo- 
litions are  the  divine  holinefs  uncreated  and  felfexift- 
ent.  And  one  attribute  of  God  is  not  more  caufed  or 
created,  than  all  his  attributes,  or  than  his  exiftence. 

An  exemption  from  extrinfic  caufality,  in  the  a6ls 
of  the  mind,  is  effential  to  Dr.  Weft's  idea  of  liberty. 
Suppofe  then,  that  a  free  volition  is  one  that  comes 
into  exiftence  without  any  dependence  on  a  caufe  ex- 
trinfic to  the  mind,  which  is  the  fubje6l  of  that  voli- 
tion ;  the  confequence  is,  that  either  fuch  a  volition 
is  caufed  by  the  mind  iifclf.  and  "  fclf  ads  on  fclf  and 
^  produces  volition  ;"  or  it  is  abfolutely  without  caufe, 
and  comes  into  exiftence  by  mere  chance;  neither  of 

which 


35 

V'hich  wll!  Dr.  Weft  avow  :  Indeed  he  has  already 
exprefsly  diiavowed  them  boih.  And  if  he  either  cx- 
prefsly,  or  by  neceflary  implication,  avows  them  both, 
that  does  not  help  the  matter  ;  lo  be  inconfiUcnt  re- 
lieves no  difficulty. 

Liberty  is  by  fome  writers  diftinguifhed  into  ex- 
ternal and  internal.  Internal  or  the  liberty  of  the 
mind,  is  the  principal  fubjetl  of  the  prefent  inquiry  ; 
and  this,  as  is  implied  in  what  has  been  faid  already, 
confills  in  the  power  or  faculty  of  will.  Every  intel- 
ligent being  who  has  this  power,  is  free,  or  has  inter- 
nal liberty,  and  fo  long  as  he  retains  tl)is  power,  can- 
not be  diveded  of  liberty.  I  am  fenfible,  that  our 
opponents  fuppofe,  that  fomcthing  further,  viz.  a  fell- 
determining  power  is  necefTary  to  liberty  :  J^nd  to 
this  I  fhall  particularly  attend  in  the  next  chapter. 
As  internal  liberty  confifts  in  the  very  faculty  of  the 
will,  fo  that  which  is  external  confifts  in  opportunity 
externally  to  execute  our  determinations  and  wiflies. 
To  define  internal  moral  liberty  to  be,  "  an  opportu- 
*'  nity  and  capacity  of  choofing  and  a£ling  otherwife 
''  than  the  fubjetl  in  faft  does,"  is  nothing  diUinguifh- 
ing  b-tween  the  fyftem  of  thofe  who  hold,  that  all 
moral  adions  are  morally  neceflary,  and  that  of  thofe 
who  deny  it.  *'•  Opportunity  and  capacity  of  choof- 
*'  ing  otherwife,"  may  mean  mere  natural  power,  as  be- 
fore explained.  When  Pharaoh  chofc  to  retain  the 
Ifraelites,  he  was  under  no  natural  inability  of  choof- 
ing to  let  them  go.  Still  it  was  a  matter  of  previous 
abfolute  certainly,  that  he  would  for  a  time  refufe  to 

let  them  go,  and  had   been  divinely  foretold. If 

"  opportunity  and  capacity  of  choofing  otherwife,  than 
"  the  fubjeft  in  fatl  does,"  mean  any  thing  inconliftent 
with  the  mod  abfolute  moral  neccffity,  it  muit  mean 
a  previous  uncertainty  how  he  will  choofe  :  And  if 
this  be  the  meaning  in  the  aforefaid  definition  of  mor- 
al liberty  ;  I  deny  that  any  man  has  in  this  fenfe  op- 
portunity to  choofe  otherwife  than  he  does.  Every 
event  and  confequently  every  a6l  of  choice,  is  previ- 
C  2  oullv 


3^ 

oufiy  foreknown  by  God  and  therefore  is  prcvioufiy 
certain  :  And  to  take  it  for  granted,  that  any  is  pre- 
vioufly  to  its  exigence,  uncertain  in  the  divine  mind 
andin  reaUtyjis  an  intolerable  begging  of  the  queftion. 

The  following  account  has  been  given  of  liberty,  as 
oppofed  to  moral  neceffity  :  *'  I  find  I  can  abftaiii 
"  from  any  particular  good  ;  1  can  defer  ufmg  it  ;  I 
"  can  prefer  fomething  elfe  to  it  ;  I  can  helitate  i« 
"  my  choice ;  in  fhort,  1  am  my  own  mailer  to  choofe, 
"  or  which  is  the  fame  thing,  1  am  free"  Perhaps 
this  is  as  popular  a  reprefentation  of  liberty  and  as 
agreeable  to  the  ideas  of  thofe  who  are  the  mod  zeal- 
ous advocates  for  libt^rty  as  oppofed  {o  moral  necefli- 
ty,  as  can  be  given, — —But  all  this  is  talking  in  the 
dark  and  confounding  the  fubjeft  by  the  ufe  of  am- 
biguous words  ;  particularly  the  word  can.  To  fay, 
*^  1  can  abftain  from  any  particular  good,"  is  the  very 
fame  as  to  fay,  I  have  j&owfr  to  abftain,  &c.  But 
ihere  are  two  fenfes  to  the  words  power  and  inability 
already  noticed  and  explained.  In  one  fenfe  Pharaoh 
had  power  to  let  the  Ifraelites  go  ;  he  was  under  no 
natural  inability  in  the  cafe.  Still  there  was  an  abfo- 
iute  previous  certainty,  that  he  would  not  for  a  time 
let  them  go.  Therefore  there  was  a  moral  neceffity^ 
that  he  fhould  not  let  them  go,  and  he  was  morally 
unable  to  let  them  go  ;  and  in  this  fenfe  he  was  not 
free  ;  it  was  not  a  matter  of  uncertainty  whether  he 
would  let  them  go  or  not. This  account  of  liber- 
ty reminds  me  of  ihc  argument,  by  which  a  certain 
man  endeavoured  to  convince  his  neighbour,  that  there 
■were  no  divine  abfolute  decrees.  The  argument  was, 
that  having  a  child  newly  born,  he  felt  himfelf  at  lib- 
erty to  call  it  by  what  name  he  pleafed,  without  re- 
gard to  any  divine  decree.  As  if  God  had  decreed, 
that  he  fhould  call  his  child  by  a  particular  name, 
whether  with  or  without  his  own  confent. 

Liberty  or  freedom  muit  mean  freedom  from  fome- 
thing. If  it  be  a  freedom  from  coa6lion  or  natural 
raieccffityj  this  is  what  we  mean  by  freedom.     The 

mind 


37 

TTiind  in  volition  is  in  its  own  nature  free.  But  our 
opponents  mean  by  freedom  an  exemption  from  all 
exirinfic  caufal  influence,  and  from  all  previous  cer- 
tainty. And  when  they  hold,  that  the  mind  caufes  its 
ov;n  volitions,  they  mull,  to  be  confident,  hold  that  it 
caufes  them  contingently  and  without  any  previous 
certainty  that  it  would  caulc  them  ;  and  they  mud 
(Jeny  that  the  mind's  caufation  of  them  is  determined, 
fixed  or  limited  by  any  caufe  whatever.  For  that  the 
mind  fhould  caufe  them  according  to  a  previous  ef- 
tablifhment,  would  be  as  inconfiltent  with  liberty,  as 
that  it  fliould  not  caufe  them  at  all,  as  it  imphes  an 
entire  limitation  of  the  mind  in  its  operations. 

The  very  inquiry,  whether  the  mind  in  the  exercife 
of  the  will,  or  as  poffeffed  of  the  power  of  will,  be 
free,  is  apt  to  lead  into  error.  It  leems  to  imply,  that 
freedom  is  fomething  elfe  than  the  freedom  of  the  will. 
To  inquire  whether  the  mind  as  poffeffed  of  will  be 
free,  is  to  inquire  whether  the  mind  as  poffeffed  of 
freedom  be  free  ;  or  whether  freedom  be  freedom. 

Alen  in  general  have  no  other  idea  of  freedom,  than 
a  power  of  will,  or  an  exemption  from  coaftion  or 
natural  neceffity,  as  their  language  on  the  fuhje£l:  im- 
plies no  more  than  this.  With  them  to  atl  freely,  znd 
lo  ad  vohinlanly  is  the  fame  thing,  and  they  never 
once  think  of  propagating  one  free  acl  by  an  antecedent 
free  a6l,  or  that  in  order  to  freedom  it  is  requifite, 
that  the  atls  of  their  wills  fljould  come  to  pafs  with- 
out caufe  and  by  mere  chance  :  Nor  do  they  once 
imagine,  that  in  order  to  freedom,  there  muft  be  no 
previous  certainty  what  their  a8s  will  be  ;  or  that  the 
divine  foreknowledge  or  prediction  is  inconfiftent  with 
liberty. 

Liberty  in  the  fenfe  of  our  opponents,  is  not  poffi- 
ble  or  conceivable.  By  liberty  they  mean  a  power 
to  caufe  all  our  own  volitions,  and  to  caufe  them  free- 
ly. But  that  we  fliould  thus  caufe  them,  is  neither 
-poflible  nor  conceivable.  If  we  fliould  thus  caufe  a 
•volition,  we  fliould  doubtlefs  caufe  it  by  a  caufal  aft-: 
C  3  Xt 


38    , 

It  is  impoffible,  that  we  caufe  any  thing  without  a 
caufal  a6l.  And  as  it  is  fiippofed,  that  we  caufc  it 
freely,  the  caufal  aft  muft  be  a/reeaS:,  i.  e,  an  aft  of 
the  will  or  a  volition.  And  as  the  fuppofition  is,  that 
all  our  volitions  are  caufed  by  ourfelves,  the  caufal 
volition  mufl:  be  caufed  by  another,  and  fo  on  infi- 
nitely :  Which  is  both  impofTible  and  inconceivable. 
It  is  no  more  poffibic  or  conceivable,  that  we  fhould 
caufe  ail  our  own  volitions,  than  that  all  men  fhould 
beget  themfelves. 

Some  have  laid,  that  volition  or  voluntary  exercife 
is  liberty.  It  i^  undoubtedly  a  free  ad  and  liberty  is 
a  property  of  that  aft  ;  but  it  is  not  more  proper  to 
call  it  //^^r/jj;itfeif,  than  to  call  the  apprehenfion  of  the 
equality  between  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  and 
two  rights,  intelled,  becaufe  it  is  an  aft  of  intelleft. 
The  flying  of  a  bird  at  large  in  the  open  air  is  a  free 
(iB,  but  not  liberty  itfelf. 

Our  opponents  fay,  they  plead  for  that  liberty,  in 
men  to  do  as  they  pleafe.  3y  this  with  refpeft  to  the 
mind,  they  muft  mean,  either  that  the  mind  caufes  its 
own  volitions,  or  that  it  afts  voluntarily.  As  to  the 
firft,  it  has  been  in  part  confidered  already,  and  fhall 
be  further  attended  to  in  the  next  chapter.  The  laft 
is  no  more  than  we  all  allow  ;  and  for  our  opponents 
to  mean  this  only,  is  to  give  up  the  difpute. 

It  is  generally  if  not  univerfally  granted  by  our 
opponents,  that  God  is  necejfarily  holy  ;  and  to  be 
fure,  the  fcripture  affures  us,^that  "  he  cannot  lie,"  and 
"  cannot  deny  himfelf."  And  Dr.  Weft  grants,  thai 
be  is  perfeBly  holy,  p.  38  ;  and  that  he  is  immutable, 
ibid.  Therefore  he  is  ivimiUahly  and  necejfarily  holy. 
Yet  the  Doftor  fuppofes  God  to  poflefs  a  felf-deter- 
mining  power.  And  although  his  definition  of  felf-de- 
termination,  as  obferved  before,  is  not  at  all  inconfift- 
ent  with  the  neceffity  which  we  hold  ;  yet  it  is  mani- 
feft,  that  1  e  fuppofes  felf-determination  to  be  incon- 
fiftent  with  that  neceflity.  And  did  he  mean,  in 
afcribing  felf-determination  to  the  Deity,  to  afcribe 

fomethins 


39 

fomething  to  him  inconfiftent  with  immutahle  and  nec- 
ejfary  holinefs  ?  Docs  he  bcHeve,  that  it  is  not  abfo- 
iutely  ariain,  that  God  will  for  ever  continue  to  be 
holy  ?  Yet  abfoliite  certainly^  as  1  have  often  fard,  is 
all  the  neccfliiy  for  which  we  plead.  The  Dottor 
therefore  has  fallen  into  a  dilemma,  or  rather  a  trilem- 
ma,  and  he  may  make  his  choice,  whether  to  concede, 
-that  there  is  no  felf-determination  in  God,  and  that 
therefore  it  is  not  necelfary  to  liberty  ;  or  that  felf- 
determination  is  not  at  all  inconhftent  widi  ablolutc 
moral  neceffity,  and  then  he  will  ^ive  up  the  difpute  ; 
or  to  hold  that  God  is  not  neceflarily  holy,  and  that 
he  can  lie  tind.caii  deny  himjelf.  1  wait  for  the  Doc- 
tor's decifion  or  explanation. 

It  is  well  known,  that  Dr.  S.  Clarke  places  liberty 
in  felfdetermnration  or  felf-motion  ;  and  he  holds, 
that"  liberty  in  the  higheft  and  compleielt  degree  is 
"  in  God  himfelf ;"  and  "that  God  is  a  mod  pcrfed- 
*'  ly  free  agent  ;"  yet  he  immediately  adds,  that  "  he 
*'  cannot  but  do  always  what  is  beft  and  wifell  in  the 
"  whole.  The  reafon  is  evident  ;  bccaufe  perfe61 
"  wifdom  and  goodnefs  are  as  Jleady  and  certain  prin- 
"  ciples  of  action,  as  necejfity  iileJf."  Perfeft  wildom 
and  goodnefs  therefore  iiriply  a  certainty  of  aftion. 
hnt  certainty  \s  \.\iG.  nece£ity  m  queftion.  How  then 
can  any  liberty  or  felf-determination  inconfiftent  with 
abfolute  moral  necelfiiy,  coexilt  in  the  Deity  with  that 

necelhty  .? Thus  the  mod  able  advocates  for  felf- 

<letermination,  and  Dr.  Clarke  as  much  as  any  of 
them,  are  neceffitated  by  their  abfurd  and  contradic- 
tory fyftem,  perpetually  to  contradict  themfelves. 

Aloft  of  our  opponents  hold,  that  we  are  the  effi- 
cient caufcs  of  our  own  volitions,  and  that  in  this  our 
liberty  confifts.  But  Dr.  Weft  exprefsly  denies  this 
with  regard  to  the  Deity  ;  p.  28  ;  "  The  divine  vo- 
"  liiions  are  no  effefcis,  either  produced  by  the  Deity, 
^' or  by  atiy  extrinfic  caufe."  Indeed  that  volitions 
are  no  efiPcds  of  any  caufe,  is  a  favourite  aiad  princi- 
^di\  doQrine  of  Dr.  Weft.  Therefore  the  felf-deter- 
C  4  ,      minatioi! 


40 

mination  which  he  afcribes  to  both  God  and  man, 
produces  no  volition  in  either.  What  then  does  it  ? 
How  does  it  contribute  at  all  to  liberty  ?  In  the  De- 
ity it  is  confUlent  with  abfolute  moral  necefliiy,  as  we 
have  juft  feen  ;  and  what  reafon  can  be  given,  why 
it  is  not  as  confident  with  the  iike  neceffity  in  man  ? 

Or  does  liberty  in  God  confifl:  in  a  contingence  or 
previous  uncertainty  of  his  volitions  ?  This,  it  is  pre- 
fumed,  w:Ii  not  be  pretended  ;  as  it  overthrows  the 
<'ivine  immutability,  and  is  direftly  contradiftory  to 
what  our  opponents,  particularly  Dr.  Clarke  and  Dr. 
Weft,  hold,  of  the  necejjity  of  God's  moral  perfeftions. 
And  if  liberty  in  God  do  not  require  fuch  contin- 
j^ence  and  uncertainty,  let  a  realbn  be  given  why  it 

Ihould  in  man. We  deny,  that  caufing  our  own 

volitions  and  aBing  by  chance  are  either  realities  or 
poihbiliiics  ;  but  if  they  were  both  poflibleand  real  ; 
fince  they  do  not  belong  to  the  liberty  of  God,  need 
we  wifh  for  any  more  liberty  or  higher  kind  of  liberty 
and  power,  than  God  has  ?  Or  fliall  we  vainly  imagine, 
that  we  poffe fs  it  ? 

Liberty  is  no  pcfitive  exiftence.  Exiftence  or  be- 
ing is  divided  into  fahjlance  and  mode.  But  liberty 
is  certainly  no  fub/la^ice.  Modes  are  divided  into  ab- 
folute or  pofitive,  and  relative.  Liberty,  as  it  is  a 
power,  falls  into  the  lat^er  clafs  ;  it  is  a  relative  mode. 
All  powers  are  relations  or  relative  modes.  It  is 
then,  as  I  faid,  no  pofitive  exiftence. 

1  have  long  fince  thought,  that  this  controverfy 
concerning  liberty  and  neceffity,  fo  long  agitated, 
might  be  eafily  fettled  to  mutual  general  fatisfaftion, 
if  the  difputants  would  but  fully  explain  their  own 
ideas  of  the  fubjefts  of  the  difpute.  But  till  this  is 
done,  what  profpeft  or  poffibility  is  there  of  fettling 
it  ?  Our  opponents  accufe  us  of  denying  the  liberty 
of  moral  agents.  Now  the  truth  or  falfehood  of  this 
charge  depends  on  the  ideas  they  affix  to  the  word 
liberty.  If  by  liberty  be  meant  what  Law  in  his  notes 
on  King,  p.  248,  defines  it  to  be,  "  A  certain  phyfical 

"  indifference 


4i 

"  indifference  or  indeterminatenefs  in  its  own  exer- 
*'  cile  ;"  then  we  do  deny  liberty.  We  deny  that  a 
man  is  or  can  be  indifferent  in   the  exercife  of  his 

liberty  or  his  will. Or  if  by  liberty   be  meant,  an 

exemption  from  all  previous  certainty,  fo  that  it  is  a 
matter  of  uncertainty  and  mere  chance,  what  our  vo- 
litions are  to  be  ;  in  this  fenfe  alfo  we  deny  liber- 
ty.  Further,  if  by  liberty  be  meant,  an  exemption 

from  all  extrinfic  caufality  or  influence,  fo  that  our 
volitions  are  efficiently  caufed  by  ourfelves  ;  this  al- 
fo we  deny. But  if  by  liberty   be  meant  a  power 

of  willing  and  chooling,  an  exemption  from  coaBion 
and  natural  necelTity,  and  power,  opportunity  and 
advantage  to  execute  our  own  choice  ;  in  this  fenfe 
we  hold  liberty. 

We  wifii  our  opponents  to  tell  us  with  the  fame 
precifion,  what  they  mean  by  liberty  and  in  what  fenfe 
they  contend  for  it.  Unlels  they  do  this,  it  fii^nifies 
nothing  for  them  to  tell  us,  that  we  deny  all  liberty, 
and  that  they  are  contending  for  liberty  againfl;  necef- 
(ity  ;  and  as  Dr.  Wed  has  done,  to  give  fuch  gener- 
al and  vague  definitions  of  liberty,  of  felf-determina- 
tion,  Sec.  as  are  perfeBly  confiftent  with  our  ideas  of 
liberty  and  free  aftion. 


CHAPTER 


CHAPTER      III. 

Of  Stlf-Delermination. 

LIBERTY  and  felf-determination  are  fo  blended 
by  our  opponents  in  this  controverfy,  that  it  is 
impolTible  to  write  a  chapter  on  one  of  thefe  fubjefts, 
%viih  proper  attention  to  the  fentiments  of  our  oppo- 
nents, without  running  into  the  other.  Therefore  in 
the  hift  chapter  I  was  neceflitated  to  fay  4nftany  things 
concertiing  felf-determination.  Yet  1  wifii  to  make 
foiTie  further  obfcrvations  on  the  fame  fubjeft. 

All  our  opponents  agree,  that  felf-determination  is 
efiential  to  liberty.  Let  us  firit  attend  to  what  Dr. 
Weft  fays  on  this  fubje6l  ;  then  we  fhall  make  fome 
remarks  on  what  Dr.  Clarke  and  others  have  faid. 

Dr.  Weft  tells  us,  that  "  determining,  when  we  ap- 
*'  ply  it  to  the  active  faculty,  is  the  fame  with  volition." 
P;  16,  17.  And  "  the  fenfe  in  which  we  ufe  Jelf-de- 
"  termination  is  fimply  this,  that  we  ourfelves  deter- 
"  mine;  i.  e.  that  we  ourfelves  will  or  choofe."  Now 
I  cannot  believe,  that  Dr.  Weft  imagined,  that  Pfcfi- 
dcnt  Edwards,  or  any  of  his  followers,  would  deny,  that 
we  ourfelves  determine,  v/ill  and  choofe.  We  doubt- 
lefs  will  and  choofe  as  really  as  we  think,  fee,  hear, 
feel,  &c.  But  who  or  what  is  the  efficient  caufe  in 
eidier  cafe,  remains  to  be  confidered.  To  fay,  that 
•we  are  determiners  in  the  aftive  voice,  and  not  the  deter- 
mined in  the  paffive  voice,  gives  no  fatis(a6tion.  We 
grant,  that  we  are  determiners  in  the  attive  ;  and  yet 
affert,  that  we  are  determined,  or  are  caufed  to  de- 
termine, by  fome  extrinfic  caufe,  at  the  fame  time, 
and  with  refpe6l  to  the  lame  "aQ  :  As  when  a  man 
hears  a  found,  he  is  the  hearer  in  the  aQive  voice,  and 
yet  is  caufed  to  hear  the  fame  found,  by  fomething  ex- 
trinfic to  himfelf  It  will  not  he  pretended,  that  a  man 
is  the  efficient  caufe  of  his  own  hearin^^,  in  every  in- 
f^ance  in  which  he  hears  in  the  aftive  voice. 
.     -  Though 


43 

Though  Dr.  Wefl:  in  general  maintains,  and  has 
written  an  eflay  to  prove,  that  volition  is  no  eO'cLt 
and  has  no  caufe  ;  yet  he  Ibmetimes  forgets  himfclf 
and  falls  in  with  the  generality  of  the  defenders  of  the 
felf-determining  power,  who  hold,  that  the  mind  is  the 
efficient  caufe  of  its  own  volitions.  Me  evory  where 
maintains,  that  volition  is  not  the  effeft  of  an  txlrinfic 
caufe  ?  Why  does  he  exprefs  himfelf  thus,  if  he  do 
not  fuppofe  it  to  be  the  effed  of  an  intrinfic  caufe  ? 
The  expreffion  implies  this.  This  is  not  all.  In  p. 
24,  he  puts  the  queftion,  "  whether  the  mind  in  choof- 
"  ing  or  ading,  do  not  modify  itfeif .?"  which  he  an- 
fwers  in  the  affirmative,  and  fays,  that  this  "  modifi- 
"  cation  is  the  etfetl  of  the  mind  willing  or  choof- 
"  ing."  The  mind  then  in  willing  modifies  itfelf,  i.  e. 
brings  itfelf  into  the  mode  of  willing.  This  mode  then 
is  volition  ;  and  this  volition  is  the  efFe6t  of  the  mind 
^yilling,  or  the  effe6t  of  volition.  So  that  Dr.  Weft 
here,  in  direct  contradiilion  to  his  general  do£lrine, 
aflerts,  agreeably  to  Dr.  Clarke  and  moft  writers  of 
his  clafs,  that  volition  is  an  effeft  and  has  a  caufe  ;  is 
the  effeft  of  the  mind  whofe  volition  it  is,  and  is  the 
effett  of  the  mind  willing  or  of  a  volition  of  that  mind. 
Agreeably  to  this  he  fays,  p.  28,  "  No  agent  can  bring 
"  any  effefts  to  pafs,  but  what  are  conjequerd  upon  his 
"  acling  ;  i.  e.  that  all  effects  are  in  confcquence  of 
"  the  aftivcnefs  or  operativenefs  of  fome  being;''  And 
p.  22,  '•  No  being  can  become  a  caufe,  i.  e.  an  effi- 
"  cient,  or  that  which  produces  an  effisd,  but  by  first 
"  operating,  aBing  or  energijing  :"   And  in  the  fame 

page,  "  Volition,  when   ufed  intelligibly is  real- 

"  iy  an  efficient  caufe."  Volition  then  is  an  efficient 
caufe,  and  an  efficient  caufe  of  a  modification  of  the 
ipind,  which  is  another  volition,  and  this  by  Jirjl  op- 
erating, ading  or  energifing  :  And  doubtlefs  this  ope- 
ration, aft  or  energifing  is  a  volition.  So  that  here  we 
have  three  volitions  in  train,  all  neceffary  to  the  exift- 
ence  of  one  volition  and  of  every  volition.  The  Jirjl 
volition  is  an  efficient  caufe  of  afecond)  called  by  Dr. 

Wea 


44 

Weft  a  modification  of  the  mind ;  and  it  produces  this 
cfFeft  by  a  third  volition,  which  is  the  operation,  aB,  or 

energifing  of  the.  firjl. Wliat  is  this,  but  "  felf  aO:- 

"  ing  on  fdf  and  producing  volition,"  and  this  by  the 
inftrumentality  of  an  intermediate  volition.  Dr.  Weft 
cannot  conliltentiy  deny  any  of  thefe  abfurdiiies  of 
his  fcheme.  He  cannot  fay,  that  one  volition,  as  an 
-efficient  caufe,  does  not  produce  a  fecond  ;  as  he 
holds,  that  "the  mind  in  willing  modifies  iifelf"  But 
according  to  him  volition  is  the  mind  willing.  He  al- 
fo  holds,  that  the  faid  "  modification  is  the  effe6l  of 
*'  the  mind  willing  ;"  i.  e.  by  his  own  definition,  the 
cffed  of  volition  ;  volition  then  is  the  ejicierd  caujedi 
the  fdid  modification.  That  this  modification  is  voli- 
tion he  will  not  deny.  Then  we  have  one  volition 
as  an  efficient  caufe,  producing  another  volition  as  its 
eiFd6l.  But  he  grants  that  "no  being  can  produce  an 
"  effeft,  but  by  Jirjl,  acting  or  energifing"  This  gives 
us  the  intermediate  volition. 

It  has  been  long  fince  charged  on  the  advocates  for 
felf-dctermination,  that  their  doclrinc  involves  the  ab- 
furdity  of  one  volition  before  every  volition,  and  even 
before  the  firft.  But  Dr.  Weil  has  made  improve- 
ment in  the  fcheme  :  He  has  taught  us,  that  felf  deter- 
mination implies  two  volitions  before  every  volition 
and  before  ihef  rfl. 

That  volition  is  produced  by  the  mind,  as  the  effi- 
cient caufe,  is  implied,  however  inconfiftently  with 
himfelf,  in  various  other  pafTages  of  Dr.  Weft's  books  ; 
asp.  25,  "  If  volition  or  internal  aQion  be  the  effeOt 
"  of  an  extrinfic  caufe,  our  reflexions  could  never  af- 
"  ford  us  an  example  of  an  efficient  caufe."  "As  we 
"  are  rational  beings,  it  follows,  that  our  volitions  are 
"  not  the  effeds  of  an  extrivfic  caufe.  but  that  we  are 
iifelf  determined.''      "  Confcious,  that    we    ourfelves 

*•  are  the  determiners  and  not  the  determined we 

«  have  the  idea  of  our  independence  in  willing  and 
«  choofing."     Our  volition  muft  either  he  the  effect 
oJf  an  extrinfic  caufe,  or  of  an  intrinfic  oncjor  it  muft  hap- 
pen 


45 

pen  without  caufe.  If  it  happen  without  caufe,  our  re- 
flections could  no  more  afford  us  an  example  of  an  effi- 
cient caufe,  than  ihey  would  on  the  fuppofition,  that  it  is 
the  effetl  of  an  extrinfic  caufe.  So  that  the  Doftor's  ar- 
gument necelfarily  implies,  that  volition  is  produced  by 
the  mind  as  the  efficient  caufe.  1  n  the  fecond  quotation 
above,  he  fpeaks  of  our  being  feif  determined,  as  in  di- 
re£l  oppofition  to  our  volitioDS  being  effefts  of  an  ex- 
trinfic caufe.  But  there  is  no  iiich  oppofition  unlefs  by 
our  beinj;  felf  determined  be  meant,  that  our  volitions 
are  the  effctls  of  an  intrinfic  caufe.  If  felf-determin- 
aiion  here  mean  no  more  than  that  we  are  the  fuhjctls 
of  a  determination,  or  that  we  ourfelves  determine,  as 
we  ourfelves  think,  feel,  &c.  this  may  be,  and  yet  thai 
determination  may  be  the  effeft  of  an  extrinfic  cauie. 
So  that  there  appears  to  be  no  meaning  in  this  pai- 
fage,  unlefs,  in  direcl  contradi8ion  to  what  Dr.  Weft 
elfewhere  holds,  it  mean,  that  our  volitions  are  ejjeds 
and  have  an  effic'unt  caufe  ;  that  this  caufe  is  our  own 
mind  ;  and  this  efficient  caufe,  as  the  Dr.  declares  all 
efficient  caufes  do,  produces  its  effect,  "  by^r/i  ope- 
"  rating,  ading  or  enefgifing  ;"  and  thus  felf  would  a6l 
"  on  felf  and  produce  volition,"  by  an  efficient  ope- 
ration.  Again  ;  if  we  were  "  confcious,   that  we 

"  ourfelves  are  the  determiners,  and  not  the  determin- 
'•  ed,"  we  ffiouid  thence  derive  no  "idea  of  our  inde- 
'*  pendencc  in  willing  and  choofing,"  if  our  willing  and 
choofing  cither  were  the  efl'ed  of  an  extrinfic  caufe, 
or  happened  without  caufe ;  or  unlefs  we  were  the  ef- 
ficient caufes  of  our  own  willing  and  choofing. 

Thouvh  all  this  is  abundantly  denied  and  renounc- 
ed by  Dr.  Weft,  as  appears  by  quotations  already 
made  ;  yet  it  is  the  real  ground  work  of  his  book, 
and  the  only  ground,  on  which  he  could  confiflenily 
oppofe  the  doctrine  of  moral  neceffity  and  extriniic 
caufaliiy  of  volitions  :  And  this  is  the  common  doc- 
trine of  the  advocates  for  felf-determination.  Thus 
Dr.  Claikc,  in  Papers  between  him  and  Leibnitz,  p. 
289,  tells  u.^;  "  The  true  and  only  queftion  concern- 

"  ing 


46 

"  ing  liberty,  is,  whether  the  immediate  phyfical  caufe 
"or  principle  ofaftion  be  indeed  in  him,  whom  we 
"  call  the  agent  ;  or  whether  it  be  fome  other  reafon 
"  fufficient,  which  is  the  real  caufe  of  the  adion,  by 
"  operating  upon  the  agent  and  making  him  to  be, 
"not  the  agent  but  a  mere  patient."  I  underftand 
the  Dodor  by  phyfical  caufe,  to  mean  efficient,  pro- 
ducing  caufe  ;  otherwife   it  is   not   to   the    purpofe. 

Dr.  Chauncy  is  flill  more  explicit.     "  Self-deier- 

"  mination  gives  rife  to  our  volitions and  is 

"  the  caufe  of  them."  Benevolence  of  the  Deity,  p.  128. 
"  A  power  in  man,  that  fubjefts  his  volitions  to  his 
"  command,  is  the  only  bottom,  upon  which  agency 
"  can  be  founded."  Ibid,  p.  129.  And  in  the  next 
page  he  fays,  the  fame  power  "  conffitutes  us  agents, 
"  or  beings  that  are  evidently  the  caifes  of  their  own 
"  volitions." 

Now  this  felf-determination,  which  "  gives  rife  to 
our  volitions,"  and  in  which  we  are  "  the  efficient 
"  caufes  of  our  own  volitions,"  is  a  determination  or 
a8;  either  of  the  will,  or  of  fome  other  faculty.  If  it 
be  an  aft  of  the  will,  it  is  a  volition.  So  that  here 
we  have  one  volition  caufed  by  another  :  And  as  the 
doBrine  is,  that  all  our  volitions  are  the  efFed  of  felf- 
determination,  they  are  all  the  efFeft  of  volition,  the 
caufing  aft  the  efFeft  of  a  preceding  aft,  and  the  firfl 
the  efFeft  of  one  before  that.  This  abfurdity  attend- 
ing the  fcheme  of  felf-determination,  has  been  long 
fince  pointed  out  ;  nor  have  the  advocates  of  that 
fcheme  been  able  to  fhow,  that  their  fcheme  does  not 
really  labour  under  that  abfurdity,  if  by  that  felf-de- 
termination, which  is  the  caufe  of  volition,  they  mean 
an  aft  of  the  will. 

But  if  this  felf-determination  be  an  aft  of  the  un- 
derftanding  ;  then  it  feems,  that  the  will  or  mind  wil- 
ling, is  influenced  to  volition  by  a  ditlaie  of  the  un- 
derllanding,  or  by  a  motive.  Then  we  are  at  once 
involved  in  what  is  fo  hideous  to  Dr.  Wef^,  and  all 
other  believers  in  felf-detenninationj  the  government 

by 


-.lis 

by  motives  and  the  moral  ncceflity  implied  in  it  :  Alfc" 
our  volitions  are  determined  by  extrinfic  caufes  and 
we  are  the  paflive  fubjetts  of  the  operation  of  ihole 
caufes. 

Or  if  we  fuppofe  the  determining  a6l  to  proceed  from 
any  other  faculty,  if  other  there  be,  the  difficulty  will  re- 
main. Dr.  Well  holds,  "  that  thc|;e  are  three  effen- 
<•  tial  faculties  of  the  mind,  which  ought  always  to  be 
"  confidered  diftinftly  ;  and  iheCe  are  fiej'ception,  pro- 
*■' penjion  and  will  ■/'  and  that  "  the  lalt  only  is  prop- 
"  erly  the  a61ive  faculty."  Then  doubtlefs  that  felf- 
determi nation,  which  is  an  aMion^  and  which  gives 
rife  to  volition,  is  an  aft  of  this  aftive  faculty.  In 
this  cafe  we  have  will  putting  forth  felf  determin- 
ation, in  order  to  give  rife  to  volition  ;  as  we  had  be- 
fore volition  as  an  efficient  caufe,  firft  operating,  a6t- 
ing  or  energifmg,  in  order  to  produce  the  efledi  vo- 
lition. As  the  will  is,  according  to  the  Doftor,  "  the 
"only  aftive  faculty,"  he  will  not  pretend,  that  voli- 
tion produced  by  felf-determination,  is  the  effecl  of 
cither  of  the  other  two  faculties,  as  he  reckons  them, 
perception  and  propenfion.  If  he  ffiould  fay,  that  it 
is  the  effetl  of  perception  ;  this  it  feems  is  a  paffive 
faculty  J  and  then  felf-determination  and  all  volition 
are  the  efifefts  of  a  paffive  faculty  and  of  paffion,  of 
which  alone  that  faculty  is  by  the  terms  capable  ;  and 
therefore,  it  feems,  felf-determination  and  volition 
mult  themfclves  be  paffions  or  mere  impreffions,  and 
we  are  paffive  in  them.  Befides,  perception  confid- 
ered as  a  faculty,  as  Dr.  Well  fingularly  confiders  it, 
appears  to  be  nothhig  elfc,  than  intelle6l  or  the  pow- 
er of  undcrOanding.  And  if  felf-determination  pro- 
ceed from  this,  the  confequcnce  is,  that  the  will  is 
governed  by  the  underftanding  and  by  the  dictates 
and  motives  which  it  fuggefls  ;  which  brings  us  where 
we  were  before,  into  the  midll  of  neceffity.  The  fame 
Gonlequence  will  follow,  if  we  fuppofe,  that  felf  deter- 
mination proceed  from  ptrception  in  the  common 
fenfe  of  the  word;  meaning  an  a^  of  the  underftand- 

ing 


48 

ing. If  Dr.  Weft  fay,  that  felf-dcter  mi  nation  pro- 
ceeds from  profienjion  ;  then  he  entirely  coincides 
-w'nh  Prefident  Edwards,  who  afcribes  a  great  part  of 
our  volitions  to  difpofition,  inclination,  paflion  and 
habit,  meaning    certain    biafes  of  the   mind   diitinti 

from  volition  and  prior  to  it. Befides  ;  as  propen- 

lion  is  according  to  the  Do6lor  a  paffive  faculty,  if 
volition  and  felf-determination  proceed  from  this  they 
are  paflions  or  impreffions,  they  proceed  from  an  ex- 
trinfic  caufe  and  we  are  paffive  in  them. 

The  caufing  of  one  a6l  of  volition  by  another  is 
attended  with  this  abfurdity  alfo,  it  fuppofes  the  cauf- 
ing a6l  in  this  cafe  to  be  diftin6i  from  the  a£l  caufed; 
■when  in  reality  they  coalefce  and  are  one  and  the 
fame.  For  inftancc,  to  choofe  to  have  a  choice  of 
virtue,  is  nothing  but  a  choice  of  virtue  ;  to  choofe 
the  choice  of  an  apple,  is  to  choofe  an  apple  :  So 
that  we  have  the  volition  before  we  have  it,  and  in 
order  that  we  may  have  it. 

Some  fenfible  of  the  abfurdity  of  fuppofing,  that 
the  mind  determines  one  volition  by  another,  as 
this  runs  into  an  infinite  feries  of  volitions,  and  im- 
plies that  there  is  volition  before  the  firft  volition, 
have  renounced  this  idea  of  felf-determination.  A- 
mong  thefe  we  may  reckon  Dr.  Weft.  But  at  the 
fame  time  he  gives  up  felf-determination  in  every 
fenfe  in  which  we  difpute  it,  and  in  every  fenfe  incon- 
fiftent  with  the  moft;  abfolute  moral  neceffity.     This 

has  been  already  illuftrated. Others,  to  avoid  the 

fame  difficulty  exprefs  themfelves  differently  :  They 
profefs  to  mean,  that  volition  is  caufed  not  by  a  pre- 
ceding volition,  but  by  the  man  or  the  mind,  whofe 
volition  it  is.  But  this  gives  no  fatisfadion.  Sup- 
pofing  it  ffiould  be  faid,  that  a  certain  carpenter  him- 
lelf  was  the  efficient  caufe  or  builder  of  fuch  a  ffiip  ; 
and  it  fhould  be  thence  inferred,  that  he  built  it  by 
working,  labouring  or  exerting  himfelf  to  the  end  of 
building  the  ffiip  ;  would  not  this  be  a  natural  and  a 
jieceffary  inference  ?  Would  not  the  man,  who  ffiould 

afferi. 


■    49 

nffert,  that  the  carpenter  did  indeed  himfclf  imrncdi- 
aieiy  build  the  Ihip,  but  not  by  uPy  labourer  exertion, 
whether  of  body  or  mind,  be  univer(i\lly  confidorcd 
as  talking  abfurdly  and  coniradn^iorily  ?  And  docs 
not  the  man  talk  as  abfurdly  and  contradidorily,  who 
aflerts,  that  a  man  is  the  eilicient  caufc  of  his  own 
voHtion,  yet  puts  Ruth  no  exertion,  in  order  to  caufe 
it  ?  If  any  other  way  of  efficiendy  caufm^i^  an  eH'ett, 
than  by  ait  or  exertion  previous  to  the  efled,  be  pof- 
fiblc  or  conceivable,  let  it  be  pointed  out  :  Tdl  this 
be  done,  we  who  conceive  {uch  a  vvay  t(j  be  impoiTi- 
ble  and  inconceivjble,  have  a  right  to  fay  fo,  and  to 
prefume,  that  our  opponents,  who  aflcrt  that  there  is 
fuch  a  way,  are  unable  to  point  it  out,  and  have 
no  more  idea  of  it,  than  we  iiave.  li^  upon  tiial,  tliey 
Ihall  find,  that  they  are  unable  to  point  out  the  way, 
let  them  honeftiy  confefs,  that  all  tliey  mean  by  felf- 
determination  is  what  we  and  all  allow,  that  they  are 
the  fubjcdi  of  volition,  and  as  Dr.  Well  e;<prtirc&  it, 
that  they  thevif elves  will  and  choofc. 

I  perfcdiy  agree  with  Dr.  Weft  when  he  favs,  p. 
2  2,  "  No  being  can  become  an  efiicieni  c-jufc,  but 
"by  FIRST  operating^  nBiug  or  energjjing."  Operation, 
aft  or  energifing  is  as  much  prefuppoi'cd  in  order  to 
an  effect,  as  an  efficient  caufe  is  prefuppofed  in  order 
to  it.  To  fuppofe  an  efficient  caufe  to  produce  ari 
effetl:  without  any  a6l  by  which  he  produces  it,  is  the 
fame  as  to  fuppofe  the  fame  cauic  produces  il)e  eftod, 
without  any  ejiciency  :  It  is  as  ablurd,  as  it  would  be 
to  fuppofe,  that  Dr.  Weft  wrote  his  eflays  widiout  any 
exertion  in  order  to  the  produ£lion  of  them,  or  that 
God  created  the  world,  without  any  creating  aft.  If 
this  be  noLtrue,letthefaIfchoodofii  be  made  toappear. 
Let  any  man  fliow,  that  an  effed  cannot  as  well  come 
to  pafs  without  an  efficient  caufe,  as  wiihout  a  caul- 
ing  a6l  ;  and  that  the  world  could  not  as  well  have 
come  into  exiftence  without  a  Creator,  as  wiihout  a 


creating  a6l. 


D  Some 


Some  of  ilie  advocates  for  fclf-detcimfnation  hold, 
that  the  mind  is  theefficient  caufe  of  its  own  voli- 
tions, yet  not  by  any  ail  or  exertion  of  the  mind,  but 
by  the  power  or  Jacjdiy  of  the  will.  And  how  can 
this  power  or  faculty  produce  volition,  unlefs  it  he 
exerted  jirjl  in  order  to  the  effeft  ?  The  man,  v;l  o 
is  the  fubjetl;  of  a  certain  volition,  had  the  power  of 
will  long  hnce  ;  yet  it  never  produced  that  volition, 
Tve  may  fuppofe,  till  this  moment.  What  is  the  caufe 
or  reafon,  that  it  produces  it  now  and  not  before  ? 
To  fay,  it  does,  becaufe  it  will,  is  to  fay  cither,  that 
this  volition  is  produced  by  another  precediiig,  which 
runs  into  the  infinite  feries  ;  or  that  the  power  of  will, 
or  rather  the  man  in  the  exeicife  of  that  power,  is  the 
fubjeft  of  volition,  becaufe  he  is  the  fuhje6i:  of  it, 
.which  is  mere  trifling. — — On  the  whole  the  exiftence 
of  a  power  of  will  in  a  man,  will  no  more  account  for 
any  particular  volition,  of  which  he  is  the  fubje6l,  than 
the  exiftence  of  the  man  will  account  for  the  fame 
volition,  or  the  exigence  of  a  fhip-carpenter  will  ac- 
count for  the  building  of  a  certain  fliip  ;  or  than  Dr. 
Weft's  having  a  power  to  write  effays  of  Liberty  and 
Neceffity,  will  account  for  his  adually  writing  them 
at  the  precife  time,  at  which  he  did  write  them,  or 
than  his  having  an  ear  will  account  for  his  hearing  a 
particular  found  at  a  certain  time. 

That  we  have  a  power  of  will  or  of  determining 
is  granted  on  all  hands  :  But  that  we  Ihould  effi- 
ciently caufe  our  power  of  will,  to  put  forth  a  voli- 
tion, without  exer'ing  any  efficiency  to  this  effetl;  ; 
only  wants  proof  to  make  it  credible,  and  explanation 
to  make  it  intailigible  or  conceivable.  Merely  the 
circumftance,  that  we  have  a  power  to  will  and  de- 
termine, no  more  proves,  that  without  motive  or  any 
influence  from  without  j  and  without  any  caufing  aft 
within,  we  caufe  that  power  to  exert  itfclf ;  than  the 
circumftance,  that  we  have  a  power  of  hearing  proves, 
that  without  any  pulfalion  in  the  air,  any  caufation 

from 


5^ 

from  without  or  from  within,  we  caufc  ourfelvt-s  to 
hear  a  particular  lound. 

Some  others,  as  well  as  Dr.  Weft,  have  denied, 
that  by  felf  determination  they  mean  the  caufing  of  one 
aft  of  the  will  by  another.  We  have  no  objedion  to 
their  denying  this  :  But  then  we  wifli  them  to  inforni 
us  explicitly,  what  they  do  mean.  If  they  have  any 
meaning  they  doubtleis  can  exprefs  it  iiUelligildy  : 
And  fo  long  as  they  do  not  exprefs  a  meaning  diHer- 
ent  from  what  we  mean  by  willing  or  choofinj;  ;  and 
fo  long  as  their  definitions  oF  felf  determination  ex- 
prefs. either  bare  volition,  or  the  caufing  of  one  voli- 
tion by  another,  though  they  infift,  that  they  mean 
fomething  different  from  either  of  thefe  ;  I  leave  the 
reader  to  judge,  whether  they  have  any  clear  mean- 
ing to  that  word  at  all. 

In  convcrfation  once  with  a  gentleman  of  eminence 
among  the  advocates  for  felf-detcrmination  he  cold  me^ 
that  Prefident  Edwards  had  abufed  thofe  who  write 
in  favour  of  felf  determination,  in  reprefenting  them 
as  holding,  that  the  mind  caufes  one  att  of  volition  by 
another.  On  my  inquiring  of  the  gentleman  what  then 
they  did  mean  ;  his  anfwer  was,  "  They  mean,  tliat  in 
determining  the  mind  determines."  Whether  this  an- 
fwer at  all  explained  the  matter  ;  or  whether  it  con- 
vey any  other  idea,  than  that  the  mind  does  determine, 
and  has  a  volition,  without  touching  the  queftion  con- 
cerning the  caufe,  extrinfic  or  intrinfic  ;  1  fubmit  to 
the  reader.  If  a  man  fhould  fay,  that  in  walking,  he 
walks  ;  in  writing  he  writes  ;  in  hearing  he  hicais  ;  it 
is  prefumed,  that  no  man  could  certainly  hence  con- 
clude, that  the  fpeaker  meant,  that  he  was  not  influ- 
enced to  walk  or  write,  by  motive  or  by  fome  extrin- 
fic caufe  ;  or  that  his  hearing  was  felf  determined. 

If  we  caufe  our  own  voliiions  at  all,  we  caufe  thern 
either  by  a  previous  volition,  or  without  fuch  volition. 
If  we  caufe  them  by  a  previous  volition,  this  is  what 
I  have  been  particularly  confidering,  and  fliall  fay  no 
more  upon  it«  If  we  caufe  thein  without  fuch  voli- 
D  2  tion, 


52 

tion,  we  caufc  them  Involuntarily,  without  any  defign,- 
any  motive  or  agency.  Now  I  wifli  it  may  be  inquir- 
ed, whct'ier  fuch  a  caufation  of  volition  as  tliis,  if  it 
be  palfible  or  conceivable,  as  I  contend  it  is  not,  be 
at  all  more  favourable  to  liberty,  than  that  volition 
ihouid  proceed  from  the  influence  of  motive  or  fome 
other  extrinfic  caufe  ;  and  whether  it  would  be  any 
advantai^e  or  privilege  in  any  rcfpeft  ;  and  whether 
it  would  not  be  a  great  difad vantage  and  calamity  to 
mankind,  and  an  infupportabie  incumbrance  on  the 
influence  of  reafon,  revelation,  virtue,  duty  and  hap- 
pinefs  both  here  and  hereafter.  For  vyhatcver  any  of 
thefe  may  di6late,  and  with  whatever  motives  they  en- 
force thofe  dittates  ;  whatever  virtue  and  our  own 
fcappinefs  may  require,  fince  the  fclf-determining  pow- 
er is  not  influenced  by  thefe  or  any  other  motives  ; 
and  fince,  as  Dr.  Clarke  lays,  "  There  is  no  connec- 
"  tion  at  all  between  the  perception  of  the  underftand- 
"  ing  and  the  exertion  of  the  aftive  faculty;"  all  thofe 
dilates  and  motives  would  be  in  vain  ;  the  felf  deter- 
mining power  is  a  fovereign,  ungovernable  principle, 
perfedtly  deaf  and  unmoved  by  any  motive,  realbn, 
argument  or  reprefentation  whether  of  duty  or  inter- 
eft.  It  therefore  de(iro)s  the  very  ufe  not  only  of 
our  reafon,  of  revelation  and  of  the  motives  of  both  ; 
but  of  our  affeftions,  paffions,  appetites  and  fcnfes,  in 
every  part  of  our  conduct  as  moral  agents.  For  fo 
far  as  we  are  influenced  by  any  of  thefe,  we  are  not 
feif-detcrmined,  and  dierefore,  according  to  our  oppo- 
nents, we  are  incapable  of  moral  aftion  ;  and  efpecial- 
ly  are  we  not  felf- determined  in  the  fenfe  now  partic- 
ularly under  confideration  ;  caufmg  our  own  volitions 
involuntarily  and  without  a  previous  volition. 

Self-determination  uninfluenced  by  motive,  is  in- 
confiitent  with  all  religion  and  morality  and  with  all 
virtue  and  vice.  To  love  God  without  motive,  prin- 
ciple, aim  or  end,  is  no  religion.  To  love  and  do 
good  to  mankind  in  like  manner,  is  no  virtue.  To 
bate  God  or  mankind  in   like  mannerj  is  no  irrelig- 

ion 


53 

ion  or  vice.  Jufl:  fo  as  to  dealing,  robbiiig,  kill- 
ing, &c. 

The  felf-detcrmining  power  is,  as  1  faid,  an  ungov- 
ernable principle.  It  not  only  cannot  be  governed  by 
reafon,  revelation,  &c.  But  not  by  any  laws  human 
or  divine  ;  for  thefe  are  only  motives.  Nay,  it  can- 
not be  governed  by  God,  his  providence  or  his  grace. 
To  be  governed  by  either  of"  thefe  would  be  to  be 
governed  by  an  cxtrinfic  caufe,  and  under  fuch  gov- 
ernment men  would  be  paffive.  If  God  in  his  provi- 
dence govern  and  control  them  and  their  a6tions,  they 
are  limited,  and  aft  only  by  permiflion,  and  have  no 
power  to  a£l  or  not  a6l,  no  liberty  to  either  fide,  but  are 
confined  to  one  fide.     Where  then  is  felf-determina- 

tion  ? On  the  other  hand,  if  men   determine  and 

control  all  their  own  aftions,  none  of  their  aBions  are 
controlled  by  God. 

Dr.  Reid,  a  late  ftrcnuous  advocate  for  felfdcter- 
mination  fays,  *•  The  name  of  a  caulc  and  of  an  agent, 
"  is  properly  given  to  that  being  only,  wiiich  by  its 
"  a6tive  power,  produces  fome  change  in  itlelf,  or  in 
"  fome  other  being.  The  change,  whether  it  be  of 
"  thought,  of  will,  or  of  motion,  is  the  eff'eft.  A6live 
"  power  therefore  is  a  quality  in  the  caufe,  which  en- 
"^  ables  it  to  produce  the  efiFecl.  And  the  exertion  of 
"  that  active  power  in  producing  the  effetl,  is  called 
"  attion,  agency,  efficiency.  In  order  to  the  produc- 
"  tion  of  any  efie^l,  there  muft  be  in  the  caufe,  not  on- 
"  ly  power,  but  the  exertion  of  that  power  :  For  power 
«  that  is  not  exerted  produces  no  effe6l."  Effays  on 
the  A8ivc  Powers,  p.  259.  Therefore  if  we  be  the 
efficient  caufes  of  our  own  volitions,  as  Dr.  Clarke, 
Dr.  Chauncy,  &c.  held,  we  mull  not  only  have  a 
power  to  produce  them,  but  there  muft  be  an  exertion 
of  power  in  order  to  the  production  of  volition.  This 
ext  rtion  is  doubtlefs  an  exertion  of  the  will.  Thus  we 
run  into  the  infinite  feries  feveral  times  mentioned. 
And  however  others  attempt  to  evade  the  abfurdities 
D3  of 


54 

of  this  infinite  feriesj  Dr.  Ried  and  his  followers  muft 
fall  into  them. 

"  All  our  power,"  fays  Dr.Reid,ibid5  299,  "  is  dire6t- 
''  ed  by  our  will  ;  wc  can  form  no  conception  of  power, 
«'  properly  fo  called,  diat  is  not  under  the  dire6lion  of 
f*  our  will."  Then  we  have  no  power  to  direft  or  de- 
termine our  will,  unlefs  we  go  round  in  a  circle.  If 
our  will  direO:  all  our  power,  as  the  Do61or  aflerts  ; 
and  our  felf-determining  power  dire6t  and  determine 
our  will,  then  we  go  round  in  a  circle,  our  will  direfl- 
iiig  all  our  power,  and  our  feif-determining  power  di- 
recting our  will.  Glorious  liberty  this  !  And  this 
jiiuft  be  an  age  of  glorious  improvement  and  illumi- 
nation, or  we  fliould  never  have  made  fuch  difcove- 
ries  as  thefe  !  Yet  Dr.  Reid  had  great  reafon  to  fay, 
that  ail  our  power  is  dire6kd  by  our  will,  oiherwife 
ibme  of  our  power  might  aB  involuntarily  and  our 
idf-determining  power  (if  we  have  any)  might  dire8; 
and  govern  us  without  our  confent ;  with  which  Dr. 
Reid's  fcherae  would  very  ill  agree.  vStill  the  DoBbr 
in  this  gives  up  a  point,  which  he  had  before  pofitive- 
iy  afferted  and  had  laboured  hard  to  ettablifli,  "  that 
if  the  will  be  not,  "  nothing  elfe  is,  in  our  pow- 
er ;"  p.  258.  Now  if  the  will  be  in  our  power, 
it  is  under  our  direction,  or  is  dire8ed  by  our 
power.  So  that  we  have  the  circle  complete  ;  all 
"  our  power  is  diretled  by  our  will  ;"  and  yet  our 
will  is  direBcd  by  our  power.  Into  what  glaring  in- 
confifiences  will  not  men  run,  rather  than  give  up  a 
favourite  and  indefenfible  hypothefis  !  Yet  they  are 
fo  blinded  by  their  attachment  to  that  hypothefis,  that 
they  fee  no  inconfiftency  attending  it. — — The  truth 
is,  that  both  thefe  principles,  ^/z^z^//  our  poxvcr  is  direB- 
cd  by  our  will ;  and  that  our  will  is  direBc.d  by  our  f elf - 
(leUrmiiiing  power,  are  effcntial  to  the  Doftor's  fcheme, 
and  to  the  fcheme  of  all  who  hold  a  felf determining 
power.  To  reconcile  thefe  two  principles  deeply  con- 
cerns therii.  But  they  have  never  yet  been  able  to 
do  it ;  nor,  it  h  prefumed;  ever  will  be  able. 

Some 


55 

Some  of  the  writers  iti  favour  of  felf-detcrmination 
Teem  to  be  fenlible  of  the  mxjlery  in  it  ;  particularly 
Dr.  Chauncy.  "  It  is  readily  allowed,"  fayi  he,  "lib- 
"  erty  in  man,  in  oppofitlon  to  neceffity,  is  one  of  th^ 
"  great  zuonders  of  God.  The  power  in  our  nature, 
"  that  conflitutt's  us  free  agents,  is  an  amazing  contriv- 
*'  ance  of  infinite  wifiom.  The  modus  of  its  opera- 
"  tion  is  loo  great  a  deep  for  us  to  fathom.  It  has  tri- 
"  ed  and  puzzled  the  greateft  gcniufes  in  all  pans  of 
"  the  world."  Benevolence  oj  lite  Deily,'p.  135.  No 
wonder  then,  that  nobody  has  ever  been  able  to  give 
a  confifknt  or  intelligible  account  of  this  power.  So 
long  as  thofe  who  believe  in  it,  are  puzzled  with  it, 
we  may  expeci,  that  their  accounts  of  it  will  be  con- 
fufed,  unintelligible  and  contradictory.  But  the  ac- 
count of  no  one  of  them  appears  to  be  more  contra- 
didory  than  that  of  Dr.  VJcii.  He  gives  up  the  idea 
of  Dr.  Claike  and  Dr.  Chauncy,  that  the  mind  is  the 
efficient  caufe  of  its  own  vohtions  ;  yet  he  falls  into 
the  fame,  in  holding,  that  the  mind  in  willing  modifies 
iifelf,  and  that  this  modification  is  the  ejjecl  of  the  mind 
willing,  p.  24  ;  and  that  we  are  independent  in  will- 
ing, p.  2-,.  He  holds  that  volition  has  no  caufe;  yet: 
h')lds,  that  the  modification  made  of  the  mind  by  it- 
fe!f  in  willing,  is  the  effect  of  the  mind  willing.  He 
holds  that  volitions  have  no  caufe;  yet  denies,  that  he 
can  he  jultly  charged  with  holding,  that  events  take 
place  without  a  caufe  ;  p.  27.  Surely  the  Doclor 
can  never  expeci,  that  his  unbiafed  readers  will  re- 
ceive his  fyftem,  until  he  fliall  have  removed  thefe 
inconfillences. 

Archbifliop  King  is  grofsly  inconfiRent  with  him- 
felf,  in  holding,  that  the  will  determines  itielf  to  choofe 
certain  objects,  without  tl.e  inlhience  of  motive  or 
?ny  caufe  out  of  the  wdl  ;  and  yet  holding,  that  the 
will  is  determined  to  choofe  thole  objetls,  becaule  of 
ilic  picafure  which  will  be  in  coni'cquence  of  that 
choice.  Law's  edition,  p.  2-j6.  In  fuch  a  cafe  the 
\^i\\  h  as  much  determined  by  motive,  as  if  a  man 
D  4  were 


56 

^vc;le  determined  io  go  to  a  debauch,  in  the  profpe£l 
of  the  rcnfiial  pleafuie,  which  he  expelled  there. 

Dr.  Wed  lays,  p.  23,  "  Every  effeB  is  wholly  paf- 
"  five  with  regard  to  the  caufe,  Vv'hich  produces  it." 
And  this  equally  holds,  whether  the  caufe  be  extrin- 
fic  or  intrinfic.  '«  Confequently,  if  human  volition 
'•  be  an  effed"  even  of  an  intrinfic  caufe,  "  the  man 
'-  mull  be  paffive  in  willing.  But  if  man  be  paffive 
*•  in  willing,  he  can  be  active  in  nothing  elfe  ;  i.  e.  he 
"  i&  no  agent,  but  a  mere  paffive  machine."  What 
then  is  the  great  advantage,  which  the  advocates  for 
j'elf-determinmg  power  and  the  intrinfic  caufation  of 
voluion,  would  gain,  could  they  eftablifti  their  favour- 
ite doctrine  ?  According  to  their  own  fcheme,  every 
voliiicn  would  be  an  effeB,  2i paffive  efFe6t,  and  "man 
"  inuit  be  paiTive  in  willing.  But  if  man  be  paffive 
*•  in  willing,  he  can  be  active  in  nothing  elfe  :  i.  e.  he 
"  !s  no  agent,  but  a  mere  paifive  machine."  Ibid. 
More  than  this  cannot  be  faid  on  this  head,  if  we  fup- 
pofe  volition  to  be  the  effe6l  of  an  exirinftc  caufe. 
Therefore  they  are  grofsly  inconfiflent  with  ihemfelves! 
in  rejetiing  one  of  two  hypothcfes,  on  account  of  fup- 
poled  abidraities,  which  equally  attend  the  other,  and 
yet  retaining  that  other. 

Although  Dr.  Clarke  and  others  affi^rt,  that  the  true 
and  only  queftion  concerning  liberty,  is,  whether  we 
be  the  efficient  caufes  of  our  own  volitions  ;  yet  they 
themfelves  would  not  abide  by  this  conceffion.  For 
if  it  were  previoufly  fixed  and  ellabliffied,  what  par- 
ticular volitions  we  ffiould  efficiently  caufe  in  our- 
felves,  this  would  be  as  inconfiftent  with  their  ideas 
of  liberty,  as  the  fuppofition,  that  they  are  produced 
by  an  extrinfic  caufe.  Gentlemen  of  that  clafs  uni- 
verfally  hold,  that  abfolute  decrees  arc  inconfiftent 
with  liberty,  bccaufe  they  eftabliffi  the  a6\ions  decreed.  . 
Therefore  if  God  have  decreed  that  we  oiirfelves 
fliali  efficiently  caufe  fuch  and  fuch  volitions  in  our 
own  minds  ;  tl  is  as  effis6lually  eftabliffies  and  fecurcs 
the  exiRcncc  of  thofe  volitions,  as  if  he  had  decreed, 

that 


57 

tnat  they  fliould  be  efFe£lcJ  by  any  oiher  ctiufe. 
Therefore  not  only  docs  their  idea  uF  liberty  require 
fclf-deiermination,  but  it  equally  requires  perfect  pre- 
vious uncertainty  and  chance,  and  an  entire  exemp- 
tion from  all  rule,  limitation  or  confinement,  f'o  that 
the  mind  not  only  produces  its  own  volitions;  but 
produces  them  at  random  and  by  mere  chance,  with- 
out the  influence  of  motive  and  without  arly  previous 
certainty,  what  particular  atls  it  fhall  produce,  and 
whether  any.  Thus  according  to  them  felf  determin- 
ation is  atting.by  clianceand  becoming  the  fubjed  of 
volitions  without  any  proper  caufeat  all  :  For  a  caufe 
that  a(-ls  by  chance  and  ftupidly,  without  motive  or 
dcfign,  is  no  proper  efficient  caufe  at  all. 

Dr.  Weft  lays,  p.  17,  "  We  have  fet  afi^e  the  no- 
"  tion,  that  the  will  determines  all  the  prefent  afts  of 
"  the  will  :  For  we  entirely  join  with  Mr.  Edwards 
"  in  exploding  that  idea."  \Vhat  myltcry  there  may  be 
couched  under  the  xoill,  I  will  not  pretend  to  fay. 
But  as  he  "  entirely  agrees  widi  Mr.  Edwards  in  ex- 
"  ploding  that  idea,"  Dr.  Weft  muft  hold  not  only, 
that  the  v.'ill  as  a  diftinft  power  of  the  mind  does  not 
determine  the  prefent  ads  of  the  will  ;  but  thai  the 
mind  in  the  excrcife  of  the  power  of  will,  does  not 
determine  thole  atfcs.  For  this  is  equally  exploded 
by  Mr.  Edwards,  as  the  other.  The  Do6lor  lays, 
tliat  "  the  will  does  not  determine  all  the  prefent  ads 
"  of  the  will."  But  does  it  determine  any  of  the  adls 
of  the  will,  whether  prefent^  pajl  or  future  ?  As  he 
agrees  in  this  particular  with  Mr.  Edwards,  he  mutl 
anfwer  in  the  negative.  All  pofl  atls  of  the  wdl  were 
once  prefent  ;  and  when  they  were  prefent  Dr.  Weft 
denies,  that  the  will  determined  them  :  And  he  will  not 
fay,  that  the  will  determines  them  now  that  they  are 
paft.  Alio  all  future  afts  of  the  will  erelong  will  be 
prefent  ;  and  when  they  fliall  be  prefent,  they  will 
not,  according  to  Dr.  Weft's  conecffion,  be  determin- 
ed by  the  will.  Therefore  he  will  not  fay,  that  they 
arc  determined  by  the  will  now,  before  they  come  in- 
to 


to  exigence.  Doubilefs  by  whatever  tliey  are  deter- 
fnined,  ihey  are  determined  by  it  at  the  very  inftani 
of  their  coming  into  exiftence.  No  caufe  produces 
an  tfrefl.  at  a  time  before  or  after  the  exifience  of 
that  effett  :  Therefore  by  this  conceflion  of  Dr.  Vv'elt 
it  feems  he  holds,  that  no  voHtion.  paft,  prefent  or 
future  is  determined  by  the  will,  or  by  the  mind  in 
the  exercife  of  the  will.  Yet  Dr.  Weft  iirenuoufly 
pleads  for  a  felf  determining  power  :  But  what  good 
purpofc  does  this  power  anfwer,  fince  it  determines 
no  ad  of  will  ?  It  feems  it  is  a  very  innocent  and 
harmlcfs  thing,  bccaufe  it  is  very  inefficacious  and 
dormant,  doing  neither  good  nor  hurt. 

Dr.  Clarke,  in  papers  between  Leibnitz  and  him- 
felf,  p.  73,  grants,  that  "  nothing  is,  without  a  fuffi- 
*'  cient  reafon  why  it  is,  rather  than  not  ;  and  why  it 
«  is  thus,  rather  than  otherwife.  But"  fays,  that  "  in 
*'  things  in  their  own  nature  indifferent,  mere  zuili, 
"  without  any  thing  external  to  influence  it,  is  alone 
"  that  fufficient  reafon."  By  will  the  Dodor  muft 
inean  either  an  act  o^  volition,  or  the  pozver  of. the 
will.  If  he  mean  that  the  formef  is  the  reafon  or 
oround  of  our  a6\s  of  the  will,  he  runs  into  the  infi- 
nite ferics.  If  he  mean  the  latter  it  is  as  abfurd  as  to 
fjy,  The  ability  of  Dr.  Clarke  to  write  his  replies  to 
Leibnitz,  was  alone  the  fufficient  reafon  why  he  wrote 
ihem. 

Dr.  Price  in  his  correfpondence  with  Dr.  Prieftly, 
p.  136,  fays,  '•  It  cannot  be  juftly  faid,  that  felf-deter- 
"  mination  implies  an  efFe6l  without  a  caufe.  Does  it 
"  follow,  that  becaufe  I  am  rayfelf  ibe  caufe,  there  is 
"no  caufe  ?"  To  this  I  anfv^er,  that  though  it  does 
indeed  not  follow,  that  bccaufe  I  afn  myfelf  the 
caufe  of  a  volition,  there  is  no  caufe  ;  as  it  is  tak- 
en for  granted,  that  there  is  a  caufe,  and  that  1  am 
that  caufe  ;  yet  from  the  fuppofnion,  ihat  volition  is 
not  the  effect  of  a  caufe  ex-trinfic  to  the  mind  in  which 
it  takes  place,  it  will  follow,  that  there  is  no  caufe  of 
it  ;  bccaufe  it  is  abfolutely  impoffibic,  that  the  mind 

iifclf 


59 

itfelf  (liould  be  the  caufe  of  it.  The  impofTibility  of 
this  has  been  already  ftated  in  the  preceding  difcourfe, 
and  more  largely  illuftrated  by  other  \Ariters  :  And  if 
aiiy  man  will  fhow  the  pofFibiiity  of  the  mind's  cauf- 
ing  its  own  volitions,  and  will  remove  the  abfurdiiies 
attending  that  fuppofition  ;  erit  viihi  Magnus  Apollo  : 
It  will  then,  and  not  till  then,  be  incumbent  on  us  to 
I'pcak  of  felf  determination  in  a  very   diiTerent  drain. 

In  fine  ;  thofe  who  plead  for  a  felf-dctermining  pow- 
er, either  mean  what  Dr.  Well  declares  he  means, 
that  we  ourfelves  determine  whenever  we  do  deter- 
mine ;  which  is  no  part  of  the  i'ubjetl  of  this  coniro- 
verfy,  is  difputed  by  none  and  is  nothing  oppofite  to 
moral  nccelfity,  extiinfic  caufaliiy  of  volition,  &c.  but 
amounts  to  this  merely,  that  we  aro  die  fubjefts  of 
volition  :  Or  they  mean,  that  we  are  the  efficient 
caufcs  of  our  own  volitions.  But  thefe  men  feem 
never  to  have  refleftcd  fo  far  on  the  fubjc6l,  as  to 
fee,  that  this  idea  of  felf-determination  runs  into  what 
has  been  fo  often  charged  upon  them,  an  infinite  fe- 
rics  of  volitions  caufing  one  another  :  And  therefore 
when  this  difficulty  is  fuggefted  to  them,  they  are  ei- 
ther filenced  and  have  nothing  to  anfwer,  or  elfc  an- 
fwer  jn  iuch  a  manner  as  to  fhow,  that  by  efficiently 
caufing.  our  own  volitions  they  mean  merely  what  Dr. 
Weft  profefles  to  mean,  that  we  will  or  are  the  fub- 
je6sof  volition,  which  no  more  implies,  that  we  caufe 
them,  than  that  we  caufe  all  our  own  perceptions  and 
feelings  follows  from  our  being  the  fubjeds  of  them. 

"  1  take  it  to  be  an  important  truth,"  fays  the  Doc- 
tor, Part  II,  p.  ig,  "  that  wherever  neceffity  begins, 
*'  liberty  ends ;  and  that  a  neceffary  agent  is  a  eontra- 
"  diclion."  What  a  pity,  that  the  Do6lor  fhould  under- 
take the  defence  of  a  propofition,  which  he  is  neceffi- 
tatcd  perpetually  to  beg  !  Or  if  he  be  not  neceffitat- 
ed  to  beg  it,  what  a  pity  that  he  fhould  do  it  without 
neceffity  !  He  knows  or  ought  to  have  known,  that 
this  which  he  here  takes  for  granted,  is  not  conceded ; 
tiiat  Prefident  Edwards  and  all  his  followers  hold,  that 

the 


-60 

the  raoft  abfolute  moral  neceflity  is  confident  with 
perfect  liberty,  and  that  an  agent  acting  under  moral 
necelfity,  is  lb  far  from  a  contradidlion,  that  neither 
God  nor  creature  is  or  can  be  any  other  agent.  If 
Dr.  Welt  Ihould  fay,  that  a  neceflary  agent  is  a  con- 
tradi6lion  according  to  his  idea  of  agent,  i.  e.  a  felf- 
determinate  agent  or  one  atling  by  chance  :  Be  it 
i'o  ;  he  ought  to  prove,  and  not  affume,  that  his  idea 
is  pofiible  and  according  to  truth. 

".  When  a  man  confiders,"  (fays  Dr.  Weft,  p.  23, 
Part  II,)  "  that  he  is  not  moved  by  any  extrinfic 
<'  caufe  to  do  evil,  but  that  his  wickednefs  has  origin- 
^'  ated  luholly  frorn  himfeif,  he  muft  feel  himfelf  e.x- 
*•  ceedingly  vile  and  unworthy  of  any  divine  favour." 
This  is  talking  altogether  in  the  clouds  :  What  does 
he  mean  by  wickednefs  originated  from  a  man's  felf  ? 
He  cannot  confiilently  mean,  that  "  felf  a6ls  on  felf 
"  and  produces  wickednefs  ;"  for  this  he  rejefts  as 
abfurd.  If  he  mean,  that  a  man  is  himfelf  the  fub- 
ject  of  wickednefs,  wicked  volitions  or  a6lions  ;  this 
is  granted  ;  but  it  is  not  at  all  oppofed  to  his  being 
moved  by  an  extrinfic  caufe  to  that  wickednefs,  any 
more  than  a  man's  being  the  fubjecl  of  pain  is  incon- 
fiitent  with  the  pain's  being  effected  by  an  extrinfic 
caufe.  If  there  be  any  fenfe  befide  thefe  two,  in 
».vhich  wickednefs  can  be  originated  from  a  man's  felf, 
let  it  be  pointed  out. 

"  If  men  have  an  exiftence  diftinQ  from  Deity," 
fays  the  Do£lor,  "  endowed  with  a  confcioufnefs  dif- 
"  tinft  from  Deity,  then  they  have  a  felf  active  prin- 
*'  ciple  diftin£l  from  Deity  ;  i.  e.  they  have  a  felf-de- 
"  termining  power  ;"  ibid,  p.  24.  That  men  have  an 
exiftcnce  and  confcioufnefs  diflinft  from  Deity,  is 
granted  ;  but  that  it  thence  follows,  that  they  have  a 
fclf-determining  power,  if  by  that  be  meant  any  thing 
diftind  from  a  faculty  of  will  influenced  by  extrinfic 
motives  and  caufcs  is  not  granted,  and  ought  not  to 
have  been  taken  for  granted,  nor  alfcrted  without 
prooF.     From  the  fame  preniifes  it  would  follow,  that 

brutes 


brutes  have  a  felf-dctermining  power  ;  which  is  not 
generally  allowed  by  the  advocates  for  that  power. 
For  brutes  have  both  an  cxifkncc  and  a  confcioufnefs 
diftind  from  the  Deity. 

"  He  that  cannot  govern  his  own  mind  ;  but  is 
"  conftanily  determined  by  an  extrinfic  caufe,  is  c'er- 
"  taiiily  the  fubjcft  of  mere  chance  and  accident  ;" 
ibid,  p.  28.  Indeed  [  and  is  tlie  planetary  fyftem 
the  fubjed  of  mere  chance  and  accident  ?  The  mate- 
rial world  cannot  govern  itlelf,  yet  not  an  hair  of  our 
head  efcapes  the  notice  or  the  difpofal  of  our  heaven- 
ly Father. Surely  the  Dodor  afferted  this  without 

confideration. 

"  Our  doctrine  of  felf-determination  implying,  that 
*•  wlien  the  mind  afts,  it  always  has  an  objeft  in  view, 
"  and  that  there  is  always  a  reafon  for  ading,  is  as 
"  fully  confident  with  our  being  the  fubje6ls  of  com- 
"  mands  and  promifes,  prohibitions  and  threatenings, 
"  and  edablifhes  as  hire  a  connection  between  means 
"  and  ends,  as  he"  [Prefident  Edwards]  "  can  fuppofe 
«'  to  ariCe  from  the  dotirine  of  Neceffiiy."  Ibid,  p. 
29.  Yet  the  Doftor's  do6lrine  is,  "  that  men  are  not 
"  always  governed  by  tie  ftrongeft  motive,"  and  that 
there  is  no  fure  connexion  between  motives  and  ac- 
tion. Ibid,  p.  6.  Now  the  Do£tor  is  fpeaking  of  the 
means  and  ends  of  moral  agents  and  moral  attions  ; 
and  particularly  oF  commands  and  promifes,  prohibi- 
tions and  threatenings,  conGdcred  as  motives  and 
means  of  aclion.  And  does  that  dodrine  which 
teaches  that  there  is  no  fure  connection  between  the 
ftrongeft  motive,  or  even  any  motives,  whether  ftrong- 
cr  or  weaker,  and  a6tion,  eliablifli  as  fure  a  connec- 
tion between  fuch  mean.;  and  their  ends,  which  are 
moral  anions,  as  that  dottrine  which  teaches,  that 
there  is  a  fure  and  infallible  connc61ion  between  fuch 
means  and  their  ends  ?  Is  it  not  furprifing,  that  the 
Dotlor  fhould  alfert  fuch  a  thing  ? 

He  tells  us,  ibid,  p.  29,  "  That  he  holds  no  fuch 
«  kind  of  lelf-dctcrminatiop;  as  a  power  to  ad  without 

«  and 


62 

"  and  againft  every  kind  of  reafon  or  argument."  But 
he  does  hold  a  power  to  aft  without  and  againft  the 
Jlrongejl  reafons  and  arguments  :  Therefore  he  ought 
much  more  to  hold  a  power  to  aft  without  and  againft 
the  weaker ;  and  confequenlly  a  power  to  aft  widiout 
and  againft  every  kind  of  reafon  and  argument. 
Nay,  the  DoQor  does  exprefsly  hold  a  power  to  rcjijl 
all  motives,  reafons  and  arguments,  and  a  power  to 
remain  inaBive  notwithftanding  the  folicitations  of  them 
all  And  is  it  not  ftrange,  that  he  who  poffefles  a 
power  to  refift  and  remain  inaftive,  without  and 
againft  every  kind  of  reafon  and  argument ;  has  not 
alfo  a  power  to  refift  them  in  afting  againft  them  ? 


CHAPTER 


^3 


CHAPTER      IV. 

OJ  Motives  and  tkeir  Injluence. 

DR.  Weft  has  given  his  definition  of  a  motive,  p. 
17  ;  "  It  is  the  ocGafion,  realbn,  end  or  defign, 
"  which  an  agent  has  in  view,  when  he  afts."  And  he 
grants,  ibid,  "  that  the  uiind  a6ts  upon  motives  j 
*'  /.  e.  when  the  mind  a8s  or  choofes,  it  always  has 
"  fome  end,  defign  or  reafon,  which  is  the  occafion  of 
"  its  a8in;^  or  choofing.  Therefore  motives,  in  our 
"  fenfe  of  the  term,  arc  the  previous  circumftances, 
"  which  are  neceffdry  fora6lion."  And,  Part  II,  p.  93; 
'•  Action  cannot  take  place  without  fome  objed,  rea- 
"  fon  or  motive ;  and  the  motive  or  reafon  for  aftingmw/? 
"  be  prior  to  the  action  of  the  mind,  and  he  perceived  by 
"  it,  before  it  can  ad."  "  Nothing  can  become  an  object 
"  of  choice,  except  it  appears  to  be  eligible;"  p.  95,  Part 
II.  Yet  he  inaintains,  "  that  there  is  no  infalhble  connec- 
"  tion  between  motive  and  atlion  ;"  and  that  "when  mo-" 
"  tives  have  done  all  that  they  can  do,  the  mind  may 
"  atl  or  not  acl,"  The  reafon  which  he  afligns  for 
this,  is,  "  that  though  the  mind  never  afts  without 
"  fome  reafon  or  defign  in  a6iing  ;  yet  there  is  no 
'•  need  of  afTigning  a  reafon  for  not  aBing"  P,  17, 
18. If  by  acling  or  not  aHing  he  mean  a  volunta- 
ry a6lmg  or  not  a6ling,  or  a  choofing  or  refufing  of 
the  motives  prefentcd ;  it  is  to  be  obfcrved,  as  1  have 
already  otjfcrved,  that  refufing  is  as  real  an  action  as 
(  l.oofing  ;  and  a  voluntary  not  aftin^  is  a  voluntary 
ivlulal  to  a6l  and  to  comply  with  the  motives  propos- 
ed, and  is  as  real  a  volition  as  any  other;  and  there- 
^)re  by  his  own  concclfion,  "  motive  is  neceffary  10 
•  it,"  equally   neceffdry   as  for  any  other  volition  or 

.idion. Or  if  by  not  aUiUg  Dr.  Welt  mean  no  a6fc 

of  either  choofing  or  refufing,  hut  a  perfed  inadion ; 
then  what  he  fays,  -will  come  to  this.  That  when  mo- 
tives 


64 

lives  are  propofed,  the  mind  may  choofc  to  comply 
with  them,  or  it  may  refute  to  comply  with  them,  of 
it  may  do  neither.  But  the  impoffibility  of  this  1  en- 
deavoured toilluitrate  in  the  fecond  chapter,  and  fliall 
fay  no  more  on  it  at  prefent. 

But  if  it  were  poffible,  that  on  the  propofal  of  mo- 
tives, the  mind  Ihould  not  aB  at  all ;  how  would  it 
follow,  as  Dr.  Wefl;  fays,  that  there  is  no  infallible 
connexion  between  motive  and  aBion  ?  It  is  granted 
by  Dr.  Welt  that  motive  *, .neceflary  to  every  aciion, 
whether  of  choice  or  refufal  ;  and  to  fay  as  the  Do6lor 
does,  that  it  is  not  neceffary  for  not  aHivg^SLmouuts  to  tl.is 
merely,  that  it  is  not  neccllary  for  involuntary,  block- 

ilh  inaBion  or  torpitude. By  infallible  conncdion 

we  mean  no  more  than  conftant  invariable  connexion, 
fo  that  whenever  the  mind  a6ls,  whether  in  choice  or 
refufal,  it  is  under  the  perfuafive  influence  of  fome 
motive,  which,  as  Dr.  Wefl  grants,  "  is  the  reafon 
"  and  occafion  of  its  atiing,"  and  "  a  circumliance 
"  neceffary  for  a61ion."  We  pretend  not  but  that 
the  man,  when  motives  are  prefented,  may  poffibly 
fall  into  a  fwoon  or  other  ftate  of  involuntary  Cupidi- 
ty. If  this  fhould  be  the  cafe,  it  would  be  nothing 
to  the  prefent  purpofe.  For  the  queftion  before  us 
is,  whether  volition  be  or  be  not  in  all  cafes  accord- 
ing to  motive  in  the  large  fenfe  of  Prefident  Edwards, 
including  reafons,  apd  external  objefts,  with  the  talte 
and  bias  of  the  mind.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  a 
determination  by  motive.  Let  what  will  be  the  caufe 
of  involuntary  and  torpid  inaftion  ;  fo  long  as  it  is 
granted,  as  Dr.  Well  does  grant,  that  motive  is  nec- 
effary to  volition,  and  that  every  volition,  whether 
choice  or  refufal,  is  occafioned  by  motive,  and  never 
extfts  without  it,  every  thing  is  granted  on  this  head, 
for  which  we  contend. 

Dr.  Weft  fays,  "  We  cannot  agree  with  Mr.  Ed- 
"  wards  in  his  affertion,  that  motive  is  the  caufe  of  voli- 
«'•  tion;"  p.  17.  Mr.  Edwards  has  very  particularly  in- 
formed us  in  what  fenfc  he  ufes  the  word  caufe.  Thus, 

p.  41 ; 


65 

p.  41  ;  "I  fometimcs  ufe  thv"  word  caiife  in  this  In- 
"  quiry.)  to'tignify  any  antecedent  cither  natural  or  mor- 
«  al,  pofitive  or  negative,  on  which  an  event,  either  a 
*•  thing  or  the  manner  and  circumltance  of  a  llnng, 
«  fo  depends,  that  it  is  the  ground  and  reafbn,  either 
«  in  whole  or  in  part,  wliy  it  is  rather  than  not  ;  or 
"  wliy  it  is  rather  than  othcrwife.  Or  in  other  words, 
"  any  antecedent  with  which  a  confequcnt  event  is 
'*  fo  connefted,  that  it  truly  belongs  to  the  reafon 
"  why  the  propofitionj  which  affirms  that  event,  is 
*'  true  ;  whether  it  has  any  pofitive  influence  or  not." 
Now,  does  Dr.  Weft  deny,  that  motive  is  an  antece- 
dent, on  which  volition  either  in  whole  or  part  de- 
pends ?  Or  that  it  is  a  ground  or  reafon,  either  in 
whole  or  part,  either  by  pofitive  influence  or  not, 
■why  it  is  rather  than  not  ?  Surely  he  cannot  with 
confidence  deny  this,  fince  he  does  fay,  "  By  mo- 
tive we  "  underftand  the  occafion^  reafon,  end  or  de- 
"  fign,  which  an  agent  has  in  view,  when  he  acts  ;" 
and  that  motives  are  the  previous  "  circumftances, 
"  which  are  necejfary  for  atlion  ?"  Surely  a  previous 
circumftance,  which  is  neccfTary  for  action  or  voli- 
tion, is  an  "  antecedent  on  which  volition  depends  ;" 
and  "  a  reafon  which  an  agent  has  in  view,  when  he 
"  aQs,"  and  "  a  reafon  which  is  the  occafion  of  his 
*'  ading,"  "  is  a  reafon  either  in  whole  or  pan,  whv 
*'  the  aftion  is."  So  that  however  defirous  Dr.  Welt 
may  be,  to  be  thought  to  differ,  in  this  point,  from 
Prefident  Edwards,  it  appears,  that  he  moll  exatlly 
agrees  with  him.  Yet  he  fays,  p.  1 1,  "  Mr.  Edwards, 
*'  by  making  motives  the  caufc  of  a6ts  of  the  will,  and 
"  by  declaring,  that  the  exiftence  of  the  a61s  of  the 
"  will  is  the  effeft  of  their  motives,  appears  full  as  un- 
"  intelligible  to  vie,  as  Chubb  could  poflibly  appear 
"  to  him."  But  as  it  appears,  that  Prefident  Edwards 
has  explained  himfelf  to  mean  by  caiife  no  other  than 
occafion,  reafon  or  previous  circufnjlana  necejfary  for 
volition  ;  and  that  in  this  Dr.  Weft  entirely  agrees 
with  him  ;  if  Prefident  Edwards  appear  abfurd  to 
E  Dr. 


66 

Dr.  Weft,  Dr.  Weft  muft  appear  abfurd  to  himfeif, 
even  as  abfurd  as  Chubb  could  poffibly  appear  to 
Frefidcnt  Edwards. 

I  do  not  pretend,  that  motives  are  the  efficient 
caufes  of  vohtion.  If  any  expreffion  importing  this, 
have  dropped  from  any  defender  of  the  connedion 
between  motive  and  volition  ;  either  it  muft  have 
happened  through  inadvertence,  or  he  muft  have 
meant,  that  motive  is  an  efficient  cavfe  in  no  other 
fenfe  than  rain  and  the  rays  of  the  fun  are  the  efficient 
eaufe  of  the  growth  of  vegetables,  or  than  medicine  is 
the  efficient  caufe  of  health. 

When  we  affcrt,  that  volition  is  determined  by  mo- 
tive, we  mean  not  that  motive  is  the  efficient  caufe 
of  it  ;  but  we  mean,  that  there  is  a  ftated  connexion 
between  volition  and  motive.  To  that  as  Dr.  Weft  fays, 
"  Whenever  the  mind  aBs  or  choofes, it  always  has 
««  fome  reafon"  or  motive,  "  which  is  the  occajion  of 
"  its  afting  or  choofing,"  and  ".,  is  a  previous  circum- 
"  ftance  neceffary  for  a6lion"  or  volition.     This  a- 
mounts  to  all  we  mean  by  an  infallible  connexion  be- 
tween  motive    and  volition  ;  and    therefore    though 
Dr.  Weft  denies  fuch  a  conneBion,  he  in  fa6l  holds 
it,  as  much  as  we  do.     By  infallible  connexion  be- 
tween motive  and  volition,  we  mean,  that   volition 
never   takes  place  without  fome  motive,  reafon  or 
caufe  of  its  exiftence,  either  in  the  views  of  the  mind 
of  him,  who  is  the  fubjeft  of  the  volition,  in  the  dif- 
pofition,  bias  or  appetite  of  his  mind  or  body,  or  from 
the  influence  of  fome  extrinfic  agent.     In  a  fenfe  large 
enough   to  comprehend  all  thefe   Prefident  Edwards 
explains  himfelf  to  ufe  the  word  motive.     His  words 
are,   "  By  motive   I  mean  the  whole  of  that  which 
"  moves,   excites  or   invhes   the   mind   to  volition, 
'«  -whether  that  be  one  thing  lingly,  or  itiany  things  con- 
«  junclly  ;"  p.  5.     He  then  proceeds  to  enumerate  fev- 
eral  things  whic:h  operate  as  motives,  viz.  the  views  of 
the  mind,  the  Jlate^  frayne  and  temper^  &-C.  which  the 
mind  may  have  by  nature,  or  which  may  have  been 

introduced 


introduced  by  education,  example,  cuftom  or  oiher 
means. 

Dr.  Weft  grants  an  infallible  connexion  between 

motive  and   volition  ; 1.   In  that  he  grants,  thac 

motive  is  necejfary  to   volition  ; 2.    In    that    he 

grants,  that  "  there  is  ahcays  a  reafon  for  the  mind's 
acting  or  choofing,  and  ihat  "  when  the  mind  atts,  it 
*'  always  has  fome  end,  dcfign  or  reafon,  -which  is  the 
*'  occafion  of  its  ading  ;  and  in  that  he  defines  motive  to 
"  be  the  occafion,  reafrn,  end  or  defign,  which  an  agent 
"  has  in  view,  when  he  atts."  In  thefe  concefrions 
not  onJy  does  he  e.xprefsly  grant,  that  whenever  there 
is  a  volition  there  is  a  motive  ;  but  he  implicitly 
grants  alfo,  that  whenever  there  is  a  motive  there  is  a 
volition.  He  e.xprefsly  grants,  that  motive  is  the  rea- 
fon of  the  mind's  adling.  But  the  reafon  of  the  mind's 
a£ling  is  infallibly  conne8ed  with  its  atling  :  Other- 
wife  it  is  not  the  reafon  of  its  ading.  If  either  ihe 
mind  fhould  aft  without  the  fuppofed  reafon ;  or  if  when 
the  fuppofed  reafon  exifts,  the  aftion  does  not  follow  ; 
this  fa6t  in  either  cafe  fhows  plainly,  that  the  fuppofed 

reafon  is  not  the  real  reafon  of  the  aftion.- Again, 

motive  is  conceded  to  be  the  occafion  of  the  mind's 
afting.  But  if  the  motive  exift  and  the  a8ion  do  not 
follow  ;  it  is  plain,  that  the  motive  is  not  the  occafion 

of  the  action.- As  motive  is  allowed  to  be  the  i  ea- 

fon  of  the  aflion  of  the  mind,  it  is  as  abfurd,  that  the 
motive  fhould  exift  without  the  adion,  as  that  the 
reafon  of  an  a6tion  fliould  exill  without  the  aflion  ; 
indeed  it  is  the  fame  thing.  Let  what  will  be  fuppof- 
ed to  be  the  reafon  of  an  a6lion,  if  that  fuppofed  rea- 
fon exift,  and  the  a6lion  do  not  follow,  thus  proves, 
the  fuppofed  reafon  is  falfely  fuppofed  to  be  the  rea- 
fon ;  and  that  either  fomething  elle  is  the  true  reafon, 
or  that  the  aftion  came  into  exiftence  without  rea- 
fon.  If  then  motive  be,  as  Dr.  Weft  grants,  the 

occafion  and  reafon  of  aftion,  it  is  as  abfurd  and  con- 

tradiftory  to  fay,  that  thcte  is  not  an  infallible  con- 

ne6lion  between  aQion   and  motive,  as    that   there 

E  2  is 


6d 

is  not  fuch  a  conneclion  between  a  thing  and  its- 
caufe. 

Dr.  Weft  argues,  that  motives  cannot  be  univer- 
fally  the  caufes  of  volition,  as  this  would  imply,  that 
they  are  the  caufe  of  the  divine  volitions  :  But  that 
**  motives  cannot  be  the  caufe  of  the  divine  volitions; 
"  for  this  would  be  to  aiTert,  that  motives  were  the 
«  caufe  of  the  firft  caufe."  Now  the  fame  reafoning 
will  equally  confute  Dr.  Well's  fcheme  of  motives  ; 
thus,  Motives  cannot  be  neceffary  occafions  of  voli- 
tions, as  this  would  imply,  that  they  are  the  neceffary 
occafions  of  the  divine  volitions.  But  to  affcrt  this, 
would  be  to  affert,  that  motives  are  the  neceffary  oc- 
cafions of  the  firfl  caufe. 

As  volition  always  implies  and  fuppofes  a  motive  ;. 
fo  does  a  motive  as  evidently  imply  and  infer  a  voli- 
tion. For  by  the  very  terms,  that  is  no  motive  to  a 
man,  which  does  not  perfuadc,  move  or  excite  him  to 
volition.  This  is  the  fenfe  in  which  Prefident  Ed^ 
wards  ufes  the  word  motive.  It  is  not  pretended  by 
the  mofl  zealous  advocate  for  the  influence  of  mo- 
tives, that  the  fame  obje6k  and  reafons  will  always 
alike  influence  a  man,  and  in  like  manner  move  or  l>e 
motives  to  him  ;  unlrfs  it  be  fuppofed,  that  the  ftate 
of  the  mind  and  every  thing  relating  to  it,  be  the  fame. 
The  mind  of  man  is  from  various  caufes  exceedingly 
changeable,  and  by  no  means  at  all  times  fufceptible 
of  the  fame  impreflions  from  the  fame  intellcftua! 
views  and  from  the  fame  biafes.  The  intelleBual 
views  may  be  the  fame,  and  the  biafes  may  be  differ- 
ent ;  and  the  biafes  may  be  the  fame  and  the  intel- 
le6lual  views  may  be  different.  It  will  not  be  deni- 
ed, that  there  is  an  infallible  ronneftion  between  caule 
and  effeft  :  Yet  this  does  not  imply,  that  the  fame  ef- 
feft  always  follows  from  the  fame  caufe,  unlcfs  by  ths 
fame  caufe  be  meant,  all  the  fame  things  and  circum- 
iiances,  which  related  to  tl  e  effeft,  or  may  have  had 
influence  to  produce  it.  And  with  the  like  explana- 
tion 


tmn  of  the  word  motive,  it  is  true,  that  the  fame  mo- 
tive is  always  attended  with  the  Came  vohtion. 

Since  then  wherever  there  is  a  vohtion,  there  is  a 
motive,  and  wherever  there  is  a  motive,  or,  which  is 
Dr.  Weft's  explanation  of  motive,  wherever  there  is 
the  reafon  and  occafion  of  volition,  there  is  vohtion, 
and  alfo  fince  wl>:rever  there  is  the  fame  motive  In 
the  I'enfe  juft  now  explained,  there  is  the  fame  voli- 
tion ;  what  is  wanting  to  fupport  the  propofition,  that 
there  is  an  infallible  connexion  between  motive  and 
volition  ?  y\  conne6tionjuft  as  infallible  as  that  between 
caufe  and  efPeft  ? 

Since  our  volitions  are  thus  entirely  limited,  bound- 
ed and  deiermiiied  according  to  motives  ;  wherein 
confifts  the  impropriety  of  faying,  that  our  volitions 
are  determined  by  motives  ?  \Ve  mean  no  more  by 
the  latter  exprcflion,  than  v;e  do  by  the  former. 

If  all  our  volitions  be  in  iliis  fcnfe  determined  by 
motives,. in  what  fenfe  can  it  be  pretended,  that  they 
are  felfdetermined  ;  or  that  we  determine  and  caule 
our  own  volitions  ?  And  what  will  become  of  the 
whole  doctrine  of  felf-determination  ?  It  will  not  be 
pretended,  that  we  caufe  all  the  ©bjecls,  with  which 
'we  are  furrounded,  and  v;hich  prefent  thcmfelves  to 
us  as  objeBs  of  choice  ;  nor  that  v/e  caufe  all  our  nat- 
ural bialcs,  taftes  and  appetites,  which  ar^  the  fources 

of  fo  many  volitions. If  it  fliould  be  faid,  that  we 

determine  our  own  motives,  determine  which  motives 
we  will  comply  with  and  which  we  will  rcje6l ;  Hill  as 
this  very  determination  is  the  a6]t;  of  the  will,  a  motive 
is  necefl'ary  to  that.  Thus  we  fliall  go  round  in  a 
circle  ;  motive,  determining,  or  (in  the  language  of 
Dx.  Weft)  being  previoujly  necejfary  to  volition,  and 
volition  being  neccflary  to  motive. 

It  feems,  that  allowing  what  Dr.  Weft  does  allow, 
no  man  can  hold  felf  determination,  in  any  other  fenfe 
than  one  of  thefe  two  ;  (i)  That  we  ourfelves  deter- 
mine, as  we  ourfelves  think,  perceive,  hear,  tafte,  &c. 
which  is  no  more  than  wc  all  allow  ;  and  to  explain 
E  3  felf-determinatioji 


7^ 

felF-determination  thus,  is  to  explain  it  away  and  give, 
it  up  J  and,  as  has  been  fiiown,  it  is  thus  given  up  by 

Dr.  Weft. (2)  That  we  efficiently  caufe  our  own 

vohtions,  but  invariably  according  to  motives,  reafons 
or  preeftabUrhed  antecedents.  This  cannot  be  con- 
fiftcMitly  avowed  by  Dr.  Weft,  both  becaufe  he  main- 
tains, that  volition  is  no  efFetl  and  has  no  caufe,  there- 
fore we  cannot  be  the  caufe  of  it ;  and  becaufe  to  be 
the  efficient  caufes  of  our  own  vohtions  implies,  that 
"  fdf  afts  on  feif  and  produces  volition  ;"  yhich  is  ex- 
prefsiy  renounced  by  him. 

Dr.  Weft,  to  prove,  that  there  is  no  infallible  con- 
yieclion  between  motive  and  volition  fays,  p.  17,  18  ; 
^^  Though  it  is  true,  that  the  mind  never  aBs  without 
"  fome  reafon  or  defign  in  ading  ;  yet  there  is  no 
"  need  (if  affigning  a  reafon  for  not  aBmg."  By  not 
a^ing.  Dr.  Weft  means,  as  obferved  before,  either  I'e- 
Jufing  and  voluntary  negleB,  or  entire  inaction.  If  he 
mean  the  former,  it  is  a  real  a£l  of  the  mind  and  by 
his  own  conceffion  therefore  is  not  "  vvithout  a  reafon 
^^  and  defign."  If  he  mean  the  latter,  his  argument  is 
juft  as  conclufive  to  difprove  an  infallible  connexion 
between  motive  and  volition,  as  the  fame  argument  is 
to  difprove  the  connexion  between  caufe  and  effed  : 
Thus,  though  it  be  true,  that  an  effi;6l  never  comes  to 
pafs  without  a  caufe  ;  yet  there  is  no  need  of  affign- 
ing a  caufe  for  no  ejfeB.  It  is  undoubtedly  true,  that 
perfeft  nihility  requires  no  caufe  :  But  no  man  in  his 
fenfes  would  hence  infer,  that  an  efFe6t  requires  no 
caufe,  or  that  there  is  not  an  infallible  connexion  be- 
tween caufe  and  effeft.  In  like  manner  "  there  is  no 
«  need  of  affigning  a  reafon"  or  motive  for  perfeft  in- 
a6lion,  which  is  pure  nihility.  But  it  cannot  be  hence 
inferred,  that  there  is  no  need  of  a  motive  for  a6lion, 
or  that  there  is  not  an  infallible  connexion  between 
motive  and  a6lion.  Dr.  Weft  denies  an  infallible 
connexion  between  motive  and  aQion,  and  he  en- 
deavours to  prove  it  by  making  it  out  that  there  is  no 
qoqnedion  between  motive  and  inaUion  :  And  what 

is 


is. this  to  (he  purpofe?  How  docs  it  hence  follow,  that 
there  is  not  an  infallible  connc61ion  between  motive 
and  a5lio}i  ? 

Dr.  Weft  puts  the  fuppofition,  that  at  a  gentleman's 
table  he  has  the  offer  of  tea,  coffee  or  chocolate  ;  that 
they  can  all  be  had  with  equal  cafe,  and  all  appear 
equally  eligible  to  his  mind, and  ihathe  determines  to 
take  coffee.  He  then  adds, p.  18, "I  believe,  that  it  is 
"impoffible  in  tl.isanda  multitude  of  fimilar  inftances 
"  to  affign  any  accident  or  circumftance,  which  deter- 
"  mines  the  mind  to  its  choice  among  things,  which  ap- 
"  pear  equally  fit  and  eligible.  Conl'equently  here  is 
"  an  undeniable  proof  of  the  liberty  for  which  we 
"  contend.  And  this  inftance  will  explain  my  idea, 
''  that  there  is  always  a  reafon  for  aQingor  choafing  : 
"But  that  there  is  not  always  a  reafon  for  not  a61ing  ; 
"  and  that  things  may  appear  eligible  to  us,  and  yet 
"  not  bechofcn;  e.g.  I  accepted  the  coffee, bccaufe  I 
"  wanted  fome  rcfrcfliment.  Coffee  appeared  to  me 
'' properly  .fuited  toanfwermy  defire.  I'his  was  a  fufB- 
"  cient  reafon  for  my  receiving  coffee.  The  other  two 
"appeared  equally  eligible.  About  them  1  exerted  no 
"  ails  :  But  this  being  a  viere  negation^  could  require 
^'  no  pofitive  reafon." On  this  I  remark, 

1.  If  it  were  ever  fo  true,  that  in  choofing  between 
things  perfe£lly  indifferent,  (if  any  fudi  there  be)  the 
mind  atls  without  motive,  how  would  this  prove,  that 
it  afts  without  motive  in  any  other  cafe  ?  And  the 
inftances  of  its  choofing  things  perfedly  indifferent  are 
fo  rare,  that  with  jefpetl  to  the  main  objeft  of  this 
difpute,  they  feem  hardly  worth  mentioning.  The 
great  obje6l  of  this  difpute  is,  to  invcftigatc  that  liber- 
ty which  is  neceffary  to  virtue  and  vice,  praife  and 
blame.  Dr.  Weft,  if  1  underftand  him,  contends,  that 
an  exemption  from  an  infallible  connexion  between 
motive  and  volition  is  effential  to  that  liberty.  Or  if 
J  do  not  underftand  him  aright  in  this  inftance,  he  is 
at  liberty  to  make  his  choice,  whether  or  not  to  main- 
tain, that  an  exemption  from  fuch  conne6lion  be  ef- 
E  4  fential 


fcntial  to  that  liberty,  without  which  we  cannot  pf^c- 
fife  virtue  or  vice.  If  he  maiHiain,  that  thisexemp- 
tion  is  ell'ential  to  that  liberty,  I  afk,  Do  we  exercife 
virtue  or  vice  in  thofe  inftances  only,  in  which  we 
choofe  one  of  things  perfeBly  indifferent  ;  or  does  it 
follow  from  the  fiippofition,  that  we  aft  without  mo- 
tive in  thofe  inftances,  in  which  we  do  choofe  one  of 
things  perfeftly  indifferent,  that  we  alfo  a£l  without 
motive  in  other  inftances  ;  viz.  in  choofmg  one  of 
things  perfedly  different,  as  virtue  and  vice,  wifdom 
and  folly,  our  eternal  happinefs  and  eternal  mifery  ? 
If  it  be  not  true,  that  we  exercife  virtue  or  vice  in 
thofe  inftances  only  in  wliich  we  choofe  one  of  things 
perfeftly  indifferent  ;  nor  that  from  the  fuppofition, 
that  there  are  things  perfeBly  indifferent,  and  that  we 
aB;  without  motive  when  we  choofe  one  of  fuch  things, 
it  follows  that  we  a8;  without  motive  in  other  cafeff 
too  ;  what  is  the  great  advantage  of  a  power  of  choof- 
ing  without  motive  in  fuch  a  rare  cafe  ?  And  is  it 
■worth  while  todifpute  about  it  ?  If  we  exercife  moral 
agency  in  thofe  inftances  only,  in  which  we  choofe 
one  of  things  pcrfeflly  indifferent ;  our  moral  agency 
is  confined  to  very  narrow  limits  indeed,  not  extend- 
ing to  one  of  ten  thoufand  of  our  rational  voluntary 
a£tions,  as,  I  prefume,  our  opponents  themfelves  wilt 
grant.  If  we  exercife  moral  agency  in  ihofe  inflanceSj 
in  which  we  choofe  one  of  things  entirely  different, 
either  we  are  perfuaded  and  influenced  by  the  differ- 
ence and  fo  are  governed  by  motive,  and  then  the  in- 
fluence of  motives  is  not  inconfiftent  with  moral  agen- 
cy or  with  liberty  ;  or  we  choofe  and  acl  without  any 
regard  to  the  difference  of  the  propofed  objeds:  But 
this  mud  be  proved,  to  obtain  credit.  If  our  oppo- 
nents fuppofe  that  it  follow  from  our  aBing  without 
motive,  when  (as  they  fay)  we  choofe  one  of  things 
indifferent,  that  alfo  we  a£l  without  motive,  whea 
we  choofe  one  of  things  not  indifferent ;  let  them 
fhow  that  it  does  follow.  They  have  not  as  yet 
done  li- 

2.  In 


73  ^ 

i.  In  the  paffage  quoted  above,  Dr.  Well  confid- 
crs  his  choice  of  coffee,  as  a  real  aft  of  his  mind  a- 
rifing  from  a  rearoi>  or  motive;  but  his  negleft  or  re- 
fufal  of  tea  and  chocolate  as  a  mere  negation^  whicii 
requires  no  rcafon  or  motive.  But  1  appeal  to  every 
candid  reader,  whether  a  voluntary  refufdl  of  any  ob- 
je6l,  be  not  as  real  an  a6l  of  the  mind,  as  a  choice. 
If  fo,  in  truth  ond  according  to  Dr.  Weft's  conceflion, 
it  requires  a  reafon  and  motive,  as  much  as  any  other 
aft.  I  do  not  mean,  that  his  rcfufal  of  tea  and  cho- 
colate in  the  cafe  put,  is  necelTarily  a  diftinft  aft  from 
his  choice  of  coffee  :  It  may  be  no  more  a  di6tin.ft: 
aft,  than  fuppofing  coffee  alone  had  been  offered  him, 
and  he  had  accepted  it  rather  than  nothing,  his  ac- 
ceptance of  it  and  his  refufal  of  nothing  had  been  two 
entirely  diftinft  afts.  The  truth  is,  that  his  choice 
of  coffee  is  one  complex  comparative  aft,  implying  a 
preference  of  coffee  to  tea  and  chocolate.  I  am  fen- 
fible,  that  Dr.  Weft  holds,  "  that  choice,  when  ufed 
*«  about  the  determination  of  the  mind  refpefting  the 
*'  things  that  appear  to  us  equally  eligible,  docs  not 
»« include  in  it  the  idea  o^ preference  ;"  p.  16.  But  what 
elfe  is  meant  by  prefer ence,  than  the  choofing  of  one 
thing  rather  than  another  or  in  the  negleft  of  that 
other,  when  both  are  offered  ?  If  Dr.  Weft  mean  by 
preference  any  thing  different  from  this,  he  ought  in 
all  reafon  to  inform  us  what  it  is.  The  reafon  which 
the  Doftor  gives,  to  fliow  that  a  choice  of  one  of  two 
equally  eligible  things,  is  not  a  preference  is,  that 
*'  they  are  both  confidered  as  equally  eligible  :"  P. 
16  :  i.  e.  they  are,  (if  I  may  fo  fay)  equally  chonfablc 
or  equally  worthy  of  choice.  And  if  one  cannot  be 
preferred^  bccaufc  ihey  are  equally  worthy  of  choice  ; 
let  it  be  ftiown,  that  it  u  not  equally  irapoffible  that 
one  of  them  fhould  be  chofen  when  ihey  are  equally 
worthy  of  choice.  If  the  confideration  that  they  are 
equally  worthy  of  choice,  preclude  the  poffibility  of 
preference,  why  does  it  not  equally  preclude  the  pol- 
bilitv  of  elision  or  choice  ? 

Dr. 


74        ■ 

Dr.  Weft  fays,  that  his  acceptance  of  coffee,  as  it 
vas  an  a8,  required  a  reafon  ;  but  about  tea  and 
chocolate  he  exerted  no  a£l  ;  and  this  being  a  mere 
negation,  could  require  no  politive  reafon.  Now  if 
coffee  or  nothing  had  been  offered  him,  and  he  had 
accepted  the  coffee,  he  might  as  well  have  faid,  that 
his  acceptance  of  coffee,  as  it  wa^  an  aft,  required  a 
reafon  ;  but  about  nothing  he  exerted  no  att  ;  and 
t4iis  being  a  mere  negation,  could  require  no  pofnive 
reafon.  The  truth  is,  every  a6i  of  choice  is  a  com- 
parative aft,  whether  one  or  more  things  be  offered  to 
our  choice.  When  only  one  thing  is  offered,  the  com- 
parifon  is  between  that  and  nothing.  When  one  of 
feveral  things  is  offered,  the  comparifon  is  between 
thofe  fevcral  things.  And  if  we  accept  the  one  thing, 
which  alone  is  offered,  we  no  more  refufe  or  decline 
the  alternative  nothing  or  the  abfence  of  that  one  thing, 
than  when  we  accept  one  of  fcveral  things  we  refufe 
the  reft. 

3.  If  when  feveral  things,  which  Dr.  Weft  calls 
equally  eligible,  ar^  offered,  and  a  man  choofe  one  of 
them,  it  be  true,  that  he  exerts  no  aB:  about  the  reft; 
the  fame  would  hold,  though  the  things  were  not 
equally  eligible  and  the  things  refufed  were  manifeft- 
ly  moft  eligible :  And  thus  it  would  be  moft  eafy  to 
account  for  an  att  of  preference  of  a  moft  infericnir 
objeft,  to  a  moft  fuperiour  one.  It  is  but  faying, 
that  about  the  laft  "  I  e.xerted  no  aft  :  And  this  be- 
"  inga  mere  negation  would  require  nopofitive  reafon." 
Thus  fuppofe  a  guinea  and  a  (hilling  be  oftered  to  a 
beggar:  He  takes  the  fliilling,  but  leaves  the  guinea. 
May  not  the  beggar  account  for  his  conduft  in  the 
fame  way  that  Dr.  Weft  accounts  for  his,  in  taking 
the  coffee  in  the  ncgleft  of  the  tea  and  the  chocolate  .►* 
He  might  fay,  "  I  accepted  the  fliilling,  becaufe  I 
"  wanted  a  little  money:  The  ftiillins  appeared  prop- 
«  erly  fuited  to  anfwer  my  defire.  I'he  guinea  ap- 
<«  peared  equally"  and  much  more  «*  eligible  :  About 
f  that  I  exerted  no  aft.     But    this  being  a  mere  ne- 

"  gat  ion. 


n 

^'  gatiorij  could  require  no  pofiiive  reafon."  But  the 
queftion  would  Hill  remain  unanfwered,  Why  did  not 
the  beggar  exeit  an  a6t  about  the  guinea,  as  well  as 
about  the  (iiilling,  or  even  in  preference  to  it  ?  Or, 
"which  comes  to  the  fame,  why  did  he  exert  an  a6l 
about  the  fhilling  in  the  neglecl  of  the  guinea  ?  ]uft 
fo,  why  did  \^i.  Weft  cxeit  an  aft  about  coffee,  in 
the  ncgled;  of  tea  and  chocolate  ?  Whatever  be  the 
propel'  anfwer  to  the  lalt  queftion,  will  doubtlefs  as 
properly  anfwer  the  former.  Nor  need  Dr.  Weft 
puzzle  himfelf  and  his  readers  about  things  equally  eligi- 
ble. His  principles  are  jufl;  as  applicable  to  any  oth- 
er things,  and  equally  prove  that  there  is  no  connec- 
tion at  all  between  motive  and  volition,  as  that  there 
is  not  an  infallible  and  univcrfal  connexion. 

4.  Dr.  Weft  grants,  that  "  when  the  mind  choofes, 
"  it  always  has  fome  reafon^  which  is  the  occafion  of 
''  its  choofing."  Therefore  when  he  chofe  coffee  in 
the  negleft  of  tea  or  chocolate,  there  was  fome  reafori 
for  it.  But  I  appeal  to  the  reader,  whether  accord- 
ing to  the  Dotlor's  own  ftatemcnt  of  the  cafe,  there 
was  any  reafon  why  he  fhould  choofe  coffee  in  the 
negleft  of  tea  and  chocolate,  and  whether  there  was 
not  the  very  fame  reafon  why  he  fhould  have  chofen 
tea  or  chocolate  in  the  negleft  of  coffee.  He  fays, 
they  all  appeared  equally  eligible  to  him.  Therefore 
there  was  no  reafon,  according  to  him,  why  he  fhould 
choofe  one,  to  the  negleft  of  the  others. 

In  his  fecond  part  as  well  as  in  his  firft  the  Doftor 
grants,  that  "  the  mind  never  a8s  without  fome  rea- 
"  fon  for  afting."  P.  14,  and  29.  Yet  he  holds,  that  of 
things  equally  agreeable,  it  fometimes  choof(Ss  one 
and  leaves  the  reft.  Now  what  is  the  reafon  of  its 
afting  in  this  cafe  .?  It  is  not  enough  to  affign  a  rea- 
fon why  the  mind  fhould  take  fome  one  of  fever- 
ai  things  propofed.  As  all  thofe  things  are  fuppof- 
ed  to  be  equally  eligible,  a  reafon  ought  to  be  given 
vhy  it  finally  takes  one  particular  one  in  the  negleft 
x>f  the  reft.     Unlefs  this  be  done,  no  reafon  is  given 

why 


75 

why  it  aBs  in  tliis  manner,  in  this  cafe  ;  and  therefore 
for  oupju  that  appears,  it  a£ls  without  reafon,  which 
is  contrary  to  the  Dodor's  conceffion.  Therefore  let 
-the  Dodor  either  retract  his  conceffion,  and  hold  that 
the  mind  fometimes  atls  without  any  reafon  ;  or  re- 
nounce the  idea,  that  it  fometimes  choofes  one  of  fev- 
■eral  things  equally  eligible,  in  the  negleft  of  the  reit. 

The  Doaor  fays,  p.  28,  Part  II,  "  When  two  ob- 
'<' je6ts  are  equally  fit,  if  one  is  taken  and  the  other 
^'  left  ;  the  mind  Had  a  purpofe  to  anfwer."  We 
ihould  have  been  greatly  gratified,  if  the  Do6lor  had 
pointed  out,  what  purpofe  the  rnind  had  to  anfwer  in 
taking  that  one  which  it  did  take,  and  in  leaving  the 
reft  by  fuppofition  equally  fit  to  anfwer  the  fame  pur- 
pofe, for  which  the  one  is  taken.  Until  he  does  point 
out  the  .purpofe,  he  muft  excufe  us  in  withholdmg  our 

affent  and  denying  his  pvopofition. The  DoBor  in 

this  repeats  what  he  had  faid  in  his  firft  pnrt,  that 
^^  about  that  which  is  not  taken  the  mind  exercifes  no 
a6t  at  all."  To  this  I  have  already  anfwered,  that  the 
mind  does  exercife  an  att  about  it ;  that  the  a6l  of  the 
mind  is  complex  and  comparative,  having  a  refpefl  to 
more  objecls  than  one,  becaufe  more  are  fuppoled  to 
be  offered  a-nd  brought  into  the  viev/  of  the  mind  ; 
that  the  mind  does  as  really  exercife  an  att  about  the 
obje6l  left,  as  if  it  were  ever  foinferiour  or  fuperiour  to 
the  one  taken  ;  and  that  the  Doctor's  reafoning,  if  it 
prove  any  thing,  proves  too  much,  viz.  that  if  things 
ever  fo  unequal  be  offered  and  the  mind  choofe  the 
bafefl  and  that  which  is  in  the  loweft  degree  fuited  to 
anfwer  its  purpofe,  it  may  be  f^ill  faid  to  have  a  rea- 
fon for  the  a6lion.     "  But  about  the  other,  which  is 

"  not  taken,  the  mind  exercifes  no  aft  at  all no 

''  reafon  can  be  affigned  for  the  nonexiflencc  of  that 
"  which  is  not." 

However,  perhaps  lUe  Do6lor  will  avow  this  lad 
obfervalion,  though  he  has  not  cxprefsly  done  it  a« 
yet  :  For  he  "  denies,  that  men  are  always  governed 
■^9  by    tlie    ftrongeft  motive,"      P.   6,  Part  II.     To 

avoid 


rr 

avoid  all  difpute  about  words,  let  it  be  remembered, 
that  by  being  governed  by  the  ftrongeft  motive,  h 
meant  no  more  than  that  the  mind  2i\w  ay  ^follows,  or 
coincides  with  the  Ihonged  motive  :  And  by  flrongejl 
motive  Prefident  Edwards  has  explained  himfelf  to 
mean,  "  that  which  has  the  greaieft  degree  of  previous 
"  tendency  to  excite  choice;"  p.  6.  Or  it  is  the  moft 
perfuafive  motive.  Now  will  Dr.  Weft  fay,  that  wher^ 
fevcral  motives  are  propofed  to  a  man,  he  fometimes 
palfes  by  the  moft  perfuafive,  and  follows  the  Icaft 
pcrfudfive  ?  If  fo,  what  is  the  reafon  and  what  is  th« 
motive  of  its  adion  in  this  cafe  .?  He  allows,  that  there 
is  a  reafon  and  a  motive  for  every  aftion  :  Let  him 
point  out  the  reafon  and  the  motive  in  this  aftion. 

The  Doftor,  p.  31,  Part  II,  fays,  "  If  the  mind 
"  never  a6ls  without  fome  motive  or  reafon  for  ading, 
«  then  it  follows,  that  the  motives  or  reafons  for  a  vir- 
"  tuous  conduft,  and  the  reafons  and  arguments  againft 
*'  the  prafticc  of  iniquity,  ought  to  be  fet  before  us  in 
"  the  Jlrongejl  light,  to  enable  us  to  choofe  virtue  and 

"  to  avoid  vice." 1.  Are  we  then  unable  to  choofe 

virtue  and  to  avoid  vice,  unlefs  the  motives  to  the 
former  and  againd  the  latter,  "  be  fet  before  us  in  the 
Jlrongeji  light  ?"  It  feems  then,  that  unlefs  thofe  mo- 
tives be  thus  fet  before  us,  we  are  uwder  no  obliga- 
tion to  choofe  virtue  and  to  avoid  vice,  becaufe  we 
are  not  ahk  to  do  it  :  For  it  is  no  part  of  Dr.  Weft's 
f\  ftem,  that  our  duty  extends  beyond  our  ability.  He 
denies  the  diftinOion  between  natural  and  moral  ne- 
celfity  and  inability,  and  holds,  that  where  neceffity 
or  inability    begins,  liberty  and  moral   agency    end. 

Part  IK  p-  19- 2.  Gf  what  advantage  can  it  be 

*'  to  fet  the  motives  to  virtue  and  againft  vice  in  the 
"  Jlrovgcjl  light,"  if  there  be  no  tonneftion  between 
the  JIro77gfJl  7?i0i'ives,3n6  volition  ?  Surely  none  at  all. 
It  is  therefore  implied  in  the  paffage  juft  quoted,  as 
in  many  other  paftages  in  Dr.  Weft's  book,  that  there 
is  a  connexion  between  fuch  motives  and  volition, 
and  that  fuch  connexion  is  not  incor.Gftent  with  liber- 


78 

ty.  Yet  as  the  Do6lor  "  denies,  that  we  ai'e  always 
"governed  hy  i\\t  Jtrongejl  motives^"  he  muft  hold^ 
that  there  is  x\o  Jure  conneclion  between  the  ftrongeft 
motive  and  volition.  Then  the  queflion  arifes,  What 
degree  of  connexion  between  the  Itrongeft  motive 
and  volition  does  he  grant  to  exift  and  to  be  confid- 
ent with  liberty  ?  If  the  higheft  degree  of  probability^ 
reaching  to  the  ftep  next  to  certainty,  be  allowed  in 
the  cafe,  what  fhould  render  the  only  remaining  ftep 
fo  baleful  to  liberty,  as  to  be  inconfiitent  with  it  ?  Or 
if  it  be  allowed,  that  the  probability,  according  to 
the  degree  of  it,  does  indeed  diminifli  liberty  j  then 
it  diminifhes  moral  agency  too  ;  and  therefore  fuch  a 
reprefentation  of  the  motives  to  virtue,  as  "  fets  them 
<«  in  the  ftrongeft  light,"  and  makes  it  more  or  lefs 
probable,  that  they  will  influence  to  a  certain  conduft, 
has  in  reality  no  tendency  to  perfuade  to  a  virtuous 
conduft  ;  becaufe  juft  fo  far  as  it  has  a  tendency  to  lead 
to  any  particular  conduft,  it  deftroys  moral  agency  and 
precludes  the  poflibility  of  virtue.  And  fuch  a  repre- 
fentation is  fo  far  from  "  enabling  us  to  choofe  vir- 
"  tue,"  that  fo  far  as  it  has  any  efFeft  on  us,  it  ren- 
ders it  impoflible  that  we  fliould  choofe  it  morally  ; 
and  any  other  than  a  moral  choice  of  virtue,  if  other 
there  be,  is  no  fubjeft  of  exhortation. 

The  Do6lor  aflerts,  "  that  there  is  not  an  infallible 
"  connexion  between  motives  and  volition  ;"  p.  80, 
Part  II.  And  in  the  fame  page,  "  That  the  infalli- 
"  ble  connexion  between  motives  and  volition  can- 
«'  not  take  place,  till  the  mind  has  determined  to  e.x- 
"  amine  the  feveral  motives  or  reafons  for  a6ling  in 
"  any  particular  manner,  in  order  that  it  may  adopt 
"  the  beft.  In  that  cafe  the  mind  will  certainly  choofe 
**  that  which  appears  the  hejl"  Indeed  !  This  is  com- 
ing down  wonderfully  :  This  is  acknowledging  an  in- 
fallible connexion  between  motive  and  volition  in  all 
cafes,  in  which  the  mind  ex ainines  the  feveral  motives 
er  reafons  for  aBing  :  It  is  alio  acknowledging,  that 
in  every  fuch  cafe  the  mind  is  governed  by  ihtjlrong- 


19 

tfi  motive,  as  '•  it  will  certainly  choofe  that  which  ap- 
"  pears  to  be  the  befl,"  Of  courfe  there  is  an  infalli- 
ble connexion  between  motives  and  volition  in  all 
cafes,  except  thofe  in  which  the  mind  a6ts  abruptly 
and  without  due  confidcration.  And  is  it  indeed 
true,  that  when  the  mind  ads  abruptly,  it  does  not 
ehoofe  that  which  appears  to  be  bell,  but  that  which 
at  the  tmie  appears  to  be  worit,  or  at  leaft  lefs  good 
and  eliiJible,  than  fomcthing  elfe,  at  the  fame  time  in 
view  of  the  mind  ?  When  men  a6t  abruptly  and  with- 
out due  Gonfideration,  no  wonder  if  they  be  mifled 
by  mere  appearance,  which  is  not  always  well  found- 
ed. But  do  they  in  fuch  a  cafe,  aft  without  regard 
to  any  appearance  well  or  ill  founded,  and  even  con- 
trary to  the  greateft  appearance  of  good  ?  That  this  is 
generally  fu6t,  needs  to  be  confirmed  by  fomething 
Itronger,  than  mere  affertion  or  implication. 

Df.  Weft,  throughout  his  books  in  general  oppofes 
the  infallible  connection  between  motive  and  volition, 
as  inconfiltent  with  liberty  and  moral  agency  :  But  in 
the  paflage  on  which  I  am  now  remarking,  grants 
fuch  a  connexion  whenever  "  the  mind"  afts  with 
proper  deliberation,  and  "  examines  the  feveral  mo- 
*'  tives  and  reafons  for  a£ling  in  a  particular  manner." 
It  feeras  then,  tl*at  on  Dr.  Weft's  plan,  whenever  the 
mind  a6ls  with  proper  deliberation,  it  is  under  fuch 
an  infallible  neceflity  of  fo  afting,' as  is  inconfiftent 
with  liberty  and  moral  agency,  and  confcquently  muft 
be  deftituie  of  liberty  and  moral  agency  ;  and  that  it 
poffeftes  liberty  and  moral  agency  then  only,  when  it 
acts  abruptly  and  without  proper  deliberation.  Will 
the  Do6lor  avow  this  conlcquence  ?  Or  if  he  fhould 
fay,  that  although  when  "  the  mind  has  examined  the 
**  motives  and  reafons,  it  will  certainly  choofe  that 
"  which  appears  to  be  the  beft,"  and  there  is  an  infalli- 
ble conneclion  in  the  cafe  ;  yet  that  conneflion  is  not 
inconfiftent  with  liberty  and  moral  agency  ;  why  does 
be  difpuie  agiinft  that  conne61ion  at  all  ?  If  it  do  not 

infringe 


So 

infringe  liberty  and  moral  agency,  why  is  it  fo  Tio 
lenely  oppofed  ? 

The  Do6lor,  in  p.  85,  Part  II,  quotes  thefe  lines 
from  Prefident  Edwards  ;  "  I  fuppofe  none  will  6c* 
*«  ny,  that  it  is  polTible  for  motives  to  be  fet  before  the 

<^  mind  fo  powerful —  as  to  be  invincible ;"  and 

then  he  remarks  on  them,  "  If  he  means,  that  argit- 
"  ments  may  be  placed  before  the  underftanding  in  fo 
"  ftrong  a  light,  as  to  become  invincible,  and  iiich  as 
"  the  mind  cannot  but  yield  to,  it  is  readily  granted, 
*'  and  is  nothing  to  the  purpofe  ;  For  the  underftand- 
«'  ing  is  not  the  a6live,  but  the  perceptive  faculty  of 
"  the  mind  ;  and  liberty  is  placed  in  the  will,  which 
"  is  the  only  a6live  faculty  of  the  mind.  But  if  the 
«  meaning  is,  that  motives  may  be  fo  ftrong,  as  necef- 
^''farily  to  determine  the  rvill^  this  is  denied  to  be  puf- 
"  fible,  while  the  mind  has  the  free  exercife  of  reajon. 
"  But  when  the  mind  is  fo  violently  agitated,  as  to 
"  lofe   the  free  exercife  of  reafon,  as  in  the  cafe  of 

"  running  in  a  fright liberty  is  deftroyed. 

"  Things  that  are  not  eligible  in  themfelves  nor  in 
«  their  confequences,  cannot  become  obje6ls  of  choice; 
"  which  is  to  fay,  there  can  be  no  motive  to  choofe 
"  them,  though  we  may  find  it  difficult,  and  in  fome 
«  cafes  imprafticable  to  bring  our  propenfities  to  fub- 
"  mit  to  our  choice.  When  one  is  convinced,  that 
"  he  has  contracted  a  wrong  habit,  he  finds  no  diffi- 
"  culty  in  choofing  to  overcome  that  habit  ;  but 
"  he  will  have  a  vaR  deal  of  difficulty  in  his  en- 
"  deavours  to  overcome  it,  becaufe  in  every  unguard- 
*•  ed  hour,  he  will  be  liable  to  be  led  aftray  by  his  evil 
"  habit.  And  therefore  fuch  a  perfon  may  fay  with 
"  the  Apoftle,  To  -will  is  prefent  with  7ne,  but  how  to 
"  perform  that  which  is  good,  I  find  not  ;  for  the  good 
"  that  I  would,  I  do  not  ;  but  the  evil  that  I  would  not, 
"  that  I  do.  Here  we  fee,  that  we  may  have  a  power 
*«  to  choofe,  when  we  find  it  extremely  difficult  and 
'•'  in  fome  cafes  impoffible  to  do  the  things  which  we 

"  have 


gl 

<^  have  chofen.     This  fhows  the  ahfolute  nacjjdy  of 
*'  divine  grace  iojlrcngthcn  us  to  do  our  duty." 
On  this  remarkable  paffage,  I  beg  leave  to  obfervc, 

1.  That  Dr.  Weft,  according  to  his  own  principles, 
cannot  confidently  maintain,  that  "  when  the  mind 
"  loies  the  free  excrcife  of  reiT/on  its  liberly  is  dcftroy- 
«  ed."  For  rtajon  belongs  to  "  the  underllandir.g, 
"  the  perceptive  facuhy,"  and  not  "  to  the  will,  the 
"  only  aftive  faculty  ;"  but  "  liberty  is  placed  in  the 
"  will."  Therefore  according  to  him  liberty  is  not 
afFe61cd  by  what  takes  place  in  the  underOanding,  as 
the  free  exercife  of  rcafon  does.  On  this  ground  it  is, 
that  he  pleads,  that  thofe  arguments  which  are  invin- 
cible to  the  underRanding,  are  nothing  to  the  purpofe 
as  to  the  quedion  concerning  liberty,  which  is  placed 
in  the  will.  The  ground  of  the  argument  nianifellly 
is,  that  there  is  no  certain  connexion  between  the  un- 
derRanding and  tlie  will  ;  and  therefore  that  which 
overbears  the  underRanding,  does  not  at  all,  on  tliat 
account,  afietl:  the  will.  Therefore  that  fear,  which 
overbears  reafon,  does  not  on  that  account  affect  the 
will  or  liberty.  Otherwife  if  that  fear  which  overbears 
reafon  and  the  right  exercife  of  the  undtrUanding,  do 
on  that  account  affeQ  and  deRroy  liberty  ;  why  do 
not  thofe  arguments,  which  are  invincible  to  the  un- 
derRanding and  overbear  it,  alfo  afFeft  and  dcRroy 
liberty  ;  which  is  denied  by  Dr.  WcR. 

2.  In  this  paffige.  Dr.  WeR,  however  inconfiRently 
with  himfelf,  holds,  that  motives  necefiarily  determine 
the  will.  In  the  firR  place  he  declares,  that  it  is  im- 
poflible,  that  motives  fhould  be  ^o  Rrong  as  neccRii- 
rily  to  determine  the  will,  while  reafon  remains.  Yet 
in  the  fame  pafTjge  he  afierts,  that  "  when  once  wc 
"  are  convinced,  that  things  arc  for  our  greateR  good, 
'•  we  can  eafily  choofe  them,"'  and  "  things  that  are 
"  not  eligible  inthemfclves  nor  in  their  conlequenccs," 
and  of  courfe  things  that  we  do  not  "  p'-rcnve'  to  be 
in  either  of  thefe  refpe6ls  eligible,  "  cannot  become 
*•  objeQs  of  choice."     In  p.  93,  Part  11,  the  Dosftor 


82 

lays,  "  The  obje6l,  motive  or  reajon  for  afting  mull  be 
"  prior  to  the  aftion  of  the  mind  and  perceived  by  it, 
"  before  it  can  a£t."  "  Nothing  can  become  an  ob- 
«' jeft,  except  it  appears  to  be  eligible."  Ibid.  p.  95. 
•'  There  mnjl  appear  fome  fitnefs  or  pleafingnefs  to  the 
"  mind,  antecedent  to  its  choice."  Ibid.  Nothing  then 
can  be  an  objet^  of  choice  or  be  chofen,  which  is  not 
and  does  not  appear  to  be  eligible.  Jit  and  pleafing.  Now 
all  obje8s  of  choice  are  of  two  kinds,  pofitive  or  neg- 
ative, the  poffeffion  or  abfence  of  the  things  propofed 
for  choice.  And  things  which  do  not  on  the  whole 
appear  to  be  eligible,  cannot  be  chofen  ;  then  the  ab- 
fence of  them  being  propofed  for  choice,  is  of  courfe 
chofen,  and  muft  be  chofen,  becaufe  it  muft  appear 
eligible.  The  poffeffion  and  the  want,  the  prefence 
and  the  abfence,  of  the  fame  things  cannot,  upon  the 
whole,  be  at  the  fame  time  eligible  :  This  would  im- 
ply a  contradiftion. To   refufe   an   obje6"l   is  to 

choofe  the  abfence  or  want  of  it.  Therefore  to  refufe 
thofe  things  which  appear  to  be  eligible  is  impoilible  : 
Of  courfe  fuch  things  muft  be  chofen  ;  there  is  a  ne- 
ceffity  of  it,  otherwife  that  would  be  chofen,  which 
does  not  appear  to  be  eligible,  which  Dr.  Weft  de- 
clares to  be  impoffible. 

The  fame  thing  may  be  more  briefly  and  perhaps 
more  clearly  expreffed  thus  ;  Dr.  Weft  grants  that 
nothing  can  be  chofen  which  does  not  appear  to  be 
eligible.  Therefore  the  abfence  of  that  which  appears 
eligible  cannot  be  chofen,  becaufe  that  cannot  on  the 
whole  appear  eligible  while  the  prefence  and  poffef- 
fion of  the  objed  appears  eligible  :  And  as  the  ab- 
fence of  the  obj,e6l  cannot  be  chofen,  or,  which  is  the 
fame  thing,  the  objeft  cannot  be  refufed  ;  of  confe- 
quence  it  muft  be  chofen  ;  and  fo  there  is  an  infalli- 
ble connexion  between  motive  and  volition,  and  mo- 
lives  neceffarily  determine  the  will. 

If  to  this  it  fliould  be  anfwered,  that  though  thofe 
things,  which  are  not  fcen  to  be  eligible,  cannot  be- 
come c^bjeCts  of  choiccj  and  therefore  we  cannot  refufe 

or 


J3_ 

or  dioofe  the  abfence  of  thofc  things  which  we  perceive 
to  bech'gible  ;  yet  wcmay  not  ad  at  all  withrefpcft  lo 
them  ;  and  may  neither  choofe  nor  refufe  them  ;  1 
reply,  as  1  have  faid  before,  that  is  an  impoffibility  ; 
there  is  no  medium  with  refpeft  to  any  thing  offered 
as  an  obje£l  of  choice,  between  choofing  and  refufmg  ; 
neither  to  choofe  nor  refufe  in  Inch  a  cafe  is  to  be  block- 
ifhly  infenfible.  Or  if  it  be  faid,  that  we  only  confidcr 
and  deliberate  on  the  ofTer;  ftill  we  choofe  to  deliberate. 

3.  According  to  this  paffage,  a  man  can  never 
choofe  vice  or  (in.  For  furely  they  are  neither  eligi- 
ble in  themfelves,  nor  in  their  confequences,  and 
therefore  according  to  this  paffage,  "  cannot  become 
"  objefts  of  choice,"  i.  e.  cannot  be  chofcn.  But  will 
Dr.  Weft  abide  by  this  ?  Or  if  to  avoid  this  confc- 
quence,  the  Dr.  lliould  fay,  that  his  meaning  is,  that  a 
thing  which  is  not  fcen  or  veizved,  as  eligible  in  either 
of  thofe  refpeds,  cannot  be  chofen  ;  1  anfwcr,  this 
implies,  that  the  will  in  all  its  ads  complies  with  the 
didates  of  the  underllanding,  and  is  neceffarily  deter- 
mined by  motive,  as  I  have  juft  now  endeavoured  to 
illuftrate  ;  nor,  as  I  can  conceive,  is  there  any  way  to 
avoid  this  confequence,  but  by  recurring  to  what  is 
denied  to  be  poffible,  a  fuppofed  power  of  the  mind, 
to  ad  or  not  ad  at  all,  and  to  be  perfedly  torpid,  in 
view  of  whatever  motives.  To  take  this  for  granted 
is  a  proftrate  begging  of  the  qucftion. 

5.  As  this  paflage  holds  forth,  that  the  human  mind 
always  ads  upon  motive  and  cannot  ad  without  it, 
and  therefore  as  is  illuftrated  in  a  preceding  paragraph, 
is  always  determined  by  motive  ;  fo  it  follows,  that  it 
is  always  determined  by  the  Jlrongeft  motive,  that 
which  appears  the  moft  eligible,  or  has  the  greatcil 
previous  tendency  to  induce  volition.  Surely  there 
can  be  no  motive  or  reafon  to  a6\  on  a  weaker  mo- 
tive in  preference  to  a  ftronger  :  This  can  never  appear 
eligible  ;  and  Dr.  Weft  holds,  that  the  mind  never 
ads  without  fome  reafon  or  motive  ;  without  the  ap- 
pearance of  fomeihing  as  eligible. 

F  a  6.  As 


S4 

6.  As  the  will  is  the  only  aftive  faculty,  and  the 
feat  of  liberty  and  moral  agency,  fo  there  is  no  moral- 
ity in  any  other  faculty,  aclions  or  impreffions,  than 
thofe  of  the  will  ;  and  Dr.  Weft  fuppofes  in  this  very 
pafTage,  as  well  as  elfcwherc,  that  our  propenfities 
and  habits  do  not  belono  to  will.  Therefore,  provid- 
ed we  choofe  things,  which  are  for  our  greateft  good, 
it  is  of  no  confcquence,  as  to  morality,  whether  or  not 
«  we  find  it  difficult  and  impradicable  to  bring  our 
"  propenfities  to  fubmit  to  our  choice  ;"  of  no  more 
confequence,  than  whether  we  can  bring  our  under- 
ftandings  to  be  as  acute  and  comprehenfive,  as  we 
may  choofe.  And  though  we  have  contracted  a  wrong 
habit,  if  we  "  choofe  to  overcome  it,",  it  is  of  no  more 
confequence  in  a  moral  view,  that  we  find  "  a  vaft 
"  deal  of  difficulty  in  our  endeavours  to  overcome 
"  it  ■"  or  that  we  are  "  liable  to  be  feduced  and  led 
*'  altraybyit;"  than  that  we  find  a  vaft  deal  of  difficul- 
ty in  our  endeavours  to  overcome  our  ignorance  of  af- 
tronomy,  and  then  that  vve  are  liable  to  be  led  aftray 
by  falfe  guides  and  falfe  witneiTes.  For  fo  long  as  our 
will  and  choice  are  right,  all  in  which  there  is  liberty 
and  moral  agency,  is  right,  and  fo  long  v.e  canriot 
poffibly  be  led  aftray  from  our  duty.  And  if  our 
wrong  propenfities  and  habits,  under  thefe  circum- 
ftances  be  not  fubdued,  it  will  imply  no  fault  in  us, 
provided,  as  is  fuppoied  by  Dr.  Weft,  thofe  pro- 
penfities and  habits  confift  not  in  the  aclive  or  moral 
faculty  or  depend  not  on  it  :  For  on  this  fuppofition 
they  are  not  of  a  moral  nature  and  imply  nothing  mor- 
ally wrong. 

7.  Nor  is  it  true,  as  Dr.  Weft  here  afferts,  that 
though  we  eafily  choofe  that  which  is  good,  we  ftand 
"  in  abfolute  necejfity  of  divine  grace,  to  ftrengihcn  us 
"  to  our  duty."  So  far  as  we  choofe  that  which  is 
good,  our  wills  are  right,  and  our  moral  part  is  right. 
So  far  therefore  vve  adually  do  our  duty,  and  have  no 
neceffity  of  divine  grace  to  ftrctigthcn  us,  to  do  that 
which  we  have  done  already.     Docs  the  Doctor  fup- 

pofe. 


J5_ 

pofe,  that  our  duty  calls  us  beyond  our  flrenoth  ?  And 
that  it  obliges  us  to  a6t  againit  ahjolute  nccefjuy.  ? 

8.  Nor  if  we  were  to  be  aflilled  by  divine  power  to 
perform  any  thing  beyond  the  reach  of  our  moral  fac- 
ulties, would  there  be  any  grace  in  fuch  adiilance.  It 
is  grace  to  enable  a  man  to  perform  his  duty  ;  but 
it  is  no  grace,  to  enable  him  to  perform  that  which  is 
not  his  duty  3  c.  g.  to  fly  to  the  moon. 

The  DoBor  fuppofes,  that  Prefidcnt  Edwards  held, 
that  there  is  always  a  reafon  for  v.ct  acling.  No  doubt 
there  is  always  a  reafon  for  the  mind's  refufing  an  ob- 
je£l  offered.  But  Prefident  Edwards  never  held,  that 
the  mind  ever  fmks  itfcif  into  perfeft  ina6lion  and 
torpor  ;  and  of  gourfe  he  did  not  hold,  that  there  is  a 
reafon  for  this. 

The  Dodor  infills,  that  "  Tlie  mind  determines  up- 
'•  on  motives,  and  is  not  properly  determined  by  mo- 
"  lives.;"  p.  87.  This  feems  to  be  a  mere  difpute  about 
words.  The  Doftor  might  as  well  have  faid,  that  veg- 
etables grow  upon,  or  in  confeqiunce  of  the  rain,  and 
rot  ly  the  rain.  And  would  it  be  worth  while  to  dif- 
pute that  matter  with  him  ? 

"  Strange  fo  much  difference  there  fhculd  be 
•*  'Tv/ixt  tivcedle-dum  and  t-vjeidle-dee" 

It  is  confidered  by  the  compilers  of  the  Encyclopae- 
dia lately  printed  at  Philadelphia,  as  an  invincible  ar- 
gument agsinfl  the  infallible  conncBion  between  mo- 
tive and  volition,  that  if  equal  motives  were  fet  before 
a  man  to  travel  an  eaftern  road  and  to  travel  a  fouth- 
ern  road,  he  would,  on  the  fuppolition  of  fuch  a  con- 
nection, travel  in  a  diagonal  line,  to  the  foutheaft. 
But  this  is  contrary  to  faCl  and  experience.  There- 
fore they  conclude,  there  h  no  fure  connexion  be- 
tween motive  and  adion.  They  might  jufl:  as  conclu- 
lively  liave  proved,  that  there  is  no  infallible  connec- 
tion between  evidence  and  the  opinions  of  men. 
Thus,  on  the  fuppofiiion  that  the  arguments,  that  the 
world  was  created  in  the  fpring  and  that  it  was  creat- 
ed in  autumn,  balance  each  other,  the  conclufion 
F  3  muft 


86 

mult  be,  that  it  was  created  in  neither  of  thofe  feafons, 
but  midway  between  them.  If  the  arguments,  that 
Dr.  Weft  wrote  the  Eflays  on  liberty  and  neceflity,and 
that  fome  other  perfon  wrote  them,  fhould  be  equal  ; 
%ve  ought  to  believe  that  neither  of  them  wrote  them  ; 
but  a  middle  man  between  them. 

Dr.  Weft,  in  his  fecond  part,  infifts  more  largely  on  ^ 
the  fubjeB  of  choofing  between  things  equally  eligiWe, 
than  in  his  firft  part  ;  and  puts  the  cafe  of  four  equal 
lines,  one  of  which  is  to  be  touched  ;  and  he  fuppofes 
that  he  dctermineo  to  touch  one  of  them,  and  this  deter- 
mination be  luppofes  to  be  without  motive  and  with- 
out extrinfic  caufe.  Now  in  any  fuch  cafe  there  ap- 
pears to  be  no  more  difficulty  in  accounting  for  my 
determination  to  take  or  choofe  one  in  particular, 
than  there  is  in  accounting  for  my  feeing  or  thinking 
of  one  in  particular.  Though  our  thoughts  roam 
freely  and  apparently  without  control,  yet  Dr.  Weft 
will  not  pretend,  that  they  happen  by  mere  chance 
and  without  a  caufe.  Juft  fo  as  to  our  volitions  ; 
they  no  more  happen  in  any  cafe  without  a  caufe, 
than  any  other  events.  Nor  can  the  mind  itfelf,  in 
■which  they  take  place,  be  the  efficient  caufe  of  them, 
without  running  into  an  infinite  feries  of  volitions, 

and  implying  volition  before  the  firft  volition. 

Therefore  let  the  Do6lor  bring  as  many  inftances  as 
he  pleafes,  of  things  apparently  indifferent,  fo  long  as 
choice  among  them  has  a  caufe,  and  a  caufe  extrinfic 
to  the  mind  too  ;  they  make  nothing  to  his  purpofe. 
I  aflc  Dr.  Weft,  Is  his  determination  to  touch  one 
of  his  equal  lines,  which  he  calls  C,  an  uncaufed 
event  ?  He  will  not  pretend  it.  Is  it  efficiently  cauf- 
ed  by  the  mind  itfelf,  in  any  other  fenfe,  than  as  the 
mind  is  the  fubjeft  of  it,  or  as  it  is  the  caufe  of  all 
its  own  thoughts  and  feelings  ?  To  anfwcr  in  the  af- 
firmative, and  not  to  clear  the  anfwer  of  the  abfurdi- 
ties  and  impoffibility  charged  upon  it,  is  mere  dog- 
matizing.  To  all  inftances,  in  which  creatures  are 

fuppofed  to  choole  one  of  feyeral  indifferent  things, 

n}y 


J7__ 

my  anfwcr  is,  that  though  we  cannot  point  out  the 
particular  motive  or  accident,  which  is  the  occafioii 
of  the  choice  of  that  particular  one  ;  (till  this  choice 
has  a  caule,  and  a  caufe  cxtrinfic  to  the  mind  too, 
and  it  is  as  eafy  to  account  for  our  choofing  one  of 
feveral  indifferent  things,  as  to  account  for  our  think- 
ing of  one  of  them  in  particular. 

But  perhaps  the  Dodor  meant  to  evade  this,  by 
faying,  that  in  the  very  a6l  of  determining  to  touch 
one  of  his  equal  lines,  viz.  C,  he  "  voluntarily  called 
it  to  mind."  What  does  the  Do£lor  mean  by  this  ? 
That  he  firft  wifhed  to  think  of  C,  and  that  in  conlb- 
quence  of  this  wifli,  it  came  to  his  mind  ?  If  he  did 
mean  this,  it  is  to  be  prefumed,  that  he  will  not  un- 
dertake to  defend  it.  And  as  I  can  imagine  no  oth- 
er meaning  of"  voluntarily  calling  C  to  mind,"  I  muft 
be  excufed  from  further  anfwer  until  1  am  better  in- 
formed. If  the  Do61;or  mean,  that  he  wiflied  to  think 
of  one  of  his  lines,  and  then  C  came  to  his  mind  ; 
the  queltion  returns.  What  made  C  come  to  his 
mind  ? 

But  the  Dodor  argues,  that  the  Creator  has  a  felf- 
deiermining  power,  and  that  he  does  or  may  exert 
that  power  in  creating  two  or  more  perfeftly  fimilar 
bodies  and  in  placing  them  in  different  fituations,  or 
in  caufing  one  of  them  to  move,  while  the  other  is  at 
rell,  <&:c.     As  to  all  fuch  cafes  I  obferve, 

1.  That  every  determination  of  God  is  as  eternal,  as 
unchangeable  and  neceffary,  as  his  exiftence  is,  and 
therefore  none  of  his  a6ls  are  any  more  felf-determin- 
ed,  than  his  exiltence.  To  fuppofe  otherwife  is  to 
fuppofe  that  the  Deity  is  mutable.  If  therefore  he 
have  determined  to  create  ever  fo  many  bodies  per- 
fe6lly  aJike,  and  to  difpofe  of  them  in  different  cir- 
cumftances,  this  is  no  proof  of  felf-determination  in  the 
Deity,  if  by  that  term  be  meant  any  thing  oppofite  to 
the  mod  abfolute  and  irreverfible  moral  neceffity  :  I 
fay  moral  neceffity,  becaufe  all  neccllity  of  moral  a6ls, 
is  moral  neceiiity. 

F  4  2.  U 


8S 

2.  If  God  have  created  two  bodies  perfe£lly  aUke» 
and  placed  the\n  in  different  fituations  ;  it  will  not 
follow,  that  he  has  done  it  without  wife  defign  and 
moliv'r.'. 

3.  But  why  did  he  not  place  them  in  a  reverfe  of 
jTituations,  that  which  is  on  the  right  hand,  on  the  left, 
and  that  which  is  on  the  left  hand,  on  the  right  ?  And 

fo  with  refpeft  to   reft  and  motion. The  anfwer 

has  been  long  fince  given  by  Prefident  Edwards  : 
'i  hefe  bodies,  though  faid  to  be  numerically  different, 
are  no  more  different  than  the  fame  found  repeated 
at  diirerent  times.  Thefe  founds  are  as  numerically 
different  as  the  bodies,  and  with  the  fame  reafon  it  may 
be  aOvcd,  why  wa.s  not  the  firft  found  made  laft  and 
the  lait  firft  ?  Or  v/hy  were  not  thefe  numerically 
different  founds  interchanged  ?  The  abfurdity  of  put- 
ling  this  queftion  mull  appear  to  every  one,  becaufe 
it  implies,  contrary  to  the  very  fuppofiiion,  that  the 
founds  are  different  in  fome  other  refpetl  than  time. 
So  the  quefiion,  why  the  two  perfectly  alike  bodies 
were  not  interchanged  in  their  Situation,  implies,  con- 
trary to  the  fuppofition,  that  thofe  bodies  differ  in 
fome  other  refpetl  befide  their  fituation. 

The  Do6lor  fuggefls  feveral  confiderations  to  fiiow, 
that  thefe  bodies  do  differ  in  fome  other  refped  be- 
fide their  fituation  -,  as  that  one  of  them  may  be  in 
motion,  the  other  at  reft.  And  what  is  motion  but  a 
change  of  fituation  ?  So  the  fame  found  may  move 
from  one  place  to  another  ;  yet  no  body  would  con- 
clude from  that  merely,  that  it  was  a  different  found 
from  a  perfedlly  fimilar  found,  i.  e.  different  from  a 
repetition  of  the  fame  found  in  a  different  place  or 

at  a  different  time. Alfo  the  Doftor  infifts,  that 

thofe  fimilar  bodies  are  numerically  different  ;  that  is, 
ihcy  differ  \\\  number,  fo  that  you  may  number  them, 
and  if  you  pleaf--,  may  call  that  on  the  right  hand 
No.  1  or  A,  and  that  on  the  left  hand  No.  2  or  B. 
And  in  the  fame  manner  you  may  number  the  founds; 
and  you  may  as  wel'    ^fk  why  found  Nq.  2,  was  not 

made 


J9_ 

made  firft,  as  why  No.  2  of  the  bodies  was  not  phiced 
on  the  left  hand.  If  two  bodies  be  different  numer- 
ically only,  they  differ  in  no  other  refpeft,  than  in 
iituation  ;  for  if  they  did  not  diiler  in  (ituation,  they 
would  become  one  body. 

The  Dodor  proceeds,  p.  1;;,  "  That  they  [the 
"  bodies]  are  numerically  different  from  each  other, 
"  appears  from  this  confideration,  that  if  the  globe  A, 
"  on  the  right  hand,  fhould  he  removed  to  a  far  dif- 
"  tant  place,  the  Deity  could  create  another  jufl;  like 
"  it,  and  put  it  in  the  fame  place  from  which  A  was 
"  removed."  So  if  found  A  fiiould  be  removed 
from  the  place  in  which  it  was  firli  made  to  a  far  dif- 
tant  place,  the  Deity  could  caufe  another  found  juft 
like  it,  in  the  fame  place,  from  which  A  had  been  re- 
moved.— '■ — P.  16.  "  It  is  evident,  that  thefe  two 
"  globes  are  as  really  two,  as  though  they  were  ever 
"  lo  diffimilar."  This  is  no  more  evident,  than  that 
the  two  founds  are  as  really  two,  as  though  they  had 

been  ever  fo  diffnnilar. Ibid.     "  And   they  were 

"  made  to  anfwer  different  piirpofes  ;  and  yet  being 
''  perfectly  fimilar,  A  could  have  anfwered  the  pur- 
"  poles  of  B  and  B  of  A."  So  the  found  A  may 
have  been  made  to  relieve  Saul  troubled  by  an 
evil  fpirit  ;  and  the  found  B  may  have  been  made 
to  anfwer  the  purpofe  of  the  temple  worfhip.  Yet 
being  perfectly  fimilar  and  indeed  no  more  than  the 
repetition  of  the  fame  found,  A  could  have  anfwer- 
ed the  purpofe  of  B,  and  B  of  A.. 

Dr.  Wefl  fays,  that  Prefident  Edwards,  in  fuppof- 
ing  that  two  globes  perfcQly  alike,  are  the  fame  in  every 
relpeft  except  their  filuation,  has  confounded  fimilar- 
ity  with  identity;  p.  16,  Part  II.  Prefident  Edwards 
does  indeed  fuppofe,  that  two  globes  perfeftly  alike 
in  all  refpe6ls  except  their  fituation,  arc  the  fame  in 
all  refpefls  except  their  filuation  ;  and  if  they  could 
be  ali.^e  in  their  fituation  too,  as  they  then  would  be 
in  the  fame  place,  no  doubt  Dr.  Weft  will  grant,  that 
in  that  cafe  they  would  become  one  and  the  fame 

globe  : 


90 

globe  :'  If  not  let  him  point  out  in  what  refpe6l  they 
would  not  be  the  fame. 

The  Do6lor  dwells  long  on  the  cafe  of  the  two  globes, 
and  yet  every  thing  that  he  fays  to  make  out,  that 
they  are  two  in  any  rerpe6l  befide  place,  may  be  faid 
to  make  out,  that  perfeftly  fimilar  founds  given  in 
different  times  or  places,  are  not  the  fame  found  re- 
peated. What  he  fays,  p.  16,  may  be  applied  to  the 
cafe  of  the  founds  thus  ;  "  What  fuperiourfitnefs  has" 
the  found  A,  to  the  found  B,  "  that  makes  it  necefla- 
«  ry,  that  it  fhould  be"  given  firfl  and  be  continued 
in  one  place  ?  "  Or  what  fuperiour  fitnefs  has"  the 
found  B  to  the  found  A,  "  that  makes  it  neceffary, 
"  that  it  fliould  be"  given  in  the  fecond  place  in 
point  of  time,  and  fhould  be  moved  to  another  place 
in  point  of  fituation  ?  "  It  is  certain  no  reafon  can  be 
"  affigned  :  For  they  being  perfe6lly  fimilar,  one 
"  cannot  in  the  nature  of  things  be  more  fit  than  the 
"  other.  So  then,  here  are  two  very  different  effe£ls 
*'  of  the  divine  power,  without  any  pofTible  reafon" 
why  found  A  fhould  not  be  given  in  the  fecond 
place  and  be  moved,  and  found  B,  in  the  firft  place 
and  not  be  moved. 

The  Do6lor  conceives,  p.  17,  that  the  ideas  ad- 
vanced imply,  "  that  one  and  the  fame  body  may  be 
"  in  two  different  places  at  the  fame  time."  No 
doubt  they  do  imply,  that  a  body  which  is  in  all  re- 
fpeBs  one  and  the  fame  with  another  body,  except 
fituation,  may  be  in  a  different  place  from  that  other 
body  at  the  fame  time  ;  and  may  be  the  fubjeft  of 
effefts  different  and  contrary  to  thofe,  of  which  that 
other  body  may  at  the  fame  time  be  the  fubjeB. 

All  that  the  Doctor  fays  on  this  fubjetl,  implies, 
that  a  body  different  from  another  numerically  only, 
differs  from  it  in  feme  other  refpefcl  befide  fituation. 
But  he  will  doubtlefs  perceive,  that  this  is  an  error, 
if  he  reficft,  that  provided  the  diverfity  of  fituation 
were  removed  and  they  were  at  the  fame  time  in  the 
fame  place,  they  would  no  longer  be  numerically  differ- 
ent. 


9^ 

cnt. Yet  Dr.  Weft  fays,  p.  17,  «  If  tlicy  differed 

«  only  in  place,  then  put  A  in  the  place  of  B,  and  it 
«J  would  become  B  ;  and  B,  by  changing  with  A, 
<«  would  become  A  ;  which  is  not  the  cafe  :  For 
«  fliould  we  fee  A  and  B  change  places,  dill  we  Ihould 
«  call  each  by  the  fame  name  we  did  before."  If 
you  put  A  in  the  place  of  B,  it  would  become  B,  in 
the  lame  and  no  other  fenfe,  than  if  you  make  the 
found  A,  in  the  place  and  time  of  the  found  B,  it  will 
become  B.  If  we  fhould  fee  thofe  two  bodies  change 
their  places  with  each  other,  Hill  ibey  would  be  all 
the  while  in  different  places,  as  much  fo  as  two  founds 
would  be,  if  we  fliould  hear  the  found,  which  is  now 
in  this  apartment,  gradually  move  to  another  place, 
and  the  perfeftly  fimilar  found,  which  is  now  made  in 
the  adjoining  apartment,  gradually  move  into  this 
apartment.  Thofe  founds  being  all  the  while  thus 
different  in  place,  do  not  become  in  all  refpeds  one 
found;  the  difference  of  place  flill  remains-  And  is 
all  the  difference  of  the   bodies  fuppoied  to  be  fecn 

to  interchange  places. And  if  the  globes  fhould 

be  annihilated  and  then  be  created  anew,  and  that 
which  is  now  on  the  right  hand  fhould  be  created  on 
the  left,  and  vice  verfa  ;  this  would  be  as  abfurd  a 
^  fuppofition,  as  to  fuppofe,  that  if  the  two  perfeftly 
fimilar  founds  now  exifling  in  this  apartment  and  in 
the  adjoining  apartment,  fhould  ceaie  ;  that  which  is 
now  in  the  adjoining  apartment  could  be  renewed  in 
this  apartment,  and  that  which  now  exifts  in  this  a- 
partment  could  be  renewed  in  the  adjoining,  in  the 
ftead  of  the  one  which  is  now  there.  Every  one 
muft  fee,  that  this  implies,  that  the  founds  are  differ^ 
ent  from  each  other,  in  fomc  other  refpecl,  than  their 
place  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  fuppofiiion. 

The  Doftor  proceeds,  ibid,  "  If  one  of  the  globes 
"  fhould  be  dafhed  in  pieces,  it  would  not  in  theleafl 
«  afFe6l  the  other,  but  it  would  be  as  whole  as  it  was 
*'  before."  So  if  one  of  the  perfeflly  fimilar  founds 
made  in  different  flaces,  though  at  firft  entirely  me- 
lodious, 


9^ 

lodious,  Should  become  harfb  and  grate  on  the  ear, 
it  would  not  in  the  leaft  aflFe6l  the  other.  Yet  Dr. 
Weft  grants,  that  thefe  before  the  alteration  of  one, 
are  only  the  repetition  of  the  fame  found. 

The  Do6l:or  continues,  "  If  the  two  globes  were 
"  one  and  the  fame  in  every  refpeB,  except  their  oc- 
«*  cupying  tv/o  places  at  the  fame  time,  then  whatever 
"  accident  fhould  take  place  with  refpeft  to  one, 
"  would  equally  take  place  with  refpect  to  the  other  : 
"  Ihat  is,  if  A  be  dafhed  in  pieces,  Ji  muft  Ihare  the 
"  fame  fate  ;  which  we  fee  is  not  the  cafe."  This  is 
faid  without  proof  or  reafon  given  for  its  fupport, 
and  therefore  a  bare  denial  is  a  fufficient  anfwer.  If 
two  founds  in  every  other  refpedl;  one  and  the  fame, 
fhould  be  made  in  two  places,  whatever  accident 
fliouid  take  place  with  refpetl  to  one,  might  not  in 
tije  leaft  afFett  the  other. 

The  fum  of  my  anfwer  concerning  the  two  globes, 
is.  That  they  are  no  more  two,  than  two  perfedly  fim- 
ilar  founds  made  in  different  places  or  times  ;  that 
the  fuppofjtion  of  their  being  interchanged,  is  as  ab- 
furd  as  the  fuppofition,  that  the  two  founds  fhould  be 
interchangv.d;  that  it  implies,  contrary  to  what  is  fup- 
pofed,  that  they  are  different  from  each  other,  in 
fome  odier  refpetl  befide  fituation  ;  and  finally,  that 
it  is  no  more  in-  the  power  of  the  Deity  to  interchange 

them,  than  to  interchange  the  two  founds. If  Dr. 

Weft  Ihould  reply  to  this,  as  he  often  has  done  in 
other  cafes,  that  '•  this  is  paft  his  pou-er  to  conceive  :" 
Be  it  fo  ;  what  follows  ?  That  therefore  it  cannot  be 
true  ?  And  is  Dr.  Weft's  fidll  to  conceive  the  ftand- 
aid  of  truth  ? 

"  To  fay,  that  no  two  things  can  have  equal  de- 
"  grces  of  eligibility  and  fitnefs  in  the  divine  mind,  is 
"  to  confound  the  reafon  of  acling,  with  atlion  itfelf ; 
"  and  to  make  the  Deity  a  mere  pallive   being,  or  a 

*•  mechanical  medium  of  fate."     Part  II,  p.  19. 

The  Do6ior  has  not  told  how  thjis  confounds  the  rea- 
fon of  a6\ing  with  action,  and  he  muft  not  expeft. 


93 

tliat  all  his  readers  will  receive  it  upon  his  mere  af- 
fertion.  It  is  to  be  prefumed,  that  many  of  them  will 
liill  believe,  that  the  divine  mind  always  a£ls  accord- 
ing to  the  diftates  of  wifdom,  and  on  account  of  fu- 
periour  litnefs  chooles  whatever  it  does  choofe,  and 
ihi't  this  is  not  to  confound  the  reafon  of  ading  with 

aftion,  but  to  preferve  them  diflinft. If  for  the 

Deity  to  acl  always  voluntarily  according  to  the  dic- 
tates of  perfect  uifdom,  be  what  the  Do£lor  means  by 
his  being  "  a  mere  paflive  being,"  we  grant  it  ;  but 
we  appeal  to  the  reader,  whether  the  Do£lor  be  not 
in  this  cafe  guilty  of  a  perverfion  of  language  ;  or  at 
leaft  whether  he  be  not  guilty  of  begging  the  quef- 
tion,  in  fuppofing,  that  there  is  no  aftion  but  that 
which  is  fclf-determinate  ;  as  that  is  manifeftly  fup- 

pofed  in  the  proportion  now  under  confideration. 

As  to  "  the  mechanical  medium  of  fate,"  the  reader 
will  fay,  whether  it'  be  not  mere  rant,  unworthy  of  a 
grave  philofopber  and  divine. 

Dr.  Weft  frequently  fays,  and  every  where  takes 
it  for  granted,  that  in  the  divine  mind  there  may  be 
innumerable  things,  which  differ  in  many  refpefts, 
which  yet  may  have  equal  degrees  of  eligibility  and 
fitnefs  to  anfwer  God's  particular  purpofes  ;  and  among 
thefe  innumerable  things  the  Deity  can  choofe  one 
and  not  another,  and,  with  refpect  to  any  of  them  can 

acl  or  not  a6l. That  things  thus  different  may  be 

equally  fit  to  anfwer  the  purpofes  of  God  is  not  grant- 
ed and  ought  not  to  have  been  afiferted' without  proof 
or  inflance.  It  appears  to  be  a  mere  conjedure  ; 
and  if  mere  conje£lur,&6  be  admitted  as  truth,  truth  is 
the  moft  uncertain  thing  in  the  world.  Befides,  it  is 
very  improbable,  that  things  differing  in  feveral  re- 
fpe^ls,  fliould  be  equally  adapted  to  the  fame  pur- 
pofc.  As  to  the  idea  that  God  can  in  any  cafe  attor 
not  aclj  this  appears  to  be  an  impoffibility,  for  the  rea- 
fons  already  mentioned. 

"  if  a  m-^-n  is  led  by  any  means  or  mothes  or  rcafoKS, 
«  to  choole  that  which  he  formerly  abhorred,"  fays  the 

Dodor, 


94 

Doftor,  *•  and  to  abhor  that  which  he  formerly  loverj^ 
"  he  is  flill  as  free  as  ever  he  was  ;  for  nothing  being 
"  an  objecl  of  choice,  but  what  appears  ehgible,  it  is 
«  impofiible  that  the  mind  fliould  choofe  that  which 
«  is  neither  eligible  in  ilfelf,  nor  in  its  confequences ;  /'.  e, 
«  nothing  is  an  objeft  of  choice  but  eligible  things. 
«  When  then  things  appear  to  us  eligible,  which  fornrier- 
«  ly  we  abhorred,  and  we  abhor  things,  that  formerly 
«  were  eligible,  we  have  only  changed  the  objeBs  of 
<«  our  choice,  but  not  our  freedom  :  We  are  as  free 
"  now,  as  we  were  before."  Part  II,  p.  30.  The 
truth  fo  naturally  obtrudes  itfelf  on  every  man,  that  it 
is  difficult  for  him  confiftently  to  contradi£l  it.*  The 
DoClor  here  grants,  that  when  a  man  choofes  an  ob- 
jeft,  by  "  whatever  means,  motives  or  reafons  he  is 
«  led  to  the  choice,"  «  he  is  ftill  free."  Therefore  to 
be  led  by  motives  in  any  cafe  is  not  inconfiftent  with 
freedom  ;  therefore  to  be  led  by  them  always,  in  an 
ejlablijhcd  and  infallible  conneHion  between  motives 
and  choice,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  freedom.  Why 
then  does  he  difpute  Prefident  Edwards  for  holding 

fuch  a  conne8ion  ? Befides,  Dr.  Weft  here  grants, 

that  if  a  man  be  led  by  any  means  to  choofe  an  objeft, 
ftill  he  is  free.  Then  he  is  free,  when  he  is  led  to 
choofe  an  objeB,  by  an  extrinfic  caufe.  Nay,  he  is 
frecj  when  he  is  led  by  a  divine  injluence,  to  choofe 
an  obje6l.  It  is  further  to  be  obferved,  that  in  this 
paffage,  Dr.  Weft  declares,  that  it  is  impojfible,  that 
the  mind  ftiould  choofe  any  thing,  which  does  not  ap- 
pear to  it  eligible.  What  then  becomes  of  felf-deter- 
mination  ?  Has  the  mind  a  power  to  make  things  ap- 
pear agreeable  or  difagreeable  at  pleafure ;  to  control 
all  its  own  views,  and  to  create  its  own  happinefs  in 
any  circumftances  whatever  .?  This  indeed  is  the  thor- 
ough fcheme  of  felf-determination  advocated  by  Arch- 
bifliop  King,  but  which  has  been  fince  given  up, 
though  inconfiftently,  by  Dr.  Clarke,  and  fo  far  as  I 
know,  by  all  other  believers  in  felf-determination  ;  and 

to 

♦  Naluram  ex^dla  furca^  tmen  ufquc  remrret,    Hor,  Ep.  I,  lo. 


95 

to  be  fure  cannot  be  confiftently  adopted  by  Dr.  Weft 
for  many  reafons  ;  particularly  this,  that  Dr.  Weft 
holds  that  the  will  always  follows  motive  j  but  this 
fcheme  is,  that  the  will  always  goes  before  motive. 

"  Mr.  Edwards  and  his   followers,"  fays  ipr.  Weft, 
"  fuppofe,  that  there  muft  be  a  particular  reafon  why 

"  every  determination  of  mind  ■ ■  is  in  thispartic- 

"  ular  manner,  rather  than  any  other which 

"  will  imply,  that  there  can  be  no  two  obje£ls  in  the 

"  mind equally  eligible. The  contrary  we 

"  know  to  be  true  by  our  own  experience."  Part 
II,  p.  14.  How  does  Dr.  Weft  know  what  our  own 
experience  is  ?  He  may  indeed  claim  a  right  to  know 
HIS  own  experience  ;  but  I  defy  him  to  tell  what  my 
experience,  or  the  experience  of  any  other  man,  is, 
unlefs  he  have  had  information.  Who  then  gave  him 
a  right  to  fpeak  in  the  plural  number  in  this  cafe  ? 
And  whom  does  he  mean,  when  he  fpeaks  of  our  ex- 
perience ?  If  he  mean  mankind  in  general,  I  call  on 
him  for  proof,  and  wifli  he  had  been  a  little  more  re- 
ferved  in  this  inftancc.  Strong  aflertions  are  equally 
open  to  all  ;  and  if  they  be  good  arguments,  it  is  ea- 
fy  to  prove,  that  the  experience  of  mankind  is  dired- 
iy  the  reverie  of  what  Dr.  Weft  aflerts  it  to  be. 

As  to  the  queftion,  whether  any  two  obje£ls  are, 
at  the  inftant  of  the  choice  of  one  of  them,  equally 
eligible  in  the  view  of  the  mind  ;  Tanfwer  it  in  the 
negative  ;  and  in  my  own  experience  never  found 
them  to  appear  any  more  equally  eligible,  than  any 
two  objeds,  to  be  equally  the  obje£ls  of  my  fight  or 
of  the  attention  of  my  mind.  And  as  to  the  various 
inftances  of  feveral  eggs,  guineas  and  fpols  on  a  chefs 
board,  one  of  which  is  propofcd  to  be  taken  or  touch- 
ed ;  there  is  no  more  difficulty,  as  I  have  faid  already, 
in  aftigning  a  reafon,  why  one  of  them  rather  than 
any  other,  is  taken  or  touched,  than  why  one  rather 
than  any  other,  i«  more  particularly  feen  or  attended 
to,  by  the  eye  or  the  mind.  The  circumftance,  that 
one  of  them  is  more  dire6Uy  and  particularly  feen  or 

attended 


96 

attended  to,  is  a  fufficient  reafon,  why  that  rather 
than  any  of  the  red  (hould  be  taken  or  touched  :  And 
when  this  circumftance  takes  place  with  regard  to 
any  one  of  feveral  guineas  for  inftance,  they  are  not 
all,  or  GO  not  appear,  equally  eligible.  That  which 
is  the  immediate  obje61;  of  fight  or  attention  is,  for 
that  reafon,  raoft  eligible  :  And  how  that  came  to  be 
more  particularly  the  objeQ;  of  light  or  attention,  I 
am  under  no  more  obligation  to  account,  than  Dr. 
Weft  or  any  other  man. 

It  is  a  fcntiment  entertained  by  forac,  that  we  ef- 
ficiently caufe  our  own  volitions,  but  invariably  ac- 
cording to  motives,  reafons  or  preeflablifhed  antece- 
dents. Dr.  Clarke  expreffes  this  in  various  parts  of 
his  metaphyfical  works;  as  in  the  following,  "The 
"  true,  proper,  immediate,  phyfical  caufe  of  adion,  is 
«  the  power  of  felf-raotion  in  men,  which  exerts  itfelf 
^^  freely  in  confequence  of  the  laft  judgment  of  the  un- 
«  derftanding.  Butthelaftjudgmentof  theunderftand- 
««  ing  is  not  itfelf  a  phyfical  efl&cient,  but  merely  a  moral 
"  motive  upon  wkichihe  phyfical  efficient, or  motive pow- 
«'  er  begins  to  a6l."  Being  and  Attributes,  p.  93.  «  The 
"  experience  of  a  man's  ever  doing  what  he  judges  rea- 
«  fonable  to  do,  is  not  at  all  an  experience  of  his  being 
*s  under  any  necejfity  fo  to  do.  For  concomiiancy  in 
«  this  cafe  is  no  evidence  at  all  of  phyfical  connec- 
"  tion.  Upon  fuppofition  of  perfeB  liberty,  a  reafon- 
"  able  being  would  ftill  conjlantly  do  what  appeared 
^«  reafonahk  it  fiiould  do  :  And  its  conjlantly  doing  fo, 
"  is  no  proof  at  all  of  its  wanting  liberty  ©r  a  phyfical 
«  power  of  doing  otherwife."     Remarks  on  Collins,  p. 

25. Dr.    Price  entirely  agrees  in  this  fentiment 

with  Dr.  Clarke.     "  A  felf-determining  power,  which 

*•  is  under  no  injliience  of  motives has  never 

"  been  contended  for  or  meant  by  any  advocates  for 

"  liberty. E>ery  being  who  ads  at  all,  muft  at! 

*'  for  fome  end  and  with  fome  view.*'  Correfpondcncc 
zuiih  Prifjllvi  p.  156.     "  The  influe?icc  of  motives  is 

^ ««  perfeftly 


97 

'' perfe81y  confident  with  liberty  and  indeed  fuppolcs 
"  It."     Reid  on  the  Atlive  Powers,  p.  275. 
On  thefe  paliagcs  1  remark, 

1.  Dr.  Clarke,  as  well  as  tlie  other  advocates  for 
fclf-dctermination,  abundantly  contradi61ts  thelc  fenti- 
nicnts.  Thus  in  his  fccond  letter  to  the  gentleman  at 
Cambridge^  fpeaking  of  the  final  perception  of  the 
undcrltanding  and  Hrll  operation  of  the  atlive  faculty, 
he  fays,  "  I  think  there  is  no  connexion  at  all  be- 
"  tvveen  them  ;  and  that  in  their  not  being  conneQed 
*'  lies  the  difference  between  a8ion  and  pafTion,  which 

"  diflercnce  is  effcntial  to  liberty." But  if  a  man 

"  on  the  fuppofiiion  of  perfeCl  liberty,"  "  conftanily 
'•  do  what  appears  reafonable  ;"  then  a  man  may  in  a 
confiftence  with  perfect  liberty  condantly  acl  agreea- 
bly to  the  final  perception  of  his  underftanding  ;  i.  e. 
the  final  perception  of  the  underftanding  and  aclion, 
or  "  the  operation  of  the  active  faculty,"  may  be  con- 
ftantly  conneded  confidently  with  liberty.  And  is 
conflant  connection,  no  connedion  at  all  ?  And  if  in 
their  not  being  connefled  lies  the  effence  of  liberty, 
the  eflence  of  liberty  cannot  be  confiftcnt  with  their 
conftant  connexion. 

2.  That  Dr.  Clarke  places  liberty  in  a  phficcl 
power  to  do  an  a6lion.  His  words  are,  "  A  being's 
"  conftantly  doing  what  appears  reafonable  it  fiionld 
"  do,  is  no  proof  of  its  wanting  liberty  or  a  phyfical 
"  power  of  doing  oiherwifc."  He  evidently  ules  liber- 
ty and  p/njical  p^zcer,  as  fynonymous  expreffions.  Ma- 
ny other  pafTages  might  be  quoted  from  Dr.  Clarke, 
Dr.  Price,  and  other  principal  authors  of  that  clafs,  in 
which  they  exprefsly  aflcrt  or  evidently  fuppole,  that 
whoever  has  a  phvfical  power  to  do  an  action,  is  free  ; 
and  that  the  reafon  why  motives  are  not  inconfiltent 
with  liberty,  is,  that  they  infer  not  a  phyfical  necefli- 
ty  or  inability.  But  this  is  no  inore  than  we  all  grant. 
Peter  had  the  fame  ph)  fical  or  natural  power  to  con- 
fefs  his  Lord,  which  he  had  to  deny  him  ;  and  Judas, 
the  fame  phyfical  power  to  be  faithful  to  him,  as  to 

G  betray 


betray  him.  Nor  do  the  mofl;  abfolute  decrees  and 
predi6lions  deftroy  ibis  phyfical  power.  So  that  ab- 
iolute  decrees  and  predittions  are,  on  this  plan,  pcr- 
feftly  confiftent  with  Uberty. 

3.  Thele  paffages  imply,  that  though  the  mind  is 
ihe  efficient  caufe  of  its  own  vohtions  ;  yet  this  effi- 
ciency is  limited  to  exert  itfclf  or  to  be  exerted,  ac- 
cording to  motives  and  the  diftates  of  the  under- 
ftanding.  But  this,  on  the  plan  oP  thofe  who  deny 
that  volition  can  be  free  and  yet  be  the  effect  of 
an  extrinfic  caufe,  is  no  more  liberty  than  the  flave 
cxercifes,  who  moves  and  acls  at  the  control  of 
his  mafter ;  or  than  the  man  has,  v;ho  walks  in  a  prifon 
and  whofe  liberty  is  bounded  and  determined  by  the 
walls  and  gates  of  the  prifon,  and  by  the  confent  of 
the  gaoler.  We  might  as  well  fay,  that  a  flave  is 
in  poifeffion  of  his  liberty  and  is  not  controlled  by 
the  will  of  his  mafter,  but  controls  himfelf  ac- 
cording to  the  will  of  his  mafter  ;  as  that  we  are  free 
with  the  liberty  of  feif-determination  and  contingencc,- 
and  yet  be  always  limited  to  determine  ourfelves  ac- 
cording to  the  influence  of  motives.  If  there  be  a 
real  connexion  between  motive  and  volition,  that 
conneSlion  is  as  inconflftent  with  liberty  as  if  motives 
were  the  efficient  caufes  of  volition  ;  provided  liber- 
ty mean  coniingence  or  previous  uncertainty  of  ac- 
tion :  And  if  liberty  mean  felf-caufation  of  volitionj 
and  this  felf-caufation  be  under  the  control  of  mo- 
tives or  any  extrinflc  caufe,  ftill  where  is  liberty  in 
the  fcnfe  contended  for  by  our  opponents  ?  Volition 
in  this  cafe  is  equally  limited  and  controlled,  as  if  it 
were  efficiently  produced  by  motive. 

Such  felf-determi nation  as  this,  is  not  at  all  rncon- 
fiftent  with  efficacious  grace,  abfolute  decrees,  and 
the  moft  firm  preeflablilhment  of  ali  events  and  voli- 
tions. If  felf-detcrmination  exert  itfelf  according  to 
motives  only,  let  God  in  his  providence  bring  the 
proper  motives  into  view,  and  we  are  efficacioufly  dc- 
i^i^miiied,  or  if  you  pleafcj  it  is  efficacioufly  brought 

to. 


99 

to  pafs,  that  we  fliall  determine  ovirfelvcs  in  a  partic- 
ular limited  manner  ;  and  let  God  decree  abfoluteiy 
that  thole  motives  fliall  come  into  view,  and  he  abfo- 
lutely  decrees  and  foreordains  what  our  condutfc 
fhall  be.  So  that  this  kind  of  felf-determinaiion  docs 
not  at  all  anfwer  the  purpofe  of  avoiding  the  dread- 
ful dodrine  of  ablblute  decrees,  the  fatality  implied 
in  that  do6lrine,  or  other  do6hines  conne61ed  with  it. 

4.  If  a  man  caiife  his  own  volitions  according  to 
motives  only,  and  this  be  a  univerfal  rule  ;  doubtlefs 
this  rule  was  eftabliOied  by  fome  caufe.  This  rule  is 
an  eftablilhmenl  ;  this  eftablifliment  is  an  effefcl.  and 
requires  a  caufe  as  much  as  any  other  eifecl:.  Who 
or  what  is  that  caufe  ?  It  is  doubtlefs  either  the  Firft 
Caufe,  or  fomc  fubordinate  caufe  appointed  by  him. 
In  either  cafe  the  original  caufe  oF  this  efiabliiliment, 
by  which  intelligent  creatures  caufe  their  own  voli- 
tions according  to  motives,  is  God.  Alfo  he  in  the 
courfe  of  his  providence  brings  all  thofe  motives  into 
our  view,  on  which  we  afl.  And  doubtlefs  both  this 
eftablifliment  and  the  comino;  of  the  motives  into  our 
view  were  caufed  by  hrm,  in  confequence  of  a  previ- 
ous determination  to  caufe  them.  Therefore  this 
fcheme  of  fclf-determination  not  only  is  confident  with 
abfolute  decrees  and  the  clficacious  providence  of 
God;  but  it  necefTuily  implies  both  thefe.  It  necef- 
farily  implies,  that  God  has  decreed  all  our  volitions 
and  is  either  mediately  or  immediately  the  caufe  of 
them  all.  Therefore  it  is  inconfilicnt,  that  ihofc  who 
cfpoufe  this  fcheme  of  liberty  and  feif  determination 
according  to  motives,  fiiould  oppofe  the  doQrines  of 
God's  abfolute  decrees  and  efficacious  grace. 

5.  Bcfide  this,  the  common  abfurdiry  of  felf-detcr- 
mination  equallv  attends  this  fcheme  of  determinin;» 
ourfelves  according  to  motives  ;  I  mean  the  abfurdi 
ty  of  an  infinite  feries  of  volitions  caufing  one  anoth- 
er. If  all  free  volitions  be  caufed  by  the  fubjc6f.  th-u 
volition  in  which  a  man  complies  with  a  motive,  muit 
have  been  caufed  by  himfelf  and  by  a  preceding  vo- 

G  2  lition  3 


tco 

lition ;  and  this  laft  volition,  for  the  fame  reafon,  muS 
have  been  caufed  by  one  preceding  that,  and  lb  on 
infinitely. 

6.  Nor  is  this  all.  The  doftrine  now  under  con- 
fideration  is,  that  every  volition  is  according  to  a  mo- 
tive, and  is  under  the  perfuafive  influ<?nce  of  it. 
Therefore  every  one  of  that  infinite  ferics  of  volitions 
mufl:  have  been  put  forth  in  the  view  of  feme  motive. 
So  that  here  we  have  not  only  an  infinite  fcries  of  vo- 
litions producing  one  another  ;  but  an  infinite  feries  of 
niotives,accordingtowhich  they  doproduceoneanother. 

Dr.  Rcid  holds,  that  "  there  are  innumerable  ac- 
<«  tions  done  by  a  cool  and  calm  determination  of  the 
"  mind,  with  fore-thought  and  willy  but  without  mctive" 
ABive  Powers,  p.  275.  This  is  ciiredly  contrary  to 
DTo  Weft.  He  holds,  as  before  quoted,  "  That  the 
''•  infallible  conneBion  between  motives  and  volition 
«  cannot  take  place,  till  the  mind  has  determined  to 
«  examine  the  feveral   motives   or   reafons   for    a6^- 

«  ing In  that  cafe  the  mind  will  certainly  choofe 

«'  that  which  appears  the  beft  ;"  Part  II,  p.  80  ;  i.  e. 
will  certainly  atl  with  motive. It  is  equally  con- 
trary to  Dr.  Reid  himfelf.  In  tlie  next  page  he  grants, 
*«  that  an  adion  done  without  any  motive  can  neither 
«*  have  merit  nor  demerit  ;"  and  fays,  that  this  is  a 
felf-evident  propofition,  and  that  he  knows  of  no  au- 
thor that  ever  denied  it.  Now  an  a6tion  in  which 
there  is  neither  merit  nor  demerit,  is  not  a  moral  ac- 
tion.' But  is  not  every  aftion  done  by  a  cool  and 
calm  determination  of  the  mind,  Vv'ith  fore-thought  and 
-will,  a  moral  aOion  ?  If  it  be,  fmce  according  to  Dr. 
Reid,  fuch  an  a61ion  may  be  done  without  a  motive, 
it  follows,  that,  dire 611  y  contrary  to  what  Dr.  Reid  him- 
felf afferts,  an  aflion  done  without  a  motive,  can  have 
merit  or  demerit  :  Or  a  moral  adion  may  have  no 
merit  or  demerit  in  it.  Or  if  an  aBion  done  by  a 
cool  and  calm  determination  of  mind,  be  not  a  moral 
aOion,  then  in  this  controverfy  we  have  no  more  to 
dc^with  itj  than  we  have  with  the  beating  of  the  pulfc 


101 

ox  winking  of  ilie  eyes  :  For  tliis  controverfy  relpeBs 

moral  aflions  only, Again,  in  the  page  lall  relerred 

to,  Dr.  Rcid  tells  us,  "  If  a  man  could  not  a6l;  wiih- 
"  out  motive,  he  would  have  no  power  at  all."  But 
if  we  have  a  power  to  a6i  without  motive,  this  power, 
according  to  Dr.  Reid,  docs  not  enable  us  to  do  thofe  ac- 
tions, which  have  either  merit  or  demerit  ;  i.  e.  mor- 
al actions.  Therefore  for  the  purpofes  of  morality, 
of  virtue  and  vice,  reward  and  punidiment,  fuch  a 
power  would  do  us  no  good.  So  that  according  to 
Dr.  Reid,  we  have  no  power  to  perform  any  moral 
a£lion.  For  according  to  him,  power  to  act  with  mo- 
tive only,  is  no  power  at  aU.  Therefore  whatever 
power  we  have,  is  a  power  to  a6l  without  motive. 
But  a  power  to  a6l  without  motive,  is  a  power  to  per- 
form thofe  aftions  only,  which  have  neither  merit  nor 

demerit  ;  /.  e.  which  are  no  moral  aBions. Yet  in 

p.  277,  he  fays,  "  The  a6lions,  which  ar^  done  with- 
"  out  a  motive,  are  of  moment  in  the  queltion  con- 
**  cerning77207'(3/  libcrly."  By  moral  hberiy  1  conclude, 
he  means  that  liberty,  in  the  exercife  of  which  we  aft 
morally,  or  with  merit  or  demerit.  Therefore  quel- 
tions  concerning  this  liberty  are  queftions  concerning 
moral  aftions.  But  how  can  thofe  a6lions,  which  have 
no  morality  in  them,  be  of  moment  in  <]ue(lions  con- 
cerning moral  a6lions  ?  Can  the  periftaltic  motion  or 
the  adion  of  the  folids  on  the  fluids  in  the  human 
conflitution,  be  of  moment  in  a  queftion  concerning 
maHce  or  envy  ? 

In  the  page  laft  quoted.  Dr.  Reid  fays,  "  If  we 
"  have  a  power  of  afling  without  motive,  that  power 
"  joined  to  a  weaker  motive,  may  counterbalance  a 
"  dronger."  What  if  it  may  ?  The  a£lion  or  aflions, 
which  ihould  be  the  refult  in  fuch  a  cafe,  would  not 
he  of  a  moral  nature.  For  if  an  aflion  done  entirely 
without  motive  be  not  of  a  moral  nature,  as  Dr.  Reid 
grants,  that  which  is  done  againft  the  ftronger  motive, 
"being  on  the  whole  done  without  motive,  muft  alfo 
be  not  of  a  moral  nature.  As  the  weaker  motive  is 
G  3  wiihftood 


102 

xvithftood  and  balanced  by  a  part  of  the  firength  of 
the  ftronger,  lb  far  as  a  man  a£ls  againft  the  excefs  of 
the  ftrength  of  the  ftronger,  be  muft  aO:  without  mo- 
live.  Therefore  if  a  man  be  influenced  by  a  regard 
to  his  duty,  as  with  the  force  of  i,  to  preferve  his  tem- 
perance ;  and  be  iriduenced  by  his  appetite,  as  widi 
the  force  of  2,  to  intemperance,  and  then  by  a  felf  de- 
termining power  determine  himfelf  to  temperance 
againfl  ihe  ftronger  motive ;  there  is  according  to  Dr. 
Reid's.own  conceftion,  no  virtue  and  no  morality  in 
the  determination.  Who  then  would  wifti  for  fuch  a 
power  as  this  ?  And  why  did  Dr.  Reid  think  it  worth 
his  while,  to  difpute  for  it  ?  Surely  in  difputing  for 
it,  he  fpent  his  time  and  ftrength  in  a  very  ufelefs 
manner. 

Though  Dr.  Reid  holds^  as  jufl;  quoted,  that  "  if  a 
*'  man  could  not  aft  without  motive,  he  would  have 
^*  no  power  at  all  ;"  yet  he  holds,  as  has  been  quoted 
alfo,  that  ".  the  influence  of  motives  is  perfeftly  con- 
"  fiftent  with  liberty  and  indeed  fuppofes  it."  And 
he  defines  liberty,  p.  251,  to  be  "  a  power  over  the 
"  determinations  of  the  will."  Therefore  as  "  the  in- 
«'  fluence  of  motives  is  perfeBly  confiftent  with  liber- 
"  ty  and  fuppofes  it  ;"  and  as  "  a  pov/er  over  the  de- 
«  terminations  of  the  will"  is  liberty  ;  the  influence  of 
motives  is  perfectly  confiftent  with  "  a  power  over  the 
"  determinations  of  the  will  :"  And  if  a  man  could 
not  att  without  motive,  but  always  afted  under  the 
influence  of  it,  he  in  the  firft  place,  "  would  have  no 
power  at  all  ;"  in  the  fecond  place,  he  would  have 
ibme  power  ;  viz.  "  a  power  ovet  the  determinations 
"  of  his  own  will,"  which  according  to  him,  is  liberty, 
and  not  only  is  confiftent,  with  the  influence  of  mo- 
tive, but  is  iuppofed  in  it. But  the  defenders  of  the 

felf-determining  power  are  fated  to  inconfiftency,  and 
felf  contradidion,  and  not  one  of  them  more  fo  th^n 
this  Dr.  Reid. 

He  alfo  holds,  that  in  order  to  have  any  power  at 
■^ll,  we  muft  have  a  power  to  aft  without  ipotive,  and 

therefore 


103 

therefore  without  the  influence  of  motive.  But  the 
influence  of  motive  is,  according  to  his  own  concef- 
lioD,  fuppofcd  in  liberty.  Therefore  to  have  any 
power  at  all,  we  mull  have  a  power  to  aft  without  that 
which  is  fuppofcd  in  liberty  and  therefore  without  lib- 
erty itfelf :  And  if  we  have  that  which  is  fuppofed  in 
liberty,  and  of  courfe  have  liberty  itfelf,  we  have  no 
power  at  all  ;  L  e.  if  we  have  a  power  over  the  deter- 
uiinations  of  our  own  will,  which  is  liberty  ;  we  have 
no  power  at  all  and  have  no  liberty  ;  or  if  we  have 
power  and  liberty,  we  have  no  power  nor  liberty.  > 
But  it  is  endlefs  to  trace  the  abfurdities  of  the  fclf-de- 
termining  power  and  of  the  raoft  acute  writer  that  ev- 
er undertook  the  defence  of  it.  It  is  indeed  a  bur- 
denfome  flone,  which  like  that  of  Sifyphus,  will  forever 
roll  duv/n  on  the  heads  of  thofe  who  give  it  a  place  in 
their  buiiJing. 

If  we  have  a  power  to  a^  without  motive,  we  have 
a  power  to  a6t  without  end  or  defign  ;  and  fuch  an 
aftion  IS  as  totally  without  morality,  as  the  blowing  of 
the  wind,  or  the  motion  of  a  -cannon-ball  :  And  a 
power  to  perform  fuch  an  aftion,  is  not  a  power  to 
perform  any  moral  a£lion,  nor  can  fuch  a  power  be 
called  moral  liberty  ;  but  it  is  a  power  to  divert  our- 
felves,  in  that  aftion  at  leaft,  of  all  moral  agency. 

To  choofe  any  thing  without  motive,  is  really  a 
contradiction  ;  it  is  to  choofe  it  and  not  choofe  it,  at 
the  fame  time.  Whatever  is  chofen,  is  chofen  as  be- 
ing agreeable  in  fome  refpeft  or  other  ;  and  whatever 
is  agreeable,  is  agreeable  cither  in  itfelf  immediately, 
or  on  account  of  its  connexion  with  fomething  elfe 
and  its  fubferviency  to  it.  which  fomething  is  immedi- 
ately agreeable  in  itfelf.  Now  whatever  is  agreeable 
on  account  of  its  conne8ion  with  fomething  elfe,  is 
chofen  on  account  of  that  fomething  elfe,  as  the  mo- 
tive. Whatever  is  in  itfelf  agreeable  to  a  man,  is 
chofen  from  the  motive  of  his  appetite,  tafte  or  bias, 
which  is  included  in  PrefidentEdwards'sfenfe  of  motive. 
And  whatever  is  not  agreeable  to  a  man  on  one  or 
G  4  other 


i04 

other  of  tbefe  accounts,  is  not  agreeable  at  all,  and 
therefore  is  not  chofen. 

To  choofe  an  objccl  without  motive,  is  to  choofe  it 
Tvithout  any  end  or  delign,  either  of  immediate  or  re- 
mote gratification  of  any  principle  in  him,  who  makes 
the  choice  :  And  whether  this  be  pofiible  or  conceiv-^ 
able,  1  wifii  every  candid  perfon  to  judge. 

An  aft  of  choice  w^ithout  a  motive,  in  the  large 
fenfe  of  motive  as  defined  by  Prelident  Edwards,  is 
an  event  without  a  caufe  :  For  every  caufe  of  voli- 
tion is  included  in  Prefident  Edwards's  definition  of 
motive.  ''  By  motive,"  fays  he,  "  I  mean  the  whole 
*'  of  that  wliich  Qnovcs,  excites  or  invites  the  mind  to 
«'  voliLion,  whether  it  be  one  thing  fingly,  or  many 
"  things  conjunQIy  ;"  p.  5.  Accordingly  in  his  fur- 
ther explanation  of  his  idea  of  motive,  he  mentions  all 
agreeable  obje6ls  and  views,  all  reafons  and  arguments, 
and  all  internal  biafes  and  tempers,  which  have  a  ten- 
dency to  volition  ;  i.  e.  every  caufe  or  occafion  of 
volition.  And  if  an  immediate  divine  influence  or 
any  other  extrinfic  influence,  be  the  caufe  of  volition, 
it  may  be  called  a  motive  in  the  fame  fenfe  that  a  bi- 
as is.  Now,  if  an  aft:  of  choice  be  without  motive 
in  this  fenfe,  it  is  abfolutely  without  a  caufe.  The 
evafion  of  Doftor  Clarke  and  others,  that  the  mind 
itfelf  is  the  caufe  of  its  o\m  volitions,  has  been  already 
confidered  ;  befide  other  abfurdities,  it  has  been 
found  to  lead  to  an  infinite  feries  of  volitions  caufing 
one  another  ;  which  is  as  great  an  abfurdiiy,  as  an 
infinite  feries  of  men  begetting  one  another.-«— -Or 
if  it  were  allowed,  that  a  man  does  efficiently  caufe 
his  own  volitions  without  motive  ;  ftill  he  mud  caufe 
|hem  without  defign  or  end,  and  therefore  mud  caufe 
them  in  the  dark  and  by  mere  chance. 

Archbifliop  King  in  Law's  edition,  p.  394,  fays, 
«•  The  will  cannot  be  determined  to  good  by  objefts." 
Then  all  the  good  and  evil  in  the  univerfe  cannot  de- 
termine one  aft  of  the  will.  In  p.  354,  he  fays, 
'J  Jhc  more  free  any  one  is  and  the  Uh  liable  to  ex- 

"  ternal 


J2L 

"  ternal  motions,  the  more  pcrfc^^.  he  is."  Therefore 
the  lefs  liable  a  man  is  to  be  influenced  by  the  di- 
vine law  and  its  precepts,  by  the  beauty  of  virtue,  by 
right  and  wrong,  by  the  divine  glory,  or  by  the  re- 
^vards  and  punifhments  of  virtue  and  vice  here  or 
hereafter  ;  the  more  perfe6l  he  is  !  !  ! 

If  motives  have  not  influence  on  men  they  are  not 
capable  of  moral  government.  The  whole  of  moral 
government  depends  on  influencing  the  fubjeQ  by 
the  motives  of  laws,  precepts,  penalties,  rewards  and 
punifhments.  Sec. 

However,  the  Archbifliop  is  perhaps  the  mofl:  con-< 
fiflent  advocate  for  felf-determination,  that  has  ever^ 
written.  Clarke,  Johnfon,  Price  and  Reid  grant  too 
much.  They  grant,  though  they  do  not  hold  to  it 
throughout,  that  the  will  always  afts  according  to  mo- 
tives, and  allow  the  influence  of  motives  ;  yet  they 
hold,  that  the  will  determines  itfelf  and  caufes  its  own 
a£ls  ;  which  is  jufl:  like  the  idea  of  fome  concerning 
the  power  of  the  civil  magiilraie,  a  power  to  govern 
the  people,  who  have  the  entire  government  of  the 
magiflrate.  But  Archbifliop  King  ftrikesa  bold  ftroke. 
He  holds,  that  there  is  "  a  faculty"  in  human  nature 
"  naturally  inclined  to  excrcife,  and  that  one  exercife 
"  is  more  agreeable  than  another,  not  from  any  nat- 
"  ural  fitnefsin  one  rather  than  another  ;  but  from  the 
"  application  of  the  faculty  itfelf  :  For  another  would 
"  often  be  no  lefs  agreeable,  if  it  had  happened  to  be 
*'  determined  to  that."  J  bid,  p.  269.  "  It  is  the  very 
"  nature  of  an  active  power,  to  make  an  objeft  agree- 
"  able  to  itfelf,  i.  e.  good,  by  its  own  proper  a6^, 
*'  For  here  the  goodnefs  of  the  objeft  does  not  pre- 
''  cede  the  aB  of  eleOion,  fo  as  to  excite  it,  but  elec- 
"  tion  makes  the  goodnefs  in  the  objetl  ;  that  is,  the 
"  thing  is  agreeable  becaufe  chofen,  and  not  chofen 
"  becaufe  agreeable.  We  cannot  therefore  juftly  in- 
"  quire  after  any  other  caufe  of  ele8ion,  than  the 
"  power  itfelf."  Ibid,  p.  279,  280.  It  feems  then, 
that  it  is  the  nature  of  a  felf-detertnining  power  to 

exercife 


exercife  itfcif,  not  in  any  particular  manner,  but  in 
■Siny  manner  and  every  pollible  manner.  It  preffes 
like  water  in  a  ciftern  on  every  fide  alike,  endeav- 
ouring lo  flow  out  in  exercife.  And  whenever  it 
does  in  fa6l  flow  out  in  any  particular  exercife,  there 
was  no  caufc  or  reafon  for  this  exercife,  more  than  for 
any  other  poffible  exercife  :  The  only  caufe  or  rea- 
fon is  the  natural  inclination  of  this  power  to  flow  out 
in  any  and  all  pofliblc  exercifes.  This  is  juil  as  good 
accounting  for  any  particular  exercife  of  this  power 
as  it  would  be,  to  account  for  the  Arcbbiftiop's  writ- 
ing his  book,  by  faying,  that  he  had  a  general  power 
^nd  inclination  to  write  fomething  or  other. 

In  this  fcheme  of  Dr.  King,  we  fee  the  gen^jinc 
idea  oi liber iy  of  indifference  :  It  is  an  equal  inclina- 
tion, previoufly  to  eieftion,  to  ail  poflibte  ele6tions 
and  volitions,  and  a  perfeft  indifference  to  all  con- 
ceivable objetls  ;  fo  that  no  particular  obje6l  or  fit- 
uation  is  more  fuited  to  give  pleafure  or  mifery  to  a 
man,  than  another  ;  and  pleafure  and  pain  are  the 
confcquence  and  depend  entirely  on  a  man's  own 
choice  and  will  ;  fo  that  it  is  entirely  in  a  man's  pow- 
er and  depends  entirely  on  his  own  will,  to  render 
Nebuchadnezzar's  furnace  more  pleafant,  than  a  bed 
of  down  perfumed  with  rofes. 

It  is  further  obfervable,  that  according  to  this  account 
of  the  fclf-determining  power,  whenever  it  does  exer- 
cife itfelf,  it  does  it  by  mere  chance,  or  as  Dr.  King 
iiimfclf  expreffes  it,  it  happens  to  be  determined  to 
that  exercife.  Thus  we  have  the  famous  liberty  of 
contingence.  or  peifecl  uncertainty,  a  liberty  of  blind 
fate  or  chance  ! 

Our  opponents  hold,  that  the  governing  influence 
of  motive  is  inconliftent  with  liberty  and  moral  agen- 
cy ;  then  if  a  man  be  influenced  by  any  motive  to  a 
compliance  with  the  gofpel  and  its  precepts,  or  by 
any  temptation  to  the  commiffion  of  any  adion  com- 
monly reputed  ever  fo  criminal  ;  in  reality  there  is 
no  virtue  in  the  former  nor  vice  in  the  latter  :  Be- 

caufe 


I 


*  10/ 

caufc  the  influence  of  the  motive  deflroys  liberty  and 
moral  agency,  the  man  is  wrought  upon  by  an  extrin- 
fic  caufe  and  therefore  is  a  mere  patient  and  not 
an  agent.  Therefore  no  man  needs  to  be  at  all  afraid 
of  any  temptation,  nor  according  to  this  fcheme  ought 
the  Lord's  Prayer  to  remain  any  Ioniser  without  cor- 
reQion  :  The  lis^ht  of  this  improved  age  requires  a 
new  edition  of  it  correcied  and  improved. 

If  it  be  objected,  that  motives  do  indeed  have  an 
influence  to  perfuade  men,  but  not  a  certain  infallible 
influence  ;  I  anfwer,  jull  fo  far  as  they  have  influ- 
ence, their  influence  is  certain  and  infallible,  becaufe 
it  is  an  influence  that  really  exifts.  That  which  does 
exift,  certainly  exifts,  and  it  is  an  infallible  truth,  that 
it  does  exift. 

Or  if  it  be  pleaded,  that  the  mind  is  flill  free,  be- 
caufe motives  are  not  the  efficient  caufes  of  volition  ; 
I  anfwer,  that  the  fame  plea  would  prove,  that  a 
Weft-India  Have  is  free,  becaufe  his  atlions  are  not 
efficiently  cauled  by  his  maftcr  or  driver,  and  they 
only  exhibit  fuch  motives  as  influence  the  Have  him- 
felf  to  perform  thofe  aBions  :  And  the  fame  plea  will 
prove,  that  moral  neceflity  is  pcrfeftly  confiltent  with 
liberty.  For  moral  neceffiiy  is  a  mere  previous  cer- 
tainly of  a  moral  aftion  ;  and  this  is  no  more  the  ef- 
ficient caufe  of  the  aftion,  than  the  perfuafive  motive, 
which  is  the  occafion  of  an  a8ion. 

I  am  entirely  willing,  that  the  advocates  for  the  felf- 
determining  power  (hould  take  their  choice  of  either 
Dr.  Clarke's  fcheme  of  conflant  concomitancy  of  mo- 
tives and  volitions  ;  or  Archbifliop  King's  fcheme, 
that  motives  have  no  influence,  and  that  previoufly 
to  election  all  things  are  perfe611y  indiflercnt  to  the 
man  who  makes  the  ele8ion.  If  they  choofe  to  a- 
dopt  the  fcheme  of  conjlant  cone ovii tan cy^  they  at  once 
allow  an  infallible  connedion  between  motives  and 
volition  ;  they  rauft  give  up  the  power  to  ad  or  not 
ad,  the  liberty  to  either  fide,  and  their  favourite  ar- 
gument frow  choofing  one  of  feveral  indifferent  things ; 

they 


so8 

they  mufl;  renounce  the  independence  and  fovereign^ 
ty  of  the  will,  and  allow  that  it  is  as  really  bounded, 
limited  and  controlled  by  motives,  as  the  flave  is  by 
his  driver,  or  as  the  will  is  by  moral  neceffity  ;  and 
there  is  nothing  of  their  boafted  liberty  left  worth 
contending  for,  nothing  but  the  pitiful  power  of  man- 
ufaduring  volitions  according  to  the  mandates  of  mo- 
tives ;  juft  as  a  Weft-India  negro  manufaftures  fug- 
ar  under  the  lafh  of  his  driver. 

Or  if  they  choofe  Archbifliop  King's  fcheme  ;  ab- 
furdities  no  lefs  glaring  will  follow.  If  all  things  be- 
fore election  be  indifferent,  then  every  ele6lion  is 
made  without  motive,  reafon,  end,  defign  or  any  con- 
fideration  right  or  wrong  ;  every  acl  of  choice  is  an 
a6l  of  as  perfe6l  ftupidiiy,  as  the  motion  of  a  canon 
ball  or  the  falling  of  a  ilone  ;  every  man  by  choice 
or  rejeftion  makes  any  objed  either  agreeable  or  dif- 
sgreeable,  good  or  bad,  to  himfelf ;  every  man,  in 
every  fituation  has  the  perfe6t  control  of  his  own  hap- 
pinefs  and  mifery  ;  and  it  is  hut  for  him  to  choofe  to 
lie  on  a  gridiron,  which  he  can  as  eafily  do,  as  choofe 
any  thing  elfe,  and  he  converts  it  into  a  bed  of 
rofes. This  is  feif-determination  to  fome  purpofe. 

Such  exclamations  as  the  following  have  been 
made,  in  relation  to  this  fubjedl  ;  "  ]f  man  be  gov- 
«'  erned  by  motives,  how  is  he  free  ?  Where  is  free- 
«'  dom  ?  What  liberty  has  man  more  than  a  beaft  ? 
*«  All  his  aflions  are  fubjedt  to  a  fatal  chain  of  caufes 
«  and  effeCis  ?"  But  fuch  exclamations  may  juftly  be 
retorted,  on  either  of  the  forementio.ned  hypothefes  of 
determining  our  own  volitions  agreeably  to  motives, 
or  without  motives.  If  we  determine  them  agreea- 
bly to  motives  only  ;  then  we  are  limited  to  mo- 
tives, we  can  go  in  one  track  only,  we  can  a£l  no  oth- 
erwife  than  according  to  the  dilates  of  fovereign  and 
all  controlling  motives.  Then  "  how  is  man  free  ? 
«  Where  is  freedom  ?  What  liberty  has  man  more 
<«  than  a  beaft  ?  All  his  aflions  arc  fubjeft  to  a  fatal 
"  chain  of  motives." Or  if  it  be  faid,  that  we  de- 
termine 


10^ 

fermine  our  own  volitions  without  motives,  end,  de- 
{\<yn  or  any  confideration  good  or  bad  ;  as  in  this  cafe 
we  ad  with  perfeft  (lupidity,  it  may  with  the  greateft 
propriety  be  demanded,  "  How  are  we  free  ?  Where  is 
"  freedom  ?  VVhal  liberty  has  man  more  than  a  beaft  ?" 
If  there  be,  as  Dr.  Clarke,  Dr.  Price,  &:c.  allow,  a 
eoriftant  concomitancy  or  connexion  between  motives 
and  volitions  ;  this  connexion  is  an  eftablifhed  law  ; 
as  really  fuch,  as  the  connexion  between  a  certain 
temperature  of  the  fcafons  and  the  growth  of  vegeta- 
bles. Now  of  thiseflablifhment  there  is  fome  author: 
It  is  an  effctl:  and  has  an  efficient  eaufe.  Nor  will  it 
be  pretended,  that  the  mind,  which  is  the  fubjeft  of 
the  volitions,  is  the  efficient  caufe  of  this  eftablifh- 
ment.  This  befide  other  difficulties  attending  it, 
would  imply  a  direft  contradiftion  ;  as  it  is  now 
granted,  that  the  mind  acls  invariably  according  to 
motives  ;  and  yet  in  eftablifliing  the  influence  of  mo- 
tives, it  muft  aft  without  that  influence,  i.  e.  without 
motive.  For  a  motive  can  have  no  influence,  be- 
fore influence  is  given  to  it  ;  and  nothing  can  be  a 
motive,  which  has  no  perfualive  influence  or  tenden- 
cy. Therefore  the  influence  of  motives  and  the  cob^ 
neftion  between  them  and  volitions,  are  the  effeds  of 
fomc  caufc  extrinlic  to  the  mind.  And  this  caufa- 
tionof  the  influence  and  confcquences  of  motives,  or  of 
the  conncdfeion  between  motive  and  volition,  is  really 
a  caufalion  of  volitions  themfelve5,  and  that  by  an  ex- 

trinflc   caufc. Thus   the   authors  juft   mentioned 

and  ihofc  who  with  them  acknowledge  a  conftant  con- 
comitancy of  motives  and  volitions,  arc  brought  into 
a  dilemma.  If  they  hold  that  this  concomitancy  and 
conflar.t  connection  is  cauicd  by  the  mind  iifclf,  they 
mull:  grant,  that  it  is  caufcd  without  motive,  and  i'o 
coniradift  the  very  principle  they  grant,  of  conftant 
concomitancy.  If  they  allow,  that  this  connexion  is 
caufed  by  fame  other  caufc,  than  the  mind  itfelf ; 
they  mull  of  courfe  grant,  that  volitions  arc  the  ef- 
fects of  an  extrinflc  caufe, 


no 

"If volition  and  agreeable  perception,"  fay^  Dr, 
Weft,  p.  12,  "  be  one  and  the  fame  thing,  then  mo- 
««  live  and  volition  are  one  and  the  fame  thing  :  For 
««  nothing  can  be  a  motive,  but  an  agreeable  percep- 

*'  tion  ;  or — -^  motive  is  the  perceiving  of  the 

"  fitnefs  of  an  objecl  to  anfWer  a  particular  purpofe." 
Hence  he  argues,  that  "  if  motive  be  agreeable  pcr- 
"  ception,  and  agreeable  perception  be  a  volition,  and 
*'  motive  be  the  caufe  of  an  a6t  of  the  will,  then  an 
"  afl;  of  the  will  is  the  caufe  of  an  a8:  of  the  will." 
And  that  "  motive  and  volition  are  one  and  the  fame 

«  thing." No  doubt  Dr.  Weft  has  a  right  to  tell  his 

own  fenfe  of  the  word  motive.  But  when  Prefident 
Edwards  has  particularly  given  his  fenfe  of  that 
word,  and  it  appears  to  be  entirely  different  from  that 
of  Dr.  Weft,  the  Do6lor  has  no  right  to  argue  from 
his  fenfe,  to  confute  the  Prefident.  He  by  motive 
meant  not  only  a  perception  of  the  fitnefs  of  an  obje£l 
to  a  particular  purpofe,  but,  as  has  been  already  ob- 
ferved,  "  the  whole  of  that  which  moves,  excites  or 
"  invites  the  mind  to  volition  ;"  and  not  only  "  the 
«  views  of  the  mind,"  but  "  the  ftate,  frame,  temper 
'^  and  habit  of  the  mind,"  however  caufed.  Therefore 
many  volitions  may  be  caufed  or  occafioned  by  motive 
in  this  fenfe,  which  are  not  caufed  by  any  perception 
at  all,  but  by  appetite,  bias,  tafte,  &:c.  And  if  a  man 
perceive  ever  fo  clearly  the  fitnefs  of  an  objeQ;  to  an- 
fwer  a  particular  purpofe,  and  in  this  refpeft  its  agree- 
ablenefs,  this  is  not  the  fame  as  aflual  choice  of  that 
objeft,  all  things  confidered.  A  man  may  perceive, 
that  hard  and  conftant  labour  is  well  fitted  to  the  in- 
creafe  of  his  property  ;  yet  he  may  not  choofe  it. 

Though  it  ftiould  be  faid,  that  every  agreeable  per- 
ception is  a  volition  ;  it  would  not  follow,  that  a  vo- 
lition is  a  motive  to  itfelf,  which  is  what  Dr.  Weft 
means,  if  he  mean  to  fi>:  any  abfurdity,  in  faying,  that 
motive  and  volition  are  one  and  the  fame.  There  is 
no  abfurdity  in  the  fuppofition,  that  one  volition 
ihould  be  a  motive  to  another  volition  ;  that  a  ftrong 

wifti 


t1^{ 

villi  for  honour  fhould  be  a  motive  to  determine  a 
man  to  gencrofiiy,  hofpitality,  a  general  good  treat- 
ment of  his  neighbours,  and  many  fervices  ufeful  to 
the  public  ;  and  charity  requires  us  to  believe,  that  a 
defire  to  do  good,  was  the  motive,  which  made  Dr. 
Weft  willing  to  write  and  publifli  his  EJfays  on  Liber- 
ty and  Neccjfity. The  principle  from   which  Dr. 

Weft  endeavours  to  faften  an  abfurdity  on  Prefident 
Edwards,  is  that  nothing  can  be  a  motive  but  an  agree- 
able perception  ;  which  is  both  contrary  to  truth  and 
contrary  to  Prefident  Edwards. 

Archbiftiop  King  fpeaks  abundantly  of  "  depraved 
elcOions."  What  docs  he  mean  by  depraved  eke^ 
ticns  ?  Eleflions  not  according  to  truth,  reafon  or  di- 
vine revelation  ?  But  if  a  man  were  to  choofe  accord- 
ing to  thefe,  he  muft  not  be  perfuaded  to  fuch  elec- 
tion by  any  regard,  to  truth,  reafon  or  divine  revela- 
tion ;  this  would  imply,  that  all  things  were  not  per- 
fectly indifferent  to  him  before  election,  and  that  fome 
things  are  cholcn,  becaufe  they  are  previoufly  adapt- 
ed to  excite  choice,  and  not  agreeable  merely  becaufe 
they  arc  cholcnj  as  he  holds  in  places  before  quoted. 
Belides  ;  if  a  man  choofe  what  is  agreeable  to  truth, 
reafon  or  revelation, yro7?j  a  regard  to  truth,  reafon  or 
revelation,  or  which  is  the  fame  thing,  from  the  mo- 
tive of  truth,  reafon  or  revelation,  he  is  perfuaded,  in- 
Jliienced  and  wrought  vpon  by  thofe  motives  ;  confe- 
quently  he  is  pajjive  in  being  the  fubjeft  of  this  influ- 
ence of  the  motives,  and  not  free  in  the  fenfe  of  free- 
dom, which  the  Archbifliop  holds Again,  if  a  man 

choofe  what  is  dictated  by  truth,  reafon  or  revelation, 
from  regard  to  any  thing  elfe  than  truth,  rcal'on  or  rev- 
elation ;  as  he  is  influenced  by  motive,  which  is  the 
thing  which  he  regards,  he  is  in  the  fame  fenfe  not 
free.  Therefore  to  be  free  in  that  fenfe  he  muft 
ehoofe  it  from  no  regard  to  any  thing,  but  without: 
motive,  end  or  defign.  And  in  fuch  a  choice  what 
tiicre    is  of  depravity   or    virtue,  more   than    there 

13 


112 

is  in  the  fiiining  of  the  fun  or  in  the  blowing  of  ihc 
mndi  let  any  man  point  out. 

Whether  there  be  an  infallible  connexion  between 
motives  and  volitions  or  not ;  ftill  fo  far  as  they  influ- 
ence and  have  effeQ  ;  fo  far  the  fubjedl  is  wrought 
upon  by  an  extrinfic  caufe  and  is  paffive  ;  and  there- 
fore according  to  our  opponent?.,  fo  far  his  liberty  and 
moral  agency  are  deftroyed.  Why  then  fliould  mo- 
tives ever  be  ufed  with  any  man  ?  We  ought  not  to 
ufe  them,  wifhing  that  they  may  have  no  effect  or  in- 
fluence  at  all.  Nor  ought  we  to  ufe  them,  to  deltroy 
moral  agency,  and  to  turn  men  into  machines.  For 
what  purpofe  then  fliould  we  ufe  them  ?  We  common- 
ly ufe  them  to  perfuade.  But  to  perfuade  is  to  influ- 
ence a  man  by  motive,  which  is  an  exlrinhc  caufe  ; 
and  under  the  influence  of  motive,  he  is  paffive  ;  and 
in  fuch  a  cafe  our  opponents  fay  his  liberty  and  mor- 
al agency  is  deftroyed.  But  if  they  be  not  in  this  way 
dellroyed  ;  an  infallible  connexion  between  motive 
and  volition  is  not  inconfifl:ent  with  liberty  ;  and  there- 
fore why  fhould  Dr.  Wefl;  or  any  other  man  difpute 
againft  it  ? 

Moft,  if  not  all  writers  in  favour  of  felf-determina- 
tion  allow,  that  men  generally  a6i;  on  motive ;  and  1  pre- 
fume  they  would  not  deny,  that  whenever  they  do  a6l 
on  motive,  they  are  perjuaded  to  a6t  by  the  motive. 
Therefore  on  their  principles,  men  are  generally  de- 
prived of  liberty  and  moral  agency,  generally  aft  as 
mere  machines  and  paflive  inftruments  ;  and  all  their 
objeftions  againfl;  an  infallible  conneQion  between  mo- 
tives and  volition,  may  be  retorted,  with  refpeft  to  the 
general  conduct  of  mankind  :  And  as  to  the  liberty 
and  moral  agency  exercifed  in  fome  rare  inflances, 
when  men  ad  without  motive,  as  when  they  are  fup- 
pofed  to  choofe  between  things  perfeftly  indifferent  ; 
it  is  a  mere  trifle  not  worth  difputing  about. 

Dr.  Price  declares  (Correfpondence  with  Prieftly^ 
p.  347,)  "  That  by  determining  as  we  pleafe,"  he 
Hieansj  '«  our  poffcflinga  power  to  make  cither  of  two 

"  motives 


^^3 

'•  motives  the  flron^efl  ;  /.  t.  to  make  cither  of  them 
**  the  motive  that  liiall  prevail,  and  the  motive  on 
"  which  we  fhall  plcafc  to  determine."  But  this  a6f, 
by  which  we  make  one  motive  ihe  ilrongcft,  mu(l  be 
without  motive.  If  it  be  not  without,  but  be  under 
the  infhicnce  of  motive,  not  we,  but  that  prior  motive 
mikes  that  motive  Ih-ongcft,  on  which  we  pieafc  to 
determine.  And  as  the  compHancc  with  that  prior 
motive  is  an  aft  in  which  v;c  determine  as  we  pleafe, 
a  ftill  prior  motive  is  neceffary  to  that  a6^,  and  we 
muft  give  flrcngih  to  that  motive  too,  and  fo  on   to 

infinity. On  the  other  hand,  if  without  motive  we 

make  one  motive  Wronger  than  another,  we  in  this 
cafe  at  leall  a61;  without  motive  ;  which  is  contrary 
to  what  Dr.  Price  abundantly  profefles  :  He  fays, 
"  A  felf determining  power  which  is  under  no  infiu- 
*'  encz  from  moiives,  has  never  been  meant  by  any. 

"  advocates  for  liberty." But  if  we  may  and  do 

a6l  without  motive  in  making  one  motive  to  prevail ; 
why  may  we  not  immediately  acl  widiout  motive,  as 
well  as  firit  without  motive  make  one"  motive  the 
ftrongeft,  that  we  may  comply  with  it  ?  Befides  ;  to 
give  ftrength  to  a  motive,  that  we  may  comply  with 
it,  is  really,  in  the  a6l  of  giving  that  Ilrength,  to  com- 
ply with  the  motive,  and  to  choofe  the  obje£]t  which 
it  recommends.  It  is  like  giving  money  to  a  friend, 
that  he  may  procure  for  us  a  certain  commodity. 
This  certainly  implies,  that  we  choofe  and  wi(h  for 
that  commodity. 

In  the  fame  page  Dr.  Price  puts  the  qucHion  ; 
"  Has  a  man  urged  by  contrary  inclinations,  no  con- 
"  trolling  power  over  his  inclinations,  to  make  one  of 
**  them  preferably  to  the  other,  the  inclination  wliich 
"  he  will  follow  ?"  I  anfwer,  no  ;  there  is  a  contra- 
diftion  in  it.  The  fuppofuion  implies,  that  before 
he  *'  makes  one  of  them  the  inclination  that  he  wiil 
"  follow,"  it  is  not  the  inclination  which  he  choofcs 
to  follow.  But  this  is  not  true  :  In  that  he  volunta- 
rily makes  it  the  inclination  that  he  will  follow,  it  is 
H  implied 


114 

implied  that  he  is  inclined  to  follow  it.  He  is  willing 
and  choofes  to  follow  it,  and  therefore  he  voluntari- 
ly makes  it  the  inclination,  which  he  will  follow. 
Thus  it  is  previoufly  what  he  makes  it  to  be  ;  and 
he  is  willing  before  he  is  willing.  In  making  it  the 
inclination,  which  he  will  follow,  he  does  follow  it. 
He  follows  it  before  he  follows  it. 

Dr.  Price  in  the  fame  book,  p.  348,  fays,  "  I  am 
"  fenfible,  that  it  is  nonfenl'e,  to  deny  the  influence 
"  of  motives,  or  to  maintain  that  there  are  no  fixt 
"  principles  and  ends,  by  which  the  will  is  guided." 
Then  is  it  not  nonfenfe,  to  affert,  that  we  give  ftrength 
to  motives  ?  And  that  we  make  an  inclination,  the 
inclination  that  we  will  follow  ?  This  feems  to  be  the 
inevitable  confequence,  unlefs  we  give  ftrength  to  one 
motive,  under  the  influence  of  another,  and  fo  run  in- 
to the  infinite  feries. 

Dr.  Clarke  in  his  Remarks  on  Collins,  p.  12,  13^ 
fuppofes,  that  motives  have  Jome  influence,  but  not  a 
prevailing,  governing  one  ;  and  that  over  and  above 
the  perfuafive  influence  of  motives,  the  felf  determin- 
ing power  muft  by  its  own  force  exert  itfelf  to  pro- 
duce volition.  Thus,  p.  12,  he  reprobates  the  fuppo- 
fition,  that  if  a  man  be  not  determined  by  motives 
neceffarily,  i.  e.  certainly  and  really  ;  he  can  in  no 
degree  be  influenced  by  them.  But  to  be  influenced 
by  motives,  is  to  be  really  and  efFe8ually  influenced, 
juft  fo  far  as  the  fubje£l  is  influenced  by  them  at  all  : 
And  fo  far  as  he  is  influenced  or  perfuaded  by  them, 
fo  far  is  he  governed  and  determined  by  them  :  For 
that  is  what  we  mean  by  a  determination  by  motives. 
On  the  other  hand,  fo  far  as  a  man  is  not  influenced 
or  determined  by  motive,  he  afts  without  motive  and 
without  regard  to  it.  So  that  there  is  no  medium 
between  no  real  or  perfuafive  influence  of  motive, 
and  a  determining  governing  influence. 

Again,  p.  14,  he  reprobates  the  idea,  "  that  mo- 
'•  lives  and  reafons  can  be  of  no  weight  and  no  ufc 
«  at  all  to  men,  unlefs  they  necejfuate  them  ;  and  thtjt 

"  if 


^  if  a  perfon  be  not  determined  irrefijlihly,  then  he 
"  muft  be  totally  indifferent  to  all  actions  alike,  and 
"  can  have  no  regard  to  motives  and  reafons  of  ac- 
«  tion  at  all."  By  necejj'itating  ard  determinwg  irre- 
Jijlibly^  if  he  mean  any  thing  to  the  purpofe,  he  mull 
mean  really  and  aQually  to  influence  by  perfuafion, 
fo  as  to  give  fome  bias  or  inclination  to  the  will. 
And  it  is  plain,  that  if  motives  do  not  at  all  bias  or 
incline  the  will,  the  man  remains  in  a  ftate  of  total 
indifference,  and  "  has  no  regard  to  motives  or  rea- 
"  fons  of  attion  at  all."  Nor  is  there  any  medium 
between  an  inclination  of  the  will  and  total  indiffer- 
ence ;  for  this  is  the  fame  as  to  fay,  that  there  is  no 
medium  between  an  inclination  of  the  will  and  no  in- 
clination of  it.  And  if  "  motives  and  reafons"  do 
rot  incline  men's  wills  and  have  no  previous  tenden- 
cy to  ipclinc  them,  "  they  are  of  no  weight  or  ufe  at  all 
"  to  men  ;"  and  if  a  perfon  be  not  really  inclined  by 
them,  he  is  totally  indifferent  to  them. 

In  the  fame  page,  the  Doftor  confiders  it  as  need- 
ing proof,  "  that  a  felf-moving  power  is  inconfiftent 
"  with  having  any  regard  to  reafons  of  aQinq."  So 
far  as  a  perfon  is  perfuadcd  to  aft,  by  reafons  and 
motives  ;  fo  far  he  is  injlucnced  by  motives,  in  ihe 
fenfe,  in  which  we  hold,  that  any  perfon  is  influenc- 
ed by  them  ;  therefore  fo  far  is  not  felf-determined  or 
felf-moved.  Or  if  by  felf-determination  be  meant, 
that  under  the  effeftual  perfuafion  of  motives,  wa 
caufe  our  own  volitions  ;  (though  we  deny  the  poffi- 
bility  of  caufing  our  own  volitions)  yet  as  to  liberty 
in  the  fenfe  in  which  I  oppofe  it,  it  would  come  to 
the  fame.  The  flave,  who  always  afts  by  motives 
exhibited  by  his  mafter,  is  as  abfolutely  controlled 
by  his  mafter,  as  the  whip  in  the  matter's  band.  Be- 
fidesj  to  be  effc6lually  perfuaded  by  motive  to  voli- 
tion, and  to  caufe  our  own  volition  independently  of 
cxtrinfic  influence,  is  a  direft  contradiftion. 

"The  doing  of  any  thing  upon  or  after  or  in  confc- 

^  q^uencc  of^  that  perception"  (the  perception  of  mo- 

H  2  tive) 


ttS 

tive)  "  this  is  the  power  of  felf-motion  or  aftion^ 

«  which in  moral  agents  we  call  libcry." 

If  the  doing  be  merely  in  confequence  of  motive, 
without  any  influeirj-e  of  the  motive  perfuading  to  the 
doing  ;  that  which  in  this  cafe  is  called  a  motive,  is 
very  improperly  fo  called.  So  a  motive  would  be 
no  reafon  at  all  for  the  doing.  If  it  be  a  reafon  and 
properly  a  7notive,  it  moves  the  agent  to  the  doing  ; 
confequently  the  doing  is  not  /^//-motion,  unlefs  felf- 
motion  and  motion  excited  by  an  extrinfic  caufe  are 
one  and  the  fame.  Nor  is  this  motion  a  free  aBi.on 
in  a  fenfe  oppofed  to  moral  neceffity.  It  is  not  free 
from  extrinfic  caufality,  nor  of  courfe  free  from  a  de- 
pendence on  an  extrinfic  caufe.  Every  effedl  is  de- 
pendent on  its  caufe.  Nor  is  it  free  with  a  liberty  oF 
contingence.  Thi^  implies,  that  fomething  happens 
without  a  caufe. 

If  it  fliould  be  faid,  that  motive  in  this  cafe  is  not 
the  ejicient  of  the  action  or  doing  :  This  is  granted  ; 
but  at  the  fame  time,  for  reafons  already  given,  it  is 
denied,  that  the  man  himfelf  is  the  efficient  caufe  of 
it.  He  who  efiablifhed  the  laws  of  nature,  fo  called, 
is  the  primary  caufe  of  all  things.  What  is  meant  by 
efficient  caufe  in  any  cafe,  in  which  an  cffe6l  is  pro- 
duced according  to  eftabliflied  laws  ?  For  inftance, 
what  is  the  efficient  caufe  of  the  fenfation  of  heat  from 
fire  ?  If  it  be  anfwered,  fire  is  the  efficient  caufe  ;  I 
alfo  anfwer,  that  the  motive  is  the  efficient  caufe  of 
the  volition  and  doing  aforcfiiid.  If  it  be  faid,  that  the 
Great  Fird  Caufe  is  the  efficient  of  the  fenfation  of 
beat  ;  the  fame  Great  Agent  is  the  efficient  caufe  of 
volition,  in  the  fame  way,  by  a  general  lav;  eftabliffi- 
ing  a  conne6lion  between  motives  and  volitions  ;  as 
there  is  a  connexion  between  fire  in  certain  filuations 
and  the  fenfation  of  heat. 

To  allow,  that  we  are  free,  though  we  always  a6l  in 
eonfequence  of  motites,  unlefs  by  afting  be  meant  an 
a6lion  not  excited  or  influenced  by  moiive,  and  of 
which  the  motive  is  no  reafon,  is  to  plead  for  no  oth- 

,  cs 


er  liberty,  tlian  is  perfeflly  confillent  with  the  moft 
abfolute  moral  neccffity  and  with  abfolute  decrees. 

Dodors  Clarke  and  Price  confider  the  man  free, 
who  efficiently  caufes  his  own  volitions  according  to 
motives,  becaufe  he  himfelf  and  not  the  motives,  is 
the  efficient  caufc.  Yet  as  by  the  fuppofition  he 
caufes  ihcm  according  to  motives,  he  is  Hmited  by 
them.  And  is  a  flave  free,  who  manufa6tures  a  com- 
modity under  the  control  and  lafli  of  his  maftcr  ?  Or 
is  the  convitl  free,  who  himfelf  walks  around  the  ftake, 
to  which  he  is  chained  ?  Yet  according  to  the  fyflcm 
of  the  faid  gentlemen,  the  ilave  and  not  the  mailer  is 
the  efficient  caufe  of  his  own  volition  to  labour.  The 
convict  and  not  the  flake,  is  the  efficient  caufc  of  his 
own  volition  to  walk  around  the  ftake.  Nor  is  the 
matter  the  efficient  caufe  of  the  limitation  of  the  vo- 
litions of  his  flave  ;  he  merely  exhibits  the  motives  to 
their  limitation  :  And  it  will  not  be  pretended,  that 
the  flake  is  the  efficient  caufe  of  the  limitation  of  the 
volition  of  the  conviQ:. 

Dr.  Price,  in  Correfpondcncc  with  Prfeflly,  p.  341, 
fays,  "  that  no  influence  of  motives,  which  is  Ihort  of 
"  making  them  ph)  fical  efficients  or  agents,  can  clafh 
*'  with  liberty."  Nov/  the  walls,  gates  and  bars  of  a 
prifon  are  not  phyjical  efficients  or  agents  ;  yet  they 
are  as  inconfiftent  with  the  liberty  of  the  prifoner,  as 
if  they  were  fuch  efficients  and  agents,  and  flood  around 
him  with  gun  and  bayonet,  to  confine  him  to  the  (pot  ; 
or  as  if  they  had  built  and  made  themfelves  for  the 
purpofe  of  his  confinement.  So  if  man  be  limited  to 
a6l  agreeably  to  motives  only,  they  are  as  inconfiflent 
with  his  liberty,  as  they  would  be,  if  they  were  intelli- 
gent agents,  had  created  themfelves  and  had  eflabliffi- 
ed  the  connexion  between  themfelves  and  volition. 
It  is  as  to  liberty,  immaterial  who  or  what  has  eftab- 
liflied  the  connexion  between  motives  and  volitions, 
provided  the  connexion  be  infallibly  eftabliffied  :  As 
it  is  immaterial  as  to  the  liberty  of  a  prifoner,  who  or 
what  made  the  walls,  gates  and  bars  of  the  prifon, 
II  3  whether 


ii8 

whether  the  walls,  gates  and  bars  thcmfelves,  any  cx- 
trinfic  caufe,  or  even  the  prifoner  himfclf.  If  he  had 
built  and  made  them  all,  had  locked  himfelf  in  and 
had  flung  the  key  through  the  grates,  he  would  be  as 
effeftualiy  deprived  of  his  liberty,  as  if  the  fame  things 

had  been  done  by  any  other  agent. Thefe  obfer- 

vations  lead  to  a  further  anfwer  to  the  plea,  that  we 
give  ftrength  to  the  motive  which  determines  us. 
What  if  a  man  fliould  give  ftrength  to  a  motive  ?  Af- 
ter it  is  thus  become  ftrong,  it  as  efFetlually  governs 
the  man,  and  as  really  deprives  him  of  his  liberty,  as 
if  it  had  derived  its  ftrength  from  any  other  fource. 
Suppofe  a  man  were  poffeffed  of  creating  power,  and 
fliould  create  another  man  ftronger  than  himfelf,  and 
this  other  man  fhould  bind  the  former  hand  and 
foot  :  Would  he  not  be  as  effe6lually  deprived  of  his 
liberty,  as  if  he  had  been  in  the  fame  manner  bound 
by  any  other  man  ? 


CHAPTER 


11^ 


CHAPTER    V. 

In  which  it  is  inquired,  whether  Volition  be  an  EffeEi  and 
have  a  Caufe, 

THE  title  of  Dr.  Weft's  fccond  ejfay  is,  «  That  vo- 
"  lition  is  not  properly  an  effcQ,  which  has  a 
<«  caufe."  Whether  his  meaning  be,  that  it  is  an  ef- 
feft  which  has  no  caufe,  or  that  it  is  not  an  elFeO:  at 
all,  the  words  do  not  determine  ;  but  from  the  fequel 
I  conclude,  the  latter  is  his  meaning.  This,  as  has 
been  already  noticed,  is  indeed  contradifled  by  the 
DoSlor,  as  in  this  paffage,  p.  24,  "  The  modification  in 
<'  qucdion"  (i.  e.  the  modification  which  the  mind  gives 
itfelf  in  willing  or  ading,  which  the  Do6lor  explains 
to  be  volition)  "  is  the  confcqucnce  or  effect  of  the 
"  mind  willing  or  choofing."  Then  volition  is  an  ej^ 
JeH  ;  and  an  etfeft  of  a  preceding  volition. 

I  prcfume  the  Doftor  has  the  merit  of  originality 
in  this  part  of  his  fyl^em.  Many  things  in  the  common 
fcheme  of  felf-detcrmination  do  indeed  imply,  that  vo- 
lition has  no  caufe  ;  viz.  Liberty  as  oppofed  to  all 
neceffity  or  certainty  ;  the  fovereignty  and  indepen- 
dence of  the  will ;  its  exemption  from  all  influence  of 
motive  or  extrinfic  caufe,  &:c.  Still  1  have  not  met 
with  one  writer  before  Dr.  Weft,  who  had  boldnefs 
enough  cxprefsly  to  avow  the  fentiment.  Dr.  Clarke 
and  all  the  reft  hold,  that  volition  is  the  efFeft  of  the 
mind  itfelf  in  the  excrcife  of  its  felf-moving  or  fe!f-de- 
termining  power.  And  Do6lor  Price,  when  charged  by 
Dr.  Prieftly  with  holding,  that  volitions  come  to  pafs 
without  a  caufe,  rejeBs  the  imputation  and  takes  it 
hardly,  that  ever  it  ftiould  have  been  made  to  him  or 
his  fyftem.     Correfpondence  with  Prieftly,  p.  349. 

But  let  us  examine  the  reafons,  by  which  Dr.  Weft 
endeavours  to  fupport  this  dotlrine.  They  are  the 
following  ; 

H  4  1.  That 


420 

1.  That  volition  is  an  abftrafl:  terra  and  fignifies 
fomething,  which  cannot  cxift  without  a  fubjeft  ;  or 
voliiion  is  nothing  but  the  mind  wilHngor  a6ting  ;  and 
therefore  is  not  an  cff'ctt  ;  p.  21. But  Ibppofe  vo- 
lition be  nothing  but  tlu  mind  willing  or  aHmg  ;  is 
that  ftate  of  the  mind  or  the  mincj  in  that  ftate,  not  an 
efFe6t  ?  Dr.  Weft  will  not  deny,  that  the  mind  abfo- 
jutely  confidered  is  an  effeft.  If  then  the  mind  will" 
ing  or  in  the  exercife  of  yoiition,  is  not  an  efFe6l  ;  it 
ieems,  that  the  mind  while  without  voHtion  is  an  efFe6l 
or  a  creature  ;  but  in  the  exercife  of  voHtion  ceafe* 
to  be  an  efFecl,  and  therefore  ceafes  to  be  a  creature. 

Wiil  Dr.  Weft  avow  this  ?- Motion  is  an  abftrad 

term  and  fignifies  fomething,  which  cannot  exift  with- 
out a  fubjetl;  ;  oif  motion  is  nothing  but  a  body  mov- 
ing. But  will  it  hence  follow,  that  motion  or  a  body 
moving  is  not  an  effeft  ?  No  more  does  it  follow  from 
the  argument  of  Dr.  Weft  now  under  con  fid  era  lion, 
that  volition  is  not  an  effe£i;  ?  The  DoBor  grants,  that 
volition  is  the  modification  or  mode  of  the  mind;  and 
is  not  that  mode  an  effeft  ?  If  it  be  not  an  efFeft,  be- 
icaufe  it  is  a  mpde  of  the  mind,  thep  doubtlefs  no  oth- 
er mode  of  the  mind  is  an  effe6l.  And  ftrip  the  mind 
pf  all  its  modes,  and  you  will  take  away  the  mind  it- 
felf ;  becaufe  fome  of  thofe  modes  are  ejfential  modes. 
If  all  the  modes  of  the  mind,  eflential  and  accidental, 
taken  fingly  and  colle6lively,  be  not  efFefts ;  the  mind 
jtfelf  is  not  an  effeft.-^ — On  the  principle  of  Do£lor 
Weft's  argument,  no  mode  whatever  is  an  efFeft.  The 
principle  is  this,  That  whatever  cannot  fubfift  of  itfelf 
put  of  any  fubjed,  is  not  an  efFe6l.  But  no  mode,  fo- 
lidity,  extenfion,  figure,  colour  or  motion,  can  fubfift 
without  a  fubjeft.  Therefore  not  one  of  them  nor 
any  other  mode  is  an  efFe6t.  And  if  not  one  of  thofe 
modes  by  itfelf,  is  an  effe6l,  all  of  them  taken  together 
are  not  an  efFe6l  ;  and  therefore  body  or  matter  is 
pot  an  efFeft  :  Yea  neither  matter  nor  fpirit  is  an 
efFeft.  And  as  matter  and  fpirit  with  their  modes, 
comprehend  the    whole   creation  -,  it    will  follow, 


i21 

tbat  no  creature  is  an  effe£l  ;  i.  e.  no  creature  is  ^ 
creature. 

2.  That  volition  or  the  mind  willing,  is  not  an  ef- 

fed,  becaufe  it  is  an  efficient  cauib. Dr.  Wed  be- 

Jieves,  that  a  carpenter  is  the  efiicient  caufe  of  a  fhip  ; 
And  docs  he  therefore  beheve,  that  the  carpenter  in 
ijuilding  the  fhip  is  not  a  creature  ?  This  would  fol- 
Jow  on  the  principles  of  this  argument.  The  princi- 
ple is,  that  whatever  is  an  efficient  caufe,  cannot  be 
an  effi^ft.  Therefore  as  a  carpenter  is  the  efficient 
caufe  of  a  ftiip,  he  is  not  an  efied,  or  not  a  creature. 
Dr.  Weft  and  others  take  it  for  granted,  that  if  voli- 
tion be  an  efFe6l,  it  cannot  be  a  caufe.  This  is  juft 
^s  abfurd  as  to  hold,  that  unlefs  a  carpenter  be  un- 
<:aufed,  he  cannot  build  a  ffiip  ;  and  that  a  creature 
can  be  the  caufe  of  nothing. 

3.  That  if  the  operation  or  aflion,  which  is  effen- 
tial  to  the  idea  of  a  caufe,  be  itlclf  an  efFedl  ;  then 
its  caufe  muft  operate  to  produce  the  faid  effcQ:;  and 
confequently  the  laft  mentioned  operation  being  an 
effed,  muft  have  another  caufe  to  produce  it,  and 
fo  on  in  infinitum  ;  and  this  infinite  feries  of  caufes 
and  effetts  entirely  excludes  the  firft  caufe  and  any 

efficient  caufe  ;  p.  22. But  it  is  denied,  that  in 

the  cafe  here  fuppofed,  an  infinite  feries  of  caufes  and 
effe6ls  is  involved.  Suppofe  it  be  true,  that  the  ac- 
tion which  is  necefTary  to  conftitute  a  man  an  efficient 
caufe,  be  the  efFeft  of  an  extrinfic  caufe  ;  how  does 
it  follow,  that  there  muft  be,  in  this  cafe,  an  infinite 
feries  of  caufes  ?  We  maintain  that  aftion  may  be  the 
cffeO:  of  a  divine  influence  ;  or  that  it  may  be  the  ef- 
fe6l  of  one  or  more  fecond  caufes,  the  firft  of  which 
is  immediately  produced  by  the  Deity.  Here  then 
is  not  an  infinite  feries  of  caufes,  but  a  very  ffiort  fe- 
ries, which  terminates  in  the  Deity  or  firft  caufe. 

I  know  that  it  is  often  fuppofed  and  ajfnttd  by  Dr. 
Weft,  that  volition  cannot  be  an  efFeft  at  all  ;  and  that 
jt  h  fuppofed  by  all  others,  who  maintain  Dr.  Weft's 
general  fcheme,  that  it  cannot  be  an  cffeft  of  an  ex- 
trinfic 


122 

trinfic  caufe.  But  their  Tuppofing  it  is  a  mere  afiump^ 
tion  of  the  thing  in  difpute,  in  this  part  of  the  argu- 
ment.    Let  ihem  prove  it  and  they  will  do  fomething 

to  the  purpofe. Again  ;    the  caufe  or  feries  of 

caufes,  which  is  implied  in  the  idea,  that  volition  is  an 
cfFe6,  is  fo  far  from  excluding  the  firft  caufe  and  any 
efficient  caufe,  as  Dr.  Weft  fays,  that  it  inevitably 
leads  to  the  firfl:  caufe,  and  implies,  that  there  is  an 
efficient  caufe  of  all  volition  in  creatures,  as  well  as  of 
every  thing  elfe  (hort  of  the  firft  caufe. 

4.  That  volition  in  the  Deity  is  no  effeft,  but  is  on- 
ly the  Deity  confidered  as  willing  or  caufing  ;  and 
therefore  to  affert,  that  volition  is  no  effis6t,  is  not  in 
itfelf  an  abfurdity.     Why  then  may  we  not  affert,  that 

volition  in  the  creature  is  no  effeft  ?  P.  23. On 

this  I  obferve,  It  is  granted,  that  volition  in  the  Dei- 
ty is  not  an  effisft  ;  but  it  no  more  hence  follows,  that 
volition  in  the  creature  is  not  an  effe6l,  than  that  ex- 
iftence  and  knowledge  in  the  creature,  are  not  effisfts, 
becaufe  they  are  not  effe6ls  in  the  Creator. 

5.  Thatif  human  volition  bean  effedjthen  man  muft 
bepaffivein  willing,butifhe  bepaffive  in  willing, he  can 
be  aSlive  in  nothing  elfe ;  i.  e.  he  is  no  agent,  but  a  mere 
paffive  machine.  But  if  man  be  a£livc  in  willing,  then 
volition  cannot  be  the  effe6t  of  an  extrinfic  caufe,  and 
will  be  nothing  but  the  mind  afting  or  operating ;  p.  23. 

No  doubt  if  human  volition  ht  an  effefl,  man  is  lb 
far  paffive  in  willing,  as  to  be  the  fubjefl:  of  the  influence 
of  that  caufe  which  produces  volition  ;  ftill  he  is  aftive 
too  in  volition,  is  ftill  an  agent  and  not  a  mere  paffive 
machine.  In  volition  man  is  both  paffive  and  adive  ; 
paffive  as  he  is  the  fubjefl  of  the  influence  of  the  caufe 
"which  excites  volition,  and  active  in  the  cxercife  of 
it.  As  the  day-labourer  is  paffive  in  that  he  is  influ- 
enced by  the  profpecb  of  wages,  to  confent  to  labour, 
and  a6tive  in  exerting  and  in  confenting  to  exert  him- 
felf  in  labour.  Nor  does  it  follow  from  a  man's  being 
aftive  in  volition,  that  volition  cannot  be  the  effedl;  of 
an  extrinfic  caufe.     The  idea,  that  it  does  follow,  takes 

for 


123 

lor  granted  the  very  thing  in  queftion,  viz.  that  an  ac- 
tion cannot  be  an  cffedt,  clpccially  of  an  extrinfic 
caufe.     Dr.  Well  ought  to  have  proved  this. 

Befides  ;  why  docs  the  Doctor  lay,  "If  man  be 
«  a6livc  in  willing,  then  volition  cannot  be  the  efl'edl 
««  of  any  extrmfic  caufe  ?"  Ibid.  His  dotlrine  equally 
implies,  that  it  is  not  the  effeft  of  an  intrinfic  caufe. 
His  doftrine  is,  that  volition  is,  in  general  terms,  not 
an  efFed  and  has  no  caufe.  But  now,  it  feems  the 
Do6lor  recedes  from  this,  and  holds  only,  that  voli- 
tion is  not  the  eflPe6l  of  an  extrivjic  caufe,  implicitly 
granting,  that  it  is  an  effcB,  and  an  eftetl  of  an  intrin- 
Jic  caufe. 

The  Do6lor  tells  us,  that  "  if  man  be  paffive  in 

"  willing he  is ■  a  mere  pajfive  machine ;" 

p.  23. How  does  this  appear  ?  A  man  is  paffive 

in  his  intelle£lual  views  ;  but  is  he  in  thofe  views  a 
mere  paffive  machine  ?  The  human  intelled  is  very 
different  from  what  we  commonly  call  a  machine. 
Or  if  by  machine  the  Do5tor  mean  any  thing  that  is 
influenced  by  an  extrinfic  caufe  ;  I  grant,  that  in 
this  fenfe,  both  the  human  intelleft  and  human  will 
are  machines  ;  and  in  granting  this,  1  grant  no  more 
than  is  implied  in  the  moral  neceffity  for  which  I 
plead.  Yet  fuch  an  application  of  the  word  machine^ 
vould  be  a  grofs  perverfion  of  it. 

6.  That  the  Deity  has  not  ohly  a£led  from  all  eter- 
nity ;  but  is  continually  a6ling  upon  the  whole  crea- 
tion, for  the  prefervation  and  government  of  it.  Yet 
thefe  operations  and  energies  of  the  Deity  are  not  ef- 
fefts,  though  they  take  place  in  time.  Therefore  the 
energies  or  volitions  of  the  human  mind  are  not  ef- 

fe6ls,  though  they  alfo  take  place  in  time  ;  p.  24. 

But  1  deny,  that  the  operations  or  energies  of  the 
Deity  begin  in  time,  though  the  efFefts  of  thofe  opera- 
tions do.  They  no  more  begin  in  time,  than  the  di- 
vine exiftence  does  ;  but  human  volitions  all  begin 
in  time.  There  is  no  fucceffion  in  the  divine  mind  ; 
therefore  no  new  operations  take  place  there.    AH 

the 


the  divine  aSs  are  equally  from  eternit/j  nor  is  there 
any  time  with  God.  "  One  day  is  with  the  Lord  as 
"  a  thoufand  years  and  a  thoufand  years  as  one  day." 
The  effeBs  of  ihofe  divine  a6ls   do   indeed  ail  take 

place  in  time  and  in  a  fucceffion. If  it  fliould  be 

laid,  that  on  this  fuppofition  the  efFe£is  take  place 
not  till  long  after  the  aSs,  by  which  they  are  produc- 
ed ;  1  anfwer,  they  do  fo  in  our  view,  but  not  in  the 
view  of  God.  With  him  there  is  no  time,  no  before 
nor  after  with  refpefl  to  time  ;  nor  has  time  any  ex- 
iftence  either  in  the  divine  mind  or  in  the  nature  of 
things,  independently  of  the  minds  and  perceptions 
of  creatures  ;  but  it  depends  on  the  fucceflion  of 
thofe  perceptions.  So  that  from  the  confideration, 
that  the  divine  energies  and  operations  are  no  efFeds, 
it  no  more  follows,  that  human  volitions  are  no  ef- 
fe6ls,  than  from  the  confideration  that  the  divine  cx- 
iftence  and  knowledge  are  no  effefcls  it  follows,  that 
our  exiftence  and  knowledge  are  no  eftedb. 

7,  That  if  volition  were  an  efFe6l,  we  could  not  be 
the  caufes  of  any  effeBs  :  At  the  moli  we  fhould  be 
9nere  pajfive  ivjlruments  ;  p.  25. This  wholly  de- 
pends on  the  meaning  of  -words^  as  moll  of  Dr.  Weft's 
arguments  do.  If  by  caiife  the  Dr.  mean  ?i  f elf  .deter- 
minate caufe,  he,  as  ufaalj  begs  what  he  has  no  right 
to  expeft  will  be  given  him.  But  if  by  caufe  he  mean 
a  rational,  voluntary  agent,  aQing  under  the  pcrfua- 
five  influence  of  light  and  motives  ;  we  may  be  fuch 
caufes,  though  volition  is  an  efFe6l  ;  and  a6ling  as 
fuch  caufes  we  may  produce  cfFe6ls.  Thus  Noah 
built  the  ark  ;    Mofes   hewed  two  tables  of  ftone, 

&c. And  if  under  the  name  of  a  pcfjlve  inflrument 

the  Do6lor  mean  to  include  fuch  a  rational,  volunta- 
ry a^ent,  as  I  have  jufl  dclctibed  ;  I  grant,  that  in 
this  fenfe  we  are  paffive  inliruments,  and  it  is  impofli- 
ble,  that  a  rational  creature  fliould  be  any  otiier  than 
fuch  a  paffive  inftrumcnt.  But  I  reprobate  the  call- 
ing of  fuch  an  agent  a  mere  paffive  inrtrument,  as  a 
great  abufe  of  language. 

3ut, 


_7^5 
But  fuppofe  volition  were  not  an  efFeft  ;  fhould 
•^e  then  be  caufes  of  effeds  ?  or  fhould  we  then  be 
leCs  paflive  iiiftruments  ?  If  volition  were  no  effeft, 
we  ourfelves  fhould  no  more  be  the  caufes  of  it,  than 
any  extrinfic  caufe.  It  would  happen  in  us  by  mere 
chance.  And  fhould  we  in  the  exercife  of  that  voli- 
tion, which  is  without  caule  and  is  merely  accidental, 
be  any  more  caufes  of  an  effefi,  than  we  fhould  be 
in  the  exercife  of  a  volition  excited  by  a  proper  mo^ 
tive  ?  If  any  reafon  can  be  given  to  fhow,  that  we 
fhould,  let  it  be  given.  Though  it  may  be  pleaded^ 
that  when  we  become  the  fubjetts  of  volition  by  mere 
chance,  we  arc  not  the  fubjeds  of  the  operation  of  a 
caufe  in  the  production  of  volition,  and  in  that  fenfe 
are  not  pafTivc  •  yet  in  this  cafe  volition  takes  place 
in  our  minds  equally  without  our  caufation,  our  pre- 
vious agency  or  confent,  as  if  the  fame  volition  were 
can  fed  by  fomeihing  extrinfic.  So  that  if  we  be  nol 
equally  xvrvught  upon  in  thefe  two  cafes,  we  are  e- 
quallv  inaBcve^  and  therefore  can  no  more  be  caufei 
in  the  cue  cafe,  than  in  the  other  ;  And  there  '\i 
nothing  more  favourable  to  liberty  or  felf-determina- 
tion  in  the  one  cafe  than  in  the  other. 

8.  That  if  volition  were  an  effect,  we  could  have 
710  more  ideas  of  caufe  and  efFe8,  than  a  blind  mart 
has  of  colours.  For  we  being  paflive  in  our  ideas  of 
fen  rations,  they  Could  never  fuggefl  to  us  the  ideas  of 
Caufe  and  efFeft  ;  and  if  volition  or  internal  a61ion 
be  the  efft^l  of  an  ex'.rinfic  caufe,  our  refleBixDns 
could  never  afford  an  example  of  an  ejSicient  caufe, 
and  fo  we  mull  for  ever  be  deflitute  of  the  ideas  of 

caufe  and  cfFett  ;  p.  25. On  this  I  obfcrve, 

(1.)  It  wliolly  depends  on  the  meaning  of  the  word" 
ca^fr.  If  as  I  before  obferved,  it  mean  a  fclf-determin- 
atc  caufe,  which  "  a6ls  on  itfelf  and  produces  voli- 
tion ;"  I  grant,  that  we  have  no  idea  of  fuch  a  caufe, 
more  ihnji  a  blind  man  has  of  colours.  Nor  has  Dr. 
Wed  any  idea  of  fuch  a  caufe,  2s  he  reprobates  it 
»id  does  not  believe  in  its  exiftcnce.     Neither  God 


i±6 

nor  creature  can  be  fuch  a  caufe  as  this  ;  it  is  an  inh- 
poffibility  ;  it  is  perfe6lly  like  the  animal,  which 
Prefident  Edwards  luppofed  the  traveller  proielTed  to 
have  feen  in  Terra  del  fuego.  But  if  caufe  mean  a 
rational,  voluntary  agent  producing  efFefls  under  the 
influence  of  motives  ;  fuch  caufes  we  ourfelves  are  or 
may  be  ;  and  the  idea  of  fuch  a  caufe  we  derive  from 
every  artificer,  whom  we  fee  employed  at  his  trade, 
from  every  hufbandman,  who  in  our  view  tills  the 
ground,  and  from  every  external  atlion  which  we 
perform. 

(2.)  Though  we  are  paffive  in  our  ideas  of  fenfa- 
lion,  yet  every  idea  of  that  kind,  for  the  very  reafon 
that  we  are  paffive  in  it,  fuggefts  to  us  the  ideas  of 
both  caufe  and  effeft.  In  that  we  are  paffive  in  thofe 
ideas  both  caufe  and  efFe6l  are  implied.  If  no  caufe 
operated  upon  us  to  produce  the  effeft,  fenfation,  we 
Ihould  not  be  paffive  in  fenfation.  It  is  true,  the  be- 
coming paffively  the  fubje£ls  of  fenfation,  does  not 
fuggeft  to  us  the  idea  of  a  felf-determinate  or  felf-ac- 
tuating  caufe  ;  for  fuch  a  caufe  does  not  exift,  is  an 
impoffibility,  and  therefore  no  idea  of  it  can  be  coa- 
ceived  ;  as  I  have  already  endeavoured  to  ffiow. 

(3.)  This  argument  fuppofes,  that  we  get  the  idea 
of  an  efficient  caufe  by  the  experience,  that  we  our- 
felves are  the  efficient  caufes  of  volition.  But 
in  the  firft  place  we  deny,  that  we  ever  do  experience 
ourfelves  to  be  the  efficient  caufes  of  volition  :  And 
in  the  fecond  place,  if  we  did,  it  would  be  entirely 
inconfiftent  with  Dr.  Weft's  propofition  now  under 
confideration  ;  it  would  prove,  that  volition  is  an  ef- 
feft,  and  that  we  ourfelves  are  the  efficient  caufes 
of  it. 

(4.)  Be  it  fo  that  "  our  reflexions  can  never  afford 
«  us  an  example  of  an  efficient  caufe  ;"  what  ab- 
furdity  follows  ?  We  avow  that  our  reflexions  can- 
not afford  us  an  example  of  fuch  a  caufe.  We  nei- 
ther efficientty  caufe  our  own  volitions  nor  our  own 
perceptions.     Yet  we  arc  not  deflitute  of  ideas  of 

caufe 


12/ 

caufe  and  cfFe£l,  as  I  have  already  fliown.- -But 

certainly  according  to  Dr.  Weft  our  reflexions  do 
not  afford  us  an  example  of  an  efficient  caufe  of  vo- 
lition ;  for  volition  is,  according  to  him,  no  effedl  and 
has  no  caufe. 

g.  That  if  our  volitions  were  the  effeQs  of  an  extrin- 
fic  caufe,  we  could  never  have  the  idea  of  dependence 
and  independence,  and  therefore  could  not  conneft  our 
ideas  together,  i.  e.  could  not  be  rational  beings.  And  as 
we  are  rational  beings,  it  follows,  that  our  volitions 
are  not  the  effc6ts  of  an  extrinfic  caufe,  but  that  we 
are  felf-deternainate>  and  that  we  get  the  ideas  of  de- 
pendence and  independence,  by  experiencing  in  our- 
felves,  that  in  willing  and  choofing  we  aft  independ- 
ently of  any  extrinfic  caufe  ;  p.  25. 

This  implies,  that  in  volition  we  a£t  independently, 
and  that  from  fuch  independent  adions  we  derive  the 
idea  of  independence.  But  this  again  is  a  fheer  beg- 
ging of  the  queflion.  How  does  it  appear,  that  we 
ad  independently  ?  The  DoBor  might  as  well  have 
taken  it  for  granted,  that  we  a6l  feif-determinately* 
\Vc  no  more  grant,  that  we  acquire  the  idea  of  inde- 
pendence, by  experiencing  it  in  volition,  than  that  we 
acquire  the  idea  of  an  efficient  caufe  by  experiencing 
ourfelves  to  be  the  efficient  caufes  of  our  own  voli- 
tions. And  if  any  man  have  the  idea,  that  any  crea- 
ture is  in  volition  independent  of  all  extrinfic  caufes, 
this  idea  is  not  allowed  to  be  according  to  truth.  As 
to  the  divine  independence,  which  is  indeed  entire 
and  abfolute,  Dr.  Weft  will  not  pretend,  that  we  get 
the  idea  of  this  by  experiencing  the  like  independ- 
ence in  ourfelves.  We  no  more  get  that  idea  in  this 
way,  than  we  get  the  idea  of  the  divine  omnipotence, 
by  experiencing  omnipotence  in  ourfelves.  So  that 
though  we  have  the  ideas  of  dependence  and  inde- 
pendence, can  conneft  our  ideas  together  and  are  ra- 
tional beings,  it  by  no  means  follows,  as  Dr.  Well  in- 
fers, "  that  our  volitions  are  not  the  effcds  of  an  ex- 
"  trinfic  caufe,   and  that   we    are    felf-determinate." 

And 


42^ 

And  why  does  the  DoQor  continually  deny  voVition 
fo  be  the  efFed  of  an  extrinfic  caufe  ?  The  propofs- 
tioft  which  he  has  undertaken  to  fupport,  equally  im- 
jf)liesj  that  it  is  not  the  effc6l  of  an  inirinjic  caufe. 

10.  That  volition  is  only  the  relation  of  the  energy 
of  a  caufe  in  producing  an  effeB,  and  therefore  is  not 
an  efFe6l,  and  has  no  proper  exiftcnce  of  its  own  ;  p. 

ijg. -If  volition  be  only  the  relation  of  the  energy 

of  a  caufe,  it  is  not  the  energy  itfelf  or  adion  of  a 
caufe  ;  and  how  then  is  it  a  part  of  the  fubje6t  of  the 
prefent  inquiry  ?  The  prefent  inquiry  and  difcuflion 
relate  to  the  voluntary  aBions  of  a  rational  being.  As 
to  the  relations  and  external  denominations  of  thofe 
anions,  they  may  be  and  commonly  are  different  in 
every  aftion,  yet  the  actions  themfelves  may  be  the 
fame. Befides ;  the  Do£lor  will  not  pretend  to  de- 
ny, that  volition  is  an  aftion  of  the  mind,  or  as  he 
choofes  to  expre fs  it,  the  mind  aBing.  And  is  the 
mind  a6ting  only  the  relation  of  the  energy  or  a6lion 
of  that  mind  ?  And  has  the  mind  a6ling  "  no  proper 
"  exiftence  of  its  own  ?"  If  it  have,  it  is  an  efFc6t 
doubtlefs,  becaufe  it  is  a  creature.  An  aftion  of  the 
human  mind  is  an  event,  and  an  event  coming  to  pafs 
in  time,  and  therefore  has  a  caufe  :  And  Dr.  Weft 
fays,  he  "  cannot  be  charged  with  holding,  that  events 
«  take  place  without  a  caufe  ;"  p.  27. 

11.  That  no  agent  can  bring  any  effe6l  to  pafs,  but 
what  is  confequent  on  his  ailing.  Therefore  it  is  very 
abfurd  to  call  the  a6ling  or  a6livenefs  of  a  being,  an 
cfFe6l ;  becaufe  it  introduces  the  utmoft  abfurdity  in- 
to language,  by  confounding  and  blending  things  to- 
gether, which  are  very  different ;  p.  28. It  is  an 

undoubted  truth,  that  no  agent  can  bring  any  effeft 
to  pafs,  but  what  is  confequent  on  his  aQing.  But 
how  does  it  hence  follow,  that  it  is  very  abfurd  to  call 
the  aftion  of  a  being  an  effeft  ?  And  how  does  this 
confound  and  blend  things  together,  which  are  very  dif- 
ferent ?  It  will  not  be  denied,  that  the  prophefying  of  a 
prophet  may  be  the  a6t  of  that  prophet ;  yet  a6ling 


by  infpiraiion  he  is  cscitcd  to  that  aB  by  a  divine 
agency.  No  doubt  the  Divine  Being  brings  to  pafs 
this  efFefl  by  a  previous  aft  or  exertion  of  himiclf. 
But  where  is  the  abfurdity  of  calHng  this  prophcf\iiig 
an  cffcQ  of  the  divine  influence  ?  How  does  the  call- 
ing ofit  fo,  confound  and  blend  the  divine  influence  and 
the  aB  of  the  prophet,  which  arc  acknowledged  to  be 
very  diifcrent  from  each  other  p 

12.  That  caufe  and  effeB  are  not  fynonymous 
terms  ;  and  therefore  "  in  whatever  fenfe  any  thing  is 
"  a  caufe,  in  that  fcnfe  it  is  not  proper  to  call  it  an 
"  effecl  ;  for  this  realbn,  that  caufes  confidercd  as 
"  caufes,  are  not  effcBs."  Part  II,  p.  go.  This  is 
jufl  as  conclufive  fcafoning  as  if  the  Dofctor  had  faid, 
the  words  Iree  and  ejfe^  are  not  fynonymous  term?^. 
Therefore  in  whatever  fenfe  any  thing  is  a  f.rec,  m 
that  fenfe  it  is  not  proper  to  call  it  an  ej/e^  ;  for  this 
reafbn,  that  trees  confidered  as  trees  are  not  cffe^s. 
Rain  confidered  as  the  caufe  of  the  growing  of  grafs, 
is  an  effeB;  ;  a  medicine  confidered  as  the  caufe  of 
a  cure,  is  flill  an  effeB  ;  and  Dr.  Welt  confidered  as 
the  author  of  feveral  effays  on  liberty  and  neccffitv, 
is  as  really  a  creature  of  God,  as  he  is  when  he  is 
confidered  to  be  in  the  exercife  of  his  favourite  liber- 
ty or  power  of  not  aBing  and  is  in  perfed  torpor. — 

The  DoBor  proceeds,  "  The  mind  aBing  is  the  mind 
''  caufing  ;  for  I  conceive,  whenever  the  mind  aUs, 
"  it  produces  fome  effeB."  Ibid.  If  the  DoBor  mean 
that  whenever  the  mind  is  the  fubjeB  of  an  internal 
aB  or  volition,  it  produces  fome  external  efFcB  ;  this 
is  manifeftly  a  millake,  and  the  DoBor  himfelf  will 
not  avow  it.  If  he  mean,  that  whenever  it  is  the  fub- 
jeB of  volition,  it  produces  that  volition  as  an  ejfcEl  ; 
this  in  the  firft  place  is  giving  up  what  he  himfelf  had 
vritten  an  efifay  to  prove,  viz.  that  volition  is  rot  an 
effeB  ;  and  fecondly  it  is  a  begging  of  the  main  point. 
In  fliort,  Dr.  Wefl  is  a  mofl  fturdy  mctaphyfical  beg- 
gar.    But  as  charity  demands   no  gratuities   to   fuch 

beggars,  he   is  to  expe61   none, He   adds   to  the; 

1  lali 


laft  quotation,  it  '^  Vk'ilj  introdace  the  greateft  confu- 
^  fion  in  i.mguagc,  to  fpeak  of  the  mind,  confidered 
^^  as  cauiing,  as  being  an  efFe6i."  But  what  confufion 
of  language  is  it,  to  ("peak  of  Dr.  Well  confidered  as 
the  author  of  efiays  on  Hberty  and  neccfiitv,  as  being 
a  creature  ?  1  hope,  when  the  Doclor  fhall  write  again, 
he  will  //zoa;  that  it  confounds  language,  and  not  mere- 
ly qJ/cTl;  it. 

The  Do6lor,  in  the  page  lafl  quoted,  fays^  "  The 
''  queftion  is,  whether  every  afl;  of  the  will  is  a  new 
^'  effefl  produced  by  the  Deity  or  by  fome  other 
^'  extrinfic  cauie."  1  do  not  allow  this  to  be  the  quef- 
tion. /rhe  Do6lor  afferts  in  general  terms,  that  voli- 
tion is  not  properly  an  effeti.  The  queftion  is  entire- 
ly genera!,  whether  volition  be  an  effect  of  any  caufe, 
extrmfic  or  intrinfic.  When  this  queftion  Ihall  have 
been  fettled,  a  lubfequent  one  may  arifc,  whether  it 
be  an  effetl  of  extrinjic  caufe. 

Thus  I  have  conlidered  Dr.  Weft's  arguments  to 
prove,  that  volition  is  not  an  effect  and  has  no  caufe. 
Whether  they  do  really  prove  it,  the  reader  will  judge. 

Dr.  Price  in  his  Correfpondence  with  Prieltly,  p. 
341,  fays,  "  An  agent  that  does  not  put  himf^lf  in  mo- 
""  tion,  is  an  agent  that  is  always  a6ed  upon,  and  an 
«  agent  that  never  a6^s."  Gn  this  I  remark,  that  it 
is  not  true,  that  every  agent,  who  does  not  put  him- 
felf  in  motion,  is  always  aded  upon,  by  an  extrinfic 
agent.  The  Deity  did  not  at  firft  put  himfelf  in  mo- 
tion, meaning  by  motion   volition.- If  he  did,  he 

\vas  before  without  motion  or  volition.  And  Dr. 
Price  would  not  pretend,  that  Qod  exifted  from  eter- 
nity without  any  volition,  and  that  when  he  came  down 
within  the  limits  of  time,  he  puthimfdf  into  volition,  i.  e, 
he  created  volition  in  his  own  mind.  Or  if  by  being 
aBed  upon.  Dr.  Price  meant,  the  Deity's  a8ing  according 
to  the  moft  wife  and  holy  reafons,  which  his  infinite  un- 
derftanding  can  fuggeft  ;  no  doubt  in  this  fenfe  the  Dei- 
ty himielf  is  atled  upon  j  and  if  this  be  inconfiftent 
with   agency,  inftcad   of  but  one,  as    Dr.  Price   fays, 

there. 


tliere  is  noi  one  agent  in  the  iiniveiTe.  God  no  more 
put  himfclf  in  motion  or  volition  at  firft,  than  ha  put 
himfelf  into  cxillcnce.  Nor  has  he  at  any  time  put 
himfelfinto  any  particular  volition.  This  would  nn- 
ply  a  new  thing  and  a  change  in  God. 

To  fay,  that  an  agent  that  is  a6cd  upon  cannot  a6>, 
is  as  groundlcfs,  as  lo  fay  tliat  a  hody  a8ed  upon, 
cannot  move  ;  unlefs  the  main  qucftion  is  beg;ed,  by 
fuppofing,  that  atlion  means  fclf-determinate  a6tion. 

The  advocates  for  felf-determinaiion  are  in  like 
manner  guilty  of  begging  the  queliion,  by  ufing  aHive 
power  to  mean  a  felf-determining  or  felf-nioving  pow- 
er ;  a  power  which  puts  iifelf  into  excrcife,  without 
the  agency  or  influence  of  any  extrinfic  caufe.  We 
deny  the  exigence  and  poilibility  of  fuch  a  power  : 
We  hold,  that  it  is  as  impofTiblC)  as  that  an  animal 
fhould  be;:,et  itfelf,  or  take  one  liep  before  the  fird 
ftep.  If  this  be  meant  by  aHive  power,  we  deny  that 
any  being  pofTeffes  it  ;  and  our  opponents  ought  to 
be  afliamed  to  be^  it. 

■o 

Dr.  Wefl  holds,  that  volition  is  no  efFeft  and  has 
no  caufe  :  He  alfo  holds,  that  volition  is  a  modiHca- 
tion  of  the  mind.  Indeed  it  is  maniff  (l,  that  the  mind 
■willing,  is  the  mind  in  a  different  mode  or  diiferently 
modified,  from  what  it  was,  when  not  willing.  Now 
is  the  event  of  this  modification  taking  place  in  the 
mind,  not  an  efPett  ?  And  is  it  uncaufed  ?  Then  not 
only  does  an  event  come  to  pafs  without  caufe,  which 
Dr.  Weft  denies  ;  but  it  happens  by  mere  blind,  11 -.i- 

pid,  undefigning  chance. It  might  as  well  be  f^iid, 

that  the  event  of  a  canon  ball  moving  is  not  an  effcB, 
as  that  the  event  of  the  mind  willing  is  not  an  cffett. 

It  is  pleaded,  that  if  volition  be  the  effect  of  an  ex- 
trinfic caufe,  it  is  wholly  paffive  :  Dr.  Weft  joins 
vith  others  in  this  plea,  p.  23.  But  if  volition  be  the 
efFed  of  an  intrinjic  caufe,  it  is  equally  paflive.  For 
as  Dr.  Weft  himlelf  fays  very  rightly,  p.  23,  '•  Every 
"  effeft  is  wholly  palTivc  with  regard  to  the  cauic 
*«  which  produces  it." 

I  2  Dr, 


Dr.  Weft  fays,  volition  is  "  a  property  of  a  mind.""" 

P.  21,  22.  Therefore  when  volition  exifts  in  the 
mind,  it  is  the  fubjeft  of  a  property  of  which  before 
it  was  deftitute.  Now  is  not  this  an  efFe6l  ?  Does 
not  fome  efficient  caufe,  either  the  mind  itfelf  or  fome 
other  caufe,  endue  it  with  that  property,  as  really  as 
if  it  were  endued  with  any  other  property  ?  Or  as  if 
a  body  were  endued  with  a  particular  colour  ? 

He  further  holds,  page  6  and  7,  that  "  virtue  and 
^-  vice  are  mere  modes  or  attributes  of  a  rational  agent." 
But  virtue  and  vice  are  voluntary  a8s  of  the  mindj 
or  volitions.  Therefore  volitions  are  modes  or  attri- 
butes of  a  rational  agent.  But  according  to  him  thefe 
modes  have  no  caufe  and  are  no  eflFefts,  And  if  fome 
modes  be  not  effe6lsj  how  fhall  we  know,  that  other- 
modes  or  any  modes  are  efFeds  ?  If  no  modes  be  ef- 
fefts,  fince  we  know  nothing  of  fubPxances  but  by 
tlheir  fenfible  modes  and  qualities  ;  how  fhall  we  knowj 
that  fubftances  themfelves  are  efFefts  ? 

Volitions  are  afts  and  events  :  Aad  if  fome  e- 
Tents  be  uncaufed,  why  may  not  all  ? 

Dr.  Weft  contradifts  and  gives  up  his  dotlrine, 
that  volition  has  no  caufe,  in  all  thofe  places,  in  which 
he  allows,  that  volition  is  not  without  motive  :  As 
when  he  grants,  "  that  the  mind  a6ls  upon  mo- 
tives"   "  that  when  the  mind  atls  or  choofes, 

"  it  always  has  fome  end,  defign  or  reafon,  which  is 

"  the  occafion  of  its  a6\ing  or  choofing" that 

"  motives  are  the  previous  circumftances  which  are 
"  neceffary  for  adion,"  &c.  Sec.  Motives  then  are 
the  reafons,  the  occafions,  the  neceftary  previous  cir- 
cumftances or  antecedents  of  volition.  And  what  are 
thefe  hut  fecond  caufcs  ?  Caufes  in  the  fenfe,  in  which 
Prefideni  Edwards  explains  himfelf  to  ufe  the  word 

caufe  with  relation  to  this  very  fubjc^jp.  41,  42. 

We  fay,  that  fire  is  the  caufe  of  the  fenfation  of  heat ; 
that  rain  and  fun-ftiine  are  the  caufcs  of  vegetation, 
(&c.  Yet  they  are  no  more  than  the  ftaled  antece- 
(^j^iMi.     In  the  fame  fenfe  motivesj  according  to  Dr. 

Weft,. 


Weft,  are  caufes  of  volitions.  Befides,  all  fecond 
caufes  are  the  efFe6ls  of  the  firft  caufe.  Therefore 
ultimately  volitions  are  effefts  of  the  Great  Firll  Caufe* 

If  volition  be  no  effeft,  it  is  not  the  effe6l  of  the 
mind  in  which  it  exiils.  That  mind  has  no  control 
over  it  :  It  comes  to  pafs  without  its  wifh  or  confent, 
as  fully  as  if  it  were  the  effctl  of  fome  extrinfic  caufe. 
How  then  is  the  mind  any  more,  or  in  any  more  de- 
firable  fenfe,  free,  than  if  volition  were  produced  by 
an  extrinfic  caufe  ?  Which  would  a  wile  man  choofe  ? 
to  have  all  volitions  take  place  by  pure  accident,  by 
blind  chance  and  fate  ?  or  to  have  them  ordered  by 
a  wife  and  good  caufe,  in  the  application  of  proper 
motives  ?  And  are  we  agents  in  the  former  of  thefe 
cafes,  more  than  in  the  latter  ?  On  this  hypothefis  voli- 
tions are  his,  in  whofe  mind  they  exirt,  in  this  fenfe  only, 
that  he  is  the  fubje6l  of  them.  And  this  is  true  on  the 
fuppofition,  that  they  are  caufed  by  an  extrinfic  caufe. 
And  how  on  this  plan,  are  we  more  accountable  for 
our  volitions  and  adions,  than  on  the  fuppofition,  that 
ihey  are  produced  in  us  by  an  extrinfic  caufe  ? 

If  volition  be  no  effed;  and  have  no  caufe,  it  pro- 
ceeds from  no  power  or  faculty  in  human  nature  as 
its  caufe  ;  not  from  the  power  of  will,  nor  even  from 
any  f elf -determining  poiver,  whether  it  confifl  in  the 
will  or  in  any  other  part  of  human  nature.  What 
then  is  the  advantage  of  the  felf  determining  power  fo 
ftrenuoufly  advocated  ?  It  cannot  produce  one  voli- 
tion nor  one  free  a6l.  How  then  does  liberty  confift 
in  it  ?  or  depend  on  it  f.Or  how  does  it  contribute 
any  aid  toward  liberty  ?  And  what  becomes  of  the 
boafted  independence  and  fovereignty  of  the  will  ? 

That  a  volition  is  produced  in  me  by  fome  extrin- 
fic caufe,  is  not  at  all  oppofed  to  liberty,  unlefs  by 
liberty  be  intended  contingence  or  an  exemption  from 
all  caufality.  If  I  could  caufe  a  volition  in  myfelf,  it 
■would  be  as  neccfiary,  as  if  it  were  produced  by  fome 
other  caufe.  Dr.  Weft  rightly  obfcrves,  that  "every 
"  efFeft  is  wholly  paflTive  with  regard  to  the  caufe, 
I  3  "  whick 


134 

t-i . 

«'  which  produces  it."  As  the  volition  then  produced 
by  myfelf  is  wholly  paffive,  it  could  not  be  mo^e  paf- 
fjve,  if  it  were  produced  by  foine  extrinfic  caufe.     "   . 

Dr.  Weil,  in  p.  25,  fays,  "  Our  coafcioufnefs,  that 
"  we  are  fejf-active,  fuggefts  to  us  the  ideas  of  caufe 
"  and  effcd,  of  dependence  and  independence  :"  i.e. 
Our  confcioufnefs  that  we  are* the  bare  fubjeQs  of  vo- 
liiions,  which  are  no  effefts  at  all,  whether  of  ourfelves 
or  of  any  other  caufe,  and  therefore  are  not  dependent 
on  any  caufe,  fuggelts  to  us  ihe  ideas  of  caufe  and  ef- 
fetl,  dependence  and  independence.  Whether  this 
be  rational,  let  the  reader  judge. 

In  p.  26,  Dr.  Weft  explains  himfelf  to  mean  by  vo- 
lition, "  the  relation  of  energy  exerted  by  a  caufe  in 
"  producing  an  effeft  ;"  and  fays,  "  It  cannot  be  con- 
s' fidered  as  being  an  effetl  of  any  caufe  whatever,  or  as 
"  having  any  proper  exiftence  of  its  own."  In  fup- 
port  of  this  idea  he  quotes  Prefident  Edwards,  where 
lie  fays,  that  a£lion  and  paffion  are  fometimes  ufed  to 
fignify  the  mere  relations  of  a61ivencfs  of  fomething 
on  another,  and  of  pafiivenefs  or  of  being  aded  up- 
on by  another  thing  ;  and  that  in  this  cafe  they  do 
not  fignify  any  pofitive  effeft  or  caufe  or  any  real  ex- 
iftences.  '  Hence  Dr.  W^eft  infers,  that  according  to 
Prefident  Edwards,  he  cannot  be  charged  wilh  hold- 
ing that  events  take  place  without  a  caufe. On  this 

jt  may  be  obferved, 

1.  Prefident  Edwards  tells  us,  that  whenever  the 
word  a6lion  is  ufed  to  fignify  a  mere  relation,  it  does 
not  fignify  •^?2  aSion  or  fome  motion  or  exercife  of 
body  or  mind.  But  Dr.  Weft  generally  ufes  volition 
to  fignify  an  aBion  or  exercife  of  the  mind  :  And  yet 
in  the  paflage  now  under  confideration,  he  gives  an 
explanation  of  volition,  in  which  he  fays  it  fignifies 
"  the  relation  of  the  energy  of  a  caufe,"  and  therefore 
not  the  energy  itfclf,  the  exercife,  exertion  or  a6l  of 
that  caufe.  Prefident  PLdwards  did  not  fuppofe,  that 
the  word  aclion  generally  and  properly  figuifies  a  mere 
relation  ;  but  that  it  generally  and  properly  fignifies  a 

pofitive 


•^35 

pofitive  exiflence,*  or  an  event  which  has  as  real  an 
cxiltence,  as  any  fact  or  event.  As  to  the  word  vo- 
lition, Prefident  Edwards  never  confidcrs  that  as  hgni- 
fying  a  mere  relation.  Whereas  Dr.  Weil  conliders 
this  to  be  the  proper  meaning  of  volition. 

2.  As  to  the  p.iflage,  which  Dr.  Well  quotes  from 
Prt  fident  Edwards,  the  latter  had  good  reafon  to  fay, 
that  when  the  aBion  is  ufed  to  exprefs  not  any  exer- 
tion, fa6t  or  event,  but  the  mci'e  relation  of  atlivity 
with  refpett  to  fomething  as  the  fubjeft  ;  it  fignifies 
no  efFe6l  or  caufe  and  no  real  exiftence.  This  may 
be  illuflrated  by  fomc  other  relation  ;  asxfonflifp,  the 
relation  between  father  and  fon.  A  father  is  a  real 
exiftcnce,  and  every  created  father  is  an  effe6l.  So 
is  a  fon.  Bvitfoii/Iiip  is  nO  real  exiflence  ;  nor  is  it  a 
proper  effed  or  caule,  more  than  the  relation  between 
the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  and  two  right  ones.  No'V 
volition  is  nut  fuch  a  meie  relation  :  It  is  a  real  pofi- 
tive  a6i;,  motion  or  exercife  of  a  mind,  and  Dr.  W^ell 
abundantly  grants  this. 

3.  If  volition  he  a  mere  relation  of  energy,  it  is 
not  "  an  exertion  of  an  aflive  principle,"  "  an  aft  of 
"  the  wilf,"  "  an  exercife  of  the  mind,"  &c.  as  Dr. 
Weft  afferts  it  to  be.  Bcfides,  if  it  be  a  mere  "  lela- 
"  tion  of  the  energy  exerted  by  a  caufe"  or  mind, 
what  is  the  energy,  acl,  exercife  or  exertion  of  which 
volition  is  the  relation  ?  Surely  an  aQ  or  exertion, 
and  the  relation  of  that  aft  ;  a  thing  and  the  relations 
of  that  thing,  are  not  one  and  the  fame.  The  fame 
thing  may  have  different  and  oppofite  relations.  The 
fame  man  may  fuftain  the  oppofite  relations  of  a  father 
and  a  fon.  And  if  fuch  a  man  be  the  lame  thing  with 
his  relations,  he  is  the  fame  thing  widi  his  fonfliip,  and 
the  fame  thing  with  his  fatherhood.  Thus,  as  two 
tilings  which  a^ree  with  a  common  meafure,  agree  be- 
tween themfclves,  it  will  follow,  that  fonfhip  and  fa- 
therhood are  the  fame  thing. 

I4  4-By 

•  It  will  be  rcmcmbcTcd,  that  loj'icians  and  ftictaphyHcians  tiivide  beings  in- 
to fubdancc  and  mode,  and  contdcr  modes  as  having  as  real  aud  peli  i»e  as 
xxillcncc,  as  fubllancc. 


4.  By  volition  Dr.  Weft  means  either  an  a£l  of  the 
ir.ind,  or  not.  If  he  do  mean  an  adl  of  the  mind,  vo- 
lition with  him  is  not  a  mere  relation,  but  a  proper 
pofitive  event  or  fa6l  ;  and  therefore  muft;  be  an  ef- 
fefcl  and  have  a  caufe  ;  or  an  event  takes  place  with- 
out a  caufe.  If  he  do  not  by  volition  mean  an  aft  of 
the  mind,  it  is  furely  not  a/ree  aft;  and  if  we  do  not 
atl  freely  in  volition,  we  do  not  aft  freely  at  all,  i.  e. 
■we  are  not  free  agents.  It  is  generally  granted,  and 
to  be  fure  Dr.  Weit's  whole  book  implies,  tliat  all  the 
moral  liberty  which  we  have  is  exercifed  in  volition. 
But  if  volition  be  a  mere  relation,  and  not  an  aft  and 
a  free  aft  ;  we  have  no  liberty  ;  and  by  holding,  that 
volition  is  a  mere  relation  and  not  an  aft.  Dr.  Weft 
gives  up  all  that  liberty  for  which  he  difputes. 

The  Doftor,in  his  fecond  part, p.  1  2,  grants  that  "afts 
*'  of  the  will,  volition,  choice  and  determination  of  the 
*•'  mind  vcxdiy  W\i\\  propriety  be  called  efFefts,  when  they 
*'  fignify  thofe  determinations  or  conclufions,  which 
'•  the  mind  makes  in  confequence  of  its  comparing 
<'  two  or  more  things  together."  Therefore  fome  afts 
of  the  will  are  efFetls.  How  is  this  confident  with 
what  the  Doftor  holds  both  in  his  former  book  and  in 
this,  that  volition  cannot  be  properly  called  an  efFeft  ? 
Befides  ;  what  the  Doftor  here  fays,  is  applicable  to  all 
volitions,  and  therefore  all  volitions  are  according  to 
his  own  account,  efFefts.  For  all  volitions  are  "  de- 
*'  terminations  or  conclufions,  which  the  mind  makes 
'^  in  confequence  of  its  comparing  two  or  more  things 
*'  together."  If  two  or  more  things  be  exprefsly  pro- 
pofed,  and  one  of  them  be  chofen,  it  is  the  very  cafe 
here  ftated  by  Dr.  Weft.  Or  if  one  thing  only  be 
exprefsly  and  pofitively  propofed  as  the  objeft  of  our 
choice,  ftill  there  is  a  real  competition  between  this 
thing  and  the  abfence  or  negleft  of  it  ;  and  the  mind 
comes  to  a  determination  in  confequence  of  its  com- 
paring thefe  two  together.  Therefore  according  to 
Dr.  Weft's  own  account  every  volition  "  may  with 
''  propriety  be  called  an  efFeft  f  and  yet  according  to 

the 


^37 

tne  fame  Dr.  Weft,  "  volition  cannot  be  properly  call- 
ed an  effeft."     "  How  can  thcCe  things  be  ?" 

Bat  Dr.  Well:  endeavours  to  evade  this  confequcnce, 
hv  faying,  "  I  have  uled  the  term  volition  to  fignify 
*'  the  mind  conjidcred  as  atling.  In  this  lenfc  and  in 
**  this  only,  1  lay  volition  is  not  an  eJfeB."  iiut  the 
mind  confidered  as  ading,  atls  in  confequence  of 
comparing  two  or  more  things  together,  and  fach  an 
a6l  Dr.  Weft  allows  to  be  an  effeCl.  Alfo  he  grants, 
"  that  the  human  mind  and  all  its  powers  and  facul- 
"  ties  are  efFeds  ;"  p.  13.  But  will  he  fay,  that  the 
human  mind  with  all  its  powers  and  faculties  dormant 
and  inatiive,  is  an  effeB,  but  the  fame  mind  with  its 
powers  and  faculties  aHing^  is  not  an  effeft  ?  And 
docs  it  ceafe  to  be  an  effe6i  or  a  creature,  as  foon  as 
it  begins  to  aft  ^ 

"  If  volition  he  only  the  mind  afting  ;  and  if  the 
**  mind  ading  is  properly  a  caufc,  then  it  is  not  prop- 
*•  er  to  call  it  an  efFetl."  Ibid,  p.  13.  But  what  or 
where  is  the  impropriety  of  calling  it  an  cffe6l  ?  In 
fuch  a  difpute  as  this,  to  aflert  fuch  a  novel  propofi- 
tion  without  proof  or  illuftration,  is  unreafonable.  'E>y 
the  fame  reafoning  it  may  be  proved,  that  any  man 
who  makes  any  thing  is  himfclf  not  an  eft'etl  or  crea- 
ture. Thus,  If  a  carpenter  at  work  be  properly  a 
caufe  of  a  ftiip,  then  it  is  not  proper  to  call  him  an  ef- 
fe6l  or  creature  ;  and  if  Dr.  Weft  writing  be  proper- 
ly the  caufe  of  feveral  eflays  on  liberty  and  ncceflity ; 
then  it  is  not  proper  to  call  him  a  creature. 

"  When  volition  is  ufed  to  fignify  the  mind  a6:- 
"  ing,  in  that  view  it  is  properly  a  caufe  and  not  an 
"  efFe61;;"ibid,  p.  28.  What  if  it  be  properly  a  caufe  ? 
This  docs  not  prevent  its  being  properly  an  cft'eft  too, 
any  more  than  the  Doftor's  being  properly  the  caufe 
of  feveral  elTays  prevents  his  being,  or  proves  that  he 

is  not,  properly  a  creature  of  God. "  Caufes  as 

"  caufes,  are  not  effefts ;"  ibid,  p.  13.     Then  authors 
ai;  authorsj  are  not  the  creatures  of  God, 

"The 


i3g 

The  Dr.  argues,  ibid,  p.  94,  That  an  aQion  can- 
not be  the  eflPe6l  of  the  Deity,  becaufe  "  an  effect  is 

'•  mofl:  certainly  paflive  in  coming  into  being ■ 

''  but  this  will  imply  pojjive  adwn  or  inactive  aBion^ 
««  wliich  is  abfurd."  I  grant,  that  an  cffe6"l  is  in  this  fenfe 
paffive,  that  it  is  produced  by  the  agency  of  tlie  effi- 
cient caufe  ;  and  in  that  fenfe  a  volition  caufed  by 
the  Deity  or  other  efficient  caufe  is  pafnve.  If  Dr. 
Weft  mean  by  paffive  a£lion,  an  a6lion  which  in  its 
production  is  caufed  by  an  exlrinfic  caufe,  I  grant  it; 
and  however  Dr.  Weft  pronounces  it  abfurd,  he 
iinows,  that  it  is  as  eafy  for  another  to  pronounce  it 
not  abfurd  ;  and  the  one  pronunciation  is  juft  as  good 
proof  as  the  odier.  VoJiiion  is  aclion,  and  if  the 
Do61or  will  prove  to  the  conviction  of  candid  inquir- 
ers, that  fuch  an  aftion  cannot  be  the  cffeQ  of  a  di- 
vine agency  or  other  extrinfic  caufe  ;  he  will  'do 
fomething  more  than  affirm  the  contrary  to  be  ab- 
furd. As  to  the  expreffion  inaBive  aclion,  if  by  this 
he  mean,  that  the  aftion  is  the  effis^l  of  an  extrinfic 
caufe,  1  grant  it,  and  demand  proof  that  the  idea  of 
fuch  an  atlion  is  abfurd.  If  he  mean  an  attion, 
which  is  not  voluntary  ;  I  know  of  no  perfon  who 
.pleads  for  fuch  an  action. 

What  the  Do6lor  fays  here,  as  well  as  almoft  his 
whole  book,  may  be  eafily  retorted.  Suppofe  voli- 
tion is  not  from  an  extrinfic  caufe,  but  from  the  fub- 
je6l:  as  the  caufe  ;  ftill  it  is  as  really  and  fuHy  paffive 
with  r6fpe£t  to  its  caufe  and  in  coming  into  exiftence, 
as  if  it  were  the  eifettof  an  extrinfic  caulc.  It  would 
as  much  be  the  fubjeB:  of  the  operation  of  this 
intrinfic  caufe,  in  order  to  its  exiftence.  Therefore 
in  this  cafe  too  we  have  pajjive  aclion  and  inaHive 
aclion. 

The  Do£lor  in  p.  23,  Part  I,  fays,  "  IIow  can 
he"  [man]  "  be  an  agent,  if  volition  be  the  effecl  of 
«'  an  extrinfic  caufe  ?"  To  which  1  anfwer  by  aflung 
another  queftion  or  two  ;  How  can  he  in  volition  be 

an 


^3^ 

an  a^ent,  if  it  be  the  efFeft  of  an  intrinfic  caufe  ?  The 
volition  IS  ftill  as  padive  in  this  calc  and  equally  pro- 
duced by  the  efficiency  of  its  cau'c,  as  it  is  when  pro- 
duced by  an  cxtrinfic  caufe.  And  how  can  man 
be  an  agent,  if  as  the  Do6lor  holds,  volition  be  the 
etfedl  of  no  caufe,  extrinhc  or  intrinfic  ?  In  that  cafe, 
it  is  merely  cafual  or  accidental,  like  the  motion  of 
one  of  Epicurus'^j  atoms  in  the  infinite  void. 


CHAPTER 


14^ 


CHAPTER    VI. 

':Qj  Foreknowledge  and  the  Certainty  or  Necejfity  impli- 
ed in  it, 

DR.  Weft  begins  his  third  effay  thus ;  «  We  fhall 
«•  endeavour  to  fhow,  in  this  eflayj  that  infalli- 
"  ble  foreknowledge  in  the  Deity  does  not  prove,  that 
««  events  take  place  in  confequence  of  an  antecedent 
*'  or  previous  neceffity  ;"  p.  29.  Let  foreknowledge 
prove  or  not  prove  what  it  will,  unlefs  events  take 
place  abfolutely  without  a  caufe,  they  do  take  place 
in  confequence  of  an  antecedent  or  previous  neceffi- 
ty. Unlefs  they  take  place  abfolutely  without  a  caufe, 
they  are  efFe6ts  ;  and  every  efFeft  necellarily  follows 
its  caufe.  Dr.  Weft  grants,  p.  23,  "that  every  ef- 
^'  fe6l  is  wholly  paffive  with  regard  to  the  caufe  which 
*^*  produces  it."  And  as  it  is  paffive,  it  is  brought  into 
-exiftence  by  the  caufing  or  neceffitating  influence  of 
its  caufe.  Its  exiftence  therefore  "  takes  place  in 
^'  confequence  of  an  antecedent  or  previous  neceffity ;" 
and  this  is  true  of  all  events,  which  happen  without 
caufe.  But  Dr.  Weft  denies,  that  any  events  take 
place  without  a  caufe.  Therefore  he  muft  concede, 
that  all  events  "  take  place  in  confequence  of  an 
"  antecedent  neceffity." 

If  to  this  it  ffiould  be  faid,  that  though  all  &.vents  are 
efFefts,  and  are  neceffitated  by  their  refpeBive  caufes, 
and  in  that  refpcft  take  place  in  confequence  of  an 
antecedent  neceffity  :  Yet  as  volitions  are  the  effefts 
of  the  mind,  in  which  they  exift,  this  caufe  does  not 
j)rGduceA\\tm  or  exert  its  producing  acl,  in  confequence 
of  an  antecedent  neceffity  ;  I  anfwer,  The  n^ind,  if  it 
do  efficiently  caufe  volitions,  caufes  them  either  in 
confequence  of  an  antecedent  certainty,  or  without 
that  certainty.  If  it  caufe  them  in  confequence  of 
antecedent  certainty,  it  caufss  them  under  the  influ- 

eace 


^4^ 

ence  of  moral  neceflity  ;  for  antecedent  certainty  of 
moral  a61ions  is  all  we  mean  by  moral  neceflity.  If 
it  caiife  them  without  that  certainty,  it  caufes  them 
contingently  and  by  mere  chance  or  blind  fate. 

Befides,  if  the  mind  caufe  its  own  volitions,  it  ne- 
ceflStates  them  into  cxiftence,  and  therefore  they  come 
into  exiftence  under  the  influence  of  antecedent  ne- 
ccffity  ;  and  the  caufing  a6l  is  an  event  and  there- 
fore mu(t  have  a  caufe,  and  this  caufe  muft  nc- 
cclfitate  this  event  into  exiOcnce  ;  and  fo  it  runs  into- 
an  infinite  feries  of  afts  caufing  one  another,  every 
one  of  which  comes  into  exiftence  in  confequence  of 
an  antecedent  neceffity. 

That  the  infallible  divine  foreknowledge  of  any 
event  does  imply  all  that  antecedent  neceflity  of  the 
future  exiftence  of  that  event,  for  which  we  contend, 
may  appear  thus  : The  infallible  or  certain  fore- 
knowledge of  any  event  is  a  knowledge  of  the  certainty 
or  certain  truth,  that  the  event  will  come  into  exiftence ; 
and  that  certainty  which  is  the  objeQ  of  this  knowledge, 
is  all  the  neceffity,  for  which  we  contend.  This  is  what 
Prefidcnt  Edwards  calls  philofophical  neceffity,  which 
with  regard  to  moral  atlions  is  moral  necefTity  ;  and  it 
muft  exirt  at  the  time  the  knowledge  of  it  exifts,  and  in- 
deed  in  order  to  be  the  objcfl:  of  knowledge  :  And  as 
the  knowledge  is  by  the  fuppofitiony<3rf^7zott/<r</^f, there- 
fore it  muil  exift  before  the  event  foreknown,  and 
lliereforc  the  certainly  or  neceffity  of  that  event  mufl 
exift  before  the  event  iilelf  y  of  courfe  it  is  antecedent 
neceffity.  To  fuppofe  otherwife  is  to  fuppofe,  that  a 
certainty  or  certain  truth  may  be  feen  and  known  be- 
fore it  exifts,  and  that  what  is  not,  may  be  feen  and 
known  to  be. 

Dr.  Weft  argues,  p.  32,  that  becaufe  "  the  Deity  is 
"  poftcfTcd  of  an  underived  felfexifting  knowledge, 
"  which  is  independent  of  any  caufe  or  medium  what- 
"  ever,  and  his  knowledge  can  extend  to  all  futuri- 
^  ties,  independent  of  the  imperfcft  mode  of  inferring 
"  conclufions  from  their  prcmifcs  ;  confcquently  in- 

'*  fallible 


143 

"  fallible  prefcience  in  the  Deny  cannot  imply  any 
"  antecedent  necefnty  of  the  event  foreknown."  By 
antecedent  neceffity  w:^  mean  antecedent  certainty  or 
antecedent  certain  truLh,  Now  does  Dr.  Weft  mean, 
that  fince  the  Deity  pofTefres  an  underived  and  feif- 
exiftent  knowledge^  therefore  he  fees  and  knows,  that 
there  is  a  certainty  of  the  iiiture  exiftence  of  an  event, 
when  there  really  is  no  fuch  certainty  ?  Or  that  God 
knows  that  to  exift,  which  does  not  exift  ?  He  does 
mean  this,  if  he  mean  any  thing  to  the  purpofe.  For 
if  he  mean,  that  God  fees  a  certainty  which  exifts,  it 
does  exift  in  order  to  be  feen  ;  and  therefore  antece- 
dent certainty  or  moral  neceffity  is  implied  in  the  di- 
vine prefcience.  But  let  the  knowledge  of  God  be 
ever  fo  underived,  felf-exiftent  and  independent,  it 
"will  not  enable  him  to  difcern  that  which  is  not,  to  fee 
truth  or  certainty,  before  it  exifts,  or  to  fee   truth  to 

be  fallehood  and  falfehood  to  be  truth. If  by  inde- 

pcndnit  knowledge  he  mean  a  knowledge  which  is  not 
dependent  on  the  truth  and  has  not  truth  for  its  foun- 
dation and  object  ;  he  muft  ftill  mean,  that  God  can 
know  a  propofuion  to  be  true  which  is  not  true. 

It  is  manifeftly  implied  in  what  Dr.  Weft  fays  on 
this  fubJT?6l,  that  if  divine  foreknowledge  were  deriv- 
ed through  any  medium,  or  if  it  be  founded  on  decrees, 
it  would  be  utterly  inconhftent  wii.h  human  liberty. 
But  fince  it  is,  as  he  fuppofes,  immediate  and  not  de- 
pendent on  decrees,  it  is  perfcGly  confident  with  hu- 
man liberty. That  there  will  be  a  general  rejeftion 

of  antichrift  and  antichriftian  errours,  we  know  by  the 
medium  of  divine  prediRion  :  And  does  the  Do6lor 
believe  that  this  our  knowledge  is  more  inconfiftent 
with  the  liberty  of  thofe,  wlio  fliall  rejetl  antichrift, 
than  the  abfolute  and  underived  knowledge  of  God  ? 
Or  than  our  own  knowledge  of  the  fame  faft,  if  it 
"were  intuitive  and  underived  ? 

The  Do61;or  adds,  "  If  this  definition  of  the  divine 
knowledge,"  viz.  that  it  is  underiv.,d,  felfexiftent  and 
independent^  "  be  juft  j  then  it  will  follow  that  there 

>*  is 


'•'  is  no  previous  or  antecedent  certainty  in  the  things 
«•  ihemfelves,  upon  which  divine  prefcicnceis  founded.'* 
This  inanifelUy  implies,  that  God  foreknows  things 
before  they  are  future,  and  fees  a  certainty  before  it 
is.  "  Bv  certainty,"  lays  the  Do6lor,  "  in  the  things 
"  themfelves,  previous  to  the  divine  knowledge,  mujl 
*'  be  meant  fomc  medium  diltinCl  fromlhe  things  them- 
"  felves,  by  which  they  render  themfelves  evident 
**  to  the  divine  knowledge."  He  here  afferts,  but 
brini^s  nothing  to  prove  what  he  afferts.  And  what 
fignify  luch  bare  affertions  ?  Does  the  DoQor  expeft 
bis  readers  will  receive  them  as  proofs  ?  May  they 
not  juftly  demand  evidence,  that  this  medium  which  he 
here  mentions,  mull  be  meant  by  certainty  in  things 
themfelves  ?  By  that  certainty  I  mean  no  fuch  thing; 
But  pofitively  I  do  mean  what  Prefident  Edwards  de- 
clares that  he  meant,  "  The  firm  and  infallible  con- 
'•  nctlion  between  the  fubject  and  predicate  of  the 
''  propofition,"  which  affirms  thetn  to  be  conncQed  ; 
or  the  real  truth  of  the  propofition.  For  inftance  it 
is  a  real  truth,  that  I  am  now  writing,  and  the  certain- 
ty or  reality  of  this  truth  or  fact,  is  the  ground  of  the 
divine  knovvledoe  of  it  ;  and  this  certainty  confifls  in 
th(#firm  and  indiffoluble  connc6lion  of  the  fubjeft  and 
predicate  of  the  propofition  which  affirms,  that  I  am 
writing.  This  certainty  or  truth  of  the  thing  is  no 
"  medium  didintt  from  the  thing"  or  fa£l  "  itfelf,  by 
"  which  it  renders  itfelf  evident  to  the  divine  knowl- 
"  edge  ;"  but  it  is  the  real  exiltence  of  the  very  thing  or 

fad. Again,  it  is  to  all  Chriftians  a  real   and   cer- 

tnin  futurity  and  truth,  that  Jefus  Chrift  will  judge  in 
righteoufnefs.  But  the  truth  and  certainty  of  this  fu- 
Une  event  is  not  a  medium  dillinft  from  the  futu- 
rity of  the  ev^nt  iifelf,  by  which  it  renders  itfelf  ev- 
i'lciu  to  the  divine  mind  ;  but  it  is  the  real  and  infal- 
lib'e  futurity  of  the  event  itfelf  and  confifls  in  the  firm 
and  iiifallihle  connexion  between  the  fubje^l  and 
predicate  of  the  propofition  which  affirms  the  futurity 
«>f  the  cvcnl.     Now  will  Dr.  Well  pr-etendj  that  there 

is 


<44 

is  no  truth  or  no  firm  and  infallible  conneQiorr  be*- 
Iween  the  fubjeft  and  predicate  of  the  propofition, 
that  I  a?}i  now  writing,  which  is  the  foundation  of  the 
divine  knowledge  of  that  event  ?  If  this  were  fo,  real 
truth  and  fa6l  would  not  be  the  foundation,  rule  or 
objeft  of  the  divine  knowledge  ;  but  God  might  in- 
differently know  truth  to  be  falfehood  and  falfehood 
iruth. 

Or  if  by  "  the  medium  by  which  things  render 
*'  therafelves  evident,"  the  Dodor  mean  the  truth  and 
reality  of  things  ;  1  grant  that  what  ever  is  known 
whether  to  God  or  creatures,  is  known  by  this  medium  ; 
and  this  is  true  of  the  mod  felf-evident  propofiiions 
and  of  the  moft  independent  and  underived  knowl- 
edge. But  to  call  this  a  medium  of  knowledge  is  a 
perverfion  of  language.  Surely  truth  is  not  the  me- 
dium by  which  itfelf  is  known. 

Dr.  Weft  himfelf  notwithftanding  his  abundant  la- 
bour "  to  fhow,  that  infallible  foreknowledge  in  the 
«  Deity  does  not  prove,  that  events  take  place  in  con- 
*'  fequence  of  an  antecedent  neceffity  3"  I'ully  and  fre- 
quently grants  all  that  we  maintain.  Thus,  p.  37. 
«  That  the  Deity  does  perfectly  difcern  all  connec- 

"  tions   between   fubjefls    and    predicates  • is 

"  readily  granted."  Now  this  implies,  that  the  faid 
fubjeds  and  predicates  are  really  and  in  themfelves  con- 
nected, and  in  order  of  nature  before  that  connexion 
is  difcerned.  This  real  and  certain  connexion  is  the 
certainty  or  certain  truth  of  things  themfelves,  of 
■which  we  have  been  fpeaking ;  and  which  with  regard 
to  moral  events  and  aftions  is  moral  neceflity.  P.  41. 
"  The  future  volitions  of  moral  agents  are  fo  infalli- 
«'  bly  and  indiffolubly  connefted  with  the  divine  fore- 
«'•  knowledge,  which  has  had  exiftence  from  all  eterni- 
«  ty,  that  it  is  impoffible,  that  the  Deity  fliould  be  de- 
"  ceived  ;  and  therefore  all  thefe  volitions  will  moft 
'«  certainly  take  place."     P.  46.     "  There  may  be  a 

c«  certainty that  fuch  a  thing  will  take  place," 

fpeaking  of  an  human  atlion.  But  certainty  with  re- 
gard 


_U5_ 
gard  to  moral  aflions  is  moral  neceflity?  and  if  all  vo- 
litions foreknown   by  God  will    certainly  lake   place, 

they  will   take   place    by    moral    neccflTity. P.  52. 

"  All  things  from  eternity  to  eternity  being  prefent  to 
*' the  divine  mind,  he  fees  all  things  as  they  are" 
Therefore  if  he  fee  fomc  events  as  certainly  future, 
they  are  certainly  future  i  for  he  fees  them  as  they- 
are.  And  this  certain  futurity  is  the  objetl  of  the 
divine  knowledL;e,  and  in  the  order  of  haiiire  is  an- 
tecedent to  it,  as  really  as  the  exiftcnce  of  this  paper, 
on  which  I  am  writing,  is  in  the  order  of  nature 
antecedent  to  my  fight  of  it.  But  this  antcce(ienr 
certain  futurity  of  any  moral  aftion,  is  antecedent 
ihoral  necefTny.  Therefore  as  all  moral  attions  are 
foreknown  by  Go^  in  confequence  of  an  antecedent 
moral  neceffity,  much  more  do  they  come  into  exji- 
ence  in  confequence  of  fucli   an  antecedent  necefli- 

ty. P.  53.  "  Deity  would   from  all  eternity  have 

"  infallibly  foreknown  this  propofition,  as  a.  certain 
"  truth,"  viz.  the  propofition  concernmg  Peter  and! 
Judas  denying  and  betraying  their  Lord.  It  feems 
then  that  whatever  propofition  concerning  a  future 
event  is  infallibly  foreknown  by  God,  is  foreknown 
ds  a  certain  and  infallible  truth  ;  or  which  is  the  fame 
thing,  it  is  known,  as  an  infallible  truth,  that  the  event 
will  come  to  pafs  ;  and  therefore  it  is  a  certain  and 
infallible  truth  antecedently  in  the  order  of  nature  to 
the  knowledge  of  it  ;  and  therefor^  the  event  being  a 
moral  aft,  was  morally  necelTary  antecedently  to  the 
foreknowledge,  and  much   more  antecedently  to  the 

event  itfelf. P.   52.  "  This  neceffity   being  only^ 

"  a  confequence  founded  upon  the  cercainty  of  ihc 
«  thing  foreknown."  Thus  notwithftanding  all  Dr. 
Weft's  clamour  againft  Prefident  Edwar  is,  becaufe 
he  had  fpoken  of  a  certainty  in  things  theinfclves,  h(i 
himfelf  here  exprefsly  holds  the  very  fame.  And 
will  Dr.  Weft  deny,  that  this  "certainty  of  the  tiling 
foreknown"  is  the  ground  of  the  divine  foreknowl- 
edge of  that  thing,  in  the  fame  fertfe,  that  my  prefent 
K  cxiftence 


14G 

exiftence  is  tlie  ground  of  the  divine  knowledge,  that 
1  exifl:  ?  If  this  be  not  denied,  it  cannot  be  denied, 
that  certainty  or  moral  necefTity  is  in  order  of  nature 
antecedent  to  the  foreknowledge,  and  much  more  an. 
tecedent  to  the  exiftence,  of  a  moral  a£lion. 

Dr.  Weft  will  not  deny,  that  any  future  event 
foreknown  by  God,  will  certainly  come  to  pafs. 
Then  there  is  a  certainty,  or  it  is  an  infallible  truth, 
that  every  fuch  event  will  come  to  pafs,  and  this  cer- 
tainty now  exifts  antecedendy  to  the  exiftence  of  the 
event.  But  this  certainty  with  regard  to  moral  events, 
is  moral  neceflity.  Therefore  there  is  a  neceffity  of 
the  exiftence  of  all  events  divinely  foreknown,  and 
this  neceffity  is  antecedent  to  the  exigence  of  the 
eyp-nts.  Thus,  mere  foreknowledge  is  an  infallible 
proof  of  antecedent  neceffity. 

.  "  We  frequently  fay,  It  is  a  pity  fuch  a  perfon  did. 
«*.  fo  ;  there  was  no  occafion  for  it  ;  he  might  eafily 
«  have  omitted  the  doing  of  the  thing  in  the  time  cf 
"  it,  if  he  would.  Why  may  we  not  as  well  fay,  A 
«  man  will  certainly  do  a  particular  thing,  though  he 
^^  will  have  power  to  forbear  doing  it  ?  There  could 
•«  not  be  the  leaft  appearance  of  abfurdity  or  contra- 
'^  diftion  in  fpeaking  in  this  manner  about  a  future 
«'  adion,  any  niore  than  about  a  paft  a6tion,  were  it 
"  not  for  the  great  difficulty  or  fuppofed  impoffibility 
*'  of  conceiving  how  a  thing  can  be  foreknown,  un- 
*'  lefs  it  be  conne6led  with  fomething  that  now  ex- 
«  ifts  ;  that  is,  a  thing  cannot  be  foreknown,  unl efs 
*'  there  is  a  medium,  which  has  a  prefent  exiftence." 
P.  30. -On  this  pafTage  I  remark, 

1.  Here  again  Elr.  Weil  holds  that  certainty  im 
things,  which  he  fo  abundandy  reprobates  in  Prefi- 
dent  Edwards.  He  fays,  "  a  man  will  certainly  do  a 
particular  thing  ;"  and  he  doubtlefs  means,  that  it  is 
a  certain  futurity,  the  event  itfelf  is  certain,  or  it  is  a 
certain  and  infallible  truth,  that  the  man  will  do  the 
thing ;  and  not  merely  that  this  truth  is  known, 
whether  by  God  or  creature.     Truth  is  truth  wbeih- 

«51f 


'H7 

'  £r  known  or  not  :  And  tliis  infallible  truth  is  the 
very  certainty  in  the  things  themfelves,  of  which  Pref- 
idcnt  Edwards  fpeaks. 

2.  What  does  Dr.  Weft  mean,  when  he  fays, 
"  He  might  eafily  have  omitted  the  doing  of  the  thing, 
"  if  he  would  F"  Suppofe  the  thing  done  was  an  in-^ 
Urnal  aft,  a  volition  to  go  to  a  debauch  ;  In  what 
fcnfe  does  Dr.  Weft  mean,  that  the  man  could  have 
avoided  this  volition,  if  he  -would  ?  Does  he  mean, 
that  if  he  had  not  had  the  volition,  he  would  not  have 
had  it  ?  This  is  an  undoubted  truth,  but  does  not 
difprove  the  neceffity  of  it.  If  God  had  not  always 
fpoken  the  truth,  he  would  not  have  fpoken  the  trutlv. 
But  it  does  not  hence  follow,  that  God  does  not  al- 
ways necefiarily  fpeak  the  truth,  when  he  fpeaks  at 
all,  or  that  he  can  lie.  If  there  had  been  no  God, 
there  would  indeed  have  been  no  God  ;  but  does  it 
hence  follow,  that  the  divine  exiftence  is  not  necef- 
fary  ? — ^ — To  fay,  that  if  a  man  had  chofen  not  to  go 
to  a  debauch,  he  would  indeed  have  chofen  not  to 
go  to  it,  is  too  great  trifling  to  be  imputed  to  Dr. 
Weft.  Yet  to  fay,  that  the  man  could  have  avoided 
the  external  aBion  of  going  to  the  debauch,  if  he 
would,  would  be  equal  trifling  ;  for  the  queftion  be- 
fore us  is  concerning  the  liberty  of  the  will  or  mind  and 

not  of  the  body. On  the  whole,  we  have  before  us 

one  of  Dr.  Weft's  things  hard  to  be  under  foody  and  wc 
xnuft  wait  for  an  explanation. 

3.  When  we  fay  concerning  any  paft  aftion  of  a 
man,  "  There  was  no  occafion  for  it  ;  he  might  eafi- 
"  ly  have  omitted  the  doing  of  the  thing  in  the  time 
"  of  it,  if  he  would  ;"  if  we  mean,  that  there  was  no 
antecedent  certainty,  that  he  would  perform  that  ac- 
tion, we  mean  a  falfehood.  That  adion  was  as  much 
from  eternity  the  objeft  of  the  divine  omnifcience, 
as  any  aBion  which  is  now  future  ;  therefore  the  cer- 
tainty of  its  then  future  exiftence  preceded  its  a£lual 
exiftence.  And  this  certainty  w<is  as  fixed,  unalterable 
**nd  indefeafible,  as  the  divine  foreknowledge  or  the 


•o' 


K  2  divine 


•14^ 

divine  decree.  The  foreknowledge  and  decree  ok 
God  imply  no  other  kind  or  de,ree  of  neceffity,  than 
the  aforefaid  abfoluie  certainty.  A  iuturity  that  is 
abfolutely  certain  is  impli  d  in  the  divine  foreknowl- 
edge ;  and  the  addition  of  a  decree  cannot  increafe 
that  certainty, 

4.  When  we  fay,  A  perfon  might  eafily  have  omit- 
ted a  certain  paft  atlion,  in  the  time  of  it,  if  he  would  ; 
we  commonly  mean,  that  he  was  under  no  compul- 
fion  or  coaclion,  or  no  natural  necelfity  j  and  that  he 
had  a  natural  -power  to  omit  the  atUon.  This  un- 
doubtedly every  man  has  wih  regard  to  every  volun- 
tary aQion,  and  this  howevc-r  tiat  aBion  be  foreknown 
or  decreed  by  God.  Though  Ju  ;as  'betrayed  his 
Matter,  "  according  to  the  determinate  counfel  and 
«  foreknowledge  of  God  ;"  yet  he  was  under  no  nat- 
ural neceffity  to  betray  him,  but  had  a  full  natural 
power  to  do  otherwife.  Now  Dr.  Weft  reconciles 
foreknowledge  with  liberty,  on  the  ground  that  we 
have  ftiU  a  phyfual  or  natural  power  to  do  otherwife. 
On  the  fame  ground  we  may  reconcile  abfolute  de- 
crees with  liberty. 

5.  In  the  fame  fenfe  "we  may  as  well  fay,  Such  a 
"  man  will  certainly  do  a  particular  thing,  though  he 
"  will  have  power  to  forbear  the  doing  of  it."  He 
may  doubdefs  have  a  natural  power  to  forbear  j  ftill 
this  does  not  at  all  diminifh  the  certain  J iiturity  of  the 
aftion  ;  and  that  whether  the  atiion  be  foreknown 
only,  or  foreknown  and  decreed.  An  i  a  nawjral  pow- 
er is  all  the  power,  which  the  man  will  have  to  for- 
bear the  a8ion.  Any  power  oppofed  to  moral  neceffity 
or  the  certain  futurity  of  the  adion,  would  imply  that 
it  is  uncertain,  whether  he  will  perform  that  attion  ; 
which  is  contrary  to  the  fuppofition  made  by  Dr. 
Weft,  "  that  the  man  will  certainly  do  the  thing." 

6.  As  to  "  the  great  difficulty  or  fuppofcjd  impoffi- 
"  biIityofconcciving,^a;athingcan  be  forcknown,un-' 
«lefs  it  be  connefted  with  fomething  that  now  exifts;" 
this  is  needlefsly  brought  in  here.     In  this  part  of  the 

argumenc  " 


M9 

argument  we  are  under  no  ncccflity  of  inquiring  or 
fhowing  how  God  foreknows  future  events,  but  may, 
fo  far  as  relates  to  the  certain  futurity  of  all  events 
foreknown  by  God  and  the  antecedency  of  that  cer- 
tainty to  the  exiftence  of  the  events,  allow,  that  God 
fore  knows  future  events  in  the  independent  and  un- 
derived  manner,  which  Dr.  Weft  maintains.  This 
would  equally  imply  a  certainty  antecedent  to  the  ex- 
iftence of  the  events  foreknown,  as  a  foreknowledge 
found  d  on  a  decree  would  imply  it.  Dr.  Weft's  ac- 
count of  the  divine  foreknowledge  implies,  as  I  have 
fhown,  all  that  certainty  or  necelhty,  for  which  we 
plead.  Befide  what  has  been  already  fa:d  to  fhow 
this,  I  add,  that  Dr.  Weft  grants,  that  foreknowledge 
has  no  caufal  influence  to  bring  thintjs  into  exiftence, 
or  to  make  their  exiftence  more  certain,  than  it  would 
be  without  foreknowledge.  "  I  fuppofe  it  will  be 
"  readily  granted  on  all  fides,  that  even  the  divine 
"  foreknowledge  itfclf  has  no  influence  or  caufal  force, 
"  with  regard  to  the  thing  foreknown,  either  to  bring 
^'  it  into  exiflence  or  to  h  nder  its  happening  ;  but 
*«  that  all  things  would  take  place  juft  in  the  fame 
"  manner,  if  they  were  not  forLknown,  as  they  do 
"  now  j"  p.  45.  Dr.  Weft  alfo  grants,  that  all  future 
events  are  foreknown  by  God,  and  that  all  things 
which  are  foreknoym  by  him,  will  certainly  and  infal- 
libly come  to  pafs.  Now  as  this  certainty  is  not  cauf- 
ed  by  foreknowledge,  it  muft  exift  independently  of 
it.  And  as  God  fees  all  things  as  they  are  ;  therefore 
when  he  fees  them  to  be  certainly  future,  \\\Qy  are 
certainly  future;  and  this  certain  futurity,  which  is  the 
obje6l  of  the  divine  knowledge,  exifled  in  the  order 
of  nature  antecedently  to  the  divine  knowledge,  and 
much  more  antecedently  to  the  atlual  exiftence  of 
the  events  themfelves.  Othcrwife  God  would  fee 
events  to  be  certainly  future,  while  they  arc  not  cer- 
tainly future. 

"  The    obvious    reafon,"    fays   Dr.  Weft,  p.    3I9 
"  why  we  cannot   know  things   but  only  bv  intuition 


«•' "or  proof,  is  bccaufe  all  our  knowledge  is  entirely  aS. 
^^  extra."     And  does  the  Doftor  believe,  that  if  part, 
of  our  knowledge  were  not  ab  extra,  we  fhouid  know 
fome  things  neither  by  intuition  nor  by  proof  ?  What- 
ever is  known  by  intuition  is  felf-evident  ;  and  what- 
ever is  known  by  proof,  is  evident  by  the  medium  of 
fomething  elfe.     And  whatever  is  known  at  all,  is  ei- 
ther evident  by   itfelf  immediately,  or  is  evident  by 
fomething  elfe   mediately.     Therefore   Dr.  Weft,  in 
fuppofmg,  that  if  our  knowledge  were  not  all  ah  extra^ 
"we  fhouid  know  fome  things  neither  by  intuition  nor 
by  proof,  fuppofes  that  fome  things  would  be  evident  . 
16  us,  neither  immediately  nor  mediately,  neither  by 
themfelves  nor  by  any  thing  elfe  :  And  what  kind  of : 
a  fource  of  knowledge  W£  ftiould  then  have,  I  leave 
the  Doftor  to  explain. 

"  If  previous  certainty  in  things  themfelves  means 
"nothing  diftinS;  from  the  things  themfelves,  then  all 
"that  can  be  meant  by  this  previous  certainty  in  things 
"themfelves,  upon  which  the  divine  knowledge  is 
"^founded,  is  only  this,  that  the  Deity  cannot  know 
«  that  things  will  exift,  which  he  knows  never  will  ex- 
«  ift.  Arid  therefore  to  fay,  that  there  is  a  previous 
«  certainty  in  things  themfelves,  upon  which  the  di- 
«  vine  knowledge  is  founded,  is  only  faying  in  other 
«  words,  that  the  divine  knowledge  is  founded  on  the 
"  divine  knowledge  ;"  p.  34.  By  certainty  in  things 
themfelves  I  have  already  explained  myfelf  to  mean 
the  truth  and  reality  of  things  themfelves,  or  the  truth 
of  the  proportion  whicli  aflerts  their  exiftence  or  re- 
lation :  And  previous  certainty  of  things  themfelves 
means  nothing  difFerent  from  the  truth  of  the  propofi- 
tion,  which  afferts  their  future  exiftence,  or  its  being 
a.  real  truth,  that  thofe  things  will  exift.  Now,  wheth- 
er to  fay,  that  the  divine  foreknowledge  of  an  event,> 
is  founded  on  the  truth,  that  the  event  will  come  into 
exiftence,  be  the  fame  as  to  fay,  "  that  the  divine  fore- 
6'  knowledge  is  founded  on  the  divine  foreknowledge," 
liam  willing  any  candid  pcrfon  lliould  judge. 

The-- 


The  Do£lor  fays,  p.  34,  "  That  knowledge  in  the 
*«  Deity  mull  mean  the  fame  thing  with  certainty." 
No  douht  knowledge  in  the  Deity  is  the  fame  thing 
with  fuhjeclive  certainty  or  certain  Unowiedge  ;  but 
it  is  not  the  fame  with  objcHive  certainty,  or  the  truth 
which  is  the  object  of  the  divine  knowledge. 

The  DoBor  grants,  p.  41,  "  That  the  future  vo- 
*'  litions  of  moral  agents  are  fo  infallibly  and  indilfo- 
«'  lubly  connefted  with  the  divine  foreknowledge^ 
"  which  has  had  exiftence  from  all  eternity,  that  it  is 
"  impofTible,  that  the  Deity  fliould  be  deceived  ;  and 
«'  therefore  thefe  volitions  will  moft  certainly  take 
"  place.  For  by  necejfary  here  he"  [Prefident  Ed- 
wards] "  can ■—  mean  nothing  di(tin6l   from  in- 

''^  fallible  certainty.  But  how  does  their  being  necefla- 
*-^  ry  in  this  fenfe,  i.  e.  infallibly  certain,  prove  that  the 
**  volitions  of  moral  agents  are  efFe6ls  produced  by  ati 

'•  extrinfic  caufe." Undoubtedly    by  necefTity    in 

this  cafe  Prefident  Edwards  means  nothing  diftin6t 
from  infallible  certainty.  This  is  the  very  thing  whicli 
he  abundantly  declares  himfelf  to  mean.  "  And  as 
'■^  the  divine  foreknowledge,"  by  Dr.  Weft's  concef- 
fion,  "  has  had  exiftence  from  eternity  ;"  and  as  "  the 
"  volitions  of  moral  agents  are  indifiTolubly  connefled 
"  with  that  foreknowledge,"  and  "  thofe  volitions  will 
'•  moft  certainly  take  place  ;"  of  courfe  there  was  art 
infallible  eternal  certainty,  that  all  human  volitions 
■would  come  into  exiftence  juft  as  they  do  exift,  and 
Dr.  Weft  grants  all  that  we  hold'on  this  head.  What 
then  becomes  of  liberty  to  either  fide,  to  act  or  not  aEl  ? 
For  inftance,  it  is  now  divinely  foreknown,  that  Gog 
and  Magng  will  rife  and  compafs  the  camp  of  the 
fainls.  Therefore  when  Gog  and  Magog  fliall  come 
into  exiftence,  they  will  no  rriorc  have  a  liberty  to  act 
or  not  act,  as  to  this  inftance  of  their  condu6l,  than 
they   would  have,  on   the   fuppofition   that  the   fame 

conduft  were  decreed. It  is  true,  there  would  be 

this  difference  in   the  cafes,  that  the   decree  would 

cavfc  the  certain  futurity  of  that  condutl,  but  the- 

K  c^  foreknowledge 


1^1^ 

foreknowledge  would  not  caufe  it  :  Nor  is  it  oF  any 
importance  as  to  liberty,  by  uhom  or  by  what  this 
certain  futurity  is  caufcd,  or  whether  it  be  without 
caufe.  If  a  prifon  when  bui||,  be  no  obftru£lion  to 
liberty,  then  the  agency  of  the  mafon  and  carpenter 
who  built  it  was  nothing  oppofed  to  liberty.  So  if 
cer  ain/uturdy,  when  ellabHfhed,  be  not  inconfiftent 
with  li'">erty  ;  then  the  divine  decree,  by  which  ii  is 
eftabliflied,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  liberty. 

If  it  (hould  be  faid,  that  God  forefees,  that  Go^and 
Magog  will  influence  tbemfelves  to  the  condudt  juft 
now  mentioned  ;  be  it  fo  ;  then  it  is  now  infallibly  cer- 
tain, that  Gng  and  Magog  will  influence  tbemfelves  to 
tha'  condu6t.  Where  then  is  their  liberty  to  a6t  or  not 
a6l  ?  It  is  not  left  loofe  and  undetermined,  whether 
they  fhall  influence  tbemfelves  to  that  condud  ;  but 
;t  is  previoiifly  certain,  that  they  will  infliience  tbem- 
felves to  it. 

The  Do6lor  in  the  laft  quotation,  aflcs,  "How 
"  does  their  being  infallibly  certain,  prove  that  the 
"  volitions  of  moral  agents  are   eflPeds   produced  by 

'  "  an  extrinfic  caufe  .?" — Suppofe  they   are  not  ef- 

JfeBs  of  an  ex.rinfic  caufe,  but  are  effeded  by  the 
fubjedof  thofe 'volitions,  if  that  were  poflible;yet  if  it 
be  prcvioufly  and  from  all  eternity  certain,  that  the  fub- 
jeB  will  produce  thefe  volitions  in  himftlf ;  ftiU  there 
is  no  liberty  o  either  fide,  to  aU  or  not  aB  ;  but  he  is  lim- 
ited to  produce  in  himfelf  thofe  very  definite  voli- 
tions, which  are  diyinely  forefeen,  and  therefore  he  is 
confined  to  one  Jide,  is  con^ned  to  aH  and  that  definitely* 

Or  fuppofe  thefe  volitions  are  produced  by  np 
caufe  whatever,  then  God  forefees  that  they  are  a- 
bout  to  happen  abfolutely  without  caufe  and  by  mere 
chance  ;  flill  there  is  in  this  cafe  no  liberty  to  either 
fide,  but  the  volitions  are  wilhaut  caufe  confined  to 
one  fi;!e  only. 

It  is  abundantly  pleaded  by  Dr.  Weft  and  others, 
that  the  circumftance  that  the  divine  foreknowledge 
is  not  the  efficient  caufe  of  human  volitions;  renders^ 

ilut 


ihat  foreknowledge  entirely  confident  ^vith  their  idea 
of  liberty,  even  as  the  divine  knowledge  of  a  voiidoiji 
in  prcfent  exidcncc  is  confiftcnt  with  the  liberty   of 

that  voliiion. If  by  liberty  in  this  cafe  they  mean 

felf determin.tion  or  the  cauiaiion  of  volition  by  the 
fubjeft  himfelf  j  1  grant,  that  the  moft  abfolutc 
forelsnowiedge  is  perfedly  confident  with  this  ide?i 
of  liberty  :  And  lb  is  an  abfolute  decree  as  confid- 
ent with  it.  If  God  were  abfolutely  to  decree,  that 
a  particular  man  fhall  caufe  in  himfelf  a  particu- 
lar volition,  the  man  would  accordingly  caufe  that 
volition  in  himfelf,  and  therefore  according  to  the 

definition  of  liberty  now  given,  he  would  be  free. 

But  if  by  liberty  in  this  cafe  be  meant,  what  the  writ- 
ers to  whom  I  am  oppofed,  call  a  liberty  to  either  Jul  . 
and  a  power  to  aH  or  not  aB,  as  oppofed  to  moral  nc- 
ceffity  ;  the  divine  foreknowledge  of  a  volition  is  utr 
terly  inconfiftent  with  the  liberty  of  that  volition- 
For  according  to  this  definition,  liberty  implies,  that 
the  volition  is  not  fixed  or  determined,  and  therefore 
it  is  uncertain  what  it  will  be,  or  whether  it  will  bz 
at  all.  But  divine  foreknowledge  implies,  that  it  is 
abfolutely  certain,  that  a  volition  foreknown  will  be, 
and  what  it  will  be,  as  Dr.  Weil  grants. 

The  circumftance,  that  foreknowledge  does  not  ef- 
ficiently caufe  an  event  to  be  certainly  future,  is  noth- 
ing to  the  prefent  purpofe.  We  are  not  now  inquir- 
ing what  caufes  an  eyent  to  be  certainly  future,  but 
"whether  it  be  certainly  future.  -If  it  be  certainly  fu- 
ture it  is  neceflary,  in  the  fenfe  in  which  we  ufe  the 
word  nccejjity,  let  what  will  be  the  caufe  of  that  futuri- 
ty, or  if  the  futurity  be  uncaufed.  Divine  prophecy 
is  not  the  caufe  of  the  futurity  of  the  event  foretold, 
yet  no  man  will  fay,  that  it  does  not  prove  the  cer- 
tain futurity  of  that  event.  But  prophecy  no  more 
implies  or  proves  the  certain  futurity  of  the  event 
foretold,  than  the  divine  foreknowledge  implies  and 
proves  the  certain  futurity  of  the  eventforeknown.— 
Jo  fay,  that  a  divine  decree  is  inconfiftent  wiui  iibcr- 

I 


ty,  becaufe  it  makes  tfie  a6lion  certainly  future,  wfieil 
the  certain  futurity  iifelf  is  allowed  to  be  confiftenC 
with  liberty,  is  very  ftrange  !  What  if  it  does  make  it 
certainly  future  ?  That  certain  futurity,  when  made, 
is  not  inconfirtent  with  liberty.  So  long  as  this  is 
granted,  to  hold  that  the  divine  decree  as  making  or 
producing  that  certain  futurity  is  inconfiltent  with 
liberty,  is  as  abfurd  as  to  grant  that  a  free  circulatiort 
of  the  fluids  in  the  animal  conftitution  is  confident 
with  health  ;  and  yet  to  hold,  that  exercife  as  produc- 
ing and  merely  becaufe  it  produces  that  free  circula- 
tion, is  inconfiRent  with  health. 

I  grant,  that  divine  foreknowledge  is  as  confiftent* 
with  liberty,  as  the  divine  knowledge  of  a  prefent 
volition  is.  If  by  liberty  be  meant  the  caufation  of 
volition  by  the  fubjedl,  God  may  undoubtedly  as 
well  forefee  this,  as  lee  it  prefent.  But  if  by  liberty 
be  meant  a  liberty  to  either  fide,  a  liberty  to  atl  or 
not  a6t,  as  oppofed  to  moral  neceflity  ;  fince  this  im- 
plies, with  regard  to  an  aft  now  in  exiftence,  uncer- 
tainty whether  the  a6l  does  exifl:,  and  with  regard  to 
a  future  aft,  uncertainty  in  the  nature  of  things  and 
in  the  divine  mind,  whether  it  will  exift  ;  I  fay,  no 
fuch  uncertainty  is  or  can  be  with  regard  either  to 
an  aft  feen  by  God  to  be  now  in  exiftence,  or  an  aft 
divinely  forefeen.  As  therefore  the  divine  knowledge 
of  the  prefent  exiftence  of  an  aft,  is  utterly  inconfilt- 
ent with  this  kind  of  liberty  in  that  aft  ;  we  need  not 
and  we  do  not  pretend,  that  the  divine  foreknowledge 
of  an  a6t  is  more  inconfiftent  with  the  fame  kind  of 
liberty  in  the  aft  foreknown. There  is  this  differ- 
ence however  in  the  cafes  ;  knowledge  of  a  prefent 
aft  does  not  imply,  that  the  aft  was  certain  previ- 
cnjly  to  its  exiftence.  But  the  foreknowledge  of  an 
aft  does  imply  this.  This  difference  ought  carefully 
to  be  noticed,  or  we  fliall  run  into  great  errour.  \^^ 
when  it  is  laid,  that  foreknowledge  no  more  proves 
a  neceflity  of  the  aft  foreknown,  than  the  knowledge 
®f  an  aft  at  prefent  exifting,  proves  the  neceflity  of 

thi*  , 


this  aQ,  the  meaning  be,  that  foreknowledge  no  more 
proves,  that  the  future  aft  foreknown  is  certainly  fu- 
ture previoii/ly  to  the  exiftence  of  it,  than  the  knowL 
edge  of  a  prefent  a6t  proves,  that  this  a6t  was  certain- 
ly future  prcvioufly  to  its  exiftence  ;  the  truth  of  this 
propolition  is  by  no  means  allowed.  Foreknowledge 
by  the  very  term  refpefts  a  future  event ;  of  courfe 
the  foreknowledge  exifts  before  the  event.  Andasic 
is  granted  on  all  hands,  that  foreknowledge  implies  a. 
certainty  of  the  event  foreknown  ;  it  follows,  that  there 
is.  a  certainty  of  thefutureexiflence  of  every  eventfbre- 
known,  and  this  certainty  is  previous  to  the  exiftence 
of  the  event.  But  the  knowledge  of  a  prefent  event 
may  not  exift  before  the  event  itfelf ;  if  it  does,  it  m 
then  foreknowledge.  And  as  it  does  not,  fo  far  as  it. 
is  the  bare  knowledge  of  a  prefent  event,  exift  before 
the  event  ;  it  does  not  imply  a  previous  certainty 3.. 
that  the  event  would  come  into  exiftence. 

My  feeing  a  man  perform  an  a£lion  does  not  proves 
that  it  was  certain  beforehand,  that  he  could  perform  it. 
But  if  a  prophet  under  infpiration  fee,  that  a  man- 
will  tomorrow  perform  a  certain  aftion,  this  does 
prove,  that  it  is  beforehand  certain,  that  he  will  per- 
form it.     And  furcly  the  forefight  of  a  prophet  no 

more  proves  this,  than  the  foreknowledge  of  God. 

Suppofc  the  a6t  foreknown  by  God,  is  about  to  be 
felf  originated,  ftill  it  is  as  neceffary  or  certain  before- 
hand, as  iF  it  were  not  to  be  felf-originated  ;  becaufe 
tl^  foreknowledge  is  from  eternity  and  therefore  pre- 
cedes the  exiftence  of  the  a6f  out  of  the  divine  mind. 
For  though  all  things  are  always  prefent  in  the  divins 
mind  ;  yet  all  things  are  not  always  in  prefent  exiftence 
outofthe  divine  mind,^x\y  more  than  all  creatures  exifted 
from  eternity. Be  it  fo,  that  in  the  divine  foreknowl- 
edge all  things  are  prefent ;  then  all  human  volitions  are 
from  eternity  as  hxed  and  certain,  as  if  they  exifted 
from  eternity  not  only  in  the  divine  mind,  but  out  of 
the  divine  mind,  and  are  as  incapable  of  not  exifting, 
«Ls  the  divine  mind  is  incauable  of  dclufion  or  crrour. 

"  Bare 


ji5^ 

"  Bare  certainty^  that  an  agent  will  do  fuch  a  thing, 
«  does  not  imply  in  it,  that  he  had  not  in  himfelf  ^a 
"  potx:.cr  to  refrain  from  doing  it  ;"  p.  45.  This  de- 
pends on  the  meaning  of  the  word  power  to  refrain, 
jif  this  mean  natural  power,  as  it  has  been  explained, 
it  is  granted,  that  ever  fo  great  certainty  and  even  a 
divine  abfolute  decree,  that  an  agent  fhall  do  fuch  a 
thing,  does  not  imply  in  it,  that  he  has  not  in  himfelf 
a  power  to  refrain  from  doing  it.  But  if  by  power 
to  refrain  be  meant  moral  power,  or  a  power  oppofite 
to  m«ral  neceffity,  which  is  the  bare  certainty  of  a 
moral  adion,  it  is  abfurd  and  fclf-contradiclory  to 
fay,  that  the  bare  certainty  that  an  agent  will  do  fuch 
.a  thing,  does  not  imply  in  it,  that  he  has  not  a  power 
to  refrain  from  doing  it.  It  is  the  very  fame  abfurd- 
ity  and  contradidion,  as  to  fay,  that  a  bare  Certainty, 
that  an  agent  will  do  fuch  a  particular  thing,  does  not 
imply  in  it  a  certainty,  that  he  will  do  it. 

In  the  fame  page  the  Doctor  tells  us,  "  The  only 
"  queftion  is,  whether  fuppofmg  it  to  be  foreknown, 
««  that  an  a.gent  will  conduft  in  fuch  a  manner,  at 
c'  fuch  a  time,  it  will  be  any  contradiftion  to  affirm, 
"  that  the  faid  agent  will  have  a  power,  at  the  fame 
«  time,  to  afcVin  a  different  manner."  If  it  be  fore- 
known, that  an  agent  will  a6l  in  a  particular  manner, 
at  a  particular  time  ;  it  will  be  granted,  that  there  is 
a  certainty,  that  he  will  a6l  in  that  particular.  But 
certainty  of  moral  atlion  is  moral  necejfily^  and  moral 
inability  of  the  contrary.  And  to  affert,  that  an  agent 
is  under  a  moral  inability  to  aft  in  a  different  man- 
ner, and  yet  has  a  moral  power  to  a6l  in  a  different 
manner,  is  a  direft  contradiction. 

The  Doftor  fays,  p.  29,  "  That  infallible  fore- 
<^«  knowledge  in  the  Deity  docs  not  prove,  that  events 
^^  take  place  in  confequence  of  an  antecedent  or  pre- 
"  vious  neceffity  ;  that  it  only  proves  a  logical  necef- 
^^  fity  or  a  neceffity  of  conftquence  ;  i.  ^.  it  being  cer- 
^«  tain,  that  a  thing  will  take  place,  it  follows,  that  to 
^'^  affert  that  it  will  not  take  place,  muft  be  falfe  and 

"  cannot 


<*  cannot  be  trlic." As  the  DoQor  makes  much 

of  this,  which  he  calls  a  logical  necefliiy,  or  a  nectili* 
ty  of  confequence,  let  us  examine  it. 

The  foreknowledge  of  God  is  here  faid  to  prove  a 
logical  ncceffity  only,  or  a  nectffity  of  confequence  ; 
which  is  laid  to  be  this,  that  "  it  being  certain,  that  a 
<^  thing  will  take  place,  it  follows,  that  to  affert  that: 
«'  it  will  not  take  place,  muft  be  falfe  and  cannot  be 
"  true."  Here  one  thing  is  faid  to  follow  from  an* 
c^her,  by  a  logical  necellity  or  a  neccflity  of  coirfe-i 
quence.  L'et  us  take  an  example  :  It  is  a  certain 
truth  that  the  dead  will  rife  ;  and  does  it  hence  JcU 
low,  that  it  is  a  falfehood,  that  the  dead  will  not  rile  ? 
No,  the  latter  is  no  more  a  confequence  from  the 
former,  than  the  former  is  a  confequence  from  the 
latter  ;  or  than  that  twice  two  are  not  unequal  to  four, 
is  a  confequence  from  this  propofition,  that  twice  tv^cr 
are  equal  to  four  ;  or  than  from  its  being  true,  that  a 
thing  IS,  it  follows  as  a  confequence  that  it  is  not  tr\ie^ 
ihat  it  is  not.  The  one  is  no  confequence  from  the 
other,  but  is  precifely  the  fame  thing  exprcffed  in  dif* 
ferent  words,  which  convey  the  very  fame  idea.  You 
might  as  well  fay?  that  if  a  man  be  kindi  it  follows  as- 
a  confequence,  that  he  is  benevolent  ;  or  that  if  a 
man  be  bujj',  it  follows  as  a  confequence,  that  he  is- 
employed  in  bvjinefs.  Thus  we  may  argue  and  drav/ 
confequences  all  day  long,  yet  make  no  more  progrefs^ 
than  the  foldier  who  marches  without  gaining  ground. 

Dr.  Weft  fays,  p.  32,  "  No  necellity  is  implied  inr 
"  divine  prefcience,  except   merely   a   logical   one  ; 

"  but  this is  in  the  nature  of  ih'mgs  fubf  qnent 

"  to  the  infallible  foreknowledge  of  the  exiftence  of 
"  the  thing  foreknown."  Lut  docs  Dr.  Weft  mean,  that 
in  foreknowledge  Cod  forefees  an  event  as  uncertain, 
and  that  in  confequence  of  this  forefight  the  event 
becomes  cert.an  ?  Surely  the  Dodor  did  not  well 
confider  the  fubjeft,  if  this  be  his  meaning.  To  fore- 
know is  certainly  to  forefce  :  And  certainly  to  fore- 
fee,  is  to  fee  a  future  event  as  certainly  about  to  be. 

This 


This  certainty  of  its  futurity  is  fuppofed  and  impHekf 
in  foreknowledge,  and  is  not  the  confequence  of  h. 
Dr.  Weft  fays,  "  It  will  be  readily  granted  on  all  fides, 
*'  that  even  the  divine  foreknowledge  itfelf  has  no  in- 
«  fluence  nor  caufal  force,  with  regard  io  the  thing 
^'  foreknown,  either  to  bring  it  into  exiftence,  or  to 
^'  hinder  its  happening."  Tiierefore  it  has  no  influ- 
ence to  make  its  exillence  certain  or  neceffary  ;  how 
fhen  is  the  neceffKy/M^/^^z^^^z^  to  foreknowledge?  The 
certainty  of  its  exiftence  is  antecedent  in  the  order  of 
nature  to  the  foreknowledge,  and  is  the  ground  or  the 
objeft  of  it.  This  alfo  is  abundantly  implied  in  va- 
lious  paffages  of  Dr.  Weft's  book,  as  has  been  fhown 
above.  In  p.  53,  the:  Do£lor  fpeaks  of  his  logical 
jieceffity  as  "  only  a  confequcnce  founded  upon  the 
"certainty  of  the  thing  foreknown."  But  this  cer- 
tainty of  moral  a£lions  is  the  very  moral  neceflity,  for 
'vi'hich  we  plead.  If  the  DoQor  mean  this  by  his  log- 
ical neceffity,  it, is  prefumed,  that  the  reader  fees  the 
abfurdity  of  faying,  that  this  neceffity  is  confequent  on 
the  divine  foreknowledge  ;  and  alfo  the  abfurdity  of 
iaying  that  it  is  founded  on  the  certainty  of  the  thing 
foreknown.  A  thing  is  not  confequent  on  itfelf  nor 
on  that  which  is  founded  on  itfelf,  as  foreknowledge 
is  founded  on  the  certainty  of  the  thing  foreknown. 
If  the  Do£lor  mean  any  thing  elfe  by  his  logical  ne- 
ceffity, I  wifh  to  be  informed  how  he  means  any  thing 
to  the  purpofe  of  oppofing  that  moral  neceffity  of  hu- 
man actions,  which  Prefident  Edwards  had  advanced, 
and  by  which  he  explained  himfelf  to  mean  the  certain- 
ty of  moral  aftions.  A  logical  neceffity  confequent  on 
that  certainty  is  a  different  thing  from  the  certainty  itfelf. 
But  allowing,  what  Dr.  Wefl  holds.  That  fore- 
knowledge proves  a  neceffity  confequential  to  fore- 
knowledge ;  this  neceffity  would  be  as  inconfiftent 
with  liberty,  as  one  that  is  antecedent  to  foreknowl- 
edge ;  becaufe  the  neceffity  would  exift  antecedently 
tp  the  aftions  of  creatures,  as  it  follows  immediately 
from  foreknowledge. 

The. 


^59  _ 

Ihe  Do£lor,  in  Viis  Second  Part,  p.  92,  fays,  "Mr. 
«f  Edwards  had  railed  a  fpedre,   \vhich  he  could  not 
"  lay.     With  him   neccffity   was  ncccfTity  ;  and  with 
"  him  it  was  all  one,  whether  the  neceffity  was  previ- 
*«  ous  to  the  thing  in  quellion,  or  a  confcqucnce  drawn 
«  from  the    fuppofition  of  its  having   taken   place." 
This  is  an  injurious  reprefentation.      The  neceffity 
for  which  President  Edwards  pleads,  is  "  previous  to 
««  the  thing  in  queOioij,"  and  he  never  pleads  for  a  ne- 
ceffity which  is  "a  confequence  drawn  from  the  mere 
*'  fuppofition  of  its  having  taken  place."     The  neceffi- 
ty for  which  he  pleads,  is  that  which  is  implied  in  di- 
vine  foreknowledge  ;  and  as    this  exifts  before  the 
event  foreknown,  fo  the  neceffity  which  is  implied  in 
it  and  proved  by  it,  is  alfo  previous  to  that  event,  and 
does  not  follow  or  begin  to  exift  in  confequence  even 
of  that  foreknowledge,  and  much  lefs  in  confequence 
of  the  fuppofition,  that  the  thing  foreknown  has  taken 
place.     The  only  thing,  fo  far  as  I  know,  which  could 
give  occaGon  for  this  reprefentation  by  Dr.  Weft  is, 
tJiat  Prcfident  Edwards  c?.ils  this  neceffity  a  nccpjfiiy 
of  conjeqiunce,  and  lays,  that  a  thing  neccffary  in  its" 
own  nature,  or  one  that  has  already  come  into  exift- 
ence,  being  fuppofed,  another   thing   recefiariiy  con- 
netled  with  either  of  the  former,  and  the  neceffity  of 
whofe  exiftence  is  in  queftion,  certainly  follows  ;  i.  e. 
the  neceffity  of  this  laft  thing  certainly   follows  from 
tJic  exiftence  or  fuppofition  of  the  exillence,  of  either 
of  the  former.     For  inftance,  when  the  divine  decree 
or  foreknowledge  of  an  event  is  fuppofed,  the  exift- 
ence of  the  event  decreed  or  foreknown  will  certain- 
ly follow.     But  the  neceffity,  which   Dr.  Weft  inju- 
rioufly  imputes  to  Prefidcnt  Edwards,  is  not  the  ne- 
ccffary exiftence  o^  one  things  implied  in  the  fuppofed 
LKxWtnzt  o^  another  ;  but  the  neceflary  exiftence  of 
one  and  the  fame  thing,  io  long  as  it  is  fuppofed  to  ex- 
ift ;  and  this  neceftary  exiftence  amounts  to  no  more 
than  the  mere  identical,  trilling  propofition,  that  zohai 
PJif  is.     Of  fach  trifling  Prefidcnt  Edwards  was  inca- 
pable. 


i6o 

pable,  and  the  implicit  imputation,  that  he  has  writ. 
ten  an  oBavo  volume  in  fupport  of  a  propofuion  fo>^ 
infignificant,  ought  either  never  to  have  been  made,' 
or  to  have  been  better  fupported,  than  by  mere  af- 
fertion. 

In  the  htter  part  of  his  third  eflay,  the  Do6lor  has* 
fpent  a  number  of  pages  to  fhow,  that  a  certainty  that 
a  man  will  perform  particular  anions  does  not  imply 
that  he  is  under  a  neceffity  of  performing  them,  or 
that  he  has  no  power  to  avoid  them.  But  all  this  is' 
labour  loft,  and  is  eafily  anfwered  by  making  the  dif- 
tinftion  between  natural  and  moral  inability  ;  or  it 
all  depends  on  the  ambiguity  of  words  and  is  mere 
logomachy. 

Dr.  Clarke  endeavours  to  evade  the  airgument  for 
moral  neceffity  drawn  from  the  divine  foreknowledge, 
by  faying,  that  foreknowledge  no  more  implies  necef- 
fity, than  the  truth  of  a  propofltion  afferting  fome  fa* 
ture  event  implies  neceffity.  This  may  be  granted. 
If  a  propofltion  aflerting  fome  future  event,  be  a  re- 
al and  abfolute  truth,  there  is  an  abfolute  certainty  of 
the  event ;  fuch  abfolute  certainty  is  all  that  is  impli- 
ed in  the  divine  foreknowledge ;  and  all  the  moral 
neceffity  for  which  we  plead.  And  though  this  cer- 
tainty is  confident  with  a  phyfical  or  natural  ability  to* 
do  otherwiftf,  it  is  not  confiftent  with  the  coniingence' 
or  uncertainty  of  the  event.  So  that  there  is  no  lib- 
erty of  contingence  in  the  cafe,  no  liberty  to  cither 
fide,  to  aft  or  not  aft,  no  liberty  inconfiftent  with" 
previous  certainty  of  moral  aftion,  which  is  moral' 
neceffity. 

Dr.  Weft  ftrenuoufly  oppofes  the  doflrine,  that  the 
divine  decrees  are  the  foundation  of  God's  foreknowl- 
edge. As  I  have  already  obferved,  this  queftion' 
feems  to  be  foreign  from  the  difpute  concerning  lib- 
erty ;  therefore  1  do  not  wiffi  to  bring  it  in  here  y 
otherwife  I  ffiould  have  no  objeftion  to  entering  on 
the  difcuffion  of  it.  But  fuppofe  the  contrary  were 
trucj  that  foreknowledge  is  the  foundation  of  decrees ;;' 


1  prcrume  it  would  be  granted,  that  decrees  immedi- 
ately follow  foreknowledge.  Therefore  all  events 
are  decreed  before  they  come  to  pafs.  And  as  de- 
crees eftablifii,  or  imply  an  eftablifament  of  the  c- 
vents  decreed,  and  this  antecedently  to  their  exigence ; 
therefore  on  this  plan  there  is  an  abfolute  certainty  of 
all  events  and  moral  aftions,  and  that  antecedent- 
ly to  the  exiltence  of  ihofe  anions  ;  becaufe  they  are 
all  abfolutely  decreed  by  God  immediately  on  his  fore- 
knowledge of  them  and  before  they  come  into  cxiil- 
ence. 

"  If  this  does  not  imply,  that  foreknowledge  is  not 
''an  effeniial,  attribute,  I  am  under  a  great  miftake;" 
p.  35.  Beit  fo,  that  Dr.  Weft  is  under  a  great  miftake  ; 
what  follows  ?  Is  if  impofTible,  that  he  fnould  be  un- 
der a  great  miftake  ?  If  foreknowledge  be  an  efTen- 
tial  attribute,  it  doubtlefs  exifts  antecedently  to  hu- 
man aOions,  and  therefore  implies  a  certainty 
of  them  antecedent  to  their  exiftence.  The  truth 
is,  that  the  foreknowledge  of  any  particular  event 
is  no  more  an  eflential  attribute  of  God,  than 
the  knowledge  of  any  prefent  or  paft  eveiit.  Knowledge 
in  general  is  an  eftential  attribute  ;  but  any  par- 
ticular perception  of  the  divine  mind  is  no  more  an 
clTcntial  attribute,  than  any  particular  act  of  the  di- 
vine will,  or  any  one  decree  of  God.  \Vill  in  gener- 
al is  an  effcntial  attribute;  but  Dr.  Weft  will  not  pre- 
tend, that  every  aQ  of  the  divine  will  is  an  effentia! 
attribute.  Or  if  it  be,  doubtlefs  every  inftance  of 
foreknowledge  is  an  elfential  attribute.  By  the  fame 
argument  by  which  Dr.  Weft  proves,  that  accordin^r 
to  our  idea?  of  decrees  and  foreknowledge,  knowledge 
is  not  an  effential  attribute  ;  it  may  be  proved,  ihdf. 
according  to  Dr.  Weft's  ideas  of  thofe  iubjeds,  will 
is  not  an  effential  attribute  of  God.  The  DotlOr,  p.  36, 
tells  us,  "That  the  divine  determinations  are  the  Dei- 
ty decreeing  and  willing  ;"  i.  e.  ihey  are  the  will  of 
God.  J]ut  according  to  him  the  divine  determioa- 
lionsordecrees  are  founded  on  foreknowledge.  There- 
L 


fore  the  divine  will  is  founded  on  God's  foreknowl- 
edge and  is  not  an  eflcntial  attribute  of  God,  but  is 
felf-created,  or  a  creatureof  the  divine  underftanding. 

The  advocates  for  liberty  to  aft  or  not  att,  "  pre- 
"  tend  not  to  be  able  to  folve  the  difficulty  arifmg  from 
"  divine  prefcience."  This  is  an  honeft  confeffion. 
Yet  with  this  acki)owledged  infuperable  difficulty 
attending  this  favourite  doftrine,  they  are  determined 
to  adhere  to  it.  This  confeffion  Dr.  Price  in  particular 
makes  in  the  followingwords;"  The  foreknowledgeof  a 
"  contingent  event  carrying  the  appearanceofa  contra- 
"  diftion,  is  indeed  a  difficulty ;  and  I  do  not  pretend  to 
"be capable  of  removing  it."     Correfpondence  with 

Prieltley,  p.  i  -j^. If  this  be  a  fufficient  apology  for 

holding  a  doctrine,  which  cannot  be  reconciled  with 
an  acknowledged  truth,  it  will  beeafy  to  apologize  for 
holding  any  dotlrine  whatever  ;  e.  g.  the  doftrine  of 
tranfubftantiation.  It  is  only  neceffary  to  fay,  "That 
a  body  fhould  be  turned  into  fleffi,  and  yet  retain  all 
the  lenfible  qualities  of  bread,  as  it  carries  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  contradiftion,  is  indeed  a  difficulty  ; 
and  we  do  not  pretend  to  be  capable  of  removingit. 

Dr.  Weft  holds,  p.  53,  that  what  is  foreknown  by 
God,  is  eternal  truth  ;  yet,  p.  33,  he  holds,  that  «  there 
"  is  no  antecedent  certainty  in  things  themfelves,  on 
'•  which  divine  prefcience  is  founded  :"  i.  e.  God 
knows  a  propofuion  to  be  a  certam  truth,  before  it  is 
a  certain  truth,  and  after  his  knowledge  of  it,  it  becomes 
a  certain  and  eternal  truth  ;  yet  the  divine  knowledge 

has   no    caufal  influence  to  make  it  a  truth. He 

flrenuoufly  oppofes  the  idea,  that  human  moral  anions 
are  certainly  future  antecedently  to  the  divine  fore- 
knowledge of  them  ;  at  the  fame  time,  he  grants,  that 
they  are  not  ma^c  certainly  future  by  the  divine  fore- 
knowledge ;  and  yet  holds,  that  as  foreknown  by 
God,  they  are  eternal  truths.  If  they  be  eternal  truths, 
doubtlefs  the  propofitions  which  affert  them,  were 
certainly  true  from  eternity,  and  therefore  in  the  di- 
vine foreknowledge  of  them  God  perceived  that  eter- 
nal 


nal  truth  and  certainty,  and  that  certainty  was  the  ob- 
jeft  and  Co  the  ground  of  the  divine  foreknowledge, 
and  therefore  there  was  "  an  antecedent  certainty  in 
"  things  themfelves,  on  which  the  divine  prefcience  is 

«'  founded." Befides,   as  the  Doctor  grants    that 

foreknowledge  has  no  influence  to  caufe  that  certain- 
ty,  I  afk,  By  what  is  it  caufcd  ?  Is  it  caufed  by  noth- 
ing ?  According  to  the  Doflor  the  certain  futurity  of 
the  things  foreknown  by  God,  does  hot  exift  antece- 
dently to  foreknowledge,  and  is  not  caufed  by  it  ;  yet 
it  exifls  from  eternity ;  and  it  is  that  very  eternal  truth 
which  there  is  in  ail  things  foreknown  by  God. 

In  page  45,  he  grants,  "  that  all  things  would  take 
"  place  juft  in  the  fame  manner,  if  they  were  notfore- 
"  known,  as  they  do  now."  Then  all  things  and  all  e- 
vents  are  fixed  and  efiablifhed  independently  of  fore- 
knowledge and  antecedently  to  it,  and  were  indepen- 
dently of  foreknowledge  certainly  about  to  be.  With 
what  confiftency  then  does  Dr.  Weft  deny  a  certainty 
in  things  themfelves  antecedent  to  foreknowledge. 
And  on  what  ground  can  he  oppofe  the  doctrine  ofdir 
vine  decrees,  which  reprefents  thofe  decrees  as  antece- 
dent in  the  order  of  nature  to  foreknowledge  ? 

If  God  from  all  eternity  knew  events  to  be  future, 
they  were  future,  and  future  in  the  order  of  nature 
before  foreknowledge,  and  were  future  by  the  divine 
agency  or  by  the  agency  of  fome  other  caufe,  or  of  no 
caufe  at  all.  If  they  were  future  by  the  agency  of 
God,  that  is  all  that  the  doftrine  of  abfolute  decrees  im- 
plies; If  they  were  future  by  the  agency  of  any  oth- 
er caufe,  this  fuppofes  another  eternal  caufe.  If  they 
were  future  by  no  caufe,  they  may  and  will  come  in- 
to exiftence  by  no  caufe  ;  which  is  abfurd.  To  im- 
agine, that  they  are  from  eternity  future  by  the  agen- 
cy ofhumian  free  will,  is  to  fuppofc,  thnt  human  free 
will  either  exifted  from  eternity,  or  could  and  did  pro- 
duce effefts  eternal  ages  before  it  exiflcd. 

It  is  faid,  that  there  is  properly  no  foreknowledge 

in  God,  that  all  his  knowledge  is  prefcnt  knowledge, 

L  2  and 


and  that  paft,  prefent  and  future,  are  now  all  prefent 

in  the  divine  mind. Still  God  does  not  view  all' 

^ojfibk  things  as  prefent.  The  exijlence  o{{omt  thing* 
is  prefent  to  God  ;  only  the  poffibility  of  other  things 
is  prefent  to  him.  Whence  arifes  this  difference  ? 
What  gives  fome  things  a  prefent  exiftence  in  the  di- 
vine mind,  when  other  things  have  only  a  poffible  ex- 
iftence in  the  fame  mind  ?  This  difference  is  an  ef- 
fe6l  ;  otherwife  all  real  exillences  and  events  are  ne- 
ceffary  exiftences,  or  thofe  which  are  not  neceffary, 
become  future,  and  finally  come  into  exiftence,  with 
a  caufe.  The  difference  between  poffible  and  future 
volitions  cannot  be  the  effeft  of  the  mind  of  the  crea- 
ture ;  becaufe  it  exifted  before  that  mind  exifted. 

By  all  things  being  prefent  in  the  divine  mind,  is 
meant  not  that  God  now  fees  them  to  be  prefent  to 
creatures  and  in  their  view  j  but  that  his  view  of  all 
things,  fo  far  as  relates  to  himfelf,  is  the  fame  as  it  will 
be,  when  they  fhall  have  come  into  exiftence  in  the 
view  of  creatures.  He  fees  them  not  to  be  in  exift- 
ence as  to  us,  but  fees  their  exiftence  to  be  as  to  us 
future.  And  this  is  all  that  we  mean  by  foreknowledge. 
So  that  faying,  that  all  knowledge  in  God  is  prefent 
knowledge,  does  not  fliow,  that  there  is  no  foreknowl- 
edge in  him.  A  knowledge  of  things  as  future  with  re- 
fpeftto  creatures,  is  foreknowledge:  And  the  whole  ob- 
jeftion,  that  the  divine  knowledge  is  all  prefent  knowl- 
edge, is  founded  on  the  ambiguity  of  words,  or  of  the 
phrafe,  all  things  are  prefent  in  the  divine  mind^  or  this, 
that,  all  the  divine  knowledge  is  prefent  knowledge. 
If  the  meaning  of  that  phrafe  be,  that  God  fees  now, 
that  certain  things  will  at  fome  future  time  be  in  e.K- 
iftence  in  the  view  of  creatures  ;  this  is  granted  on 
all  hands  ;  and  what  follows  from  it  ?  Surely  not  that 
there  is  no  certainty  previous  to  the  exiftence  of  thofe 
things  in  the  view  of  creatures,  that  they  will  thus  be 
in  exiftence  ;  but,  that  there  is  fuch  a  certainty. 
Therefore  in  thisfc^nfe  of  the  phrafe  it  is  not  at  all  op- 
pofed  to,  but  implies  the  doctrine  of  previous  certainty 

and 


i^5 

and  moral  neceflity,  which  we  maintain.  If  that  phrafe 
mean,  that  God  now  fees  all  events,  which  ever  take 
place,  to  have  a  prefent  exiftencein  the  view  of  crea- 
tures ;  this  is  not  true  and  will  not  be  pretended  by 
our  opponents.  Yet  this  is  the  only  fenfe  of  the 
phrafe,  which  oppofes  the  doQrine  of  previous  certain- 
ty as  argued  from  the  divine  foreknowledge.  That 
all  things  are  prefent  in  the  divine  mind,  can  meaa 
no  nwre,  than  that  all  things  are  now  fcen  by  God, 
and  that  there  is  no  pad  nor  future  with  him.  Stjll 
he  views  fome  things  to  be  pad,  and  other  things  to 
be  future,  with  refpe8;  to  creatures  :  And  his  view  of 
fome  things  as  future  with  refpeft  to  creatures,  is 
what  we  mean  by  the  divine  foreknowledge  ;  not  that 
he  views  things  as  future  with  refpeft  to  himfelf.  If 
therefore  God  now  fees,  that  certain  volitions  will 
hereafter  take  place  in  the  minds  of  Gog  and  Ma- 
gog, according  to  prophecy,  they  will  certainly  take 
place,  and  there  is  a  moral  necelhty  of  it,  and  a  moral 
neceility  now  exijling  ages  before  thofe  volitions  will 
have  an  exiftcncc  in  the  minds  of  thofe  nien.  The 
confideration,  that  all  things  are  prefent  with  God, 
docs,  as  before  obferved,  not  at  all  prove,  that  there 
is  not  now  a  previous  certainty  or  moral  neceflity, 
that  thofe  volitions  will  come  into  exiftence  ;  but  ev- 
idently proves  that  there  is  fuch  certainty,  and  that  in 
two  refpecls  ;  (i.)  A  certainty  previous  in  order 
of  time  to  the  exiftence  of  thofe  volitions  in  the  minds 
of  Gog  and  Magog.  (2.)  A  certainty  previous  in  the 
order  of  nature  to  the  divine  foreknowledge  itfelf,  and 
which  is  the  foundation  of  that  foreknowledge. 

Moft:  or  all  the  obje6lions  brought  againlt  moral 
neceflity,  may  be  brought  with  equal  force  againft  di- 
vine foreknowledge.  For  example  ;  "If  there  be 
*'  an  abfolute  moral  neceflity,  that  John  go  on  in  fin,  and 
"be  finally  damned,  there  is  nopoflibiliiy  that  he  be 
*' faved.     Then  why  fliould  heor  any  other  perfon  ufe 

"  any  endeavours  toward  his  falvation  ?" If  there  be 

force  in  this  objedion,  it  is  equally  forcible  againft: 
L  3  divine 


i65 

divine  foreknowledge  :  Thus,  If  God  foreknow,  tliz^t 
Joha  will  go  on  in  fin  and  be  finally  damned,  there  is 
an  abfolute  certainty  or  moral  neceffity  of  it.  There- 
fore there  is  no  poffibility  of  John's  falvation  ;  and 
-why  fliould  he  or  any  other  perfon  put  forth  any  en- 
deavours toward  it  ?  This  and  all  objeBions  of  the  kind 
imply,  that  all  moral  events  are  left  in  a  ftate  of  per- 
feft  uncertainty,  till  they  come  to  pafs,  that  they  come 
to  pafs  by  mere  chance,  and  that  they  are  not,  and  can- 
not poffibly  be,  the  obje£ls  of  foreknowledge. 

It  has  been  already  obferved,  that  though  divine 
foreknowledge  is  not  the  efficient  caufe  of  the  certain 
futurity  of  any  event  ;  yet  it  implies,  that  the  event  is 
certainly  future,  and  this  certainty^lct  it  be  caufed  by 
what  it  will,  or  though  it  be  uncaufed,  is  with  refpeflt 
to  a  moral  event,  moral  neceffity,  and  equally  confid- 
ent or  inconfiftent  with  liberty^  as  if  it  were  caufed  by 
foreknowledge.  1  now  obferve  further,  that  this  cer- 
tain futurity  undoubtedly  is  caufed  by  fomdhing.  It  is 
equally  abfurd  to  imagine,  that  an  event  may  become 
future  without  a  caufe,  as  that  it  may  come  into  exijl- 
ence  without  a  caufe.  Certain  futurity  implies,  that 
the  a£lual  exillence  of  the  event  is  fecurcd  to  take 
place  in  due  time.  And  whatever  is  able  thus  to  fe- 
cure  the  event,  is  able  to  bring  it  into  exiftcnce.  If 
h  may  be  fecured  without  a  caufe,  it  maybe  brought 
into  exiftence  without  a  caufe.  This  certain  futurity 
of  all  events  from  eternity  is  an  effcQ,  and  cannot  be  the 
effeft  of  any  creature,  becaufe  no  creature  exifled  from 
eternity.  It  mull  therefore  be  the  efFe£l  of  the  Creator, 
who  alone  exifted  from  eternity,  and  who  alone  there- 
fore  could  from  eternity  give  futurity  to  any  event. 

Therefore  however  frightened  Dr.  Well  and  other 
writers  be  at  the  idea,  that  moral  aBions  fhould  be 
the  effefl  of  a  caufe  extrinfic  to  the  fubjeft  of  thofe 
anions,  we  feem  to  be  neceffitated  to  give  into  this 
idea,  from  the  confideration,  that  all  moral  a£lions  of 
creatures  were  from  eternity  foreknown  and  therefore 
•  were  certainly  future.  This  eternal  futurity  mufl  be 
• " '  '  an 


^6; 

an  effefl;  of  a  caufe  extrinfic  to  all  creatures.  Thi§ 
exirinfic  caufc  fecures  their  cxillence,  and  in  due 
time  a6lua!Iy  brings  them  into  exigence. 

It  isfaid,  that  God  knows  all  things  from  eternity, 
as  we  know  things  prelcntly  exilling  before  our  eyes. 
Now  tl-.e  aftual  exiltence  of  diings  out  of  our  minds 
is  the  foundation  of  our  knowledge  in  the  cafe.  But 
it  will  not  be  faid,  that  all  things  cxiflcd  from  eternity 
out  of  the  divine  mind,  and  that  tliis  exiftence  of 
them  is  the  foundation  of  the  divine  eternal  knowl- 
edge of  them  or  of  their  exiflencein  the  divine  mind. 
If  they  did  eternally  exift  out  of  the  divine  mind, 
they  were  neceflanly  exiftent  in  the  fame  fenfe  in 
which  God  is  ;  and  confequenily  none  of  our  a8ions 
are  caufed  by  ourfelves  or  by  our  fclf-dctermining 
power  :  They  are  as  uncaufed,  as  neccffary  and  as 
eternal,  as  the  divine  exiftence. 

Dr.  Clarke  in  his  remarks  on  Collins,  p.  c^g,  fays, 
that  "  in  the  argument  drawn  againft  liberty  from  the 
*'  divine  prefciencc,  or  power  of  judging  infallibly  con- 
"  cerning  free  events,  it  mud  be  proved,  that  things 
"  otherwife  fuppofed  free,  will  thereby  unavoidably 
*'  become  necefiary."  On  this  1  remark,  (i.J  That 
if  by  the  \fjord/ree  the  Do6lor  mean  any  thing  oppo- 
fite  to  the  mod  abfolute  moral  neccflity,  he  muii; 
mean  comiingeni,  uncertain^  net  certainly  j-ulure.  But 
nothing  is  in  this  fenfe  fuppofed,  or  allowed,  to   be 

free. (2.)  Vv^e  do  not   pretend  from    the  divine 

prefcience  to  prove,  that  "  thereby  things  unavoida- 
bly become  ncceffary,"  or  certainly  future.  But  wc 
do  pretend  from  prefcience  to  prove,  that  all  events 
-were  certainly  future,  in  the  order  of  nature,  aiuecc-  ' 
dently  to  the  prefcience  ;  and  that  they  are  certainly 
future,  in  the  order  of  time,  antecedently  to  their  cx- 
iflence. 

Dr.  Clarke  in  his  Being  and  Attributes^  p.  95,  Va- 
grants, that  all  things  are  and  vere  certain  from  eter- 
nity, and  yet  fuppofes,  p.  97,  that  an   univcrial  fatali- 
ty would  be  inconfiftent  with  monihty.     But  it  fecms, 
L  4  that 


i68 

that  according  to  the  Doflor  an  univerfal  and  eternal 
certainty  of  all  things  is  not  inconfiftent  with  morali- 
ty  ;  and  if  by  fatahty  he  meant  any  thing  different 

from  certainty,  he  oppofes  what  nobody  holds. 

Ibid,  p.  98,  the  Dodor  fays,  "  mere  certainty  of 
"  event  does  not  imply  necefiity."  But  mere  cer- 
tainty of  event  doubilefs  implies  itfelf,  and  that  is  all 
the  necefiity,  for  which  we  plead.  The  Dodor's  ar- 
gument to  prove,  that  certainty  docs  not  imply  necef- 
iity, is,  that  foreknowledge  implies  no  more  certainty, 
than  would  exifl:  without  it.  At  the  fame  time  he 
grants,  that  there  is  "  the  fame  certainty  of  event  in 
*'  every  one  of  man's  adions,  as  if  they  were  never  fo 
"  fatal  and  neceflary."  Now  any  other  certainty  or  ne- 
cefiity than  this  we  do  not  pretend  to  be  implied  in 
foreknowledge.  And  as  the  Dodor  himfelf  grants 
this  neceflTity  to  exift,  whether  there  be  or  be  not  fore- 
knowledge ;  then  in  either  cafe  all  that  necefiity,  for 
which  we  plead,  is  granted  to  exift. 

Dr.  Welt,  in  p.  20,  21,  Part  II,  thinks  Prefident 
Edwards  inconfiftent  with  himfelf,  in  denying,  that 
the  divine  decrees  are  founded  on  foreknowledge,  and 
yet  holding,  that  "  the  perfedion  of  his  underftanding 
*'  is  the  foundation  of  his  decrees."  The  Dodor  ar- 
gues, that  "  If  foreknowledge  in  the  Deity,  is  part  of 
"  the  perfedion  of  the  divine  underftanding.  Then  is  it 
"  the  foundation  of  his  wife  purpofes  and  decrees  ; 
"  and  fo  his  objedion  lies  juft  as  ftrong  againft  him, 
"  as  againft  us."  Doubtlefs  the  perfedion  of  the  di- 
vine underftanding  ;  i.  .e  God's  perfed  view  of  the 
iitnefs  of  certain  things  to  certain  ufes  and  ends,  is  the 
reafon  why  he  decrees  and  appoints  thofe  things  to 
ihofe  ufes  and  ends.  But  this  is  very  different  from 
fuppofing  that  foreknowledge  is  the  foundation  of  de- 
crees, and  that  God  firft  forefees  certain  events  about 
to  take  place,  and  then  decrees  to  permit  them  to  take 
place.  And  the  inconclufivenefs  of  Dr.  Weft's  argu- 
ment juft  quoted,  may  appear  thus ;  If  after-knowledge, 
or  a  knowledge,  that  events  have  taken  place;  be  a  part 

of 


169 

of  the  divine  underftanding  ;  then  it  is  the  foundation 
of  his  wife  purpofes  and  decrees.  But  it  will  not  be  pre- 
tended, that  the  confequent  in  this  cafe  juftly  follows 
from  the  antecedent.  Yet  it  follows  as  juftly  as  in 
the  argument  of  the  Do£lor.  Not  every  perception 
which  belongs  to  the  divine  underftanding  is  the 
foundation  of  God's  decrees  univerfally  or  generally  : 
Befide  the  inftance  already  mentioned,  I  might  men- 
tion God's  perfedl  knowledge  of  geometry,  mechanics, 
Sec,  The  divine  perfe6l  knowledge  of  ihofe  fciences 
is  not  the  foundation  of  all  God's  decrees  :  No  more 
is  God's  foreknowledge. 


CHAPTER 


170 


CHAPTER     VIL 

Ohjediom  confidtred* 

1.  TT  is  argued,  that  we  are  pofieffed  of  a  felf-deter- 
X  mining  power  and  a  liberty  to  either  fide,  be- 
(Caule  we  find,  that  we  have  a  power  to  confider  and 
examine  an  a6iion  propofed  to  us,  and  to  fujpend  our 
determination  upon  it,  till  we  fhall  have  duly  confid- 

cred  it. But  as  the  determination  to  fuCpend  and 

examine  is  a  voluntary  afl,  it  no  more  appears  to 
be  without  motive  or  without  moral  neceffity  than 
any  other  vohjntary  aft.— Sufpenfioniseither  a  vol- 
untary a6t  or  not.  If  it  be  a  voluntary  aft,  it  no 
more  appears  to  be  without  motive  and  moral  necef- 
fity, than  any  other  voluntary  a6l.  If  it  be  not  a  volun- 
tary acl,  it  is  not  a/?Y(?a6l,  nor  is  any  liberty  exercifed 
in  it  ;  and  therefore  it  is  nothing  to  the  prefent  purpofe. 

To  argue,  that  we  have  a  power  of  felfdetermina* 
tion,  becaufe  we  have  a  power  to  fufpend  an  aftion, 
is  as  groundlefs,  as  to  argue,  that  we  have  a  power  of 
felf-determination,  becaufe  we  have  a  power  to  choofe 
to  ad,  or  becaufe  we  have  a  power  of  will.  Sufpen- 
fion  is  a  voluntary  a£l  ora  volition,  and  the  argument 
Under  confideration  is  this  ;  A  man  has  a  volition,  not 
at  prefent  to  determine  in  a  certain  cafe  ;  therefore 
he  has  a  power  efficiently  to  caufe  volition  in  him- 
felf.  This  argument  is  juft  as  conclufive  as  the  fol- 
lowing ;  A  man  has  a  volition  at  prefent  to  determine 
in  a  certain  cafe  ;  therefore  he  has  a  power  efficiently 
to  caufe  volition  in  himfelf  :  Or  as  this  ;  A  man  has  a 
a  volition,  therefore  he  has  a  power  efficiently  to  caufe 
volition  in  himfelf. 

But  if  fufpenfion  be  no  voluntary  a8,  but  a  total 
fufpcnfion  of  all  volition,  it  is,  if  poffible,  flill  lefs  a 
proof  of  felf-determination.  Self  determination  is  a  vol- 
untary aft,  and  fufpenfion  is  brought  as  ra  inftance 

of 


of  f  jlf-detcrminaiion.  But  how  can  that,  which  is  nq 
voluntary  aft  be  an  indance  of  a  voluntary  acl  P  I'bis 
is  as  abfurd  as  to  argue  felf-determination  from  any 
inlellc61ual  pcrccpiion,  or  from  the  perfc6l  infenfihil- 

iiy  of  a  dead  corpfe. But  this  mode  of  arguing  is 

familiar  with  Dr.  Weft,  who  conftantly  ar^^ues  a  felf- 
determining  power,  from  a  power  to  not  a^,  a  power 
to  be  perfeftly  torpid. 

2.  Self-determination  is  argued  from  our  own  con- 
fcioufnefs  and  experience.  Dr.  Wefl  fays,  page 
26,  that  *'  we  experience  in  ourfeives,  that  in  willing 
"  and  choofing  we  a6t  independently  of  any  extrinfic 
caufe."  Others  hold,  that  we  are  coiifcious  of  ft;lf-de- 
termination  and  an  exemption  from  extrinfic  caufal- 

ity. When  gentlemen  fpeak  of    experience  and 

con  fcioufnefs,  they  ought  to  confine  their  obfervations 
to  themfeives  ;  as  no  man  is  confcious  of  more  than 
paffes  in  his  own  mind,  and  in  fuch  things  a  man 
can  with  certainty  tell  his  own  experience  only.  For 
my  own  part,  I  am  not  confcious  of  either  felf-caufa- 
tion  of  volition,  or  an  exemption  from  extrinfic  cauf- 
ality  ;  and  to  be  fure  I  am  not  confcious,  that  my 
volitions  take  place  without  caufe  and  by  mere  chance. 
I  am  confcious  of  volitions  of  various  kinds  ;  but  I 
never  yet  caught  myfelf  in  the  a6l  of  making  a  volition, 
if  this  mean  any  thing  more  than  having  a  volition  or 
being  the  fubjefl;  of  it.  If  any  man  be  confcious, 
that  he  makes  his  own  volitions,  he  is  doubilefs  con- 
fcious of  two  diHindl  ads  in  this,  one  the  act  made  by 
bimfelf,  another  the  aH  making  or  by  which  he  makes 
the  aEl  made.  Now  will  any  man  profefs  to  the  world, 
that  he  is  or  ever  has  been  conlcious  of  thefc  di(lin£l 
afts  ?  If  not,  let  him  tell  the  world  what  he  means  by 
being  the  efficient  caufe  of  his  own  volitions.  If  he 
mean,  that  he  has  volitions,  this  is  no  more  than  the 
advocates  for  moral  neccflity  are  confcious  of,  and  to 
grant  that  this  is  all  that  is  meant,  is  to  give  up  the 
argument.  If  it  be  meant,  that  he  caufes  them  by 
the  mind  iffdfox  bv  fome  power  of  the  mind  and  no't 

by 


172 

by  any  aB  of  the  mind  or  oJF  tliofe  powers ;  I  appeal 
to  the  reader,  whether  this  be,  or  can  be,  a  matter  of 
confcioufnefs.  I  take  it  to  be  univerfally  granted, 
that  no  man  can  be  confcious  of  more  than  the  aBs 
and  perceptions  of  his  own  mind.  The  exiftence  of 
the  mind  and  of  its  powers,  is  inferred  from  the  ads, 
and  we  are  not  properly  confcious  of  them.  Dr. 
Reid  may  be  an  authority  with  the  gentlemen,  with 
whom  I  am  now  concerned.  *'  Porcer,"  fays  he,  "  is 
"  not  an  objeft  of  any  of  our  external  fenfes,  nor 
''  even  an  oh^tdio^ confcioufnefs.  That  it  is  not  feen, 
<'  nor  heard,  nor  touched,  nor  tafted,  nor  fmelt,  needs 
"  no  proof.  That  we  are  not  confcious  of  it,  in  the 
*'  proper  fenfe  of  the  word,  will  be  no  lefs  evident,  if 
"  we  reflect,  that  confcioufnefs  is  that  power  of  the 
««  mind,  by  which  it  has  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
"  its  own  operations.  Power  is  not  an  operation  of 
'«  the  mind,  and  therefore  is  no  objeEt  of  confcioufnefs, 
''  Indeed  every  operation  of  the  mind  is  the  exertion 
''  of  fome  power  of  the  mind  ;  but  we  are  confcious 
««  of  the  operation  only^  and  the  power  lies  behind  the 
"  fcene  :  And  though  we  may  juftly  infer  the  power 
«  from  the  operation,  it  muft  be  remembered,  that 
*«  inferring  is  not  the  province  Q>i  confcioufnefs^  but  of 
"  reafonr     EJfays  on  ABive  Powers,  p.  7. 

If  from  our  confcioufnefs  of  volitions,  it  follows, 
that  we  ejficiently  caufe  thofe  volitions,  let  a  reafon  be 
given,  why  it  will  not  equally  follow  from  our  con- 
fcioufnefs of  any  perception,  e.  g.  the  found  of  thun- 
der, that  we  efficiently  caufe  that  too. 

If  we  be  the  efficient  caufes  of  our  own  volitions, 
they  are  effeds.  But  an  effeft  is  produced  by  a  pre- 
vious exertion  of  the  efficient  caufe,  which  a£l  is  as 
diftinft  from  the  effeft,  as  the  divine  creating  aft  was 
diflin6l  from  the  world  created.  Every  effisd  is  paf- 
five  with  regard  to  its  caufe,  and  paffive  in  this  refpeft, 
that  the  caufal  a6l;  of  the  efficient  operates  upon  it  : 
Therefore  the  volition  is  and  muft  be  diftinft  from  the 
a6t  of  the  efficient  by  which  it  is  caufed.     If  a  man 

be. 


^73 

be  the  efficient  caufe  of  his  own  volition  and  he  be 
confcious  of  it,  he  is  confcious  of  an  a6l  of  his  own 
mind  previous  to  every  volition  caufed  by  himfelf, 
efficiently  caufing  that  volition,  and  as  this  caufingatl 
niuft  be  a  voluntary  a£l,  in  order  to  be  a  free  one, 
there  mud  be  an  infinite  feries  of  voluntary  a£ls  cauf- 
ing one  another,  or  one  a6l  before  the  firft  :  And  of 
this  the  man  who  is  fubjecl,  muft  have  a  confcious 
experience,  or  elfe  he  cannot  be  confcious  of  felf  de- 
termination. Whether  any  man  will  profefs  to  be 
confcious  of  all  this,  we  muft  wait  to  fee.  It  is  to  be 
prefumed  however,  that  no  man  will  profefs  to  have 
experienced  an  infinite  feries  of  a£ls,  or  one  aft  before 
the  firft  aa. 

As  to  knowing  by  confcioufnefs  and  experience, 
that  our  volitions  are  not  the  cffeQ  ofanextrinfic 
caufe  ;  this  I  conceive  is  an  abfolute  impoflibility, 
unlefs  we  know  by  experience  and  are  confcious,  that 
we  ourfelves  efficiently  caufe  them  in  the  manner  juil 
now  defcribed,  viz.  in  an  infinite  feries,  or  with  one 
aft  before  the  firft.  Unlefs  we  be  confcious,  that  we 
caufe  our  own  firft  volition  by  a  previous  a61,  we  can- 
not be  confcious,  that  we  caufe  it  at  all.  And  if  we 
be  not  confcious,  that  we  caufe  that,  we  cannot  be 
confcious  but  that  it  was  caufed  extrinfically.  If  we 
do  not  experience  that  we  caufe  our  volitions  by  our 
own  previous  afts,  we  do  not  experience,  that  we 
caufe  them  at  all.  All  we  experience  is^the  volitions 
themfelves,  and  we  have  no  more  evidence,  that  they 
are  not  the  eff^efts  of  an  extrinfic  caufe,  than  from  the 
experience  of  any  of  our  ideas  of  fenfation,  we  have 
evidence  that  thofc  ideas  are  not  excited  by  an  ex- 
trinfic caufe. 

Let  an  inftance  he  taken  and  I  prcfume  no  man 
will  pretend,  that  he  is  confcious,  that  he  caufes  one 
volition  by  another  :  e.g.  di  volition  to  give  to  the 
poor.  Will  any  mjn  pretend,  that  he  is  confcious, 
that  he  caufes  in  himfelf  a  volition  to  give  to  the  poor, 
by  a  previous  volition  ;  and  that  he  in  the  firft  place 

finds, 


^74 

finds,  by  confcioufnefs,  that  he  choofes  to  have  a  76- 
]ition  to  give  to  the  poor  before  he  has  it,  and  that  by 
this  previous  choice  he  becomes  willing  to  give  to  the 
poor  ?  If  no  man  will  pretend  this,  but  every  man  by 
the  bare  Rating  of  the  cafe  fees,  that  it  implies  the  ab- 
furdity  that  he  is  willing  before  he  is  willing,  furely  it 
is  high  time  to  give  up  this  argument  from  experi- 
ence and  confcioufnefs. 

It  has  been  faid,  that  we  perceive  noextrinfic  influ- 
ence producing  our  volitions.  Nor  do  we  perceive 
any  extrinfic  influence  producing  a  great  part  of  our 
thoughts  and  perceptions,  which  yet  it  will  not  be  pre- 
tended, that  we  ourfelves  caufe. 

It  is  impoflible  for  a  man  to  be  confcious  ofa negative, 
otherwife  than  as  he  is  either  not  confcious  of  it,  oris 
confcious  of  the  oppofite  pofitive.  Therefore  when  it 
is  faid,  that  we  are  confcious,  that  oUr  volitions  are  not 
the  effe6l  of  an  extrinfic  caufe,  the  meaning  muft  be  ei- 
therthat  weare  not confcions, that  theyare  the  efFeftof 
an  extrinfic  caufe,  or  that  we  are  confcious,  that  we 
do  efficiently  caufe  them  ourfelves.  That  we  are 
not  confcious,  that  our  volitions  are  the  effeft  of  an 
extrinfic  caufe,  is  no  proof,  that  they  are  in  fa6l  not 
the  effe6l  of  fuch  a  caufe,  becaufe  if  they  were  the 
effeB:  of  fuch  ai  caufe,  (till  we  fhould  not  be  con- 
fcious of  it.  If  whether  they  be  the  effeel  of  fuch  d 
caufe  or  not,  we  fliould  not  be  confcious,  that  they 
are  the  cffe6l  of  fuch  a  caufe,  then  the  circumflance 
that  we  are  not  confcious,  that  they  are  the  efteCl  of 
fuch  a  caufe,  is  no  proof  either  way.  Nor  are  we 
confcious,  that  we  do  efficiently  caufe  our  own  voli- 
tions, as  it  is  prefumed  appears  by  what  has  been  al- 
ready faid  in  this  and  former  chapters. 

But  if  we  were  confcious,  that  we  do  efficiently 
caufe  our  own  volitions,  this  would  be  no  argiiment 
againft  the  abfolute  previous  certainty  or  moral  ne- 
ceffity  of  all  our  volitions.  Such  efficiency  may 
have  been  from  eternity  the  object  of  the  divine  ab- 
folute foreknowledge  or  decree.  So  that  to  a  con- 
fcioufnefs' 


*7} 

fcioufnefs  of  liberty  as  oppofed  to  moral  neceflity. 
is  requifite,tbat  webe  confcious  not  only,  that  wc  ctn- 
cientlycaufe  our  own  volitions,  but  that  we  caufctbem, 
with  the  circumflance,  that  it  was  previoufly  uncer- 
tain, whether  we  fhould  caufe  them  or  not.  But  of 
<his  circumttance  it  is  impollible,  that  we  fhould  be 
tonfcious  ;  it  is  no  aft  or  perception  of  the  xwii^d^ 
and  therefore  cannot  be  an  obje6l  of  confcioaf- 
nefs. 

Archbifhop  King  fpeaks  of  a  man's  being  ''  con- 
<'  fcious,  that  it  was  in  his  power,  to  have  done  c  ler- 
«  wife  than  he  has  done."  If  this  mean  any  ihirr^op- 
pofite  to  moral  neceffity,  it  muft  mean,  that  a  man  is 
confcious,  that  it  was  not  previoufly  certain,  that  he 
would  do  as  he  has  done.  But  of  this  no  man  can  be 
confcious,  for  the  reafon  already  given. 

3.  It  is  further  argued,  that  we  aft  as  if  we  were 
under  no  neceflity,  but  at  perfeft  liberty  ;  and  that 
therefore   the   doftrine  of  moral  neceffity  is  contra- 

difted  by  all  our  conduct,  and  the  maxims  of  it. 

To  this  I  anfwer,  that  our  conduft  does  by  no 
means  fliow,  that  we  are  not  influenced  by  motives, 
or  that  we  aft  without  motives,  without  defign,  with- 
out biafes,  taftes,  appetites  or  anyfuch  principles,  and 
in  perfeft  indifference,  infenfibility  and  Ilupidity. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  conduft  of  all  mankind  fhows, 
that  they  are  aftuated  by  motives,  biafes,  various  paf- 
fions  and  appetites,  which  have  as  ftated  and  regular 
an  efFeft  on  their  minds  and  conduft,  as  fecond 
caufes  have  in  the  natural  world.  The  conduft  of 
men  does  by  no  means  fhow,  that  their  conduft  is 
previoufly  altogether  uncertain  and  left  to  mere 
chance.  It  does  indeed  fliow,  that  they  are  free  agents 
in  the  proper  fenfe  ;  z.  e.  intelligent,  voluntary  agents, 
afting  upon  motives  and  various  principles  in  human 
nature,  natural  and  acquired  ;  and  therefore  we  ufe  ar- 
guments and  motives  with  one  another  to  in- 
fluence each  other's  conduft.  All  this  is  perfeftly 
confiftent  with  thfe  fchemc   of  moral    neceflity   for 

which 


176 

which  I  plead,  and  is  implied  in  it :  And  aH  govern- 
ment civil  and  domeftic  is  not  only  confident  with 
that  fcheme,  but  is  built  upon  it;  otherwife  in  vain 
would  be  all  the  motives  of  rewards  and  punifhments 
exhibited  as  the  means  of  government,  and  by  which 
government  is  carried  into  efFeft. 

If  moral  neceffity  be  inconfiftent  with  the  praQice 
of  mankind,  fo  is  that  previous  certainty  implied  in 
the  divine  foreknowledge ;  for  that,  with  refpetl  to 
moral  aflions,  is  moral  neceffity. 

4.  It  is  objefted,  that  on  this  plan  all  agency  and 

a6lion  are  deftroyed  or  precluded. Anfwer  ;  If  by 

agency  and  aftion  be  meant  felf-determinate  or  con- 
tingent agency  and  action,  I  grant  that  this  fcheme 
does  preclude  them  and  means  to  preclude  them. 
But  it  is  not  allowed,  that  fuch  agency  and  adion  are 
neceflary  to  a  rational,  moral  being,  or  are  at  all  de- 
firable  or  even  poffible  :  And  to  take  thefe  for  grant- 
ed, is  to  beg  the  main  points  in  difpute.  Let  it  be  Ihown 
that  fuch  agency  and  aftion  are  neceflary,  defirable, 
or  poflible,  and  fomething  to  the  purpofe  will  be  done. 
But  rational  voluntary  agency  or  atl:ion,  arifing  from 
motive  and  principle,  and  dire6led  to  fome  end,  is 
not  precluded,  but  fuppofed  and  eftablilhed  by  this 
fcheme. 

It  is  faid,  that  on  the  hypothefis  of  a^  divine  agen- 
cy in  all  things,  there  is  but  one  agent  in  the  univerfe. 
But  the  Deity  is  no  fclf-determinate  agent  :  He  is  no 
more  the  efficient  caufe  of  his  own  volitions  than  he  is 
of  his  own  exiflence.  If  he  were,  his  volitions  would 
not  be  from  eternity,  nor  would  he  be  unchangeable. 
Therefore  with  as  much  reafon,  as  it  is  faid,  that  there 
is  hut  one  agent  in  the  univerfe,  it  might  have  been 
faid,  that  there  is  not  one.  Self-efficiency  of  volition  is 
either  neceflary  to  agency  and  aftion,  or  it  is  not. 
If  it  be  neceflary,  God  is  not  an  agent.  If  it  be  not 
neceflary,  we  are  agents  and  God  too. 

It  is  further  faid,  .that  on  this  plan  of  a  moral  ne- 
ceflity  ellabliflied  by    G®d,  all    human   actions   are 

nothing 


nothing  but  the  operations  of  God  aftuating  men,  as 

tlie  foul  afluates  the  body. If  this  mean,  that  God 

is  the  remote  and  firft  caufe  of  all  things,  and  that  he 
brings  to  pafsall  things  and  all  human  adions,  either 
hy  an  immediate  intluence,  or  by  the  intervention 
of  fecond  caufes,  motives,  temptations,  &:c.  we  allow 
it  :  We  firmly  believe,  that  thefe  are  under  the  con- 
trol and  at  the  difpofal  of  Providence.  But  bccaufe 
the  devil  tempted  Eve,  it  will  not  be  pretended,  that 
flie  afted  nothing,  and  was  merely  atled  upon  by  the 
devil,  as  the  human  body  is  afluated  by  the  foul  ;  that 
bccaufe  Godfent  his  prophets  to  thelfraelites,  to  preach 
to  them,  the  prophets  a6ted  nothing  ;  that  when  God 
affords  the  aids  of  his  grace  to  any  man,  fo  far  as  he 
is  influenced  by  thefe  aids  to  an  aQion,  it  is  no  aftion 
of  his  ;  that  when  the  goodnefs  of  God  Icadeth  a 
finner  to  repentance,  the  finner  does  nothing,  does 
not  repent  •  but  this  repentance  is  the  a6l  or  exer- 
cife  of  the  divine  mind,  and  in  it  God  repents. 

If  when  it  is  objefted,  the  fcheme  of  moral  neceffity 
precludes  adion,  a6lion  mean  volition  ;  the  obje8ion 
is  groundicfs :  We  hold  as  ftrenuoufly  as  ouropponenfs, 
that  we  all  have  aftion  in  this  fenfe.  But  if  by  aflion 
they  mean  any  thing  elfe,  they  muft  mean  fomething 
in  which  there  is  no  volition.  But  that  any  fuch  thing 
fhould  be  an  action  is  abfurd  and  what  they  will  not 
pretend.  The  circumRance,  that  a  man  caufes  his 
own  volitions,  if  it  were  poHible,  would  not  imply  a- 
gcncy  or  a£lion,  unlefs  the  caufation  or  caufing  a6l 
were  a  volition.  For  inftancc,  if  a  man  in  a  convul- 
fion,  having  a  fword  in  his  hand,  involuntarily  thrult 
it  into  his  friend's  bofom,  this  is  not  agency  :  Yet  the 
man  caufes  the  thrufl  and  the  wound.  But  if  the  caufing 
a6l  be  a  volition,  it  runs  into  the  abfurdity  of  an  in- 
finite fcrics  of  volitions  caufing  one  another. 

Dr.  Wen,in  Part  II,  p.  8,  fays,"  If  the  Deity  is  the 

*^  proper  cfiicicnt  caufe  of  volition,  then  the  m-ind  is 

**  entirely  palfive  in  all  its  volitions,  and  confequcntly 

"  cannot  be  in  -dx^y proper  fenfe <2n  a^cnt.'  Wc  grant, 

M  that 


that  the  Deity  is  ihe  primary  efficient  caufe  of  all  things, 
and  that  he  produces  volitions  in  the  human  mind  by 
fuch  fecond  caufes  as  motives,  appetites,  biafes,  &c. 
and  the  human  mind,  in  being  the  fubjeft  of  the  di- 
vine agency  whether  mediate  or  immediate,  ispaflive. 
Still  we  hold,  that  volition  is  an  aBion^  as  has  been  al- 
ready explained.  Nor  is  there  the  leaft  abfurdity  in 
the  fuppofition,  that  an  aftion  fliould  be  the  effeft  of 
a  divine  or  other  extrinfic  agency,  uniefs  by  a£lion 
or  volition  be  meant  a  felf-caufed  or  an  uncaufed  aftion 
or  volition.  But  for  Dr.  Weft  in  the  prefent  cafe  to 
mean  this  by  aHion  in  the  proper  fenfe^  is  to  beg  the 
queftion.  The  very  queftion  is,  whether  aftion  in 
the  proper  fenfe  of  the  word,  be  felf-caufed  or  uncauf- 
ed. And  if,  when  he  fays,  "  If  the  Deity  is  the  effi- 
"  cient  caufe  of  volition,  the  mind  cannot  be  in  any 
^^  proper  fenfe  an  agent;"  he  mean  an  agent,  who 
efficiently  produces  an  a6l  of  will  in  himfelf,  or  who  is 
the  fubjeft  of  a  volition  which  is  uncaufed  ;  I  grant, 
that  the  mind  cannot  be  fuch  an  agent  ;  I  believe, 
that  fuch  agency  is  an  abfurdity  and  impoffibilty,  and 
call  on  Dr.  Weft  to  clear  it  of  the  abfurdity  and  im- 
poffibility,  which  has  long  fince  been  pointed  out  to 
be  implied  in  it. 

Befides  ;  the  Do£lor's  reafoning  may  be  retorted, 
thus  ;  If  the  mind  itfelf  be  the  proper  efficient  caufe 
of  volition,  then  the  mind  is  entirely  paffive  in  its  vo- 
litions, and  confequently  in  volition  cannot  be  in  any 
proper  fenfe  an  agent.  For  every  efFe6l  muft  be  paf- 
five, feeing  it  cannot  contribute  any  thing  towards  its 
ownexiftence.  Volition  or  the  mind  a6ling  is  either 
an  effeft,  or  it  exifted  from  eternity,  or  it  came  into 
exiftence  without  caufe.  Neither  of  the  two  laft  will 
be  pretended.  Therefore  it  isaneffi^£l;  and  as  every 
effeft  is  paffive,  the  mind  in  volition  is,  on  the 
ground  of  Dr.  Weft's  argument,  in  no  proper  fenfe 
an  agent  in  volition. 

The  Doftor  proceeds,  ibid,  p.  8,  "  Either  volition  is 
«  only  the  immediate  aBion  of  the  Deity  on  the  mind, 

.   «or 


^7^ 

''or  it  is  diftinfl  from  it-  If  volition  is  diflintl;  from 
"  the  a6lion  of  the  Deity  on  the  mind,  then  the  at1;ion 
*'  of  the  Deity  on  ihe  mind,  is  only  to  produce  all  the 
"  requifites  for  a6lion  ;  and  confeqticnily  there  is  no 
"  abfurdity  in  fuppofing,  that  wlien  all  thefe  requifites 
"  have  taken  place,  the  mind  is  then  only  put  in  a  ca- 

"  pacity  for  aiSting." On  this  I   remark,   Volition 

is  granted  to  be  entirely  diflinQ  from  the  a8ion  of 
the  Deity,  as  diftinfl  from  it,  as  the  motion  of  a  plan- 
et is.  liut  It  is  not  granted  to  follow  hence,  that  the 
action  of  the  Deity  does  no  more  than  produce  all 
the  necelfary  requifites  for  aBion.  Dr.  Weft  will 
grant,  that  when  the  Deity  caufes  a  planettomove,  he 
does  more  than  to  produce  the  requifites  for  its  mo- 
tion, unlefs  in  requifites  for  its  motion  be  compre- 
hended the  a8ual  produBion  of  its  motion.  If  this 
be  his  meaning  with  regard  to  the  a6lion  of  the  mind, 
there  is  an  abCardity  in  fuppofing,  that  when  all  thole 
requifites  have  taken  place,  the  mind  is  only  put  into 
a  capacity  foraBing  or  notaBing.  And  whatever  be 
his  meaning  in  producing  requifites,  I  do  not  allow 
they  do  or  can  put  the  mind  into  a  capacity  of  v.ci 
aBing^  i.  e.  of  finking  itfcif  into  perfeB  torpitude. 

What  immediately  follows  the  laft  quotation  is,  "If 
«*  befides  prefeniing  to  the  mind  the  requifites  for  ac- 
"  tion,  the  Deity  does  produce  a  certain  modification 
*' of  the  mind  called  volition,  in  which  modification  the 
'•  mind  is  wholly  paflive,  then  there  is  no  aBion,  but  on- 
"  ly  the  immediate  aBion  of  the  Deity  on  the  mind;  and 
"  volition  isnothingdiftinBfromtheimmediateaBionof 
'•theDeity."  The  very  fame  mode  ofreafoning  will  prove, 
that  bodily  motion  is  nothing  diilinB  from  the  a6tion  of 
the  Deity  ;  thus.  If  befides  producing  the  requifites  for 
motion,  the  Deity  produce  a  certain  modification  of 
matter,  called  motion,  in  which  matter  is  wholly  paf- 
five,  then  there  isonly  the  immediate  aBion  of  the  Deity 
on  maltcr,and  motion  is  nothing diftinfcl  from  the  imme- 
diate aBion  of  the  Deity. Vet  it  is  prerumcd,thai  Dr. 

Welt  will  not  pretend,  that  when  God  caufes  a  pbn- 
M  2  ct 


iSo 

ct  to  move  round  in  its  orbit,  the  Deity  liimfelf  and 
lie  only  moves  round  in  that  orbit  ;  or  that  the  mo- 
1#n  of  the  planet  is  nothing  diftincl  from  the  a8ion 
of  the  Deity.  Now  vohtion,  though  caufed  by  the 
Deity,  is  as  diftintl  from  the  a6lion  of  the  Deity,  by 
which  it  is  caufed,  as  the  motion  of  a  planet  is  from 
fhe  aflion  of  God  by  which  that  is  caufed. 

The  Do6lorfays,  p.  lO,  "If  when  the  mind  afts  on 
"  any  particular  objeft,  the  Deity  produces  a  new  aH 
"or  a  new  operativenefs  in  the  mind,  then  there  muft 
"  be  a  change  in  the  mind."  Doubtlefs  there  is  fo  far  a 
change,  as  is  implied  in  the  new  a6l :  And  what  then? 
Why  the  Doflor  "  upon  the  clofefl  examination  can- 
"  not  find  any  change  in  the  operativenefs  of  his  mind." 
Beit  fo ;  yet  as  it  is  fuppofed,  that  his  mind  isthefub- 
jeB:  of  a  new  aH,  he  can  doubtlefs  find  a  change  in 
the  aH  of  bis  mind  ;  and  if  he  cannot  find  a  change 
in  the  operativenefs  o^il,\im\i?i  be  becaufe  operative- 
nefs, which  is  a  peculiar  and  favourite  word  with  the 
Do£lor,  means  fomething  diflPerent  from  <5;^,  and  there- 
fore is  nothing  to  the  prefent  purpofe,  as  the  fubjeft 
under  confideration  is  the  production  of  a  new  a6l  by 
the  Deity  :  And  we  do  not  pretend,  that  when  the 
Deity  produces  a  new  acl  in  the  mind,  he  produces  a 
new  operativenefs  too,  unlefs  acl  and  operativenefs  be 
the  fame.  If  they  be  the  fame,  whenever  the  Do6lor 
can  perceive  a  change  in  the  aB  of  his  mind,  he  can 
doubtlefs  perceive  a  change  in  this  operativenefs  of  it. 

The  Doctor  thinks  he  has  faid  fomething  new  con- 
cerning his  favourite  word  operativenefs:  But  1  fee  noth- 
ing new  or  important  in  it,  unlefs  it  be  a  new  word 
ufed  in  an  ambiguous  manner. 

"  I  fay,  that  the  operativenefs  of  the  mind  on 
«'•  different  objefls  is  always  uniformly  one  and  the 
"  fame  thing,  and  not  that  there  are  as  many  ope- 
'•  rations,  as  there  are  obje6ls  on  which  the  mind 
"  a8:s;"  ibid,  p.  13.  Here  it  is  manifeft,  that  the 
D96lor  ufes  the  word  operalivenufs  as  fynonymous 
with  operation^  othersvife  he  is  guilty  of  the    moll 

,grofs 


grofs  equivocation.  And"  is  it  indeed  one  and 
the  fame  operation  of  mind  to  love  virtqe  and  love 
road  beef?  To  choofe  the  ferviccof  God  and  chool'e 
a  pine  apple  ?  This  is  new  indeed  :  In  this,  I  pre- 
fume  the  Do£lor  is  an  original  ! 

5.  My  aflions  are  jniiie  ;  but  in  what  fcnfj  can 
they  be  properly  called  vime,  if  1  be  not  the  ef- 
ficient caufe  of  them  ? Anfwcr;  My  thoughts  and 

all  my  perceptions  and  feelings  are  7nine  ;  yet  it  will 
not  be  pretended,  that  I  am  the  efficient  of  them  all, 

6.  It  is  faid  to  be  felf-evident,  that  abjolute  necejjhy 

IS  inconfillent   with   liberty. Anfvver  ;  Tliis  wholly 

depends  on  the  meaning  of  the  words  UhcrLy  and  nc- 
cejjity.  Abfolute  natural  ncceffity  is  allowed  to  bo 
inconfiflent  with  liberty  ;  but  the  fame  conceflion  is 
not  made  with  regard  to  abfolute  moral  neceffity. 
All  that  is  requifiie  to  anfwer  this  and  fuch  like  ob- 
jeftions  is  to  explain  the  words  liberty  and  neceffity. 
If  by  liberty  be  meant  uncertainty,  undoubtedly  abfo- 
lute moral  neceffity,  which  is  the  certainty  of  a  moral 
event,  is  utterly  inconfiflent  with  liberty.  But  if  by 
liberty  be  meant  exemption  from  natural  neceffity, 
there  is  not  the  leafl  inconfiftence  between  the  molt 
abfolute  moral  necefTity  and  the  moft  perfc6l  freedom 
or  exemption  from  natural  neceffity.  The  rnofl  per- 
feft  exemption  from  natural  neceffity  is  confiflent  with 
the  mofl  abfolute  previous  certainty  of  a  moral  aftion. 
Judas  in  betraying  his  Lord  "  according  to  the  deter- 
minate counfel  and  foreknowledge  of  God,"  was  en- 
tirely exempted  from  natural  necefTity  ;  yet  his  con- 
du6l  was  according  to  an  abfolute  previous  certainty. 

7.  That  v;e  have  liberty  of  lelf-determination  is  ar- 
gued from  our  7/ior<2/  difccrmiunt,  or  fcnfe  of  right  and 
wrong  and  of  defert  of  praile  and  blame.  And  Ibmc 
are  lb  confident  of  the  fufliciency  of  this  argument  a- 
gainfl  moral  neceflTuy,  that  they  are  willing  to  rtltthc 
•whole  caufe  on  this  fingle  point.  It  is  therefore  a 
very  important  point.  It  is  fjid,  that  our  eflimating 
the  moral  charatler  of  the  man,  from  his  internal  dif- 

M  3  pofi lions. 


l82 

pofitions  and  a£ls,  is  on  the  fuppofition.  that  thefe  are 
within  the  pQu.tr  of  iht  man.  But  ihe  word  power  is 
equivocal  ;  if.it  mean  natural  power,  and  that  the 
agent  is  under  no  natural  inability,  (as  before  ex- 
plained) to  other  difpofitions  and  atls  ;  it  is  granted, 
that  in  this  fenfe  they  are  in  his  power.  But  if  it 
mean,  that  there  was  no  previous  certainty,  that  he 
■would  have  thofe  very  difpofitions  and  a6ls  ;  and  that 
no  man  will  or  can  reafonably  blame  himfelf  or  an- 
other but  incafe  of  a  perfect  previous  uncertainty  with 
refped  to  thofe  difpofitions  and  ads  ;  this  is  not 
granted,  nor  is  it  proved. 

It  is  faid,  that  no  man  ever  did  commend  or  blame 
himfelf  for  what  he  knew  to  be  necejfary  and  unavoid- 
able^ not  within  his  power,  or  not  determined  by  him- 
felf. I'his  ftript  of  the  ambiguity  of  words  is  this 
merely  ;  that  no  man  ever  did  commend  or  blame  him- 
felf for  what  he  knew  to  be  previously  certain,  and 
was  not  entirely  cafual.  But  this  is  manifellly  falfe  ; 
becauie  every  man  knows  or  may  know,  that  all  things 
are  pr^vioiifly  certain,  as  they  are  theobjeds  of  the  in- 
fallible foreknowledge  of  God  :  Andif  noman  can  com- 
mend or  blame  himfelf  for  what  is  previoufly  certain, 
no  man  can  commend  or  blame  himfelf  for  any  thing. 

Will  it  be  pretended,  that  we  are  more  blamable 
for  an  adion,' which  is  previoufly  uncertain  and  cafu- 
al, and  which  we  perform  by  chance  without  motive, 
end  or  defign,  than  for  that  which  is  previoufly  cer- 
tain and  future,  and  which  we  do  from  motive,  and 
vith  an  end  and  defign  ?  Take  the  inflanceof  Judas's 
treachery.  The  fad  is,  that  this  treachery  was  pre- 
yioufly  certain  and  infalliby  foreknown  by  God. 
Now,  was  Judas  lefs  blamable  than  if  bis  condud  had 
been  previoufly  uncertain,  and  had  taken  place  by 
pure  chance  "^  To  fay,  that  he  was  biamable,  if  this 
conducl  proceeded  from  fclf  determination,  afFoids  no 
fatisfadion,  unlefs  this  felf determination  were  by 
chance.  For  otherwife  the  felf  determining  ad  was  pre- 
vioufly certain  and  morally  neccffary,  and  therefore  li- 
able 


i83 

able  to  all  the  objeflions,  ^vbich  arc  brought  againft 
moral  neceflity  in  any  cafe. 

Blarneworthinefs  is  nothing  but  moral  turpitude  or 
odioufnefs  ;  praifeworthinefs  is  nothing  but  moral 
amiablcnefs  or  excellence.  But  the  moral  amiable- 
uefs  of  an  adtion  does  not  depend  on  the  circumllance, 
that  it  is  efficiently  caufedby  ourfclves  ;  becaufe  tins 
runs  into  theabfurdiiy  and  impoflibility  of  an  infinhe 
feries  of  aftions  cauhng  one  another.  Nor  does  it 
depend  on  this  circumllance,  that  the  a8ion  is,  as  Dr. 
Wed  holds,  uncaufed  ;  for  no  actions  of  creatures 
fall  under  this  defcription.  Either  of  ihofe  hypothe- 
fes  would  fliut  moral  amiablcnefs  and  odioufneis  out 
of  the  world. 

That  moral  neceflity  or  previous  certainty  of  mor- 
al conduft  is  confident  with  moral  difcernment,  may 
be  argued  from  the  cafe  of  the  faints  and  angels  in 
heaven.  It  will  not  be  pretended,  but  that  there  is 
a  certainty,  that  they  will  continue  in  their  date  of 
perfe6l  holinefs  and  happinefs  to  eternity.  Nor  will 
it  be  pretended,  but  that  they  are  the  fubjeds  of  mor- 
al difcernment  and  of  that  virtue  and  holinefs  which 
is  truly  amiable  in  the  moral  fenfe,  and  the  proper 
objecl  of  approbation  and  reward.  Therefore 
moral  neceflity  is  not  inconfident  with  praife  and 
blame. 

I  need  not  infift  on  the  neceflary  holinefs  of  God 
and  of  our  Lord  Jefus  Chrid. 

The  writers  in  oppofition  to  moral  neceflity  infift 
much  on  its  inconfidence  with  accountablenefs.  This 
is  rea^ly  no  other  than  to  infid,  that  it  is  inconfident 
with  praife  and  blame  or  with  moral  agency  ;  aiid  i& 
the  fame  objedion,  which  wc  have  been  confidering. 
To  be  accountable  is  to  be  liable  to  be  called  to  an 
account  for  an  aftion,  and  to  be  the  proper  fubjecl  of 
reward  or  punifhment.  But  this  is  no  other  than  to  be 
worthy  of  praife  or  blame,  and  to  defcrve  love  or 
hatred,  complacency  or  difapprobation,on  account  of 
moral  temper  or  condu6t.  So  that  what  has  been 
M  4  laid 


i84 

faid  concerning  praife  and  blame,  is  equally  applica- 
ble to  accountablenefs. 

It  has  been  long  fince  fhown  by  Prefident  Edwards, 
that  the  moral  amiablenefs  and  odioufnefs  of  a6lions, 
and  their  deCert  of  praife  or  blame,  or  the  eflcnce  of 
virtue  and  vice,  depend  not  on  die  circumftance, 
ihataSions  arc  efficiently  caufed  by  the  fubjeft  ;  but 
that  the  aQ.s  themfelves,  without  any  confideration  of 
their  efficient  caufe,  are  amiable  or  odious  :  As  oth- 
erwife  virtue  and  vice  will  be  thrown  back  from  the 
caufed  aB,  to  the  caufmg  aft,  till  they  are  thrown  out 
of  the  univerfe.  If  they  confift  not  in  a6ls  of  the 
will  themfelves,  but  in  the  acl^  by  which  they  are 
caufed,  as  thefe  caufing  atts  are  alfo  caufed,  virtue 
and  vice  mull  for  the  lame  reafon  confifl:  not  in  them, 
but  thofe  by  which  they  are  caufed,  and  fo  on  to  an 
aft  which  is  not  caufed.  But  this  being  not  caufed 
by  the  fubjeft,  can,  on  the  principle  of  our  opponents, 
have  no  virtue  or  vice  m  it.  Thus  there  would  be 
no  place  found  in  the  univerfe  for  virtue  and  vice  : 
Not  in  the  caufe-l  atts,  becaufe  virtue  and  vice  con- 
lilt  not  in  them,  but  in  their  caufe.  Not  in  any  un- 
caufed  aQ  or  a6tsj  becaufe  they,  by  the  fuppofition, 
are  not  caufed  by  their  fubjeft.  There  is  no  way  to 
avoid  this  confequenc.e,  but  to  allow  that  virtue  and 
vice,  defert  of  praife  and  blame,  confift,  in  the  a61;s 
themfelves  and  not  in  their  caufe  ;  or  if  there  be 
any  virtue  or  vice  in  the  caufe,  this  is  diftinft  froni 
the  virtue  or  vice,  which  there  is  in  the  a6ts  them- 
felves. If  I  be  accountable  for  any  volition,  for  the 
fole  reafon,  that  I  caufe  it  ;  then  I  am  accountable 
for  the  aft,  by  which  I  caufe  it,  for  the  fole  reafon, 
that  I  caufe  that,  and  fo  on  in  an  infinite  feries. 

Befides  ;  the  mere  circumftance,  that  I  caufe  my 
own  volition,  does  not  on  the  principles  of  our  oppo- 
nents, make  me  accountable  for  it  :  Becaufe  that  I 
Ihould  caufe  it  may  be  a  matter  of  previous  certain- 
ty, as  it  may  be  foreknown,  and  even  decreed,  by 
God,  that  I  fhall  caufe  it ;  and  therefore  I  caufe  it 

not 


not  freely  in  the  fenfc  of  our  opponents,  but  nccdfa- 
riiy,  under  the  influence  ofabfolute   moral  ncccifity. 

3ut  Dr.  Welt  holds,  that  all  our  volitions  are  with- 
outcaufe.  I'hen  they  take  place  by  blind  fate  or  chance. 
And  how,  on  his  principles,  art' we  accountable  for  them? 

The  true  ground  of  accountablenefs  and  of  praife 
and  blame,  is  not  the  circumnance,  that  we  ourlclvcs 
efficiently  caufe  our  own  volitions ;  or  the  circum- 
Itance,  that  they  take  place  without  caufe,  by  mere 
chance;  but  the  nature,  moral  aipeft  and  tendency  of 
ihofe  volitions,  and  of  the  aftions  which  flow  from  them. 

Our  opponents  oblerve,  that  we  allow,  that  men 
mud  be  the  voluntary  caufes  of  their  external  adions.^ 
in  order  to  be  accountable  for  them  :  And  then  they  afli, 
why  we  do  not  for  the  fame  realbn  allow,  that  we  muR 
be  the  voluntary  caufes  of  our  a61s  of  will,  that  we  mav 
be  accountable  for  them  ?  The  anfwer  is,  that  external 
anions  are  not  volitions.  The  volitions  of  rational 
beings,  are  in  their  own  nature  moral  ads,  and  for 
that  reafon  the  fubjeOs  of  them  are  accountable  lor 
them.  Bui  external  adions  are  not  of  a  moral  nature 
in  themfelves,  and  therefore  the  fubjeBs  of  them  are  ac- 
countable for  them  then  only,  when  they  aiethe  effefls 
of  volition.  Bcfides ;  that  external  aBions  fliould  be  the 
cfTefts  of  volition  does  not  run  into  the  abfurdity  of 
an  infinite  feries,  as  is  implied  in  the  fuppofition,  that 
all  volitions  are  the  effctts  of  previous  volitions. 

Dr.  Weft  fays, "  I  have  already  fhown,  that  necef- 
"  fity  fhuts  out  all  fenfeof  vilenefsand  unworthinefs ;" 
Part  II,  p.  39.  Where  he  has  fhown  this,  he  has  net 
informed  us.  If  he  had,  perhaps  his  readers,  on  pe- 
rulal  of  the  pafl'age,  would  not  have  joined  with  him  in 
the  opinion,  that  he  had  fhown  it.  For  my  part,  I 
cannot  find,  that  he  has  fhown   it   in   any  part  of  hi:; 

two  books. If  moral  ncceifity,  which   is  previous 

certain  futurity  of  a  nunal  aft,  "  fhut  out  all  fi^nfe  of 
"  vilenefs  and  unworlhinefs  ;"  then  it  fcems,  that  in  or- 
der that  a  man  may  have  anv  fenfe  of  vilenefs  in  fin, 
he  muft  a£l  without  anv  previous  certainty  in  the  na- 
ture 


i86 

ture  of  things,  or  in  divine  foreknowledge,  what  his 
adions  will  be  ;  i.  e.  he  mull  a6l  by  mere  chance. 

8.  It  is  objeded,  that  this  do6lrine  of  moral  necef- 

fity  makes   men  mere  machines. This  objetlion, 

which  is  frequently  made  by  all  our  opponents,  de- 
pends on  the  fenfe  affixed  to  the  word  machine.  If  it 
mean  an  intelligent  voluntary  agent,  who  does  not  aft 
by  perfe£l  contingence  or  chance,  and  who  does  not 
take  one  ftep  before  his  firft  ftep  ;  but  afts  from  fuch 
motives  and  purfues  llich  objefts,  as  appear  to  him 
moft  eligible  ;  I  grant,  that  we  are  machines  :  And  in 
the  fame  fenfe  the  faints  and  angels  in  heaven,  and  all 
intelligent  beings,  are  machines.  But  whether  it  be 
not  a  great  abufe  of  language,  and  whether  it  be  not 
an  artifice  of  our  opponents,  to  excite  a  popular  pre- 
judice and  clamour  againft  our  do6lrine,  to  life  the 
word  machine  in  this  fenfe  ;  1  leave  the  reader  to 
judge. If  by  machine  be  meant,  what  is  common- 
ly meant  by  it,  a  mere  material  engine,  without  voli- 
tion, knowledge  or  thought  in  itfelf ;  I  prefume,  that 
our  opponents  ihemfelves  will  not  pretend,  that  on 
our  principles,  men  are  fuch  machines  as  this. 

Do  thofe  who  make  this  obje6lion,  hold,  that  the 
human  underftanding  is  a  7nachine  ?  Or  that,  in  under- 
Itanding,  reafoning,  judging,  remembering,  &c.  man 
aQ.s  mechanically  ?  Yet  all  grant,  that  in  thefe  things 
he  afts  necelTarily. 

If  moral  neceffity  imply,that  we  are  machines,  then 
whatever  induces  a  moral  neceffity,  or  actually  influ- 
ences or  perfuades  us  to  any  conduft,  turns  us  into  ma- 
chines. Now  the  oppofers  of  moral  neceffity  often 
fpeak  of  the  aids  of  grace  and  of  the  Spirit,  as  necef- 
fary  and  influential  to  virtue  and  religion.  But  if 
any  man  become  the  fubjeft  of  true  virtue  or  piety 
hy  the  aids  of  God's  grace^  fo  far  he  is  paffive,  he  is 
wrought  upon  and  governed  by  an  extrinfic  caufe, 
and  his  conduft  is  the  cfTefl  of  that  caufe.  But 
every  eiFe6l  is  nccejfary  with  refpeft  to  its  caufe. 
Therefore  whoever  is  led  by  this  caufe  to  virtue  or 

piety. 


piety,  is  led  neccfTarily,  and  according  to  the  objec- 
tion now  before  us,  is  {mued'uiio  d.mciemachnie. - 

On  the  groun.l  oFihis  objetlion  ail  finners  abandon- 
ed by  God,  a!l  the  damned  and  devils  in  hell,  all  the 
faints  and  angels  in  heaven,  the  man  Chnft  jefus,  and 

even  God  himfelf,  are  mere  machines. How  ncccl- 

fary  it  is,  that  thofe  who  make  an  objeftion  to  any 
fyiiem,  fhould  confider  tirit  whether  the  objection  be 
not  equally  forcible  againft  doftrines  which  they 
ihemfelves  hold  ! 

9.  It  is  further  objeBed,  that  moral  neceffity  places 

men,  with  refpett  to  liberty,  on  a  level  with  brutes. 

If  by  liberty  be  meant  contingence  or  previous  un- 
certainty, 1  grant  that  the  actions  of  men  and  brutes 
are  in  this  fenfe  eq\ially  void  of  liberty  ;  a  previous 
certainty  attends  them  enually.  Or  if  it  could  be 
made  to  appear,  that  the  atlions  of  men  arc  previ- 
oufly  uncertain  ;  I  (hould  maintain,  that  thole  of 
brutes  are  equally  uncertain,  and  in  this  fenfe  equally 

free. If  by  liberty  be  meant  exemption  from  ex- 

trinfic  caufality  of  volition  ;  1  grant,  that  in  this 
fenfe  alfo  the  adionsof  men  and  brutes  are  equally 
void  of  liberty.  Men  no  more  manufadure  their 
own  volitions,  than  brutes  ;  and  there  is  no  more  ev- 
idence, that  men  act  without  motive  or  defign,  than 
that  brutes  do.  But  if  by  liberty  be  meant  rational 
liberty,  the  liberty  of  «  moj-al  agent,  I  hold  that  men 
are  pofTcfTed  of  this,  and  brutes  not.  Brutes  are  no 
moral  agents  ;  but  it  is  for  the  want  of  reafon  and 
intelligence,  not  of  any  power  of  will.  If  Sir  Ifaac 
Xewion's  horfe  had  had  as  much  reafon  and  knowl- 
edge as  his  mafter',  he  no  doubt  would  have  had  as 
much  moral  liberty,  and  would  have  been  equally  a 
moral  agent  and  equally  accountable.  Without  rea- 
fon and  intelligence,  thouoh  a  horfe  (liould  have  a 
liberty  of  perfetl  uncertainty  and  adt  by  the  purelt 
chance  ;  and  though  he  Ihould  propagate  one  voli- 
tion by  another,  or  without  another,  with  ever  lb  great 
dexterity  ;  he  would  be  a  brute  Ihll,  and  no  more  3 

moral 


i88 

moral  agent,  than  he  is  now  that  he  aBs  by  motive 
or  appetite.  So  that  the  difference  between  a  man 
and  a  beaft,  as  to  moral  agency,  confids  not  in  liber- 
ty of  contingence  or  hberty  of  felf-determination  ; 
but  in  reafon  and  knowledge. 

We  might  on  this  fiibjeB  venture  to  turn  the  tables 
on  our  opponents,  and  hold,  that  if  a  power  of  felf-de- 
termination be  liberty,  brutes  are  free  as  well  as  men. 
The  afs  determining  to  eat  of  one  of  two  equally  good 
bundles  of  hay,  is  as  good  an  inftance  to  prove,  that  fhe 
has  a  felf-determining  power,  as  any  brought  to  prove 
it  in  men.  So  that  if  thofe  inftances  prove  it  in  men, 
this  proves  it  in  brutes.  Self-determining  power  then 
is  nothing  diftin6live  between  men  and  brutes. 

The  capacity  of  confidering  and  judging,  of  dif- 
tinguifliing  virtue  and  vic^of  deliberating,  reafoning, 
refleeling,  and  fufpending,  have  been  mentioned  as 
diitinguifliing  between  men  and  brutes.  But  all 
thefe,  except  fufpending^  are  ads  of  the  intelleQ,  not 
of  the  will  :  And  fufpenfion,  though  an  aQ  of  the 
•will,  does  not  appear  to  imply  felf-determination  more 
than  any  other  ad  of  the  will.  Befides  ;  brutes  fuf- 
pend,  as  well  as  men.  A  dog  in  quell  of  his  mafter, 
will  fufpend  proceeding  in  any  road,  till  he  is  fatisfied, 
in  which  his  mailer  has  gone.  And  Ihecp,  a  more 
flupid  race,  on  hearing  a  dog  bark,  will  often  iuf- 
pend  their  flight,  till  they  fee  from  what  quarter  their 
enemy  is  approaching. 

It  is  faid,  that  external  liberty  and  fpontaneity  be- 
long to  brutes  and  mad  men,  as  well  as  to  rational 
men.     Be  it  fo  ;  yet  the  power  and  proper  exercife 

of  reafon  does  not  belong  to  them. It  is  faid,  that 

if  an  action's  being  voluntary  makes  it  virtuous  or 
vicious  ;  then  brutes  would  be  the  fubjefts  of  virtue 
or  vice.  But  merely  that  an  aftion  is  voluntary  does 
not  conrtitute  it  virtuous  or  vicious.  '  It  muft  befidcs 
be  the  action  of  a  rational  being. 

Dr.  Clarke,  the    greateft    champion  for  the  felf- 
determining     power,    exprefsly    grants    that     chil- 
dren,' 


i89 

dren,  beafls  and  even  every  living  creature  pofl'cls  il. 
Remarks  on  ColJins,  p.  27.  "  The  adions  of  chiU 
*'  dren,  and  the  a6lions  of  every  living  creature  are 
*'  ali  of  them  effentially  free.  The  mechanical  and 
«'  involuntary  motion  of  their  bodies,  fuch  as  the  pul- 
«'  fation  of  the  heart  and  the  like,  are  indeed  all  nee- 
«4  efTary  ;  but  they  are  none  of  them  anions.  Every 
«  aHion,  every  motion  ariling  from  the  filf-moving 
«  principle,  is  e{reniiallyy7T(?.  The  difference  is  this 
<«  only,  in  men  this  phylical  liberty  is  joined  with  a 
«  fenfe  or  confcioulnefs  of  moral  good  or  evil,  and 
«  is  therefore  eminently  called  liberty.  In  beafls 
"  the  fame  phyfical  liberty  or  felf-moving  power,  is 
*«  wholly  feparatc  from  a  fenfe  or  confcioufnefs  or  ca- 
"  pacity  of  judging  of  moral  good  or  evil  and  is  vul- 
"  garly  called  fpontaneity.  In  children  the  fame 
*«  phyfical  liberty  always  is  from  the  very  beginning; 
"  and  in  proportion  as  they  increaie  in  age  and  in  ca- 
"  pacity  of  judging,  they  grow  continually  in  degree 
"  not  more  Jree,  but  more  moral,  agents."  Thus  we 
have  the  DoBor's  authority,  that  children  and  beafts 
poffefs  a  felf-determining  power,  as  well  as  men,  and 
that  they  are  not  only  as  really  free  as  men,  but  that 
their  freedom  is  in  degree  equal  to  that  of  men  ;  and 
that  what  they  want  to  conftitute  them  moral  agents, 
is  not  liberty,  but  rcafon  and  a  capacity  of  judging. 
lO.  Much  has  been  faid  by  Dr.  Clarke  and  oth- 
ers after  him,  concerning  the  beginning  of  motion  ;  by 
motion  meaning  volition,  if  they  mean  any  thing  to 
the  purpofe.  The  argument  is,  that  if  motion,  i.  e, 
volition,  had  a  beginning,  it  was  begun  by  God,  and 
of  courfe  he  had  a  felf-moving  or  felf-determining 
power,  a  power  efficiently  to  caufe  volition  in  him- 
felf,  and  aQually  did  thus  caufe  it.  That  volition 
even  in  the  Deity  had  a  beginning,  the  Do8or  ar- 
gues thus  ;  "  Motion  muft  cither  finally  be  rcfolvcd 
*'  into  a  firft  mover,  in  whom  confcquentlv  there  is 
"  liberty  of  aftion,"  i.  e.  fclf-determinaiion,  *•  or  elfe 
"  into  an  infinite  chain  of  caufcs  a»d  efFcds  without 

"  any 


igO 

"  any  caufe  at  all ;  which  is  an  exprefs  contradidioq, 
"  except  motion  could  be  necefl'arily  exiflent  in  its 
"  own  nature  ;  which  that  it  is  not,  is  evident,  be- 
"  caufe  the  idea  of  reft  is  no  contradiftion  j  and  alio  be- 
^'  caufe  there  being  no  motion  without  a  particular 
*'  determination  one  certain  way,  and  no  one  deler- 
<*  mination  being  more  necefl'ary  than  another,  an  ef- 
"  fential  and  neceflnry  tendency  to  motion  in  all  de- 
"  terminations  equally,  could  never  have  produced 
''  any  motion  at  all."  Remarks  on  Collins,  p.  ii,  12. 
Motion  throughout  this  quotation  means  internal  mo- 
tion ar  volition,  or  the  whole  is  nothing  to  the  pur- 
pofe.  I  grant  that  external  motion,  the  motion  of 
matter,  had  a  beginning,  and  that  after  the  creation 
of  matter.  But  the  whole  queftion  is  concerning  vo- 
lition, the  aft  or  motion  of  the  mind.  That  this  is 
not  neceffarily  exiftent,  and  therefore  not  from  eter- 
nity, the  Dotlor  argues  firfl;  from  this,  that  "the  idea 
of  reft,"  i.  e,  of  an  entire  abfence  or  non-exiftence 
of  volition,  "  is  no  contradiBion."  It  is  doubdefs  as 
much  and  in  the  fame  fenfe  a  contradiBion,  as  the 
idea  of  the  entire  non-exiftence  of  knowledge  or  in- 
telligence, or  of  all  being  -.  And  if  this  argument  prove, 
that  volition  had  a  beginning,  it  will  equally  prove, 
that  knowledge  or  the  divine  exiftence  had  a  begin- 
ning. Volition  isjuft  as  neceffarily  exiftent  as  God  is  ; 
without  volition  he  would  not  be  God.  It  is  impof- 
lible,  that  God  fliould  from  eternity  have  intelligence 
and  not  from  eternity  have  volition. 

The  DoftoF  goes  on  to  argue  the  beginning  of  vo- 
lition thus ;  "  There  being  no  motion,  i.  e.  volition, 
''  without  a  particular  determination  one  certain  way, 
"  and  no  one  determination  being  in  nature  more 
*'  necedary  than  another,  an  efiential  and  neceffary 
"  tendency  to  volition  in  all  determinations  equally, 
"  could  never  have  produced  any  volition  at  all." 
On  this  I  obfervc, 

1.  That  by  the  lame  argument  all  intelleftual  ideas 
and  perceptions  of  happincfsin  the  divine  mind  have 


^9^ 

a  beginning  ;  tlius,  There  being  no  intellc6lual  idea 
without  a  particular  determination  one  way,  and  no 
one  determination  being  in  nature  more  necelTary 
than  another,  an  elTcntial  and  neceflary  tendency  to 
all  determinations  of  idea  equally,  could  never  have 
produced  any  idea  at  all.  And  with  regard  to  per- 
ception of  happinefs,  thus  ;  There  being  no  percep- 
tion of  happinefs  or  mifery  without  a  particular  de- 
termination one  certain  way,  and  no  one  determina- 
tion being  in  nature  more  neceffary  than  another,  an 
eflential  and  neceflary  tendency  to  the  perception  of 
happinefs  or  mifery  in  all  determinations  equally 
could  never  have  produced  any  particular  percep 

tion  of  them  at  all. The  fame  argument  will  prove 

that  God's  exiftence  is  not  eternal  and  neceflary  ;  thus. 
There  can  be  no  being,  who  is  not  a  particular,  dc 
terminate  being  ;  and  no  particular  form  or  kind 
of  being  is  in  nature  more  neceflary  than  another. 
But  an  elfcntial  and  neceflary  tendency  to  exiftencc 
in  all  forms  and  kinds  equally,  could  never  have 
been  the  foundation  of  any  particular  being  at  all. 

If  in  thefe  cafes  it  fliould  be  objefted,  that  one 
determination  of  idea  is  in  nature  more  neceflary  than 
another  ;  that  which  is  according  to  truth  and  fa6l,  is 
more  neceflary  than  that  which  is  contrary  to  truth  ; 
and  that  feeling  of  happinefs,  and  that  form  of  cxift- 
cnce  which  is  mod  complete  and  perfeft,  is  more 
neceflary,  than  that  which  is  lefs  perfcft  :  1  anfwer, 
for  the  fame  reafon,  it  muft  be  granted,  that  the  vo- 
lition which  is  mofl  rational,  wile  and  holy,  is  more 
neceflary,  than  that  which  is  lefs  wife  and  holy  ;  and 
therefore  this  particular  volition  or  determination  of 
will  is  neceflarily  exiflent  in  its  own  nature,  and  is 
without  beginning. 

2.  From  the  luppofition,  that  the  volitions  of  God 
are  not  eternal  and  as  neceflarily  exiftcnt  as  the  di- 
vine knowledge  or  divine  exiftence,  it  follows,  that  he 
is  very  far  from  an  unchangeable  being  ;  that  from 
elcrniiy  he  exifted  without  any  volition  or  choice  of 

one 


19^ 

one  thing  in  preference  to  another  ;  that  when  the 
eternity  a  parte  ante^  as  it  is  called,  had  run  out,  he 
began  to  will  and  choofe,  and  from  that  time  he  has 
been  the  fubjefl  of  various  ads  of  v/ill,  but  never 
before,  and  therefore  has  been  the  fubjeft  of  a  very 
great  change. 

That  God  Uiould  from  eternity  exift  ir-ithout  vo- 
lition, and  that  in  time  he  fhould  become  the  fubjecl 
of  volition,  implies  not  only  a  very  great  change  in 
God,  but  that  from  eternity  he  was  not  a  voluntary 
agent,  and  therefore  no  agent  at  all.  So  that  the 
very  argument  which  Dr.  Clarke  ufes  to  prove,  that 
God  is  a  felf-dcterminate  agent,  in  faft  does,  direflly 
contrary  to  his  intention,  prove,  that  he  was  from  eter- 
nity no  agent  at  all. 

If  God  began  volition  in  himfelf,  he  began  it  either 
voluntarily  or  involuntarily.  If  he  began  it  voluntarily, 
he  would  be  the  fubje6l  of  an  infinite  feries  of  volitions 
caufing  one  another;  whichisanabfurdity,  impoffibili- 
ty  and  contradiflion.  If  he  began  it  involuntarily,  he 
did  not  begin  it  freely. 

In  his  remarks  on  Collins,  p.  6,  Dr.  Clarke  fays, 
"  To  be  an  agent  fignifies,  to  have  a  power  of  begin- 
*'  ning  motion."  Motion  here,  if  it  be  at  all  to  the 
purpofe,  mud  mean  volition  :  And  to  fay,  "  To  be  an 
"  agent  fignifies  to  have  a  power  of  beginning  volition." 
is  a  fervile  begging  of  the  queftion,  utterly  unworthy 
of  Dr.  Clarke. 

In  the  fame  book,  p.  44,  he  obferves,  "  That  if  mo- 

«'tion  exift  neceffarily  of  itfelf with  a  determina- 

"  tion  one  certain  way  ;  then  that  determination  is 
"  neceffary,  and  confequcntly  all  other  determina- 
'•  lions  impoflible  ;  which  is  contrary  to  experience." 
And  how  does  it  appear  by  experience,  that  any  oth- 
er determinations  of  will  are,  or  ever  were,  pofTible 
in  the  divine  mind,  than  that  which  aftually  exifts  in 
it  ?  Did  Dr.  Clarke  experience  divine  exercifes,  and 
find  by  that  experience,  that  other  volitions  are  pof- 
fiblc  in  God  than  what    adually  exift  ?  Surely  this 

was 


was  written  by  the  Doftor  with  great  inattention  ! 

If  to  fave  the  Do6lor  it  fhould  be  f,iid,  that  this  ob- 
fervation  relates  not  to  volition,  but  to  the  motion  of 
matter  ;  this,  if  it  were  the  meaning  of  the  Do6lor, 
would  ar;;uc  equal  inattention.  Would  he  have  im- 
agined, that  becaufe  the  motion  of  matter  is  not  from 
eternity  and  neccfl'arily  cxiflent  ;  therefore  the  fame 
is  true  of  thought  and  volition  ? 

11.  Self-determination  has  been  argued  from  the 
irregular  condu6l  of  mankind,  and  efpecially  from 
the  confideration,  that  their  moral  exercifes  are  fo  ir- 
regular and  out  of  courfe.  But  the  exercifes  and 
conduft  of  men,  are  not  more  irregular  than  the  blow- 
ing of  the  wind,  or  the  (late  of  maw's  body  often  is  in 
fickncfs.  Yet  it  will  not  be  pretended,  that  this  con- 
fideration proves,  that  ficknefs  or  the  blowing  of  the 
wind  is  felf-determinate. 

12.  Dr.  Weft  objeds,  that  "according  to  Mr.  Ed- 
"  wards,  the  mind  muft  always  be  governed  by  chance 
*•  or  accident ;  i.  e.  by  fomething  unforefeen  or  not  de- 
"  figned  bvthe  mind  beforehand.  Thus,let  a  man's  mind 
"be  ever  fo  ftrongly  determined  at  prefent,  topurfue 
"any  particular  obje£l,  yet  thatextrinfic  caufe,  which 
*'  has  the  entire  command  of  his  will,  may  the  next 
"  hour  fruftrate  ail  his  purpofcs,  and  determine  him  to 
"  a  quite  contrary  purfuit.  If  this  is  not  to  be  gov- 
"  erned  by  blind  fate  and  chance,  I  know  not  what  is." 
Fart  II,  p.  31. On  this  I  obfervc, 

1.  Whether  the  Da6 or  do  or  do  not  know, 
what  it  is  to  be  governed  by  blind  fate  and  chance, 
is  of  no  importance  to  his  readers  ;  and  what  a  pity, 
that  he  fhould  confume  fo  much  of  his  own  and  his 
readers'  lime,  in  appeals  to  himfelf  as  an  authority. 

2.  According  10  this  account,  to  be  under  the 
govcrnin;^  influence  of  any  extrinfic  caufe,  is  to  be 
governed  by  blind  fate  arid  chance.  Therefore  the 
planetary  fyftem  and  all  the  material  world  are  under 
the  government  of  blmd  faie  and  chance  ;  fo  were 
the  prophets  and  apoilles,  fo  far  as  they  were  infpired 

N"  and 


194 

and  influenced  by  the  Spirit  of  Godi  Does  Dr.  Weft 
acknowledge  this  ?  If  not,  mult  he  not  own,  that  when 
he  wrote  the  pafTage  above  quoted,  he  was  miftaken  in 
his  idea  of  being  governed  by  blind  fate  and  chance  ? 
3.  Doubtlefs  Prefident  Edwards  holds,  that  the 
human  mind  is  often  governed  by  motives  "  un- 
«  forefeen  and  not  defigned  by  the  mind  before- 
«  hand."  And  as  Dr.  Weft  holds,  that  the  mind 
never  a6ls  without  motive,  unlefs  he  hold  alfo,  that 
it  always  forefees  beforehand,  the  motives  on  which  it 
will  in  future  a6},  he  muft  join  with  Prefident  Ed- 
wards in  the  idea,  that  it  afts  on,  or  which  is  the  fame, 
is  governed  by  motives  "  unforefeen  and  not  defign- 
ed by  the  mind  beforehand  :"  And  therefore  on  the 
fame  gro\ind,  on  which  he  charges  Prefident  Edwards 
vith  holding  principles,  which  imply  that  the  mind  is 
governed  by  blind  fate  and  chance,  he  may  be  charg- 
ed with  the  fame. 

-  He  alfo  holds,  that  God  "  regulates  and  governs 
"all  things  and  fets  bounds  to  the  actions  of  all  ra- 
'*  tional  creatures,  to  bring  about  his  own  purpofes," 
and  that  "  infallibly."  Part  II,  p.  46,  47.  "  That 
"  the  Deity  governs  free  agents  as  perJeHly  and  viakes 
"  them  perform  his  purpofes  as  m/allibly,  as  though 
"  they  had  no  agency  at  all."  Ibid,  p.  67.  And  that 
"every  thinghjirmlyjixed  in  the  divine  mind."  Ibid, 
p.  49.  Now  the  Deity  is  a  caufe  extrinfic  to  the  hti- 
man  mind,  and  by  conceflion,  he  regulates,  governs, 
and  overrules  all  the  aftions  of  intelligent  creatures, 
and  makes  them  infallibly  perform  his  purpofes.  There- 
fore "  let  a  man's  mind  be  ever  foftrongly  determin- 
"  ed  at  prefent  to  purfue  any  particular  objetl,  yet 
"  that  extrinfic  caufe,"  the  Deity,  "  which  has  the 
*'  entire  command  of  liis  will,  may,"  and  certainly 
will,  '•  fruftrate  all  his  purpofes,"  unlefs  the  objeft  of 
his  purfuit  be  agreeable  to  the  purpofes  of  the  De- 
ity. Now  then  I  appeal  to  the  reader,  whether  Dr. 
Weft  do  not  as  fully  hold  ihofe  principles  which  he 
fays  imply,  that  men  are  governed  by  blind  fate  and 
chance,  as  Prefi^ient  Edwards.  CHAPTER. 


^95 


CHAPTER     VIl/. 

'In  which  is  coiijidered  the  Obje&ion,  that  Moral  Nccejfi- 
ty  mplieSi  that  God  is  the  Author  of  Sin. 

IT  is  objeBed  to  tlie  doftrine  of  moral  neceflityi 
fliiU  fince  this  ncceflity  and  the  conneclion  between 
motives  and  volitions  are  eftablifhed  by  God,  he  is 
the  author  of  all  the  fin  and  wickednefs  in  the  uni- 
verfe  ;  that  he  by  the  motives  which  he  lays  before 
creatures,  tempts  them  to  fin,  and  is  himfelf  anfwera- 
ble  for  all  the  fin  committed  by  them.  And  a  great 
deal  of  vehement  declamation  is  poured  out  on  this 
fuhjeft,  well  fuiied  to  take  hold  of  the  feelings  and 
paflions  of  men,  but  not  to  inform  their  underfland- 
ings  and  affilt  their  reafon. 

Before  we  proceed  to  amoredireft  and  particular 
confideration  of  this  objeflion,  it  is  proper  to  fhow  in 
what  fenfe  the  advocates  for  moral  neceffity  hold  that 
the  divine  agency  is  concerned  in  the  exiflcnce  of  fin. 

1.  They  do  hold,  that  all  neceffity  and  certainty 
or  certain  futurity,  whether  of  natural  or  moral  events, 
is  eftablifhed  by  God  ;  of  courle  that  the  connedioii 
between  all  caufes  and  tfl'e6ls,  and  particularly  the: 
connection  between  motives  and  volitions,  is  eftab- 
lifhed  by  the  fime  fupreme  agent. 

?..  They  hold,  that  all  things,  which  come  to  pafa 
in  time,  were  certainly  foreordained  by  God  from  e- 
ternity ;  that  he  foreor  dained  them  not  in  conftquence 
of  forefeeing,  that  the  free  will  of  man  will  bring 
them  into  exiftcnce  ;  but  the  free  will  of  man  brings 
them  into  exiftence,  in  confequenceof  the  divine  de- 
cree, fo  far  as  that  will  does  at  all  bring  them  into  ex- 
iftence. 

3.  They  hold,  that  whatever  fin  takes  place  among 

creatures,  takes  pl.ice  not  by  the  bare  permifljion  or 

non-influence  of   God  ;  but  under   his  fuperiniend- 

X  2  ing 


ing  providence,  and  in  confequence  of  his  difpofing 
things  fo,  that  fin  certainly  or  with  moral    neceffity, 

follows. Prefident  Edwards  has  explained  himfelf 

fully  on  this  head.  Inquiry,  p.  254  ;  *'  If  by  the  au- 
^^tkor  offm  be  meant  thej'zn/zcr,  the  agent  ov  adlor  of 
"  fin,  or  the  doer  of  a  wicked  thing  ;  fo  it  would  be 
"  a  reproach  and  blafphemy,  to  fuppofe  God  to  be  the 
"  author  of  fin.  In  this  fenfe  I  utterly  deny  God  to 
"  be  the  author  of  fin  ;  rejecting  fuch  an  imputation 
"  on  the  Mod  High,  as  what  is  infinitely  to  be  abhor- 
"  red  ;  and  deny  any  fuch  thing  to  be  the  confe- 
"  quence  of  what  I  have  laid  down.  But  if  by  author  of 
^^  fin  is  meant  the  permitter  or  not  hinderer  of  fin,  and 
'*  at  the  fame  time,  a  dfpofer  of  the  fate  of  events  in  fuch 
*•  a  manner,  for  wife,  holy  and  moft  excellent  ends  and 
"  purpofes,  THAT  SIN,  if  it  bepermitted  andnot  hinder- 

*'  edjWILL   MOST   CERTAINLY   FOLLOW 1    do  HOt 

"  deny,  that  God  is  the  author  of  fin it  is  no  re- 

"  proach  for  the  Moft  High  to  be  thus  the  author  of  fin." 

The  objediions  againft  fuch  an  agency  of.  God  in 
the  exiftence  of  fin,  as  has  been  now  defcribed,  are 
two  ;  (1)  That  fuch  divine  agency  is  inconfiftent  with 
human  liberty,  moral  agency  and  accountablenefs  : 
(2)  That  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  perfeft  holinefs  of 
God.  Before  I  anfwer  thefe  objeftions  diftinftly, 
1  wi(h  it  to  be  obferved,  that  they  are  inconfiftent 
and  mutually  deftroy  each  other. 

If  the  divine  agency  in  the  eftablifliment  of  moral 
neceffity  and  the  connexion  between  motives  and  vo- 
litions, be  inconfiftent  with  our  liberty  and  moral  a- 
gency ;  then  God  in  eftabliftiing  fuch  a  neceffity  of 
any  adion  in  us,  which  we  call  fin,  is  not  the  caufe 
or  author  offn  ;  for  his  agency  fo  far  from  produc- 
ing fin  in  us,  renders  us  incapable  of  fin.  Suppofe 
God  with  moral  neceffity  influence  a  man  to  kill  an- 
other with  malice  prepenfe  ;  if  this  neceffitating  influ- 
ence as  really  deftroy  his  moral  agency,  as  if  it  turn- 
ed him  into  a  windmill,  though  the  man  kills  the 
©therj  he  commits  no  more  fin  in  it;  than  if  a  windmill 

had 


^97 

had  killed  hira  ;  and  confequently  God  is  no  more 
the  author  of  fin  in  this  inflance,  than  if  he  had  in- 
fluenced the  windmill  to  kill  him,  or  had  firft  turned 
the  man  into  a  windmill,  and  this  windmill  had  in 
the  courfe  of  providence  been  the  inftrument  of  his 
death.  So  that  they  who  hold,  that  moral  neceffity 
is  inconfiftent  with  moral  agency,  muft  never  objedt, 
that  GodisMi?  author  ofjin^  by  eftablilhingthatnecef 
fity,  and  thus  aBs  inconfillenily  with  his  perfeftholinefs. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  God  do  influence  any  man 
to  commit  fin,  and  thus  afl;  inconfiftently  with  his  perfeft 
holinefs,  the  man  is  a  moral  agent  notwithftanding  fuch 
influence,  and  there  is  no  foundation  to  objeft,  that  the 
influence  is  inconfiftent  with  liberty  and  moral  agcn. 
cy  ;  and  they  who  obje6l  that  fuch  influence  implies, 
that  God  is  the  author  of  Jin,  muft  forever  be  filent 
concerning  the  inconfiftency  of  that  influence  with 
human  liberty  and  moral  agency. 

If  moral  neceflity  be  inconfiftent  with  moral  agency, 
it  is  abfolutely  impoffible  and  contradiftory  for  God 
lo  difpofe  things  fo,  that  fin  will  certainly  or  with  moral 
neceflity  follow.  For  on  thisfuppofition  whatever  cer- 
tainly follows  fuch  a  difpofal  cannot  be  fin  or  any  other 
moral  a6t,  as  moral  agency  is  in  the  cafe  deftroyed  by 
the  difpofal.  Therefore  it  is  impoflTible,  that  God  in 
this  way  fliould  caufe  fin,  and  therefore  it  is  abfurd 
and  felf-contradiBory  in  thofe  who  hold,  that  moral 
neceflity  is  inconfiftent  with  moral  agency,  to  charge 
us  with  blafphemy,  as  they  frequently  do,  becaufe  we 
avow  the  fentiment,  that  God  fo  difpofes  events  that 
fm  certainly  follows. 

Yet  fo  far  as  I  know,  all  thofe  who  oppofe  moral 
neceflity,  make  both  the  obje8ions  before  mentioned, 
and  thus  pull  down  with  one  hand,  what  they  buildup 
with  the  other.     This  is  eminently  true  of  Dr.  Weft. 

I  now  proceed  to  confider  thofe  obje8ions  dif- 
tinaiy. 

1.  It  isobjefted,  that  a  divine  agency  eftablifliing 

a  moral  neceflity  of  fin,  is  inconfiftent  with    human 

N  3  liberty, 


iiberty,  moral  agency  and  accountablenefs.— -» 
Anfwer  :  The  divine  agency  in  this  cafe  js  no 
more  inconfiftent  with  human  liberty,  &c.  than  the 
njoral  ncceffity  which  il  eflabliflies.  If  this  neceffity  be 
incor)fiftent  with  liberty,  be  it  fo ;  the  divine  agency 
which  caufcs  it,  does  not  increafe  the  inconfiftency, 
beyond  what  would  be,  if  that  neceflity  took  place 
■without  fuch  agency.  A  mountain  placed  acrofs  the 
.channel  of  a  river,  may  be  inconfiftent  with  the 
river's  flowing  in  that  channel.  But  whether  it  were 
placed  there  by  God,  were  conftruQed  there  by  human 
art  and  labour,  or  happened  there  without  caufe,  are 
queftions  immaterial  as  to  the  river's  running  in  that 
channel,  fg  long  as  the  mountain  is  the  very  fame. 
Therefore  let  our  opponents  prove,  that  moral  necef- 
lity or  a  previous  certainty  of  moral  a6lions,  j^  irjconfift- 
pnt  with  moral  agency,  and  that  moral  agents  tnuft 
a5t  by  perfeft  coniingence,  mere  chance  and  blind  fate, 
and  they  will  carry  their  point,  without  faying  a  word 
concerning  the  divine  agency  :  And  until  they  prove 
this,  whatever  they  may  fay  concerning  the  divine 
agency,  will  ferye  no  good  purpofe  to  their  caufe,  as 
to  this  part  of  the  argument. 

2.  It  is  objeded,  that  for  God  to  eftablifli  a  moral 
neceflity  of  fjn,  or  as  Prefident  Edwards  expreiles  it, 
?'  for  God  to  difpofe  of  the  (late  of  events  in  fuch  ^ 
"  manner,  for  wife,  holy  and  moft  excellent  ends, 
"  that  fin  will  mt>ft  certainly   and  infallibly  follow;" 

is  inconfiftent  with  ti,e  perfe£l  hoiinefs  of  God. 

But  in  y»'hat  refpeflsis  it  inconfiftent  with  his  hoiinefs.? 
Or  for  what  reafons  are  we  to  conclude,  that  it  is  in- 
confiftent with  his  hoiinefs  ?  So  far  as  I  have  been 
able  10  coUeti  the  reafons  from  the  ableft. writers  on 
that  fide  of  the  queftion,  they  are  thcfe  : 

(i)  That  whatever  is  in  the  effcft  is  in  the  caufe, 
and  the  nature  of  every  caufe  may  be  known  by  the 
effe6l.  Therefore  if  God  foorder  things,  that  fin  will 
certainly  follow,  he  is  the  caufe  of  fin,  and  therefore 

is  finlul  himfelf. If  this  argument  be  good,  Go4 

'  '     '  is 


^99 

is  the  fubjeft  of  pain,  ficknefs  and  death,  fmce  he  is 
the  caufe  of  them  :  He  is  material  and  is  the  fubjeft 
of  ail  the  properties  of  matter,  extenfion,  fohdity,  mo- 
bility, figure,  colour,  Szc.  becaufc  he  created  matter 
and  all  its  properties.     Yea  he  fuffers  the  torments  of 

hell,    bccaufe  he  inflitls  ihcm, This    argument, 

though  urged  by  men  of  great  fame,  is  too  weak  and 
abfurd  to  bear  inrpe6lion  ! 

(2)  If  God  difpofe  things  fo,  that  fm  will  certainly 
follow  ;  he  doubtlefs  takes  pleafure  in  fin,  and   this 

implies  fin  in  God  himfelf. If  God  do  take  a  di- 

redl  and  immediate  complacency  in  fin,  it  is  granted, 
that  this  would  imply  fin  in  God.  But  if  he  cboofe 
the  exigence  of  fin  as  a  mean  of  good  only,  as  pain 
and  ficknefs  may  be  the  means  of  good  ;  this  implies; 
no  fin  in  God.  Nor  does  it  follow  from  his  difpofing 
things  fo,  that  fin  certainly  takes  place,  that  he  does 
direftly  delight  in  fin  itlelf  ab(lra6^ly  confidcred,  any 
more  than  it  follows  from  his  inflifting  ficknefs  and 
mifery  on  his  creatures,  that  he  takes  a  dire£t  com- 
placency in  thcfe.  And  we  do  not  allow,  but  utterly 
deny,  that  God  from  a  dire6l  complacencey  in  fin 
difpofes  things  fo,  that  it  certainly  follows.  If  our  op- 
ponents believe  that  a  direfl  complacency  of  God  in 
lin  is  implied  in  our  doftrine,  it  behoves  them  to 
make  it  out,  and  not  to  take  it  for  granted. 

Dr.  Weft  infifts   on  this  argument.  Part  II,  p.  43. 

"  If  the  Deity  produces  finful  volitions then  fin 

"  is  his  own  work and  then  he   cannot  hate    fin, 

*'  but  mult  love  it  and  delight  in  it."  It  fcems  the 
Dodor  forcfaw  that  to  this  argument  it  would  be  an- 
fwered  that  God's  producing  fin  in  the  manner  before 
explained,  no  more  implies  a  dirc6l  complacency  in 
it,  than  his  producing  mifery  implies  a  dire£l  compla- 
cency in  that  ;  and   he  replies,  that  "  the   two  cafc^ 

"  are  by  no  means  parallel that   the   Deity  is  no 

"  where  reprefcnted  as  being  angry  at  his  creatures, 

"  becaufe   they  fuflTcr  pain   and   difirefs whereas. 

"with regard  to  moral  evil,  Godisalwaysreprefentcd 
N  4  ^'  as 


200 

^'  as  haling  it,  and  punifhlng  the  impenitent."  To 
this  1  rejoin,  that  the  want  of  parallehlm  does  not  ap- 
pear. P'or  though  God  is  not  reprefenled  to  be  an- 
gry at  pain  and  mi/cry,  as  they  are  not  the  proper  ob- 
je6ls  of  anger  ;  yet  he  is  reprefented  to  be  difpleafed 
with  them  j  and  anger  is  only  one  kind  of  difpleafure, 
(difpleafure  at  moral  evil.  And  if  God  do  produce  a 
thing,  with  which  he  is  difpleafed,  why  may  he  not 
produce  a  thing  with  which  he  is  angry,  and  which  he 
is  difpofed  to  punifh  as  it  deferves  ?  Let  a  reafon  be 
given,  why  he  may  not  do  the  latter,  as  well  as  the 
former. 

(3)  God  hates  fin  and  doubtlefs  he  mufl  hate  to 
bring  it  into  exiftence  ;  and  therefore  he  will  notfo  dif- 
pofe  things,  that  it  will  certainly  come  into  exiftence. 
But  God  hates  the  pain,  mifery  and  death  of  his  crea- 
tures in  the  fame  fenle,  that  he  hates  (in  ;  yet  we  fincj 
in  faft,  that  he  docs  difpofe  things  fo,  that  they 
do  take  place  among  his  creatures. 

(4)  That  God  fhould  fo  difpofe  of  events,  that  .finr 
is  the  certain  confcquence,  is  doing  evil,  that  good 
may  come  of  it  ;  which  is  contrary   to  fcripture,  as 

well  as  reafon. -This  is   merely  aiferting,  bat    not 

proving  what  is  afleried.  Hov/  does  it  appear,  that 
for  God  fo  to  difpofe  of  events,  that  fm  is  the  certain 
confequence,  and  this  to  fubferve  the  moft  wife 
and  holy  pi{.rpofes,  is  dojng  evil  ?  To  do  evil  is  to 
commit  fin  }  and  to  fay  that  this  is  to  commit  fin.  is 
to  beg  the  queftion.  Let  it  be  proved  to  imply,  that 
God  commits  fin,  and  the  point  is  gained.  We  af- 
fert,  that  to  fay,  fuch  a  dtfpofal  implies,  that  God  com- 
miis  fin,  is  as  groundlefs  a  propofiiion,  as  to  fay,  that 
if  God  fo  difpofe  of  events,  that  ficknefsis  the  certain 
confequence,  implies,  that  God  himfelf  is  fick.  I 
prefume.  it  will  not  be  denied,  that  God  did  fo  dif- 
pofe of  events,  that  the  certain  confequence  would  be 
that  jofeph  fiiould  be  fold  into  Fgypt,  and  that  our 
Saviour  Ihould  be  crucified.  Nor  will  it  be  denied, 
^hat  God  made  this  difpofition  of  events  with  a   holy 

an4 


201 

and  wife  purpafe.  And  if  God  may  do  thi$  in  one 
or  two  iuHanccs  ;  why  may  he  not  do  the  fame  in 
every  jn(tance,  in  which  (in  atlually  exids  ? 

(5)  That  God  fliould  make  an  eftabliflimenl  V/heve- 
by  any  creature  is  laid  under  a  moral  necciluy  of  fin-, 
ning  is  a  great  injury,  both  lo  the  creature  himfelf, 
and  alfo  to  the  fyllem  ;  as  all  fin  is  injurious  lo   the 

fyflem. Anlwer  :  What  injury  can  be  pretended  to 

be  done  to  the  creature,  who  is  the  fubjc6lof  ihe  fin, 
in  the  cafe  defcribed,  fo  long  as  his  liberty  and  moral 
agency  remain  entire  ?  And  they  do  remain  entire  by 
the  fuppofition  ;  elfe  he  would  be  incapable  of  fin. 
A  creature  which  is  not,  and  fo  long  as  it  remains  to 
be,  not  a  moral  agent,  cannot  be  influenced  even  by 
God  himfelf  to  commit  fin  :  It  would  imply  a  contra- 
di£lion.  So  that  there  is  no  foui^dation  for  com- 
plaint, that  the  fubjetl  is  injured,  by  being  laid  un- 
der a  moral   neceffity,  or  previous   certainty,  of  lin- 

ning. Befides;  this  objection  in)plies,  that  every 

moral  agent  is  injured,  unlcf;;  it  be  a  matter  of  per- 
fect uncertainty,  what  his  future  atlions  fhall  be,  un- 
certainty not  only  to  himfelf  and  all  creatures,  but  to 
God  and  in  the  nature  of  things  ;  i.  e.  every  moral 
agent  is  injured,  pnlefs  he  be  left  to  a6l  by  puie 
chance. 

With  regard  (o  injury  lo  the  fyftem  of  intelligent 
beings,  there  is,  ifpollible,  Itilllefs  foundation  for  ob- 
jetlion  on  this  ground.  For  it  is  a  part  of  the  doc- 
trine of  moral  neceffity,  that  God  never  eflabliihes  it, 
excepting  when  it's  eliablifhment  is  fiibfervicni  and 
neceffary  lo  the  general  good  of  that  f\  fiem,  in;pl\  int; 
the  divine  glory  ;  and  to  be  furc,  that  God  never  fa 
difpofes  of  events,  that  fin  certainly  follows,  unlefs 
fuch  a  difpenfalion  is  neceffary  to  the  general  good  : 
Nor  ought  the  contrary  to  be  taken  for  granted.  If 
God  do  in  any  infiance  fo  difpofe  of  events,  that  fii.i 
certainly  follows,  when  the  exidence  of  that  fin  is  net 
neceflary  to  the  general  good,  but  injurious  to  it  ;  [ 
confefsj  I  fee  not  how  in  this  cafe,  the  divine  holinefs 

can 


202 

can  be  vindicated.  But  this  is  nothing  peculiar  to 
the  introdudion  of  fin.  It  would  alfo  be  inconfiftent 
Avith  the  divine  perfeft  holinefs  and  wifdom  lo  create 
matter,  or  to  caufe  holinefs,  in  fuch  circumftances  as 
lo  differve  the  general  good" 

(6)  It  is  inquired,  Where  is  the  confidence  between 
God's  laying  a  man  under  a  moral  necefiity  of  finning, 
and  then  punifhing  him  for  that  fin  ? 1  anfwer, 

1.  How  can  God  confidently  make  a  man  fick,  and 
then  apply  medicines  or  any  remedy  toward  his 
reftoration  ?  Punifhment  is  inflifted  to  prevent  either 
the  fubjeft  of  the  punifiiment,  or  others,  from  falling 
into  the  fame  pratlice.  If  there  be  no  inconfiftence 
in  bringing  ficknefs  on  a  man,  and  then  healing  him 
by  medicine  ;  where  is  the  inconfiftence  in  bringing 
fin,  which  is  moral  ficknefs,  on  a  man,  and  whereby  both 
he  and  that  fyftem  are  fo  far  morally  difeafed,  and 
then  by  punin:iment  healing  him  or  the  (yftem  ? 

2.  There  is  no  confiftence  in  the  cafe,  if  moral 
neceffity  be  incompatible  with  moral  agency.  But 
if  it  be  entirely  compatible  with  moral  agency,  there 
is  no  inconfiftence  in  the  cafe  :  For  in  la\in!J  a  man 
under  a  moral  necefiity  o^Jinning^  as  he  is  fuppofed 
iiWlio  fin^  nothing  is  done  to  impair  his  moral  agency 
or  his  defert  of  punifhment.  On  this  fuppofition  it 
is  immaterial  as  to  defert  of  punifhment,  who  or  what 
is  the  caufe  of  the  moral  necefliity,  whether  God  or 
any  other  being,  or  whether  it  happen  without  caufe. 
Therefore  God  may  as  confiftently  punifh  a  finner, 
whom  he  himfelf  has  laid  under  a  moral  necefi[jty  of 
finning,  as  he  may  punifli  him,  provided  he  be  laid 
under  the  fame  moral  necefiity  by  any  other  being, 
or  by  mere  chance.  ]f  moral  necefiity  be  entirely 
confident  with  defert  of  punifhment,  it  is  as  imper- 
tinent to  afk  bow  God  can  confiftently  lay  a  man  un- 
der a  moral  neccfTity  of  finning  and  then  punifii  him 
for  it,  as  to  aflv  bow  God  can  confiftently  make  a  man 
of  a  dark  complexion  or  a  low  ftature  and  then  pun- 
ifh him,  for  any  fins,  which  he  may  commit.     For 

moral 


203 

moral  nccefCny  is  no  more  incohfiftent  with  fin  and 
detVrt  of  punifhnicnt,  than  a  dark  complexion  or  a 
low  (taturc.  To  lay  a  man  under  a  moral  necelTity 
of  finning,  is  to  make  it  certain,  that  he  will  fin  :  And 
to  afk  how  God  can  confidently  make  it  certain,  that 
be  will  fin,  and  then  punifh  him  for  that  fin,  implies 
that  previous  certainty  is  inconfiftent  with  fin,  and 
that  in  order  to  fin  a  man  muft  atl  by  mere  chance. 
It  is  no  more  inconfiftent,  for  God  to  forbid  men  to 
fin,  and  yet  h  difpofe  things,  that  they  certainly  will 
commit  fin  ;  than  it  is  to  forbid  them  to  fin,  and  yet 
voluntarily  to  fuffer  other  caufes  to  lead  them  into 
fin.  Nay,  fince  liberty  is  out  of  the  queftion,  as  by 
the  very  flatement  of  the  obje8ion,  it  allows,  that  not- 
\vithftanding  the  divine  difpofal,  the  man  who  is  thq 
fubje6t  of  that  difpofal  does  commit  Jin  ;  it  is  no 
more  inconfiflent  for  God  to  forbid  men  to  fin.  and 
yet  fo  difpofe  things,  that  fin  will  follow,  than  ii  i.s 
for  him  to  forbid  it,  and  yet  voluntarily  permit  men  tQ 
fin  by  felfdetermination.  For  in  Hifpofing  things  fo 
that  fin  follows,  when  the  difpofal  is  fuppofed  to 
be  confident  with  fin  and  moral  agency,  nothing  can 
be  pretended  to  be  inconfillent  with  the  prohibition 
of  fin,  unlefs  it  be  the  divine  confept,  that  fin  fliould 
come  into  exiftcnce  ;  and  this  equally  exifts  in  the 
cafe  of  bare  permiflTion,  as  in  the  cafe  of  the  aforcfaid 
difpofal.  The  law  of  God,  which  forbids  all  fin,  does 
not  imply,  that  God  will  prevent  fin,  by  introducmg 
the  greater  evil  of  defiroying  moral  agency.  Nor 
docs  it  imply,  that  he  will  not  confent  in  his  own 
mind,  that  it  be  committed  by  men  or  other  moral 
agents,  rather  than  the  faid  greater  evil  or  other  as 
;^rcat  evil  (hould  take  place.  Tiicrefore  rather 
than  that  the  fame  or  as  great  an  evil  Ihould  take 
plac  e,  the  Deity  may  not  only  conferit  to  the  exill- 
ence  of  fin,  hut  may  confent,  that  fccond  caufes,  mo- 
tives, temptations,  &c.  fhould  do  whatever  they  can 
do,  toward  the  introdu6lion  of  it,  confidently  with  the 
freedom  of  ihc  creature.     He  may  do  all  this  without 

inconfiftcncc 


204 

inconfiftence  and  infincerity.  The  prohibition  of  fin 
in  the  law  does  not  imply  a  wifh  or  choice  of  the  di- 
vine mind,  all  things  conlidered,  that  fin  fhould  not 
be  committed.  It  barely  points  out  our  duty,  but 
reveals  nothing  of  God's  defign,  whether  or  not  to  per- 
mit it,  or  to  difpofe  things  fo,  that  it  will  follow. 
Therefore  there  is  no  inconfiftence  between  this  pro- 
hibition  and  fuch  a  difpofal  in  providence,  as  will  be 
followed  by  fin. A  good  mafter  may  ftridly  for- 
bid his  fervant  to  fteal  ;  yet  convinced,  that  he  does 
fteal,  the  mafter  may  in  a  particular  cafe,  wifh  him  to 
flea!,  and  even  leave  money  expofed  to  him,  that  he 
may  fteal,  and  ultimately  with  a  defign  that  an  advan- 
tage may  be  put  into  the  matter's  hand,  to  convi6l,  pun- 
ifti  and  reform  his  fervant.  There  is  no  inconfiftence 
in  the  mafter's  thus  forbidding  theft,  and  yet  from  the 
motive  before  meniioned  wifhing  to  have  it  committed. 

(7)  It  is  faid,  that  if  God  choofe  that  the  fmiulnefs 
of  volitions  fliould  come  into  exiftence,  and  if  he  fo 
difpofe  events,  that  it  will  certainly  come  into  exift- 
ence ;  there  is  no  difference  between  this,  and  God's 

being  himfelf  the  fubjedt  of  fmful  volitions. 1  an- 

fwer,  there  is  the  fame  difference  in  this  cafe,  as  there 
is  between  God's  choofing  that  a  man  fliould  be  fick, 
and  being  the  fubjeft  of  ficknefs  himfelf  ;  as  there  is 
between  creating  matter,  and  being  himfelf  material ; 
and  as  there  is  between  willing  andcaufingthe  damna- 
tion of  a  finner,  and  being  himfelf  the  fubjeft  of  dam- 
nation.  It  will  not  be  pretended,  that  if  God  difpofe 
events  and  circumftances  in  fuch  a  manner,  that  re- 
pentance, godly  forrow,  faith  in  a  Redeemer,  fubmif- 
fion  and  holy  fear,  take  place  in  the  heart  of  a  man, 
God  himfelf  is  the  fubje6l  of  thofe  exercifes. 

If,  though  human  liberty  be  left  entire,  God  can- 
not fb  difpofe  things,  that  fin  will  certainly  follow, 
without  being  himfelf  the  fubje6l  of  a  difpofition 
friendly  to  fin  ;  he  cannot  without  the  fame  implica- 
tion choofe,  that  fin  fhould  take  place,  rather  than  a 
greater  evil.     But  our  opponents  allow,  that  God  did 

choofe, 


^Q5 

choofe,  that  fin  fhoiild  take  place,  rather  than  a  great- 
er evil  ;  they  allow,  that  he  had  a  pcrfeft  foreknowl- 
edge, that  if  he  fhould  create  man  with  a  felf-deter- 
mining  power,  and  leave  him  to  the  free  exercife  of 
that  power,  the  confequence  would  be,  that  he  would 
commit  fin.  Therefore  they  allow,  that  God  chofe, 
that  fin  fhould  come  into  exigence,  rather  than  hu- 
man liberty  fhould  be  deflroyedjand  rather  than  free 
agents  fhould  not  be  brought  intoexifience.  So  that 
in  the  fame  fenfe,  in  which  we  hold,  that  God  chofe 
or  was  willing,  that  fin  fhould  come  into  exiflence, 
our  opponents  hold  the  fame.  We  hold,  that  God 
chofe  that  fin  fhould  take  place,  rather  than  a  greater 
evil  ;  and  therefore  difpofed  of  events  confiftently 
with  human  liberty,  fo  that  it  certainly  followed. 
They  hold,  that  God  chofe,  that  fin  fliould  take  place, 
rather  than  a  greater  evil,  and  therefore  difpofed  of 
events,  confidently  with  human  liberty,  fothat  it  cer- 
cainly  followed,  and  when  God  certainly  forefaw,  that 
it  would  follow. 

In  that  our  opponents  charge  us  with  holding  prin- 
ciples, which  imply,  that  God  is  the  author  of  fin^xhty 
allow,  that  whatever  God  does  according  to  our  prin- 
ciples toward  the  introdu61ion  of  fin,  is  confident  with 
free  agency  in  the  fubjc6t  of  fin.  This  muft  be  con- 
ceded by  them  ;  elfe  their  charge  is  perfcttly  incon- 
fiftent  and  felfcontradifclory,  as  has  been  fhown. 
Therefore  fince  it  is  allowed,  that  whatever  God  has 
done  toward  the  exiftence  of  fin,  is  confiflcnt  with 
the  creature's  free  agency,  the  only  queflion  remain- 
ing, is,  whether  he  have  adled  in  this  affair,  with  a 
holy  and  wife  defign,  a  defign  to  promote  the  gener- 
al good  :  And  we  arque  from  the  effential  perfeflions 
of  God,  that  whatever  he  has  done  in  this,  as  well  as 
in  every  other  inllance,  mufl  have  been  done  with 
fuch  a  defign. 

If  it  be  faid,  that  fin  cannot  even  bv  the  Deity,  be 
made  fubfcrvient  to  good  ;  the  qucliion  will  arife, 
why  then  did  he  fo  dilpofe  circumllanccs  that  it  did 

come 


-o6 

come  into  eNiftencp,  and  this  when  he  forcfaw  theJ 
conC^qirence  ?  To  anfwer,  that  he  could  not,  confift- 
ently  with  free  agency,  keep  it  out  of  exiltence,  is  on 
the  prefent  fuppofition  groundlels.  It  is  now  fuppof- 
ed,  that  God  did  bring  it  into  exiftence,  confidently 
with  free  agency  ;  and  therefore  he  could  doubtlefs 
keep  it  out  of  exiftence,  confiftently  with  the  fame 
free  agency. 

If  the  exiftence  of  fin  be  ultimately  made  fubfervi- 
ent  to  good,  or  if  it  be  neceflary  to  the  prevention  of 
greater  evil  ;  what  reafon  in  the  world,  can  be  given^ 
why  God  fhould  not  bring  it  into  exiftence,  in  a  way 
confiftent  with  human  free  agency  ?  In  this  way  it 
muft  be  brought  into  exiftence,  if  at  all. Our  op- 
ponents themlelvcs  allow,  as  has  been  obferved,  that 
the  exiftence  of  it  was  neceftary  to  the  prevention  of 
greater  evil,  the  evil  ofdeftroying  human  liberty,  or  of 
the  non-exiftence  of  free  agents  :  And  for  God  in  this 
view  to'confent  to  the  exiftence  of  (in,  as  our  oppo- 
nents grant  that  he  did,  is  as  inconfiftent  with  his 
moral  charafter,  as  to  give  the  fame  confent  and  to 
put  forth  any  exertion  toward  its  exiftence,  confiftent 
with  human  liberty.  So  long  as  the  exertion  is  con- 
fiftent with  liberty,  it  cannot  be  pretended,  that  there 
is  any  thing  in  it  more  oppofile  to  the  moral  charac- 
ter of  God  or  more  friendly  to  fin,  than  there  is  in 
the  confent  implied  in  that  permiffion  of  fin,  which 
our  opponents  hold.  Therefore  their  plan  is  in  this 
refpetl  equally  liable  to  the  fame  objeftion  of  being 
inconfiftent  with  the  moral  chara6ler  of  God,  as  our's. 

(8)  Dr.  Weft  argues,  that  if  the  Deity  order  things 
io  that  finful  volition  follow,  "  he  muft  place  the  ob- 
"  jecl  in  fuch  a  view  before  the  mind,  as  to  make  it 
"  appear  the  greateft  good  under  prefent  circumftan- 
"  ces  ;  which  implies,  that  he  prefents  the  objeft  in 
"  a  falfe  point  of  light,  and  eftedually  deceives  the 
"mind;"  and  '•  theapoftlewas  under  a  great  miftakc. 
"  when  heTaid,  it  was  impoftible  for  God  to  lie  ;" 
and  to  lie  is  fin.     The  Do6lor,  as  ufual,  tells  us,  "  I 

"  can 


20'/ 

"  can  have  no  idea,  that  the  Deity  can  produce  a  fin- 
"  ful  volition  in  the  human  mind,  in  any  other  wav, 
"  than  what  I  have  now  defcribcd  ;"  Part  II,  p* 
41. On  this  I  remark  ; 

1.  It  is  very  imn^aterial  to  others,  what  Dr.  Weft 
can,  and  what  he  cannot,  have  an  idea  of.  Does  the 
Dottor  mean  this  as  an  argument,  that  no  other  per- 
fon  can  have  an  idea  of  it,  or  that  it  cannot  be  true  ? 

2.  If  when  he  fpeaks  of  God's  making  fin  appear 
the  greateft  good,  he  mean,  that  he  makes  it  appear 
fo  to  a  man's  unbiafed  reafon,  this  is  not  true,  nor  is 
it  pretended  by  any  man. 

3.  When  fin  appears  to  any  man  the  greateft 
good,  it  is  in  confequence  of  the  influence  of  his  cor- 
rupt appetites,  and  not  by  the  dictates  of  his  unbiafed 
reafon.  How  a  man  becomes  the  lubjeti  of  corrupt 
appetite,  I  do  not  undertake  to  fay  any  further  than 
Prefident  Edwards  has  faid  already,  that  God  has  dif- 
pofed  things  fo,  that  it  takes  place  as  an  infallible  confe- 
quence. But  if  God  fo  difpoi'e  things,  that  an  inordi- 
nate appetite  for  ftrong  drink  lake  place  in  the  mind 
of  a  man,  and  by  the  itifluence  of  fuch  appetite  ftrong 
drink  appear  to  him  the  greated  good  ;  does  it  hence 
follow,  that  God  is  a  liar  ?  Will  Dr.  Well  affert  it .? 
If  not,  the  ground  of  his  argument  fails. 

The  Do6tor  further  obfervcs,  that  "•  if  God  is  the 
"author  of  men's  lulls,  he  deceives  them,  by  caufing 
"  them  to  view  things   through   the  falle  medium  of 

"  their  lulls  ;"  ibid,   p.    4*,   43. The   exprellion, 

"  God  is  the  author  of  men's  lulls,"  is  the  Poftor's,  not 
Prefident  Edwards's.  It  tendsto  miflead,  and  cannot 
be  admitted,  without  explanation  and  qualifying. 
Suppofe  a  man  by  leading  his  neighbour,  fiequenily 
into  the  immoderate  ufe  of  ilrong  drink,  fliould  pro- 
duce an  appetite  for  it  in  his  neighbour, fo  tjiat  hence- 
forward flrong  drink  fliould  appear  to  him  the  greatcit 
good  ;  is  the  man,  who  does  this,  a  liar  ?  Whether 
he  be  guilty  of  other  fin,  than  lying,  is  nothing  to  the 
prefect  piirpofe  ;  for  Dr.    Wcd'i  argument  is,  that 

God 


20S  • 

God  byproducingluft  in  men,  deceives  the  man  infuch 
a  fenfe,  as  to  difprove  the  words  of  the  apoftle,  that 
God  cannot  lie.  l{  the  man  above  fuppofed  be  not 
guihy  of  lying,  neither  is  the  Deity  in  fo  difpofing 
things,  that  luft  infallibly  follows. 

(9)  "  If  the  Deity  be  the  pofitive  efficient  caufe  of 
"  fin,  then  there  can  be  no  foundation  for  repentance  : 
"  For  how  can  a  man  repent  or  be  forry,  that  he  is  juft 
«  fuch  a  creature,  in  every  refpeft,  as  the  Almighty  has 

"  been  pleafed  to  make  him  ?"  Ibid,  p.  44. 'With  the 

fame  objedion  to  the  expreffion,  "  pofitive  efficient 
caufe  of  ^n,"  I  obferve,  that  this  argument  is  equally 
good  with  refped  to  pain,  ficknefs  and  calamity  j  and 
•will  prove  that  no  manought  to  be  forry  for  any  calamity 
befalling  liimfelf  or  others  :  For  "  how  can  a  man  be 
forry,  that  he  is  juft  fuch  a  creature,"  juft  as  mifera- 
ble,  "  as  God  has  made  him  ?"  If  the  Do£tor  fay,  that 
though  calamity  in  itfelf  is  an  evil  and  therefore  to 
be  regretted  ;  yet  as  God  fends  it,  he  will  overrule  it 
for  good,  and  that  in  that  view  it  is  not  to  be  regret- 
ted ;  the  fame  obfervations  are  applicable  to  the  ex- 
iftence  of  fin.  Sin  in  itfelf  confidered  is  infinitely 
vile  and  abominable,  and  proper  matter  of  forrowand 
repentance.  But  confidering  that  it  no  more  came 
into  exiftence  without  the  defign  and  providence  of 
God,  than  calamity  did  ;  and  confidering,  thatiis  ex- 
iftence will  be  certainly  overruled  for  final  good  ;  its 
exiftence  is  no  more  to  be  regretted,  than  the  exift- 
ence of  calamity  and  mifery,  efpecially  extreme  and 
eternal  mifery. 

The  Doftor  proceeds  ;  "  What  remorfe  of  con- 
"fciencecan  there  be,  when  the  finner  believes  that 
"  every  finful  volition  was  formed  in  him  by  the  De- 
"  ity  ?"  Ibid.  Sinful  volitions  proceed  from  fome  caufe, 
or  no  caufe.  If  they  proceed  from  no  caufe,  what 
remorfe  of  confciencc  can  there  be,  when  the  finner 
believes  and  knows,  that  every  finful  volition  happen- 
ed in  him  bv  pure  chance  ?  If  finful  volitions  pro- 
ceed from  fome  caufe,  that  caufe  is  either  the  finner 

himfeif 


himfelf  or  fome  extrinfic  caufe.  If  they  proceed 
from  any  other  extrinfic  caufe,  befide  the  Deity,  the 
fame  difficuhy  will  arife,  and  it  may  be  afked  with  the 
fame  pertinency,  as  the  above  queftion  is  afked  by 
Dr.  Welt,  What  t-emorfe  of  confcience  can  there  be, 
when  the  fmner  beheves,  that  every  finful  vohtion 
was  formed  in  him  by  an  extrinfic  caufe  ?  Ifthe  effi- 
cient caufe  be  the  finncr  himfelf,  then  "  felf  a61s  on 
felf  and  produces  volition,"  which  the  Doctor  denies: 
And  if  he  did  not  deny  it,  it  is  abfurd  and  impoffible,  as 
it  runs  into  an  infinite  lericsof  volitions  propagating  one 
another,  and  yet  all  thisferies  would  really  amount  to  but 
one  fingle  volition,  and  this,  as  there  would  not  then 
be  a  preceding  caufal  volition,  would  not  be  efficient- 
ly, voluntarily  and  freely  caufed  by  the  fubje6l  himfelf. 

Befides;  ifthe  fubje6i:  efficiently  caufe  his  own 
volitions,  he  either  caufes  them  under  the  influence 
of  motives  or  not.  If  he  caufe  them  under  the  in- 
fluence of  motives,  he  caufes  them  neceflarily,  and  a6ls 
neceffarilyin  caufingthem  ;  andDr.  Weft  fays, "  Where 
*'neceffity  begins,  liberty  ends  ;"  ibid, p.  19.  There- 
fore if  a  man  cfhciently  caufe  his  own  volitions  io  as 
to  be  free  from  necelfity,  he  mufl  caufe  them  with- 
out motive,  aim  or  end  ;  i.  e.  he  muft  caufe  them  in 
perfe£l  flupidity,  and  in  the  exercile  of  Dr.  WefVs 
torpid  liberty  of  not  ading.  And  then  I  atk,  what 
remorfe  of  confcience  can  there  be,  when  the  (inner 
believes,  that  he  himfelf  caufed  every  finful  volition 
in  himfelf,  as  involuntarily  as  a  man  in  a  convulfion 
ftrikes  his  friend,  and  as  flupidly  and  unmeaningly  as 
a  door  turns  on  its  hinges  ? 

Remorfe  of  confcience  is  a  fenfe  of  having  done 
wrong  J  and  whenever  3t  perfon  has  done  wrong, 
there  is  a  foundation  for  remorfe  of  confcience;  and 
to  take  it  for  granted,  that  there  can  be  no  remorfe  cf 
confcience,  unlefs  we  determine  our  own  volitions,  is 
to  take  it  for  granted,  that  wiiliout  felf  determination  we 
can  do  no  wrong  and  are  no  moral  agents  ;  which  is 
to  beg  the  wain  qucdion  in  this  controverfv.  Let  it 
O  be 


ato 

be  ftiown,  that  without  felf-determination,  we  are  not 
tnoral  agents,  and  one  important  Hep  will  be  taken 
toward  fettling  this  controverfy.  Yet  even  this  Hep 
will  not  be  decifive  :  It  muft  be  alfo  fliown,  that  our 
felf-determination  was  not  previoufly  certain,  but  is 
fexercifed  ^y  mere  chance  :  For  if  it  be  previoufly 
certain,  it  is  morally  neceflary. 

(lo)  If  God  have  fo  difpofed  of  events,  that  fin 
certainly  follows,  it  is  his  work  ;  and  to  be  oppofed 
to  fin  is  "  to  be  oppofed  to  God's  work,  and  to  be  op- 
pofed to  God  ;"  ibid. So  calamity  is  the  work  of 

God,  and  to  be  oppofed  to  that,  is  to  be  oppofed  to 
God's  work,  and  to  be  oppofed  to  God.  And  will  Dr. 
Welt  admit  that  every  one  who  wiflies  to  efcape  any 
calamity,  is  in  a  criminal  manner  oppofing  God  ? 

(ii)"  If  the  Deity  has  formed  finful  volitions  in  a 
"  man^  becaufe  his  glory  could  not  be  promoted 
''  without  it ;  then  furely  the  finner,  if  he  loves  God, 
"  muft  love  him  becatifehe  has  made  him  a  finful  crea- 
«'  ture,  and  ought  to  thank  him  for  all  the  fins,  which 
*'  he  has  committed  ;"  ibid. The  difficulty  attend- 
ing moft  of  Dr.  Weft's  arguments,  is,  that  if  they 
prove  any  thing,  they  prove  too  much,  and  confute 
principles  and  fads,  which  he  will  not  dare  to  deny. 
So  with  refpeft  to  this  argument.  The  Do6lor  will  not 
deny,  that  pain  and  calamity  are  the  work  of  God. 
"  And  if  the  Deity  has"  fent  pain  and  calamity  "on 
"  a  man,  becaufe  his  glory  could  not  be  promoted 
"  without  them  ;  then  furely  the  finner,  if  he  loves 
*  God,  muft  love  him,  becaufe  he  has  made  him  a" 
miferable  "  creature,  and  ought  to  thank  him  for  all" 
the  calamity  and  mifery,  which  he  fuffers,  for  all  his 
ficknefs  and  dangers,  for  the  death  of  his  wife,  chil- 
dren, &c.  Sec.  And  if  a  man  ought  to  thank  God  for 
thefe  things,  no  doubt,  "  a  finner  ought  to  thank  God 
«  for  damnation."  If  thefe  confequences  do  not  in- 
evitably follow  from  the  principle  of  IJr.  Weft's  ar- 
gument, let  the  contrary  be    ftiown,  and  not  merely 

aiferted. -Again  ;  "  If  we  are  to  thank  God  for 

all 


211 

all  the  calamities  and  miferies  which  we  do  or  fhall 
fufFer  ;  "  this  will  imply,  that"  calamity  and  tnifery 
"  are  bieffings  or  favours ;  and  confequentljs^  iF  the 
«  finner  is  to  thank  God  for  damnation,  then  damna- 
«  tion  is  a  bleffing  and  favour- — Hence  finners  who 
«  believe  this  doftrine,  will  be  apt  to  conclude,  that 
«  it  is  a  matter  of  no  confequence,  whether  they  be 
"  faved  or  damned  ;  feeing  upon  either  fuppofition, 
"  they  are  fure  that  whatever  they  receive  from  God 
«  will  be  fuch  a  bleffing,  that  they  ought  to  be  thank- 

*«  ful  for  it."     Ibid,  p.  45.- Thus  may  the  Dodlor's 

arguments  be  retorted  againft  himfelf. 

If  theDoftor  fhould  anfwer,  Though  calamity  and 
mifery  in  themfelves  are  no  bieffings^  yet  wheii  they 
are  overruled  by  God  to  the  good  of  thofe  who  fuffer 
them,  br  to  the  general  good,  they  become  bieffings ; 
I  acknowledge  the  fufficiency  of  the  anfwer.  But 
the  fame  anfwer  may  with  equal  truth  and  force  be 
made  to  his  obfervations  concerning  fin.  The  Doc- 
tor  grants,  that  the  wickednefs  of  the  vicious  fhall  be 
overruled  to  the  glory  of  God  and  the  advancement  of 
thehappinefsofthe  righteous;  ibid,  p.  49.  Though 
wickednefs  is  in  itfelf  no  bleffing  and  no  matter  of 
thankfulnefs  ;  yet  when  God  overrules  it  to  good, 
greatergood  than  could  have  been  efFe6led  in  any  other 
way  ;  in  this  conne6lion  it  is  in  the  fame  fenfe  a  bleffing, 
and  matter  of  thankfulnefs,  as  calamity  and  mifery  are. 

(12)  On  the  plan  of  moral  neceffity,  God  tempts 

mankind  to  fin.- If  the  meaning  of  this   be,  that 

God  eftabliffies  a  connexion  between  motives  and 
volitions,  and  a  previous  certainty  of  thofe  volitions; 
and  in  the  courfe  of  his  providence  brings  into  the 
View  of  men  motives  which  a^ually  influence  them 
to  fin  ;  I  grant,  that  God  does  in  this  fenfe  tempt 
mankind  to  fin  ;  as  he  did  our  firft  parents,  Judas, 
Sec.  Nor  is  there  any  ground,  on  which  this  can  be 
denied,  unlefs  it  be  allowed,  that  t\'s  previous  cer^ 
tainty  is  eftabliffied  by  fome  other  caufethan  the  De- 
ity>  or  that  it  txiUs  without  caufe,  or  that  volitions 
O   2  arc 


are  not  previoufly  certain,  but  happen  by  chance. 
To  hold  that  the  previous  certainty  of  all  volitions  is  ef- 
tablifhed  by  fome  other  caufe  than  God,  is  to  run  in- 
to the  Manichean  fcheme  of  two  Gods,  and  at  the 
fame  time  to  hold,  that  the  fecond  God  is  an  involun- 
tary agent  and  is  the  caufe  of  all  the  volitions  of  the 
voluntary  God,  as  well  as  of  all  creatures.  If  we  fay, 
this  previous  certainty  of  all  volitions  is  uncaufed, 
Ave  may  as  well  fay,  that  every  thing  elfe  is  uncaufed. 
Ifwe  fay,  that  volitions  are  not  previoufly  certain, 
but  happen  by  mere  chance,  we  may  as  well  fay,  that 
every  thing  elfe  happens  by  chance. 

But  if  by  tempting  be  meant  foliciting  or  enticing 
to  fin,  as  the  devil  tempts  men,  we  deny  that  this  is 
implied  in  our  doftrine. 

Dr*  Weft  makes  fome  remarks.  Part  II,  p.  75,  &c.on 
Jam.  i.  13 16,  which  appear  to  be  remarka- 
ble.  1.  He  tells  us,  that  "  a  man  is  tempted,  when 

"  he  confents  to  the  gratification  of  his  own  luft  ;  i.e» 
'•  when  he  commits  fin."     Indeed!  Is  no  man  tempt- 
ed, but  he  who  aftually  commits  fin  in   confequence 
of  the  temptation  ?  The   apoftle  Paul  declares,  A6ls 
XX.  19,  that  he  "  ferved   the  Lord  with  all  humility 
"  of  mind,  and  with  many  tears  and  temptations,  which 
"  befel  him  by  the  lying  in  wait  of  the  Jews."    And 
were  all  thefe  temptations  fuccefsful  with  the  apoftle? 
The    very    text  implies  the  contrary.     Gal.  iv.  14. 
"  And  my  temptation,  which  was  in  my  flefii,  ye  def- 
«'•  pifed  not  nor  rejeQed,  but  received  me  as  an  angel 
«  of  God,  even  as  Chrift  Jefus."     Jam.  i.  2.  "  Count 
"  it  all  joy,  when  ye  fall  into   divers   temptations." 
V.  12.  "Blefledisthe  man,  that endureth  temptation  : 
For  when  he  is  tried,  he  fhall  receive  the  crown  of  life." 
Or  if  Dr.  Weft  fhall  allow,  that  a  man  is  or  may  be 
tempted  without  falling  into  fin,  this  will  fpoil  his  ar- 
gument.    His  words  immediately  following  thofe  laft 
quoted  from  I  iin,  are,  "  This  proves,  that  when  it  is 
«  faid,  neither   tempteth  he  any  man,  the  fenfe  is, 
«'  God  caufeth  no  man  to  fin."    But  if  a  man  may  be 

tempted 


^^3 

tempted  without  committing  fin,  then  God  may 
t€mpt  a  man,  without cauiing  liim  to  fin. 

2.  He  obfervcs  from  Leigh,  that  the  Greek  verb 
tret^a^cc,  ufcd  in  the  paffage  in  James  now  under  con- 
fideration,  fignifies  to  make  trial,  i.  e.  to  try  a  perfon. 
But  becaufc  James  fays  of  God,  neither  tempteth  he 
any  man,  will  Dr.  Weft  adventure  to  fay,  that  God 
never  'ries  any  man  ?  and  particularly  thgt  he  did  not 
try  Abraham? 

3.  Becaufe  this  text  declares,  that  God  does  not 
tempt,  i.  e.  according  to  the  DoQor's  explanation,  try 
any  man,  he  infers  that  God  <'  does  not  caufe  them  to 
"  fin."  This  confequence  follows  not  from  the  prin- 
ciple premifed.  Whether  God  do  or  do  not,  try 
men,  he  may  fo  difpofe  things  that  fin  will  be  the  cer- 
tain confequence  -,  and  this  may  be  done  not  to  try 
any  man. 

4.  He  fays,  that  <' a  voluntary  confcnt  to  indulge  or 
"  gratify  luft,  is  fin."  Yet  in  the  next  fentcnce  he 
fays,  "  the  apoftle  makes  every  fin  to  be  the  effe^  of 
'•  a  confent  to  gratify  fome  particular  luft :"  i.  e.  eve- 
ry fin  is  the  cffe6l  of  fin. 

5-  The  whole  force  of  this  text,  to  prove,  that 
God  does  not  difpofe  things  fo^  that  fin  is  the  cert^ain 
confequence,  if  it  prove  any  thing  to  this  effed,  lies 
in  thefe  words,  "  Neither  tempteth  he  any  man." 
The  Doftorfays,"  thefe  muft  mean.  Neither  caufcth  he 

*«  any  man  to  lin  ;"  ibid,  p.  75. But  if"  the  Deity 

"  infallibly  and  perfe6ily  regulate,  govern  and  fet 
*'. bounds  to  the  a6"Hons  of  all  rational  creatures,  and 
'«  overrule  all  thofe  aftions  to  accomplifli  his  pur- 
*•  pofes,"  if  he  make  them  perform  his  purpofes  infal- 
libly ;  as  Dr.  Weft  fays ;  then  every  thing  which 
they  in  faft  do,  and  every  fin  which  they  commit, 
was  God's  purpofe  and  he  makes  them  perform  it.  Is  he 
then  in  no  fenfe  the  caufe  of  their  fin  ?  Does  he  not  at 
IcaftfodifpofelhingSjthat  finisthecertainconfequcnce? 

Dr.  Weft  abundantly    afferts    thofe  things   which 

neceflarily  imply  both  abfolute  decrees  and  fuch  dif- 

O  3  pofal 


2J4 

pofal  of  God,  that  fin  cettainly  and  infallibly  follows, 
«  The  creature,"  fays  he,  "  in  every  moment  of  its 
««  exiftence,  is  fabje6l  to  the  divine  control ;  confe- 
f'  quently  no  aB  can  take  place,  but  what  the  Deity 
«  iforefaw  and  determined  from  all  eternity  to  overrule 
« to  his  own  glory  and  the  general  good.  If  the  Dei- 
«  ty  forefaw,  that  a  creature  — —would  do  that 
f'  which  could  not  be  overruled  to  the  divine  glory 
'*  and  the  general  good  — — —he  would  rejlrain  him^ 
"  from  doing  that ;"  Part  II,  p.   22.   "  He  who  has 

^'  made  all  things — -  does  regulate  and  govern 

"  all  things,  and y^^s  bounds  to  the  aHions  oj  all  ration- 

"  al  creatures. The   Deity,  by  his  permiflive  de- 

*'}  zxt.t,  fuper intends  ar)d  governs  all  the  aHions  of  his 
f'  creatures  to  accomplifh  his  own purp.ofes,in  as  Jlrong 
f  Offenfe,  as  though  he  brought  them  to  pafs  by  his  pof- 
"  itive  efficiency  ;"  ibid,  p.  46.  "  We  believe,  that 
"  the  lycxiy  governs  and  overrules  the  aflions  of  thefe 
"  beings"  [rational  creatures]] "  to  bring  about  his  own 

f'  purpofes   and   deHojns  as  injallibly, as  though 

^'they  were  mere  pajjive  beings  ;"ibid,  p.  47. 

Now  if  thefe  things  be  fo  ;  no  a9;  of  the  creature 
can  take  place,  but  what  God  determined  from  all  e- 
ternity,  to  overrule  to  his  own  glory.  If  God  re- 
jlrain the  creature  from  the  contrary  ;  if  he  overrule 
all  thofe  aflions  to  accomplifh  his  purpofes,  in  as 
flrong  a  fenfe,  as  though  he  brought  them  to  pafs  by  his 
pofit'iye  efficiency,  and  as  infallibly  as  though  they 
■were  mere  paffive  beings  ;  then  certainly  he  does 
difpbfe  things  fo,  that  all  thofe  a8ions  do  infallibly  take 
place.  To  be  fubje6l  to  the  control  of  our  Creator 
in  every  moment  of  our  exiftence,  fo  that  no  aft  can 
take  place  in  us,  but  what  God  from  eternity  deter- 
mined-yKoht.  regulated  andgoverned  by  God  mall  things-, 
if  he  fet  bounds  to  all  our  anions  ;  and  if  he  govern 
and  overrule  all  our  a£lions  in  as  ftrong  a  fenfe  as 
if  he  brought  them  to  pafs  by  his pojitive  efficiency,and 
as  infallibly  as  though  they" were  mere  pajfive  beings  ; 
furely  all  this  implies,  that  God  does  fo  difpofe  of  e- 

ventSj 


vents,  tliat  fin  certainly  follows.  And  on  this  plan, 
vhere  is  feif-de termination  ?  Where  is  liberty  to  ei- 
ther fide  ?  liberty  toad  or  notaft  ?  All  the  anions  of 
rational  creatures  are  limited,  bounded  and  retrained  to 
certain  dehnitepbjefts  and  purpofes,  which  God  from 
eternity  had  in  view.  They  are  therefore  fhut  up  to 
aft  oneway  only,  and  cannot  aft  otherwife.  They  can 
a6l  in  fuch  a  manner  only,  as  God  from  all  eternity 
faw  would  accomplifli  his  glorious  purpofes,  i.  e.  his 
glorious  decrees.  Therefore  all  the  anions  of  crea- 
tures are  decreed  from  eternity  to  be  precifely  what 
they  are,  and  all  creatures  are  as  infallibly  reftraine4 
from  afting  contrary  to  the  decrees  of  God,  as  if  he 
brought  their  aftions  to  pafs  by  his  pofitive  efficiency, 
and  as  though  they  were  mere  paffive  beings. 

If  it  fhould  be  faid,  that  though  God  bounds  and 
reftrains  his  creatures  from  ading  in  a  manner  which 
is  oppofite  to  his  purpofes  and  decrees;  yet  he  does 
not  neceffitate  them  to  a6l  at  all,  but  leaves  them  at 
liberty  to  aft  or  not  aft  : — On  this  I  obferve, 

1.  As  I  have  already  faid,  whenever  any  thing  is 
propofed  to  any  intelligent  being,  as  the  objeft  of  his 
choice,  it  is,  as  Mr.  Locke  has  long  fince  thought, 
abfolutely  impoflible  for  that  being  not  to  aft.  He 
may  indeed  either  choofe  or  refufe  the  objeft.  But 
to  refufe  it  is  to  aft,  equally  as  to  choofe  it.  In  ei- 
ther cafe  the  being  afts  and  cannot  avoid  a61ing,  un- 
lefs  he  be  fijnk  into  a  ftate  of  perfeft  unfeeling  ftu- 
pidiiy. 

2.  If  it  were  poffible  for  a  creature  to  aft  or  not 
aft  ;  ftill  according  to  Dr.  Weft  he  could  do  neither 
the  one  nor  the  other,  unlefs  it  were  fubferv;ient  to 
the  glorious  purpofes  of  God.  For  if  God  will  in- 
fallibly reftrain  creatures  from  afting  in  all  inftances, 
in  which  their  afting  is  not  fubfcrvient  to.  his  pur- 
pofes ;  will  he  not  reftrain  them  from  not  aHing,  i.  e, 
prevent  their  finking  into  unfeeling  ftupidity,  and  ex- 
cite them  to  aftion,  in  all  inftances  in  which  not  aft- 
ing would   not  in  Hke  manner  be    fubfervient  to  his 

O  4  purpofes  ? 


2l6 

purpofes  ?  If  not,  let  a  reafon  be  given  ;  a  reafon 
■why  God  will  not  prevent  creatures  from  countera8;-- 
ing  his  purpofes  by  not  aBing^  as  well  as  by  aEling. 
Surely  it  will  not  be  pretended,  that  to  excite  by  ra-  • 
tional  motives  and  confiderations,  a  creature  to  ac- 
tion, is  more  inconfiftent  with  liberty,  than  infallibly 
to  rcftrain,  whether  by  ipotive§  or  without  motives, 
the  fame  creature  from  action. 

3.  I  appeal  to  the  reader,  whether  the  DoQor 
have  not  in  the  paffages  above  quoted,  given  up  the 
vhole  queftion  both  with  refpeft  to  liberty  as  oppoled  to 
infallible  moral  neceflity  or  certainty  ofmoralaftion,  and 
with  refpect  to  abfolute  decrees.  If  all  men  be  limited 
and  bounded  by  God,  to  a6l  in  all  cafes  according  to 
his  purpofes  ;  if  they  be  fliut  up  to  this  way  of  aQing, 
and  cannot  voluntarily  refufe  to  a6l  in  this  way,  as 
that  would  be  to  acl  contrary  to  God's  purpofe  ;  if 
they  cannot  abfolutcly  ceafe  from  all  aBion  when  an 
objeflis  propofed  to  theirchoicCjbut  muft  either  choofe 
or  refufe,  and  that  according  to  God's  purpofe  ;  if, 
as  DoQor  Weft  exprefsly  declares  to  be  according  to 
his  fentiments,  "  Every  thing  is  as  firmly  fixed  in  the 
''  divine  mind,  by  his  permiflive  decree,  and  fhall  be 
"  as  infallibly  accomplifhed,  as  though  he  was  the  im- 
"  mediate  author  or  efficient  caufe  of  all  the  anions 
"  of  creatures  ;"  ih.id,  p.  49.  Let  the  candid  reader 
■judge,  whether  the  Do6itor  do  not  grant  both  abfo- 
lute neceffity  and  abfolute  decrees. 

lie  as  we  have  fecn  in  his  Part  II,  p.  22,  allows, 
that  God  permits  and  overrules  fin  to  his  own  glory 
and  the  general  good  ;  but  thinks  this  a  demon- 
ilrative  proof  of  felf-determination.  Let  usxonfider 
v;hat  he  fays  on  this  fubjedt. — Ibid,  p.  34;  "  If  the 
«  doftrinc  of  neceffity  be  true,  and  we  are  not  felf- 
"  determined,  then  it  will  follow,  that  we  arc  conftant- 
"  ly  determined  by  the  pofiiive  efficiency  of  the  Deity." 
if  it  be  true,  as  the  Doftor  holds,  that  God  regulates 
«•  and  governs  all  things,  ^ndfcts  bounds  to  the  anions 
i<  of  (ill  ^rational   crealuresj  to  bring  about  infallibly 

"  his 


«  his  own  purpofes  ;*'  if  he  "  govern  free  agents  as- ' 
"  perfectly  pnd  make  them  perforin  his  purpofcs  as  in- 
'•  ialiibly,  as  if  they  had  no  agency  at  all  ;"  1  leave  the 
reader  to  judge,  whether  we,  in  all  our  atlions,  be 
not,  mediately  or  immediately,  determined  by  the  pofi- 
tive  efficiency  of  the  Deity.  "  If  God  make  them 
perform  his  purpofes  injallihly^'  it  fccms  he  mult  by 
his  pofitive  efhcienry  determine  them  to  the  perform- 
ance ;  for  what  is  it  to  make  men  perform  a  purpofe,  - 
but  to  put  forth  pofitive  exertions  to  this  end  ?  This 
is  alfo  by  pofitive   efficiency  to  abolifli  all  liberty  of 

felf-dctermination.- If  thefe  things  be  denied,  and 

it  be  affirmed,  that  ftill  the  man  is  at  liberty  to  a£t  in 
that  particular  manner,  which  is  fubfervicnt  to  the  di- 
vine purpofe,  or  not  to  a6l  at  all,  and  thus  there  is 
room  for  felf-determination  ;   I  anfwcr, 

1.  It  is  not  allowed,  that  a  man  on  a  propofal  to 
a6\,  can  poffibly  not  aH  cft  all  ;  and  this  ought  not  to 
be  taken  for  granted,  i 

2.  Then  God  docs  not  infallibly  make  men  com- 
ply with  his  purpofe,  but  leaves  them  to  comply  or 
not  ;  which  is  diredlly  contrary  to  Dr.  Weil  himfclf, 
in  the  quotations  made  above. 

3.  If  the  Deity  by  his  pofitive  efficiency  prevent; 
his  creature  from  every  aftion,  but  that  which  is 
agreeable  to  his  purpofe,  he  will  prevent  him  by  his 
pofitive  efficiency  from  rcfufing  to  comply  with  that- 
purpofe,  and  this  is  by  pofitive  efficiency  to  deter- 
mine him  to  comply  with  that  purpofe.  And  the 
Dottor  gratits,  that  all  the  aftions  of  rational  creatures 
arc  agreeable  to  God's  purpofcs.  Therefore  all  ra- 
tional creatures  in  all  their  atlions  are  determined  by 
the  pofitive  efficiency  of  God.  And  all  thofe  which 
Dr.  Samuel  Wefl  mentions  as  abfurd  confequcnccs 
of  the  fentimcntsofDr.  Stephen  Weft,  may  be  retorted 
on  the  former,  thus  ;  Since  God  infallibly  makes  and 
determines  all  men  to  perform  his  purpofes,  in  al«l 
their  actions,  "  fin  is  as  much  the  work  of  God.  as 
"  any  thing  that  he  has  made.     But  that  the   Deitv 

«  flioul'd 


21 


*'  fhould  have  an  infinite  averfion  and  an  immutable 
**  hatred  to  his  works,  is  inconceivable.  It  is  fome- 
"  times  faid,  that  the  tendency  of  fin  is  to  dethrone 
"  the  Almighty,  to  kill  and  utterly  to  deftroy  his  ex- 
*'  iftence.  But  is  the  Deity  conftantly  working  to 
"  deftroy  himfelf  ?  This  will  make  the  Deity  a  ftrange 
"  contradiftion  to  himfelfj  and  will  conftitute  fuch  a  be- 
<«  ing,  as  cannot  exift  in  the  univerfe.  If  the  Deity 
^'  forms  wicked  volitions  in  the  human  mind,  and 
*'  then  infinitely  hates  and  abhors  thofe  very  works  of 
"  his,  he  muft  be  infinitely  miferable  and  wretched. 

"  God  is  faid  to  rejoice  in  his  own  works If  then 

«•  fin  is  God's  work  he  rejoices  in  it God  is  the 

"  greateft  lover  of  fin  in  the  univerfe."  Whatever 
abfurdities  thefe  be,  it  concerns  Dr.  Samuel  Weft, 
as  much  as  any  man,  to  remove  them.  As  appears, 
it  is  prefumed,  by  what  has  been  faid  already. 

Befides  ;  moft  or  all  thefe  obje6lions  lie  with  equal 
force  againft  the  divine  efficiency  of  pain,  mifery  or 
death.  The  Doftor  will  not  deny,  that  thefe  are  in- 
flifted  by  God.  Therefore  mifery  and  death''  are  as 
*'muchthe  works  of  God,  as  any  thathehas  made."  Yet 
"  he  does  not  willingly  afflift  and  grieve  the  children 
"  of  men."  And  "  he  has  no  pleafure  in  the  death 
«'  of"  even  "  the  wicked."  Therefore  "  God  has  an  in- 
"finiteaverfion  and  an  irreconcilable  hatred  to  his  own 
"  works :"  And  if  this  be  inconceivable  to  Dr.  Weft 
he  will  not  deny  it  to  be  faB ;  and  therefore  that  a  thing 
is  inconceivable  to  him,  is  no  proof,  that  it  is  not 
true.  And  that  the  Deity  fhould  hate  mifery  and 
death  and  yet  caufe  them,  would  equally  as  in  the 
cafe  ftated  by  Dr.  Weft  concerning  the  introdu£lion 
of  fin,  *'•  make  the  Deity  a  ftrange  contradi6lion  to 
"  himfelf,  and  would  conftitute  fuch  a  being  as  can- 
"  not  exift  in  the  univerfe."  "  If  the  Deity  forms" 
mifery  and  death,  "  and  then  infinitely  hates  and  ab- 
«»  hors  thefe  very  works  of  his  hands,  he  muft  be  in- 
"  finitely  miferable  and  wretched.  God  is  faid  to  re- 
"  joice  in  his  own  works.     If  then"  mifery  and  death 

««  be 


SI  9^ 

«  be  his  works,  he  rejoices  in  them,  and  God  is  the 
"  greatcfl:  lover"  of  all  the  mifery  and  death  "  in  the 
'*  univcrfe,"  Whenever  Dr.  Weft  will  anfwer  thefc 
obfervaiions  concerning  the  divine  efficiency  of  mif- 
ery and  death,  he  will  furnifh  himfelfwith  an  anfwer  to 
his  own  fimilar  obfervations  concerning  the  divine 
agency  in  the  introdu8ion  of  moral  evil.  If  he 
fliall  fay,  that  God  does  indeed  hate  mifery  and  death 
in  thcmfclves  confidered,  and  infli61s  them,  becaufc 
they  are  neceffary  to  greater  good,  and  to  the  ac- 
complifhment  of  his  own  moft  benevolent  purpofcs  3 
the  fame  may  be  faid  concerning  moral  evil. 

The  Doftor  quotes  the  following  paffage  from  Dr. 
Hopkins  ;  •'  If  God  be  the  origin  or  caufe  of  moral  evil 
"  this  is  fo  far  from  imputing  moral  evil  to  him,  or 
"  fuppofing,  that  there  is  any  thing  of  moral  evil  in 
"  him,  that  it  neceffarily  fuppofes  the  contrary  :"  On 
which  he  remarks,  "  Confequently,  if  God  be  the  or- 
"  igin  and  caufe  of  holinefs,  this  by  the  fame  kind  of 
**  reafoning,  is  fo  far  from  imputing  holinefs  to  him,  or 
"  fuppofing,  that  there  is  any  thing  of  that  nature  in 
"  him,  that  it  neceffarily  fuppofes  the  contrary  ;  that 
<•  is  to  fay,  that  the  Deity  has  no  moral  charafter  at 
"  all."     In  the  above   quotation,  Dr.   Hopkins  evi- 
dently means,  If  God  be  the  caufe  of  ^/Z  moral  evil,  or 
of  the  firft  which  exifted  in   the  univerfe.     This  the 
word  or^g•^7^  implies  ;  he  evidently  ufes  it  to  mean  orig-  ' 
inal  caufe.     Now  whatever  is  in  God,  is  uncaufed. 
Therefore  if  there  be  moral  evil   in  him,  neither  he 
nor  any  other  being  is  the  caufe  of  that  ;  of  courfe 
whatever  moral  evil  he  caufes,  muft  all  be  out  of  him- 
felf;  and  if  he  caufe  all  moral  evil,  it  muft  all  be  out 
of  himfelf  and  none  of  it  in  him.     So  that  Dr.  Hop- 
kins's propofition  on    this    head    is    manifcftly    true. 
Suppofc  theDo6lor  had  faid,  If  God  be  the  caufe  of 
all  matter,  this  fo  far  from  fuppofing  matter  in  him,  ne- 
ceffarily fuppofes  the  contrary  ;  no  doubt  Dr.  Weft 
himfelf  would  have  acknowledged  the  truth   of  the 
propofition  :  And  let  a  rcafon  be  givenwhy  the  form- 
er 


220 

er  propofition,  in  the  fenfe  now  given  of  it,  is  not  as 
true  as  the  latter.  As  to  the  confequence  which  Dr. 
Weft  draws  from  Dr.  Hopkins's  propofition,  "  that 
"  if  God  be  the  caufe  of  holinefs  [of  all  hoHnefs]  this 
"  is  fo  far  from  fuppofmg  holinefs  in  God,  that  it  ne- 
"  ceffarily  fuppofes  the  contrary  ;"  this  is  fo  far  from 
an  abfurdity,  as  Dr.  Weft  imagines,  that  it  is  a  man- 
feft  truth.  Holinefs  in  God  is  no  more  caufed  or 
created,  than  the  divine  effence.  If  then  there  be 
no  other  holinefs,  than  created  holinefs,  there  is  and 
can  be  none  in  God, 

On  a  paflage  in  which  Dr.  Hopkins  afferts,  that 
moral  evil  and  holinefs  are  equally  the  confequence 
of  the  divine  difpofal,  but  whether  by  the  fame  mode 
of  operation  he  could  not  tell  ;  Dr.  Weft  remarks, 
«  This  makes  it  extremely  unhappy  for  us  ;  for  we 
"  feem  to  have  no  way  to  know  a  true  revelation 
'^  from  a  falfe  one,  both  equally  coming  from  the  De- 
«'  ity  ;"  p.  46,  Part  11.  But  how  this  confequence  fol- 
lows from  the  affertionofDr.  Hopkins,  Dr.  Weft  does 
not  illuftrate.  God  may  fodifpofe  things,  that  fin  in- 
fallibly follows,  and  yet  not  be  the  author  of  a  falfe 
revelation  :  And  as  the  Do£tor  merely  alferts,  with- 
out attempting  to  prove  what  he  afferts,  he  has  no 
right  to  expe£l,  that  his  affertion  fhould  be  received 
as  truth.  If  the  Do6lor  take  it  for  granted,  that  if 
God,  in  the  way  which  I  have  explained,  introduce 
lin,  he  is  hirrjfclf  as  real  a  finner,  as  he  would  be,  if 
he  were  to  give  a  falfe  revelation,  he  takes  for  grant- 
ed the  very  thing  in  queftion,  which  is  to  be  fairly 
proved,  not  pitifully  begged. 

In  the  fame  page,  he  fays,  "  According  to  Dr. 
"  Hopkins  will  it  not  follow,  that  many  who  are  led 
«  by  the  Spirit  of  God,  are  the  children  of  the  devil  ?" 
This  implies,  that  whenever  God,  by  means  of  mo- 
tives or  in  any  other  way,  fo  difpofes  of  things, 
that  fm  inBillibly  follows,  the  man  who  is  the  fubjeft 
of  that  fm,  is  in  that  fin  led  by  the  Spirit  of  God. 
The  principle  on   which  this  argument  is  built,  is, 

that 


2Sfl 

that  whenever  God  fo  difpofes  things,  that  an  a£lion 
is   the  certain  confequence,  in  that  a6lion  the  man  is 
led  by  the  Spirit  of  God.     But  Dr.  Weft  will    not  a- 
vow  and  abide  by  this  principle  :  For  he  grants,  that 
men  always  a£t  upon  fome  motive  and  never  without 
motive.     Nor  will  he  deny,  that  the  conftitution,  that 
men  fhould  always  aft   upon  motive  and  never  with- 
out, is  eftablifhed  by  God.     Yea,  the  Dodor  exprefs- 
\y  aflerts,  that  "  God  overrules  all  the  aBions   of  his 
"  creatures  to   accomplifh   his  own  purpofcs   in    as 
"  ftrong  a  fenfe  as  though  he  brought  them   to  pafs 
"  by  his  pnjitive  efficiency''     Yet  he  will   not  pretend, 
that  in  all  thofe  aftions  they  are  led  by  the  Spirit  of  God. 
The  Doftor  proceeds  ;  "  The  Deity   is  called  the 
"  Father  of  lights,  from  whom  proceeds   every  good 
«'  and  perfcft  gift.     But  according  to  thefe  principles, 
"  may  he  not,  with  as  much  propriety,  be  called  the 
"  Father  of  darknefs,  from   whom  proceeds  all  ma- 
"  lignity  and  wickednefs  ?"  Since  the  Do£lor  holds, 
that  "  The  Deity  governs  free  agents  as  perfe£lly  and 
"  makes  them  perform  his  purpofe  as  infallibly,  as   if 
*'  they  had  no  agency  at  all  ;"  the  queflion  which  the 
Do6lorhere  propofes  concerning  the  principles  of  Dr. 
Hopkins  may  with  equal  propriety  be  propofed  on  his 
own  principles.     And   notwithftanding    any    agency 
■which  God  exercifes  toward  the  produtlion  of  moral 
evil,  he  may  with   the  fame  truth  and  propriety  be 
called  the  Father  of  lights,  as  he  is  called //zg  Father  of 
mercies  and  the  God  of  all  covifort,  although   all    the 
pains  and  miferies,  which  his  creatures  fuffcr,  whether 
in  this  world  or  the  future,  are  infjitled  by  him. 

The  Doclor  feems  to  attempt  to  fcreen  himfelf 
from  thofe,  which  he  fuppofes  to  be  abfurd  confe- 
quences  of  Dr.  Hopkins's  fcheme,  by  reprefeniing, 
that  he  hcdids,  that  God  barely  permits  Jin.  But  to 
fuperintendi  govern  atid  overrule  the  atlions  of  ration- 
al creatures  "  as  infallibly,  as  if  they  were  mere  paf- 
"  five  beings;"  Part  H,  p.  47  ;  ar\jd  "in  as  ftrong  a  fenfe, 
"asihowgh  hebrought  them  to  pafs  by  hispohtive  cf- 

"  ficicncy  ;" 


222 

"  ficiency ;"  ibid,  p.  46.  «  So  to  fix  them,  that  they 
"  (hall  as  infallibly  be  accomplifhed,  as  though  he  was 
'•  the  immediate  author  or  efficient  caufe  of  them,"  ibid, 
p.  49.  "  And  to  govern  free  agents  as  perfe5lly  and 
"to  make  them  perform  his  purpofesas  infallibly^  as 
"  though  they  had  no  agency  at  all  ;"  ibid,  p.  67  ;  is 
more  than  barely  to  permit  free  agents  to  aO;  of  them- 
felves.  Barely  to  permit  them  toafl;  of  themfelves,  by 
which  the  Doftor  explains  himfelf  to  mean, "  ordaining 
"  things  contingently,  i.  e.  avoidably,  and  with  a  poffi- 
«  bility  of  hot  coming  to  pafs,"  ibid,  p.  47  ;  is  not  to 
govern  them  at  all,  but  to  leave  them  to  govern  them- 
felves ;  it  is  not  to  overrule  their  aftions,  but  to  leave 
them  to  overrule  their  own  a6lions  ;  it  is  not  to  make 
them  perform  his  purpofes,  but  to  leave  them  loofe  to 
perform  or  to  omit  thofe  purpofes.  And  much  lefsis 
it  to  govern  and  overrule  their  aftions  as  infallibly  as 
if  they  xvere  mere  paffive  beings^  and  in  as  flrong  a 
fenfe  as  though  he  brought  them  to  pafs  by  his  pofitive  ef- 
ficiency ;  to  fix  thofe  aBions  as  infallibly  as  though  he 
was  the  immediate  author  of  them  ;  or  to  govern  them 
as  perfeBly  and  to  make  them  perform  his  purpofes  as 
infallibly^  as  though  they  had  no  agency  at  all. 

Dr.  Weft  conftantly  infifts,  that  "  the  Deity  has 
"  communicated  to  man  a  feif-moving  or  felf-a6live 
"principle."  But  what  kind  of  a  felf-moving  prin- 
ciple is  that,  which  is  always  and  in  all  its  aflions  in- 
fallibly and  perfeftly  regulated,  governed  and  over- 
ruled by  an  extrinfic  caufe  .?  and  which  is  made  by 
God  as  infallibly  to  perform  his  purpofes,  as  if  it  were 
no  felf-moving  principle  at  all  .?  Such  a  felf-moving 
principle  as  this,  is  fo  like  a  principle  that  never  moves 
jifelf,  but  is  always  moved  by  an  extrinfic  caufe,  that 
I  requeft  Dr.  Weft  to  point  out  the  difference. 

The  DoBor  grants,  that  "  there  is  a  fenfe  in  which 
"  Cod  hardens  the  hearts  of  men,"  and  that  this  is  by 
his  "  taking  from  them  what  he  had  granted  them,  as 
"  a  juft  punilhment  of  their  negleft  and  abufe  of  the 
«  advantages  which  they  enjoyed ;"  Part  II,  p.  52.  He 

grants 


223 

grants  therefore,  that  God  may  confidently  with  hh 
holinefs  harden  the  heart,  and  caufe  fin  in  men,  in 
fome  cafes  ;  viz.  when  they  deferve  it  as  a  juft  pun- 
ifliment  of  their  fin.  But  the  only  reafon,  \i'hich 
renders  it  confiftent  with  the  divine  perfeftions,  to  in- 
flict this  or  any  other  juft  punifhment,  is,  that  the  glo- 
ry of  God  and  the  general  good  of  his  kingdom  re 
quire  it.  J^ow  no  one  pretends,  that  God  ever  in 
any  fenfe  caufes  fin  to  take  place,  unlefs  its  exilt- 
ence  be  fubfervient  to  the  glory  of  God  and  the  good 
of  his  kingdom.  And  if  this  reafon  will  in  one  cafe 
juftify  his  fo  difpofing  of  things,  that  fin  is  the  infalli- 
ble coniequence,  why  not  jn  another  ?  Until  a  reafon 
is  given  to  the  contrary,  we  may  prefume,  that  when- 
ever the  glory  of  God  and  the  general  good  of  the  crea- 
tion require  it,  God  may  and  does  fo  difpofe  things, 
that  fin  is  the  infallible  confequence. 

"  A  man's  becoming  a  veffel  to  honour  or  difhon- 
"our,  is  in  confequence  of  his  own  conduft  and  be- 
*«  haviour."  Part  II,  p.  54.  If  by  becoming  a  vef- 
fel to  diflionour  the  Do6lor  mean,  heitig  puntpied,  no 
doubt  it  is  in  confequence  of  aman'sown  mifconduft, 
and  to  affert  this  is  to  affert  nothing  very  great  or 
pertinent  to  the  queftion  concerning  the  caufe  of  fin. 
But  if  he  mean  by  it  committing  fin  ;  this  is  not,  nor 
can  be  always  in  confequence  of  the  finner'sown  mif- 
condudl;  becaufeihis  like  the  fclf-deicrmining  power, 
impliestheabfurdity  of  an  infinite  feries  of  a6tions,  in 
confequnce  of  each  other  ;  and  that  a  man  is  doomed 
to  commit  fin  in  the  firft  inftance,  in  confequence  of 
a  prior  fin  committed  by  him. 

"  God  does  not  harden  the  hearts  of  men,  by  any 
"  pofitive  efficiency  in  forming  or  infufing  any  wick- 
"  ednefs  into  their  heart,  but  only  taking  from  thcni 
"  thofe  things,  which  were  defigned  to  reltrain  them 
"from  the  committing  of  fin,  and  by  permitting  them 
"  to  walk  in  their  own  wicked  ways  ;"  ibid,  p.  55. 
Of  all  men  Dr.  Weft  fo  long  as  he  holds,  that  God 
as  perfectly  and  infallibly  regulates,  governs  and  over- 
rules 


242 

rules  all  the  actions  of  free  agents  and  makes  thtm 
conform  to  his  purpofes,  as  perfetlly  as  if  they  had 
no  agency  at  all,  fhould  be  ihe  lad  to  objed  to  the 
idea  of  God's  politive  efficiency  of  fin ';  as  has  been 
already  iliiiftrated.  But  afide  ftom  this,  if  God  by 
taking  from  men  what  is  neceffary  to  reftrain  them 
from  fin,  lay  them  under  an  infallible  certainty  or  ab- 
folute  moral  neceflity  of  finning ;  what  advantage  is 
gained  by  this  mode  of  reprefenting  the  matter  ?  Is 
it  at  all  more  favourable  either  to  the  liberty  of  men, 
or  to  the  holinefs  of  God  ?  To  be  fure  this  reprefenta- 
tion  implies  all  that  neceffity,  for  which  Prefident  Ed- 
wards pleads  in  the  cafe.  It  is  fo  to  difpofe  things, 
that  iin  is  the  infallible  confequence.  Or  if  this  tak- 
ing away  of  reftraints  beattended  with  nocertain  confe- 
quence of  fm,  how  does  God  by  it  harden  the  fin- 
ner  ?  It  feems,  that  after  all  he  is  left  in  a  Rate  of  un- 
certainty, i.  €.  Dr.  Weft's  perfe6t  liberty,  whether  he 
willfmornot.  Where  then  is  hardnefs  of  heart?  Doesit 
confi [I inperfe6l liberty  ?  Itis  further  tobeobferved, that 
if  fin,  for  inftance,  ah  aft  of  malice,  envy  or  inordinate 
felf-love,  fhould  come  into  exiftencC)  without  any  pof- 
itive  caufation,  whether  by  motive  or  in  fome  other 
way  ;  why  may  not  any  other  pofitive  thing,  either 
fubilance  or  mode,  and  even  the  whole  material  uni- 
verfe,  come  into  exiftence  in  the  fame  way  ? 

Dr.  Weft  remarks  on  Ifai.  Ixiii.  17.  0  Lord,  why 
kcijl  thoib  mads  us  to  err  from  thy  ways,  and  hardened 
our  hearts  from  thy  fear  ?  "  Now  it  is  certain  from 
"  the  texts  that  have  been  already  examined,  that 
"  nothing  more  is  intended,  than  that  God  leaves 
•'  men  to  err,  and  to  harden  their  own  hearts;"  ibid, 
p.  51.  This  pofitive  aflertion  led  me  to  review  the 
Do6lor's  remarks  on  thole  texts,  and  1  am  very  willing 
the  candid  fliould  judge  concerning  the  Dodor's  ex- 
hibition of  certainty,  that  nothing  more  is  intended, 
by  God's  hardening  the  hearts  ol  men,  than  that  God 
leaves  them  to  hi:rden  their  own  hearts.  He  fays,  p. 
525  in  what  fenfe  God  hardens  the  heart,  our  Saviour 

will 


225 

ivill  inform  us,  Mat.  xiii.  i.],  15.  "  This  people's 
"heart  is  waxed  grofs,  and  their  ears  are  dull  of  hcar- 
"ing,  and  their  eyes  they  havc'clofed."  In  anfwcr  to 
this  it  may  be  faid  with  equal  force,  \n  whatfenfe 
God  hardens  the  heart,  we  are  informed  in  Joh.  xii. 
40.  "  He  hath  blinded  their  minds,  and  hardened  their 
"hearts,  that  they  Ihould  not  fee  with  their  eyes,"&c. 
Whatever  right  the  Do6lor  has  to  fuppofe,  and  without 
a  reafon  to  deliver  the  opinion  as  truth,  that  Joh.  xii. 
40,  is  to  be  explained  by  Mat.  xiii.  15  ;  any  other 
perfon  has  the  fame  right  to  fuppofe  and  to  deliver 
the  opinion  as  truth,  that  Mat.  xiii.  15,  is  to  be  ex- 
plained by  Joh.  xii.  40. 

The  Dodor  conflanily  infi-ls,  that"  God  never  hard- 
'*  ens  any  man  or  withdraws  his  fpirit  and  grace,"  ibid, 
p.  52,  butin  confequence  ofhisabufe  of  them.  Ifthis 
were  ever  fo  true,  it  would  not  fettle  the  quclliori 
concerning  the  origin  of  moral  evil.  For  the  quef- 
tion  is  not  what  is  the  caufe  or  fource  of  fin  in  fome 
particular  cafes,  as  in  hardening  the  heart,  in  confe- 
quence of  a  former  fin  or  fins;  but  what  is  the  caufe 
of  all  fin,  and  particularly  of  the  frfl  fin,  whether 
in  man  or  in  the  univerfe.  Now  toanfwer  this  qucf- 
tion  by  faying,  that  when  a  man  has  "  abufed  God's 
fpirit  and  grace,"  God  delivers  him  up  to  fin,  is  asab- 
furd  as  to  anfwer  the  quefiion  concerning  the  origin 
of  the  human  race,  by  faying,  that  after  Adam  had 
lived  a  while,  he  begat  a  fon. 

Although  the  Do8or  thinks  it  certain  from  the 
texts,  which  he  had  examined,  that  Ifai.  Ixiii.  17,  '•  in- 
"  tends  nothing  more  than  that  God  leaves  men  to 
*•  err  and  to  harden  their  own  hearts  ;"  he  does  not 
choofc  to  reft  the  matter  en  that  foundation  ;  but  ob- 
ierves,  that "  Hebrew  verbs  in  Hiphil  often  fignify  only 
"  permiffion."  Ifthis  were  ever  fo  true,  it  would  de- 
cide nothing  concerning  Ifai.  Ixiii.  17.  If  verbs  in 
Hiphil  do  often  fignify  or.ly  permiifion,  this  implies, 
that  they  often  do  not  fignify  that  only.  Then  the 
queftion  would  be,  wlnt  docs  it  fignify  in  this  text  ? 
P  Neither 


226 

Neither  Dr.  Weft  nor  any  other  Hcbraid,  wiil 
pretend,  that  a  verb  in  Hiphil  natiirally  fignifies  per- 
miiTion  only.  If  therefore  any  verb  in  that  conjuga- 
tion do  lignify  that  only,  it  niuft  be  for  fome  other 
reafon.  than  merely  hecaufc  it  is  in  that  conjugation. 
If  there  be  any  fuch  reafon  in  this  cafe,  the  Doftor 
has  not  informed  us  of  it.  Nor  can  I  conceive  of 
any,  unlels  it  be  the  fuppofed  abfurdity  of  underftand- 
ing  the  text  as  it  is  tranfiated.  But  the  Do6lor  muft 
on  refjedtion  be  fenfible  of  the  impropriety  of  taking 
that  fuppofed  abfurdity  for  granted.  Let  him  prove 
it,  and  he  will  oblige  us  to  believe  him. 

On  1  Sam.  xvi.  14,  "  The  fpirit  of  the  Lord  de- 
"  parted  froni  Saul,  and  an  evil  fpirit  from  Godtroub- 
"  led  him,"  the  Dodor  remarks,  "  i.  e.  he  was  left 
"  of  God  to  his  own  gloomy  and  frightful  imagina- 
*'  tions  ;"  ibid,  p.  57  :  But  who  was  the  efficient 
caufe  of  his  own  gloomy  imaginations  ?  Surely  they  did 
not  happen  out  of  nothing,  like  the  atheilVs  world. 
Nor  will  the  Doftor  pretend,  that  Saul  defignedly  pro- 
duced them  in  his  own  mind.  So  that  he  gives  no 
account  of  the  caufc  of  thofe  imaginations,  and  no 
explanation  of  the  text. 

"  If  then  the  Deity  creates  fin,  in  the  fenfe  in  which 
"  he  creates  darknefs,  it  will  follow,  that  as  darknefs  is 
*•  the  confequence  of  God's  withdrawing  light,  fo  the 
"  confequence  of  God's  withdrawing  his  fpirit  and 
"  grace  from  any  perfon,  is  fin  ;  which  will  fall  in 
"  exa6tly  with  our  fenfe  of  God's  hardening  the  heart." 
If  fin  in  no  inftance  take  place,  but  in  confequence 
of  God's  withdrawing  his  fpirit  and  grace  from  a  per- 
fon ;  then  God's  fpirit  and  grace  are  fometimes  with- 
drawn from  a  perfon,  antecedently  to  his  finning  :  And 
in  thofe  cafes  they  are  not  withdrawn  in  righteous 
judgment,  and  asa  juft  punifhment  offin  ;  becaufe  the 
perfon,  by  the  fuppofition,  has  been  guilty  of  no  ante- 
cedent fin.  Yet  the  Doftor  every  where  confiders 
the  withdrawment  of  God's  fpirit  and  grace  as  a  juft 
punifhment  of  the  fin  of  thofe  from  whom  it  is  with- 
drawn ; 


227 

drawh  ;  as  a  jiift  punifhment  of  the  ncgleft  and  abiifc 
of  the  advantages,  which  ihcy  enjoyed,  &c.  &c.  And 
on  this  ground  only  he  attempts  to  juUify  the  with- 
drawnncnt.  If  on  the  other  hand,  fin  in  any  inftance, 
do  take  pUice  when  there  has  been  no  withdfawment 
of  the  divine  fpirit  and  grace  ;  then  the  Dodor  has 
here  given  no  account  of  the  exiftence  of  fin  in  that 
inftance  ;  and  fuch  an  inftance  there  was,  when  fm 
firfl  catne  into  exiftence  ;  it  took  place  without  a 
withdrawment  of  grace,  in  the  way  of  righteous  judg- 
ment. 

It  may  here  be  added,  tliat  though  dark nefs,  a  mere 
nonentity,  will  take  place  in  confequence  of  the 
withdrawment  of  light  ;  yet  malice,  envy  and  inordi- 
nate fclf-love,  pofitive  ath  of  the  mind,  will  no  more 
take  place  in  confequence  of  mere  withdrawment  of 
influence,  than  benevolence  or  fupreaie  love  to  God. 
or  the  whole  material  creation,  would  come  into  ex- 
iftence in  confequence  of  a  mere  withdrawment  of  the 
influence  of  God. 

"  We  fee  in  what  fenfe  God  is  faid  to  move,  fti'r 
"  up  or  incline  men  to  evil  ai:lions  ;  viz.  bv  permit- 
*•  ting  Satan  to  tempt  men  to  evil,  or  by  pcrtnitting 
"  things  to  take  place,  which  occnjion  men  to  become 
"perverfe."  Ibid.p.  64.  If  the  Doi^oih) '■' per  mil  Lin  i^ 
"  things  to  take  place,"  mean  that  God  fo  difpoles 
things  that  certain  defintte  events  will  infallibly  fol- 
Jow  ;  this  is  all  for  which  I  plead,  and  which  Preii- 
dent  Edwards  held  on  this  head.  And  furely  the 
Do£tor  does  not  mean,  that  things  are  of  their  own 
accord  and  by  their  own  native  power,  independently 
of  the  divine  agency,  endeavouring  to  take  place,  and 
vill  effe£l  the  objedl  of  their  endeavour,  if  they  be 
permitted  by  the  Deity  ;  as  a  high  mettled  Heed, 
when  permitted  by  his  rider,  leaps  into  a  race.  This 
would  favour  t()o  much  of  atheifm,  to  he  holden  by 
a  Chriitic^-n  divine.  As  to  the  human  mind's  making 
one  volition  by  another  or  without  another,  I  have 
nothing  more  to  fay  ;  nor  do  I  wilh  to  fay  any  more 
P  s  concerning 


228 

concerning  ft,  till  an  anfvver  is  given  to  what  has  been 
already  faid. 

This  text,  "  I  will  fend  liim  againft  an  hypocritical 
"  nation,  and  againft  the  people  of  my  wrath  will  I 
"  give  him  a  charge,"  Ifai.  x.  6  ;  Dr.  Weft  fays, 
"  implies  no  more  than  that  the  Deity  meant  to  pun- 
'•  ifli  the  Jews,  by  letting  loofe  the  King  of  AlTyria  upon 
*'  them  ;"  ibid,  p.  67.  Yet  in  the  fame  page  he  fays, 
that  the  king  of  Affyria  "  was  as  much  under  the 
"  control  of  the  Deity,  as  the  a?^e  and  the  faw  are  un- 
''  der  the  control  of  the  workman."  Yet  this  control 
over  that  king  implies  no  more,  it  feems,  than  that  God 
let  him  Joofe  en  the  Jews.  And  is  no  more  implied 
in  the  control  which  the  workman  has  over  the  axe 
and  the  faw,  than  that  he  Ictstlievi  loofe  on  the  timber.*^ 
I  appeal  to  the  reader,  whether  if  the  king  of  Affyria 
"  was  as  much  under  the  control  of  the  Deity,  as  the 
*'axe  and  the  faw  are  under  the  control  of  the  work- 
"  man  ;"  a  pofitive  and|  efficacious  influence,  and 
not  a  bare  permijfion^  be  not  implied  in  fuch  con- 
trol. 

On  Rev.  xvii.  17,  <•  For  God  hath  put  in  their 
"  hearts  to  fulfil  his  will,  and  to  agree  and  giye  their 
"  kingdom  untd  the  bcaft.  until  the  words  of  God 
««  fiiall   be    fulfilled  ;"  the   DoBor   remarks,"  Thefe 

«'•  ten  kings  are  to  agree in  giving  their  kingdom 

"  to  the  beaft,  that  by   his  prptedion  and  affiftance, 

*^  they  may  be  able entirely  to  defiroy  the  whore, 

^.'  by  whom  they  have  been  long  oppreffed."  Jbid,  p. 
68.  Thus  the  Dodor  fuppofes,  that  the  end,  for 
which  thefe  ten  kings  give  their  power  to  th^  beaft,  is 
that  by  his  afliftance  they  may  deftroy  the  great  whore. 
Bui  this  is  a  mere  fuppojition,  unfupported  by  any 
thing  in  the  text  or  context  ;  nor  does  the  DoBor 
give  any  reafon  toward  its  fupport.  Eefides,  what 
advantiige  is  there  in  this  fuppofiiion  ?  Is  the  beaft 
mentioned  a  friend  to  virtue  and  religion  ^  And  did 
thofe  kings  do  their  duty  in  giving  their  power  into 
his  hands  .?  If  they  did  not ;  of  Gourfe  they  did  wrong ; 

and 


£29 

and  then  the  difficuhy  of  God's  putting  it  into  their 
hearts  to  do  this  wrong  ftill  rcnnains. 

On  quoting  Ifai.  v.  4 ;  "  What  could  have  been 
"  done  more  to  my  vineyard,  that  1  have  not  done 
"  in  it  ?  Wherefore,  when  I  looked,  that  it  flioiild 
*'  bring  forth  grapes,  brought  it  forth  wild  grapes  ?" 
the  Doftor  adds,  "according  to  the  fchcmc  lam 
"  oppohng,  all  diat  the  Deity  has  done  to  his  vinc- 
"  yard,  was  to  make  it  biing  forth  wild  grapes.  How 
'•  could  he  then  appeal  to  the  men  of  Judah  and  the 
'*  inhabitants. of  Icrulalem,  to  judge  between  him  and 
"  his  vineyard?"  Ibid,  p.  71,  &c.  Now  this  and  all 
the  reft  ihat  the  Do(5Ior  adds  in  his  remarks  on  that 
text,  lies  equally  agninft  the  fcheme  of  a  permiflive 
decree  "  pcrfedly  and  infallibly  boundmg,""  reftrain- 
"  ing,"  "  marking  out"  and  "  fixing  bounds  to  the  ac- 
*'  lions  of  men,  beyond  which  they  cannot  pafs."  For 
*•  according  to  this  fcheme"  of  the  Dotlor,  "  all  that 
"  the  Deiiy  has  done  to  his  vineyard  was"  by  re- 
training them  from  all  other  anions,  by  bounding 
them  to  thofe  very  aflions  which  they  have  perform- 
ed, and  by  fixing  fuch  bounds  as  they  could  not  pafs, 
♦'  to  make  them  bring  forth  \vild  grapes.  Plow  then 
"could  he  appeal  to  the  men  of  Judah  and  jerufalem 
'•  to  judge,  between  him  and  his  vineyard  ?  Will 
''•  it  be  faid,  that  the  means  ufed  with  them  ^vere  fuch, 
*'  that  if  they  had  been  rightly  improved  they  would 
"  have  enabled   them    to  have   brought  forth   good 

^'grapes  ?  Theanfv:cr is  very  eafy  ;  ihefe  means 

"  could  have  no  cfredl  but  fuch  as  the  Deity  defigncd 
<^'  theratohavej'becaufe'*  the  Deity  fixed  their  bounds, 
<•  beyond  which  they  could  not  pafs,"  "  and  they 
"  muft  produce  either  good  or  bad  grapes,  according 

"  to  the"  bounds  fixed  by   the  Deity. And  fo  on 

through  the  fame  and  following  page.  But  I  need 
not  rcpublifli  Dr.  Well's  book  by  way  of  retortion. 

The  Do6lor  in  his  4ih  elfay,  Part  II,  (and  in  hi« 

Poflfcriptj  on  1  Kings  xxii.  23,  '•  Now  therefore,  bc- 

<'  hold,  the  Lord  haih  put  a  lying  fpirit  in  the  mouth 

?  3  _»  of 


«  of  all  thefe  thy  prophets ;"  fays,  "  The  word  trant 
'•  lated  put  ought  to  have  been  tranflated,  The  Lord 
"  hatU  permitted  ox  fuffered  a  lying  fpirit,  &c.  for  the 
"  verb  here  tranflated  j^uif,  frequently  fignifies  io  per- 
*•  mit  orfitffer.  For  the  truth  of  this  I  appeal  to 
"  every  good  Hebrician.  Thus  in  Ezek.  xx.  25, 
'•  inftead  of,  1  gave  them  ftatutes  that  were  not  good, 
*'  it  fliould  be,  I  fuffered  them  to  have  flatutes  that 
'•  were  not  good  ;"  p.  66.  It  is  always  a  fufficient 
anfwer  to  a  mere  confident  affertion,  as  confidently  to 
deny  it.  Therefore  ray  anfwer  is,  ^'  The  verb  here 
"  tranflated  j&m/,"  which  is  :ini  does  not  "  frequently  fig- 
nify  permit  or fuffer  ;"  and  in  Ezek.  xx.  25,  "  Inftead 
"  ofj  I  gave  them  ftatutes  that  were  not  good,  it  fliould" 
not  "  be,  I  fuff'ered  them  to  have  ftatutes  that  were  not 
"  good."  Dr.  Weft  for  the  confirmation  of  his  criti- 
cifm  "  appeals  to  every  good  Hebrician."  Whom  he 
would  acknowledge  as  a  good  Hebrician,  is  very  un- 
certain. Therefore,  inftead  of  appealing  to  fo  uncer- 
tain a  judge,  I  call  on  the  DoQor  himfelf,  or  any  oth- 
er Hebrician  good  or  bad,  to  point  out  the  inftances, 
whether  frequent  or  unfrequent,  in  which  :inj  figni- 
fies merely  to  j^ermz^  or /i^e?'.  Befide  this,  fufiBcient 
reafons  muft  be  given  to  convince  the  candid  and  ju- 
dicious, that  it  IS  ufed  in  this  fenfe,  in  the  text  now 
under  confideration,  and  reafons  which  do  not  beg 
the  main  point,  that  God  can  do  nothing  toward  the 
exiftence  of  fin,  but  barely  to  permit  it^  When  thefe 
things  fliall  have  been  done,  we  fhall  have  better 
ground,  on  which  to  believe  the  Do6lor's  criticifm> 
than  his  mere  round  affertion. 


CONCLUSION. 


231 


CONCLUSION. 

1HAVE  now  finifhed  my  remarks  on  Dr.  Weft's 
EJIays  on  Liberty  and  NeceJJity.  If  he  fliall  think 
proper  to  write  again  on  thofe  fubjefls  and  to  reply  to 
theie  remarks,  I  reqiieft  him  to  attend  to  thofe  points 
only,  which  are  material  and  affetl  the  merits  of  the 
caufe.  If  I  have  expofed  myfclf  by  ever  fo  many 
inadvertencies,  which  do  not  aflfeft  the  merits  of  the 
caufe,  to  take  up  his  own  time  andthatof  his  readers, 
to  exhibit  them,  feems  not  worth  while.  In  difputes 
of  this  kind  fuch  inadvertencies  are  frequent.  Alfo 
fuch  difputes  are  apt  to  degenerate  into  mifreprefenta- 
lions,  pcrfonal  reflections  and  logomachy.  How  far 
1  have  fallen  into  any  ofthefe,  it  is  not  proper  for  me 
to  fay.  However,  1  may  fay,  that  I  have  endeavour- 
ed to  avoid  ihcm.  1  hope  the  Dodorwiilbe  fuccefs- 
iul  in  the  lame  endeavour. 

If  he  fi>all  write  again,  I  requelt  him  to  inform  us 
more  clearly,  what  he  means  by  fclf-determination. 
If  he  mean  no  more  than  he  hitherto  profefles  to 
mean,  "  that  we  ourfelves  determine  ;"  he  will  in- 
form us,  wherein  on  that  head  he  differs  from  Prefi- 
dent  Edwards  or  any  other  man  j  and  whether  it  be 
his  opinion,  that  we  determine  our  own  volitions  in 
any  other  fenfe,  tlian  we  determine  all  our  perceptions 

and  feelings. If  he  fhall  be  of  the  opinion,  that  we 

r.fficieiuly  caufe  our  own  volitions ;  1  requeft  him  to 
inform  us,  how  we  do  or  can  do  this  otherwife  than 
by  antecedent  volitions.  If  he  fhall  grant,  that  this 
is  the  way,  in  which  wecaule  them  ;  he  will  pleafe  to 
remove  the  abfurdides  fuppofed  to  attend  that  fuppo- 
iition  ;  and  alio  decide  whether  or  not  we  caufe  them 
without  any  icflraint  by  previous  certainty,  i.  e.  wheth- 
er wc  caulc  them  by  mere  chance,  and  at  hap-hazard. 

If  he  fliall  flill  be  of  the  opinion,  that  voliiion  is 
no  effect ;  he  will  pleafe  to  inform  us  how  to  recon- 
cile 


ciie  that  with  the  idea,  that  it  proceeds  from  an  intrmr 
fie  caufe  and  is  originated  by  him  who  is  the  lubje£l 
of  it.  If  volition  have  a  caufe,  whether  intrinfic  or 
extrinfic,  it  is  of  courfe  an  effeO:. — He  will  alfo  be 
h  kind  as  to  inform  us,  whether  every  human  volition 
cxifted  from  eternity,  or  whether  it  came  intoexiftence 
wnhout  caufe. 

If  he  flill  maintain,  that  with  refpeft  to  praife  and 
blame,  there  is  no  difference  between  natural  and  mo- 
isn  neceiTity  ;  I  wifh  him  to  informus.  whether  Judas 
lA?ere  as  blamelefs  in  betraying  his  Lord,  becaufe  it 
was  previoufly  certain  and  certainly  foretold,  that  he 
%vould  do  it,  as  he  was  for  being  attached  to  the  fur- 
face  of  the  earlbj  and  not  afcending  to  heaven  as  Eli- 
jah did. 

I  hope  the  Doftor  will  explain  himfelf  concerning 
antecedent  and  confequent  neceflity.  If  he  mean, 
that  before  the  exiftence  of  any  hunnan  aftion,  there 
was  no  certainty,  that  it  would  exill  ;  he  will  pleafe 
to  reconcile  this  both  with  divine  foreknowledge,  and 
with  the  prophecies  of  fcripture.  If  by  antecedent 
iieceffity,  he  mean  any  thing  elfethan  antecedent  cer*- 
tainty,  he  will  pleafe  to  ftiow  how  it  is  tothepurpofe, 
or  how  it  oppofes  what  we  mean  by  antecedent  ne- 
ceffity. 

I  requeft  him  to  fhow  the  confiftency  between  thefe 
two  propofilions,  that  motive  is  neceffary  to  every 
volition  ;  and  that  men  do  not  always  a£l  on  the 
{Irongeft  motive.  He  will  of  courfe  fhow,  what  the 
motive  is  which  perluades  a  man  to  pafsby  theflrong- 
ell  motive,  and  to  a6l  on  a  weaker. 

It  is  to  be  wifhed,  that  the  Doftor  would  explain 
liis  favourite  power  to  aH  or  net  aH.  If  he  fhall  own, 
that  he  means  a  power  to  choofe  or  refufe  merely,  it 
is  prefumed,  that  his  candour  will  lead  him  to  own  al- 
io, that  he  means  nothing  on  this  head  different  from 
Preiident  Edwards,  unlets  by  power  he  mean  previous 
uncertainty^  and  by  a  man's  power  to  choofe  or  refufe, 
he  mean,  that  it  is  in  itfelf  and  in  the  divine  view  un- 
"  '  ^         certain^ 


^crtain^  whether  he  \vill  choofe  or  rcfufe  :  And  if  he 
mean  this,  I  wifh  him  to  avow  it. 

I  hope  he  will  not  fpcnd  time  in  difcufTing  quef- 
tions,  which  are  merely  verbal,  fuch  as  whether  mo- 
tive be  the  canfe  or  the  occafion  of  volition.  All  that 
Prefident  Edwards  means  by  cauje  in  this  cafe,  isJlaU 
cd  cccafion  or  antecedent. 

Perhaps  the  Do6lor  will  find  his  book  to  be  no  lefs 
ufefnl,  if  he  (hall  confine  himf^If  more  to  argument^ 
and  indulge  himfclf  lefs  in  hijlory.  Narratives,  how- 
ever true  and  accurate,  of  his  own  opinion  without 
hisreafons,  and  of  his  ability  or  inability  whether  to 
do  or  to  conceive,  are  very  unintereftingto  thofe  who 
think  for  themfelves,  and  do  not  depend  on  the  Doc- 
tor as  an  authority.  If  he  had  hitherto  fpared  all 
fuch  narratives,  his  books  had  been  confiderably 
fiiorter  and  no  lefs  demonllrative. 

1  hope  the  Do£ior  will  be  very  explicit  in  commu- 
nicating his  idea  of  liberty.  I  prefume  he  will  join 
with  me  in  the  opinion,  that  the  whol?  controverfy 
turns  on  this.  If  the  liberty  neceffary  to  moral  ac- 
tion be  an  exemption  from  all  cxtrinfic  influence,  we 
hold  that  the  certain  confequence  is  that  either  we 
caufe  one  volition  by  another  ;  or  that  our  volitions 
come  into  exigence  without  caufe  and  by  mere  chance. 
Therefore  the  DoBor  will  pleafe  to  fhow,  that  nei- 
ther of  thefe  cotifequences  follow^  ;  or  will  avow 
whichever  he  believes  does  follow. 

He  fuppofes  felf-determination  is  free  aBion.  Now 
1  wifh  him  to  inform  us,  whether  felf  determination, 
that  is  limited,  bounded,  governed  and  overruled,  to 
a  conformity  to  the  divine  purpofc,  as  he  aflerts  all 
the  a£lions  of  rational  creatures  to  be.  is  free  a£lion. 
If  it  be,  I  requed  him  to  inform  us,  why  an  action 
decreed  to  be  conformed  to  the  fame  divme  purpofe, 
is  not  alfo  free. 

I  rejoice,  that  this  important  fu!)je61:  has  been  tak- 
en up  by  fo  able  an  advocate  as  Dr.  Weft.  From 
his  high  chara6ler  we  have  a  right  to  expcB,  that  if 

the 


234 

the  fcaufe  which  he  has  iindettaken,  be  capable  of 
fupport,  it  will  be  fupported  by  the  DoQ;or.  1  wifh 
the  other  fide  of  the  queftion  had  an  advocate  able  to 
doitjuftice.  However,  fince  I  have  embarked  in 
the  caufe,  I  fhall,  fo  long  as  important  matter  is  brought 
forward,  do  as  well  as  I  can,  till  1  fhall  either  be  con- 
vinced that  the  caufe  is  a  bad  one,  or  find  myfelf  un- 
able to  reply  :  And  I  doubt  not,  that  ray  failure  will 
draw  forth  to  the  fupport  of  the  truth,  fome  more  able 
advocate,  who  no;v  through  modefty  or  fome  other 
caufe,  does  not  appear  lor  its  defence. 

I  think  it  is  but  fair,  that  Dr.  Weft,  and  all  others 
"who  write  againft  moral  neceifity,  fliould  take  the  ex- 
planations, which  we  give  of  moral  and  natural  necef- 
fity  and  inability,  and  all  other  important  terms  in  this 
difquifition.  And  fo  far  as  they  oppofe  any  doQrine 
which  we  hold,  they  ought  to  oppofe  it  in  the  fenfe 
in  which  we  hold  it,  and  not  in  a  fenfe  which  they 
may  find  it  convenient  to  impute  to  us,  becaufe  they 
can  more  eafily  confute  it.  Such  a  management  of 
any  queftion  as  the  laft  mentioned,  will  never  bring  it 
to  an  iffue,  and  befides  is  exceedingly  difingenuous, 
and  gives  reafon  to  fufpeQ;  the  goodnefs  of  the  caufe, 
in  favour  of  which  it  is  employed. 

As  this  queftion  concerning  liberty  and  heceflity 
affefts  the  moft  important  fubjefls  of  morality  and 
religion  ;  it  is  to  be  wifhed,  that  the  difcuffion  of  it 
may  finally  conduce  to  the  more  clear  underftanding 
and  the  more  fmcere  and  cheerful  praQice  of  virtue 
and  piety,  and  to  the  glory  of  our  God  and  Redeemer. 


F  I  N  1  S. 


ERRATA. 

THE  Reader  is  requefted  tocorreft  the  following  Errors, 
moft  of  which  efcaped  the  Author,  in  preparing  the  Alanu- 
fcript  for  the  Prefs. 

Page   8,  line  21,  for  the,  rezdifome. 

{or  freedom,  read  pow;r. 
read,  it  does  it. 
read,  why  it  is  as  it  is. 
for  then,  read  than. 
for  John/on,  read  Jack/on, 
read,  which  do  not  happen 
read,  judge  the  world. 
11,  read,  without  a  caufe. 
for  this,  read  the. 
for  thought,  read  taught. 


37. 

17, 

50, 

11, 

65. 

7, 

84, 

20, 

105, 

M. 

140, 

17. 

143. 

31. 

164, 

11, 

x8o, 

28, 

21s, 

23. 

N 


K 


